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Preface
The average Ph.D. thesis is nothing but a transference of bones
from one graveyard to another.
Frank J. Dobie, A Texan in England, 1945
We have a habit in writing articles published in scientific journals to make the work as
finished as possible, to cover up all the tracks, to not worry about the blind alleys or
describe how you had the wrong idea at first, and so on. So there isn’t any place to
publish, in a dignified manner, what you actually did in order to get to do the work.
Richard Feynman, Nobel Lecture, 1965
After several years of planning, reading, calculating - fixing mistakes, recalculating, updating
data and redoing all calculations all over again a few times - and writing, this comprehensive meta
analysis is finally ready to be published. Although it would be misleading to call it finished, I
am sure that it covers all necessary aspects to stand on its own. It would have been very easy
for me to extend this work almost to infinity by including more studies, performing more calcu-
lations, applying more techniques or spending more time and space on many aspects. Eventually,
even for a literature focussed thesis with a large statistical coverage it has become very long. I
conceptualized this work in such a way that most of it may be read and understood by almost
any interested reader; only a few sections require some advanced statistical knowledge to be fully
comprehended. Some readers who are already very familiar with some concepts may want to skip
the corresponding sections.
This work emerged from a cross-disciplinary project between the economics department of
the Technical University of Darmstadt and the criminological department of the University of
Heidelberg. The project started in 2003 and was financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft
(DFG) until 2007. I picked up many ideas, elements and conceptions and introduced them into this
thesis. Although I use the first person plural throughout the whole thesis, this has solely stylistic
reasons. Whenever I refer to multiple persons, I do this explicitly.
Some quotes introducing new sections are missing a primary source. Although the given author
was verified as well as possible, I had to rely on secondary and internet sources. This work
includes a very large appendix which contains some typical elements which are not necessary for
understanding the thesis. However, most of the appendix is made up of the descriptive coverage
of all included variables and studies. These are not essential but ultimately belong to this meta
analysis.
xvi Preface
Many people were - directly and indirectly - involved in the making of this thesis. The team in
Heidelberg consisted of Dieter Do¨lling, Dieter Hermann, Andreas Woll and Armando Ha¨ring. The
team in Darmstadt was made up by Horst Entorf and myself. Needless to say that my acknowl-
edgment of their support and work are placed here first. I am especially grateful for the advises,
resources, patience and academic freedom given to me by my PhD supervisor Horst Entorf. I
have also to emphasize the technical support by Ileana Petroniu who was an indispensable help
in processing and cleaning the literature data base, acquiring new studies and other administrative
tasks; as well as Philip Savage for many advises on the English language. Furthermore, I have to
thank Hannes Spengler, Oliver Schmid, Emanuela Trifan and Jochen Mo¨bert for suggestions and
uncovering mistakes. I also incorporated many suggestions made during several criminological
and economical conferences.
1 Introduction
Without libraries what have we? We have no past and no future.
Ray Bradbury
Meeting Dr. Wollaston one morning in the shop of a bookseller, I proposed this question:
If two volumes of hydrogen and one of oxygen are mixed together in a vessel, and if by
mechanical pressure they can be so condensed as to become of the same specific gravity
as water, will the gases under these circumstances unite and form water? “What do you
think they will do?” said Dr. W. I replied, that I should rather expect they would unite. “I
see no reason to suppose it,” said he. I then inquired whether he thought the experiment
worth making. He answered, that he did not, for that he should think it would certainly
not succeed. A few days after, I proposed the same question to Sir Humphry Davy. He at
once said, “they will become water, of course;” and on my inquiring whether he thought
the experiment worth making, he observed that it was a good experiment, but one which
it was hardly necessary to make, as it must succeed.
Charles Babbage, Reflections on the Decline of Science in England, and on Some of Its
Causes, 1830
Crime matters to society. As reported elsewhere1 - and according to common sense - crime
causes huge economical and psychological damage to individuals, the economy and to society
itself. Therefore, it is natural that a society - through its legislative, executive and judiciary - tries
to control crime. For thousands of years the idea that the fear of arrest and subsequent punish-
ment will deter people from committing crimes, has been a major tool in this concept. While
punishment has several motivations such as revenge, retribution, normative guidance, correction
and deterrence, the latter was theorized late in the 18th and 19th century2 by Marchese Beccaria
(1819); Bentham (1830) and Chadwick (1829). Deterrence is recognized as a method for pre-
venting potential delinquents3 from committing crimes by the threat of punishment. As far as
deterrence is concerned, punishment is not meant to be anything like a “fair compensation” for a
crime already committed but as a price potential offenders would have to pay for a future crime.
1For example, refer to Cohen (2000) for costs of crime and Viscusi (2000) or Spengler (2004) about the value of (a
statistical) life and further references.
2In fact, Cesare B. Marchese Beccaria published his work 1764 in Italian and its translation was published much
later. Jeremy Bentham’s manuscripts were written about 1770 but found and published many years afterwards.
3In fact, general deterrence would be more precise. In contrast, specific deterrence relates to the offender and aims
at deterring him from further delinquency.
2 1 Introduction
Empirical tests of the effectiveness of deterrence began just “recently” in the 20th century. How-
ever, after the formulation of a formal model by Becker (1968) and its empirical verification by
Ehrlich (1973) an increasing amount of literature emerged which scrutinized the theory of deter-
rence and its empirical application.
Deterrence is embedded in a body of theories of understanding crime. While it is based on the
idea that people adjust their unlawful behavior to changing incentives - expressed by the proba-
bility and severity of punishment - many other theories exist on why people offend; from genetic
characteristics to social and cultural differences. We describe a selection of such theories in more
detail in subsection 2.1.3. Nevertheless, most of these theories can be encompassed by an eco-
nomic framework: a crime will be committed if the benefits from it exceed its expected costs.
While any exact identification and determination of these abstract measures seem to be impos-
sible, criminal behavior - very often expressed by official crime rates - should change when the
probability and severity of punishment changes. Most of the empirical studies exploit this prin-
ciple and make it subject to statistical tests to find out whether any evidence of a deterrent effect
can be found. Literally hundreds of such studies have emerged in the last four decades and have
been subject of an intense debate. The discussion has been - and still is - especially heated about
the question whether the death penalty deters crime or not. However, for almost all offenses two
studies can be found which come to completely different results; one finding strong support for a
deterrent effect while the other cannot find any evidence of it being at work. This situation is, at
least, very unsatisfying from a scientific point of view. Moreover, public policy would obviously
greatly benefit from a better understanding of the effectiveness of deterrence.
The large number of available studies, the heterogeneity of their results, the scope of studied
populations, offenses and implemented techniques offer a perfect playground for a quantitative
analysis of the literature. While many qualitative literature surveys of studies covering the deter-
rence issue have been published (see subsection 2.1.2) there are almost no analytical reviews to be
found. While Antony and Entorf (2003) and Mu¨ller (2003) were first steps and feasibility studies
of a meta analysis, we are only aware of Pratt (2004) as one further quantitative literature sur-
vey4. However, the latter considers deterrence only at the margin and focusses on the differences
between several selected theories of crime. To the best of our knowledge, the cross-disciplinary
project “Metaanalyse empirischer Abschreckungsstudien - ein quantitiver methodenkritischer Ver-
gleich kriminologischer und o¨konomischer Untersuchungen zur negativen Generalpra¨vention”5
was the first comprehensive attempt to use the existing bulk of studies to identify the driving fac-
tors behind the heterogeneity of results and to analytically assess the current situation of research.
Some preliminary results - with a snapshot of the acquired data - are published in Do¨lling et al.
4Although not an analytical review, Eide et al. (1994) calculate, using a small set of selected studies, some simple
bounds of the published results for several types of crime.
5Translated: meta analysis of empirical deterrence studies - a quantitative and critical comparison of criminolog-
ical and economical studies about negative general deterrence. Involved members were: Dieter Do¨lling, Dieter
Hermann, Andreas Woll, Armando Ha¨ring from the University of Heidelberg and Horst Entorf and Thomas Rupp
from the Technical University of Darmstadt.
3(2006) and Do¨lling et al. (2007). This thesis originates from this work and utilizes the full data set
of all 700 acquired studies. In the following chapters we address several questions in more detail:
are there any key factors which determine the results of a study (e.g., the studied population, the
statistical methods employed, the cultural background of the authors, the studied offense, etc.)?
Is there any significant deterrent effect overall? How reliable is the retrieved information? Since
there are almost no prior theories about the strength and direction of any potential key factors we
resort to methods of data mining. Afterwards, we employ several tests to assess the quality of the
calculated estimators, i.e., how well the estimators perform in reproducing and forecasting results.
Indeed, we can identify several elements of the design of a study, the cultural background of an
author and offense-specific properties which affect the outcome of a study. Whether or not these
elements measure a direct effect or - to some extent - pick up other neglected effects belongs to the
subsequent interpretation. Nonetheless, our results should contribute to the knowledge of crime
and the understanding of its literature.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the theoretical background of several
theories about deterrence and - with a focus on the rational choice approach - the corresponding
problems and empirical and statistical issues. It also shows the large variety of fields the theory
of deterrence is applied in and that a lot of contradictory results exist in the literature. The large
body of inconsistent results is one of the main reasons why a meta analysis should be helpful to
increase the understanding of deterrence. Chapter 3 contains the creation of the data base and its
statistical analysis. Several techniques are used to identify important factors which may determine
the results of an individual study. Chapter 4 then puts these results into perspective and shows how
reliable, trustworthy and usable these estimates are. Subsequently, the results of the best models, in
regard to precision and fit, are discussed in more detail. Finally, chapter 5 concludes this thesis and
recapitulates the main issues and results. Furthermore, the appendix contains some minor findings
which are interesting but not essential as well as an extensive description of all available variables
and displays all included studies (accompanied with some important additional information).

2 Deterrence and Crime
If people are good only because they fear punishment, and hope
for reward, then we are a sorry lot indeed.
Albert Einstein
Although many other facets of crime and deterrence are considered, this work concentrates
on the rational choice theory and its accompanying literature. The literature we retrieved and
included almost evenly covers the subjects of sociology, criminology, economics and other fields.
Nevertheless, most of the sociological and criminological literature was covered by the team in
Heidelberg and, as a result, will be somewhat under-represented in this introductory chapter.
2.1 Rational Choice Theory
Unlike Marxian analysis, the economic approach I refer to does not assume that indi-
viduals are solely motivated by selfishness or material gain. It is a method of analysis,
not an assumption about particular motivations. [. . . ] The analysis assumes that indi-
viduals maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal,
spiteful, or masochistic. Their behavior is forward-looking, and it is also assumed to be
consistent over time. In particular, they try as best they can to anticipate the uncertain
consequences of their actions. Forward-looking behavior, however, may still be rooted
in the past, for the past can exert a long shadow on attitudes and values.
Becker (1993)
Many disciplines have developed different theories to explain criminal activity. The main in-
fluential factors “vary from emotional and behavioral characteristics in psychology, physiological
characteristics in biology, environmental and organizational variables in sociology, to alternative
cost and benefit consideration in economics” (Howsen and Jarrell, 1987). We do not discuss the
psychological approach anywhere and defer to psychological text book material1 such as Bandura
(1969) or Schwartz (1984), but concentrate on the legal, criminological and economical theory2.
Most of this literature emerged after the seminal work from Becker (1968) who renewed old
ideas3 from Marchese Beccaria (1819); Bentham (1830) and Chadwick (1829) and molded them
1According to Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), the first psychological study to test the effect of punishment was that
of Estes (1944).
2Although we exclude the psychological approach from our analysis we include several studies from psychologists
or psychological journals.
3Adam Smith had already written about crime and economics.
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into a modern theoretical and economic framework (Bodman and Maultby, 1997). In a broader
sense, rational choice theory4 assumes that people, criminal or not, respond to incentives. Each
individual may have a different inherited “taste of crime”, but as the costs of crime change, the
individuals choice is also likely to change. To optimize welfare certain levels of probability and
severity of punishment have to be chosen while tolerating a “natural” crime rate5. This boils down
to the question “whether crime income is positively related to the perceived risk of crime” (Vis-
cusi, 1986). Although Becker’s reasoning is obvious, if not banal (Blaug, 1980), it took a long
time until science started to analyze this concept (theoretically and empirically). This economic
view of crime is fairly compatible with the sociological point of view, given in Erickson et al.
(1977), that “the doctrine reduces to the assertion that when a criminal act is contemplated the
perception of a high risk of a swift and severe reaction by legal officials is a sufficient condition
for omitting that act”. The economic distribution to deterrence research has been acknowledged
by criminologists and sociologists:
Economists should be given credit for one of the most exciting developments in research
on deterrence in recent years. The techniques they used, the controversy they created and
the discussions they generated have stimulated interest in deterrence research beyond all
expectations.
Fattah (1983)
In general, a model to describe the behavior of potential offenders includes, besides many social,
economical and environmental covariates, several deterrence variables. These should describe the
actual mental process in the decision whether a crime shall be committed or not. Regarding
deterrence the probability that the crime is detected, cleared, the offender arrested, the offender
prosecuted, convicted and punished are relevant. Additionally, the severity and type of punishment
itself (e.g., a fine, probation or imprisonment) - if a punishment occurs - is also important6. The
model of Becker implies that, if one of these probabilities and severities increase, the probability
of committing a crime will decrease. Introducing more detailed levels of punishment can alter this
mechanism slightly.
Typical models are based on the notion that each individual has to allocate his time between
legal and illegal activities7 (Ehrlich, 1973). The potential offender will then commit a crime if his
expected utility from legal alternatives is smaller than the expected gain8 from his illegal actions.
Whereas “Utility is nothing more than an economist’s jargon to represent the personal satisfaction
one receives from various pecuniary and nonpecuniary pleasures in life” (Cohen and Simpson,
4Rationality should not be confused with narrow materialism (Williams and Sickles, 2002).
5Below a certain level of crime the costs of increasing the probability and severity of crime surpass the marginal
loss of welfare due to crime.
6In principal, these variables are not independent. Punishment, for example, may be less effective when its proba-
bility is very low.
7Ehrlich (1972) remarks that if an individual is solely active in the illegal sector his actions are inelastic to small
changes in deterrence.
8The expectation includes - in theory - all possible consequences.
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1997). “In the field of legal studies the deterrence theory justifies punishment as deterring future
crimes on the assumption that a higher expected punishment produces lower levels of criminal
behavior.” (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). These behavioral implications are then aggregated
from the individual level to the entire society.
Of course fundamental criticism followed. Fattah (1983), like many others, argues that crim-
inals are not rational in their actions and are more likely to act because they see no possibilities
in the legal sector. The value of monetary gain (and the unpleasantness of punishment) “varies
greatly from individual to individual depending on a host of factors” and may, as well as the in-
accurate knowledge of the population about deterrence measures, impede statistical analysis. An
even more radical argument is “that economic analysis lacks the conceptual resources needed to
criticize intrinsic value retributivism9” (Kahan, 2004). Furthermore, the perceived probability and
severity of punishment is decisive and the correlation with official statistics may not be as good
as they are supposed to be (Chaiken et al., 1974). These statistics may inhibit so many errors, in-
accuracies or high spatial and temporal sensitivity (including unknown lag structures, differently
affected groups, etc.) that cannot be overcome by statistical techniques, or that any results are too
fragile to draw any relevant policy conclusions (Decker and Kohfeld, 1990a). For public policy
decisions it may not be sufficient to know that deterrence is working in general when the precise
effectiveness is unknown (Fattah, 1983). However, some authors like Vire´n (1994) argue that it is
the lack of “good” data which is responsible for mixed or insignificant results. Although large sta-
tistical improvements have been made in the last decades, some problems still remain, as will be
shown further on. Fattah (1983) reminds us that methodological complexity does not ensure good
results: “the sophisticated techniques they use may create illusions about the accuracy of their
findings and may give the impression that the results are as good as the techniques themselves”.
However, it is important to know that the deterrent effect is unlikely to be proved or disproved
on theoretic grounds. When the restriction of fixed leisure time is removed some odd implica-
tions become possible: e.g., the normality of illegal activities or the independence of decisions
in the legal labor market and variations of the parameters in the illegal market (Heineke, 1978a).
Furthermore, Block and Heineke (1975) show that when the time allocation is explicitly entered
in the utility function no unambiguously static results can be drawn10. Since the effectiveness of
deterrence cannot be proven theoretically it remains an empirical matter to verify its impact (Brier
and Fienberg, 1980). The latter may be the single issue in the deterrence literature which is almost
uncontroversial.
The first study to reach a broad audience whilst being based on the Becker model was conducted
by Ehrlich (1973), although Ehrlich (1972) was published one year before. He uses cross sectional
data of U.S. states from 1940, 1950 and 1960 and Index I crimes. Using OLS, 2SLS and SUR
9This refers to the backward-looking intuition that punishment should be in proportion to the reprehensibility of the
committed crime.
10The sentence length has a negative substitution and a positive income effect. Strong restrictions are necessary to
achieve unambiguous results.
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estimators he concludes - among other results - that all crimes vary inversely with the probability
and severity of punishment.
An intense discussion immediately followed. Vandaele (1978b) corrects Ehrlich’s data for some
errors and repeats his analysis with and without outliers and some different specifications. Over-
all, he confirms the deterrent effects found by Ehrlich. Using this data, Raftery et al. (1997) rely
on Bayesian Model Averaging (which should recognize the potential absence of relationships bet-
ter than other methods) to select the relevant variables and conclude that only the probability of
punishment deters but the severity does not. Pogue (1986) argues that most of the significant de-
terrents arose due neglecting other important variables (see also section 2.3.1). He concludes that
there is, using Ehrlich’s data, only a small deterrent effect for robbery to be found, if at all. Many
other researcher reevaluated the deterrence hypothesis with Ehrlich’s data (like Nott and Green
(2004); Ferna´ndez et al. (2001a); Andreoni (1995)) and come to different conclusions - some of-
fer full support of the deterrence hypothesis, while some find no effect. Brier and Fienberg (1980)
reject the Becker-Ehrlich model itself and discard all subsequent empirical findings. They argue
that the model is too flawed and the empirical findings (in the economic literature) are not reliable
enough to draw any conclusion (neither for or against the deterrence hypothesis). Although their
criticism seems to be exaggerated the ambiguity of findings in the deterrence literature was and
still is perhaps the main reason for the prolonged debate. Vire´n (2001) proposes allowing criminal
activities to be part of the leisure activities of each individual. He uses mostly Finnish data and
concludes, besides finding significant deterrent effects, “that crime also depends on the available
amount of leisure time at least to the extent that we are dealing with part-time criminals”.
“Becker’s assertion that maximization of social welfare requires the exclusive use of fines when-
ever they are feasible” (Ehrlich, 1981) does not hold when incapacitation effects are taken into
account. Ehrlich argues that “even when feasible, fines should be replaced by, or used in con-
junction with, an incapacitating penalty” to reach more optimal results. Contrary to the public
point of view that fines should increase with recidivism, Emons (2003) argues that, according to
game theory, it is optimal to confiscate the whole wealth of the delinquent and none for recidi-
vism (since no wealth remains). However, Garoupa (1999) argue that high fines are not optimal
anymore for lesser offenses when there is uncertainty about the probability and severity of pun-
ishment. Furthermore, Rubinstein (1980) shows that for every two-level game with a maximum
penalty there exists a lesser penalty and a utility function so that the lesser penalty deters more than
the maximum penalty. When relaxing the perfect information assumption, Levitt (1997a) shows
that “private information greatly reduces the usefulness of fines due to the additional incentive-
compatibility constraint that binds the social planner”. Another reasoning is proposed by Garoupa
and Jellal (2002) who ponder the possibility of collusion between criminals and enforcers. They
argue that higher penalties are linked with more resources spent on the detection and punishment
of corruption (since the likelihood of collusion increases). “Thus, the government could reduce
this sanction [for the underlying offense], save on detection, and increase the criminal sanction
for corruption (in order to offset the negative effect on deterrence)”. Fines and probations are,
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as is generally assumed, less threatening than imprisonment. Therefore, increasing the fine- or
probation rate leads to a decrease in the imprisonment rate and can therefore lead to more crime
due to a reduced level of punishment (Entorf, 2003). However, some studies, like Wolpin (1980),
find a deterring effect of the probation rate.
Inspired by German penal law, which relies heavily on fines, Cherry (2001) studies the impact
of fines on Index I crimes in California. He finds that the probability of punishment and the fines
are significantly deterring crimes while the average sentence length is not. He also points out that
an increased usage of fines for non-serious offenses would make the legal system of the U.S. more
efficient and less expensive because these offenses make up for the largest part of the U.S. prison
population. While the U.S. has (with Russia) built up the largest (and most expensive) prison
system in the world, Germany has (by increasing the usage of fines) lowered such expenditures
while holding crime constant. He also reports that recidivism is lower for those punished by fines
than by imprisonment. However, Withers (1984) notes that, depending on the severity of crime,
imprisonment might pay off when the incapacitation effect is large enough.
If an offender is risk neutral the probability and severity of sanction are of equal effectiveness.
If he is not - although the expected gain (and thus expected punishment) remains the same -
his expected utility changes differently. Becker (1968) shows in his model that an individual
who has a preference for risk is more deterred by an increase in the probability of punishment
than by a comparable increase in the severity of punishment. The contrary is true for risk-averse
individuals. It is even possible that a risk preferrer engages more in crime when the average
punishment increases. This may happen if the stimulation effect to commit more offenses due
to his reduced expected wealth is larger than the opposite substitution (legal for illegal activities)
effect (Ehrlich, 1972). In empirical studies this is used to interpret the behavior of the studied
subjects. If the elasticity of the deterrent effect of the probability of punishment is larger (smaller)
than that of its severity the studied population may be assumed to be risk preferring (averse).
The individual discount rate also influences the risk aversion (Polinsky and Shavell, 1999). For
example, an offender with a large discount rate will be deterred more effectively by the probability
of imprisonment than by the sentence length.
Many studies find that the probability of detection deters more than the severity of punishment,
which is interpreted by Kau and Rubin (1975) as evidence that society spends enough on detecting
crime such that only risk-preferring individuals engage in criminal activities. They find a deterrent
effect of the conviction rate but not of the average time served and argue that this implies that the
remaining potential offenders in the crime market are risk-preferrers. Mendes (2004) argues that,
on an aggregated level, “potential criminals mentally combine the three deterrence components11
- regardless of whether they are risk neutral, averse, or acceptant”. However, not all offenders
are completely neutral towards the expected gains. Shachmurove et al. (2001) study burglaries in
Greenwhich and conclude that burglars prefer lower risk above more loot.
11This refers to the probability of arrest and conviction and the severity of punishment.
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Deterrence relies heavily on the available police resources and efficiency. Using U.S. state level
data, Cameron (1991) analyzes the police output function and finds that the police are largely
working (marginally) inefficiently. Bodman and Maultby (1997) add that, ceteris paribus, police
efficiency decreases significantly with rising crime, especially when the system is already oper-
ating at its limit (Chambouleyron and Willington, 1998). Additionally, the correlation between
police expenditures and police output (in most cases arrests or convictions) is low when the police
administrators confuse output maximization with budget or utility maximization. Kau and Rubin
(1975) point out that law enforcement might be more effective in combating violent crime - at the
margin - so that switching resources from property crime to crime against the person might reduce
total crime. However, the average citizen fears property crime more than violent crime in regard
to the demand for police (Chapman, 1976).
Usually crime is more prominent in cities which might be partially be explained by smaller
arrest probabilities and other factors. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) report, using previously found
elasticities and data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), National Longitudi-
nal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and Uniform Crime Report (UCR), that up to 20% can be explained
by the lower arrest rates and 33 - 50 percent by female headed households.
Although Sickles et al. (1979); Witte and Schmidt (1977) and Witte (1980) relate more to spe-
cific deterrence, we mention them here (and include them in this meta analysis) because these
are pioneering studies using individual data (of prisoners from North Carolina) to test deterrent
effects12. Sickles et al. (1979) regress the sentence length after release from prison on, among
others, the number of previous arrests and the first wage. They find that the first wage influences
the criminal career but the future criminal career does not affect the first wage. Previous arrests
are correctly signed but not significant. Witte and Schmidt (1977) and Witte (1980) find that both
the probability and severity of punishment deter, while the marginal effect of the latter is smaller.
Subsequently, Tauchen et al. (1994) and Williams and Sickles (2002) analyze a birth cohort from
Philadelphia and use police resources per offense as a measure for general deterrence. The former
find that police do deter crime, but do this more effectively for people with clean criminal records,
whilst the latter do not.
Most authors use data from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and
Scandinavian countries. While a group around Pablo Fajnzylber concentrates on South America,
other countries are studied only in very rare cases. Wolpin (1980) studies England, Japan and Cal-
ifornia and finds that Japan’s inherent crime rate is even higher than that of the USA (represented
by California). He notes that countries with a high inherent robbery rate have higher clearance
rates, lower conviction rates and harsher punishments. Mui and Ali (1997) study crime in Honk
Kong and find that, contrary to western nations, unemployment, poverty and foreigners are not
associated with crime. However, unemployment (due to the shadow economy) and foreigners
(illegal immigrants are expelled immediately) might not have been adequately accounted for. An-
12These can be interpreted as studies of general deterrence with individual data; but only prisoner-data is available.
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other study (Tao, 2004) uses data from Taiwan (which is, for political reasons, assigned to China),
Meera and Jayakumar (1995) use Malaysian data and their overcrowded prisons. Argentina is
an exception and is subject to several studies; see for example Cerro and Meloni (2000); Cham-
bouleyron and Willington (1998); Kessler and Molinari (1997) or Balbo and Posadas (1998). In
some cases multiple countries all over the world are studied (as pooled cross sections or panel
data). Usually homicide and robbery are analyzed because these crimes are defined very similarly
across all nations. Fajnzylber et al. (2002b) and Fajnzylber et al. (1998) report that economic
growth and inequality are main influences of the (anti-cyclical) movements of crime. Western Eu-
rope stands out by having high homicide rates, South America by robbery and Hindu countries by
having very low homicide and robbery rates. Recessions and other shocks can lead to persistent
long-term increases in crime.
Assessing the available literature, the severity of punishment is generally assumed or found to be
less relevant than the probability of detection or punishment. An exception to this rule is the study
by Funk and Kugler (2003b), who focus on this issue and conclude, using data from Switzerland,
that both - probability and severity of punishment - are of equal importance. Another aspect is
the interaction of the probability and severity of punishment, especially when the probabilities are
very small. A few authors explicitly test the expected punishment and come to different results:
Curti (1999) finds significant deterrent effects using German data, Swimmer (1974a) only finds
deterrent effects for aggravated assault and burglary (and larceny in a non-linear estimation) using
data from all U.S. cities with more than 100000 inhabitants. However, probability and severity
of punishments are not always substitutes. As described in subsection 2.2.4, this is found in an
experiment with students about free riding (Anderson and Stafford, 2003).
It is generally assumed that the introduction of harsher maximum penalties, mandatory penal-
ties or larger police budgets should deter potential offenders. These effects may be mitigated for
several reasons. Andreoni (1995) points out that, while more punishment has a deterrent effect,
criminals will invest more energy on avoiding capture. Furthermore, judges and juries may be
more hesitant to convict someone as punishment increases (Bodman and Maultby, 1997; Vingilis
et al., 1988). More severe maximum penalties cannot be effective if the expanded scope of sen-
tencing is not utilized. For example, in 1991 new sentencing guidelines were introduced which
were aimed at doubling the median fine for corporate crimes. However, Parker and Atkins (1999)
do not find a significant change in the imposed sentences. Consequently, they can not find much
evidence for any increased compliance. Stafford (2002) uses an increase of almost 2000% for
fines (violating waste regulations) but finds only very small effects. Increasing mandatory mini-
mum sentences avoids this problem (at least for the distribution of the lenient sentences) but may
lower the probability of conviction. A judge or jury may be more cautious convicting someone
when the minimum sentence exceeds the penalty they would have imposed otherwise. When
these effects, which lessen the deterrent effect, are incorporated into the deterrence model, for-
mer significant results become insignificant. This is supported by Mustard (2003) who reports
that judges in Oregon lessened their overall sentences when minimum sentences were introduced.
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Witte (1980) additionally points out that social conditions also modify the probability of punish-
ment. Using individual data, being married or having a job did influence the conviction probability
but not the arrest probability. Moreover, many studies use the police budget as a proxy of police
effectiveness. Although it is quite reasonable to assume that a larger budget enhances the available
equipment and training, or increases the available manpower, there may be some mitigating ef-
fects. On the one hand the police may be interested in high crime rates to avoid decreasing budgets
(see also section 2.3.1 for this feedback effect). Furthermore, the police may redeploy their forces
to crimes which, overall, reduces the marginal deterrent effect of the police budget or simply to
crimes which are not considered in the usual analysis (see subsection 2.2.3 for an example).
The focus of the empirical studies has changed over the last decades. In the beginning, re-
searcher were mainly interested in the deterrent effects of probabilities, sentences and laws. How-
ever, “the economics literature on crime has transited from an emphasis on economic conditions
(including education) and deterrence effects to more recent considerations of factors that may
explain how crime is propagated over time and within communities” (Fajnzylber et al., 1998).
Nowadays, a large part of the literature implements deterrence variables as covariates in studies
of other effects (for example, unemployment and crime).
2.1.1 Public Perception
In a way general deterrence is a kind of belief. It has been
introduced in penal law not after series of investigations in
which its validity has been proven. It has been accepted as a
useful concept in penal law because people believed in the
deterrent influence of sanctions.
Buikhuisen (1974)
As Fattah (1983) points out, deterrence is only applicable to those who are not lawful or crim-
inal by nature - or stated economically: “the deterrence effects should be strongest in the group
where the expected costs and benefits of noncompliance are closest to being identical” (Braith-
waite and Makkai, 1991). This leads to the consideration of the general normative development of
the society or sub-groups in the analysis of deterrence. This is often done in studies dealing with
driving under the influence, considering those who never drink alcoholic beverages and hardcore
drinkers (see subsection 2.2.6) but seldom in other fields. As an exception, for example, Salem
and Bowers (1970) study deterrence in regard to minor offenses in U.S. colleges and universities.
These offenses are significantly reduced by increasing penalties but deterrent effects are largely
rendered irrelevant when the normative attitude of the students are considered. Gertz and Gould
(1995) asked 611 college students in Florida about their past delinquency and find only insignifi-
cant support of the deterrence theory but judge moral attitudes to be relevant. Indeed, Bohnet and
Cooter (2001) point out that laws made to reduce offenses do not only deter but do also educate
and coordinate while Cloninger (1994) applies the same argument to police presence. Erickson et
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al. (1977) argue that “all purported evidence of general deterrence is suspect” until the deterrent
effects hold “independently of the social condemnation of crime”. Furthermore, low crime rates
in combination with a high perceived certainty of punishment may not reflect deterrence but the
social (extralegal) attitude (“what ought to be”) toward these offenses. Brier and Fienberg (1980)
also argue that any educational effect of deterrence might not be distinguishable from the pure
deterrent effect. As pointed out in subsection 2.2.6, this may be seen in the case of drunken driv-
ing when the probability and severity of punishment and the public awareness of the problem rose
simultaneously.
Police crackdowns in crime prone areas have been implemented into the resource distribution
strategy of the police, especially for drug-related crimes (Sherman and Rogan, 1995) and Driv-
ing Under the Influence (DUI), as pointed out by Benson et al. (2000). Besides increasing the
efficiency of police actions these crackdowns are also likely to increase the public awareness
and acknowledgement of police activities. Furthermore, the private sector also responds to crime
(Clotfelter, 1978) by investing huge amounts of money in security measures (Witte and Witt,
2001). However, Guttel and Medina (2007) show in a game-theoretic model that “such invest-
ment will not only affect the behavior of the perpetrators, but will also affect that of the police”.
In the case that the police concentrate more on the protection of the more vulnerable sector this
may impede spending on private protection measures in that sector. Furthermore, beside the usual
security measures like alarm systems, better locks and other equipment, keeping weapons at home
and, especially, carrying concealed guns may even increase crime (refer to section 2.2.9 for a more
detailed description of the corresponding discussion).
Deterrence research is of great societal importance. Fear of crime and policing against it is a ma-
jor topic in many societies and scientific disciplines. Besides criminology, sociology, economics
or public policy, even the CDC (Centers of Disease Control and Prevention) and the WHO (World
Health Organization) are interested in deterrence research. The latter have declared violence pre-
vention a public health priority: where criminal justice emphasizes punishment, deterrence and
incapacitation, public health focuses on primary prevention (Foege et al., 1995). Although ad-
vises for public policy may be given from theoretical and empirical studies, it cannot be taken for
granted that these are incorporated into actual laws accordingly. In the famous case13 Gregg v.
Georgia which ended the death penalty moratorium in the U.S., Justice Stewart (U.S. Supreme
Court, 1976) wrote about the deterrence hypothesis of capital punishment that “there is no con-
vincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view”14. Sampson and Raudenbusch
(1999) state that the broken windows theory (introduced by Wilson and Kelling (1982); see sec-
tion 2.1.3) was the determining factor in the police crackdowns in several cities (especially New
York). Also, Weber and Crew (2000) note that the laws to ensure water pollution control were mo-
13Solicitor General Robert Bork introduced Ehrlich (1975a) - who found strong deterrent effects of capital punish-
ment - into the case.
14Nevertheless, they were convinced that there exist at least some potential offenders who are deterred but it remained
nebulous on what their opinion was based on.
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tivated directly by deterrence research. However, due to the great variance of methodologies, data
sources and results, great care has to be taken when deriving any public policy advises: “a cynical
view would point out that familiarizing the public with the research findings would give people the
information to distinguish between political promises about crime control that are merely wishful
thinking and promises that might have merit” (Becsi, 1999). Daily political business is not likely
to mitigate this dilemma because, as can be verified on a regular basis, crime statistics and isolated
studies are not appropriately put into perspective. The following quote illustrates the point of this
problem:
The release of new crime statistics is typically followed by a barrage of partisan po-
litical approvals and disclaimers depending on which party or interest group benefits.
Incumbents are always quick to accept the credit for any decrease in crime rates while
opponents are just as quick to challenge the reliability of the statistics or argue rates
would have somehow fallen faster had they been in office.
Doyle et al. (1999)
2.1.2 Literature Surveys
Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for
granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and
consider.
Francis Bacon, 1625
In the last five decades several surveys have been published. Among these we consider Cook
(1977); Nagin (1978); Brier and Fienberg (1980); Beyleveld (1980); Cameron (1988) and Eide et
al. (1994) to be the most prominent.
In an early review Cook (1977) comes up with a mixed conclusion. While “there is strong
evidence from some of these studies that an increase in the threat of punishment can reduce the
amount of some crimes in some circumstances” he attenuates this by remarking that these evidence
do not cover long-term effects, magnitudes involved and other points. He thinks that it is “highly
unlikely that anything like a complete scientific basis for criminal justice policy will be produced
in the foreseeable future”.
After Becker’s and Ehrlich’s initial work Nagin (1978) is the first popular survey of the deter-
rence literature which was in its infancy at that point of time. He evaluates about 20 studies and
delves into several sources of possible problems (data acquirement on the police level, simultane-
ity and identification issues, incapacitation effect, etc.). He estimates that about 20 to 80 percent
of the decline in crime could be attributed to incapacitation. He ends with the insight that it is
too soon to draw any final conclusions but deterrence seems to be working. He concludes that “a
more critical assessment of the evidence is needed if we are to see progress in the development of
knowledge about deterrent effectiveness and its application to effective public policy”.
Brier and Fienberg (1980) draw very pessimistic conclusions. They conclude that no progress
had been made in ten years of research and much of the debate about Ehrlich’s findings only
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diverted the efforts of serious scholars. Moreover, they also state that no reliable conclusion can
be drawn about the deterrence hypothesis and they “believe that little will come from further
attempts to model the effects of punishment on crime” with that kind of employed data.
Beyleveld (1980) gives a profound summary of the literature about general deterrence from
1946 to 1979. After giving a good and generalized introduction into the deterrence theory he
presents reviews (some very short, some very detailed) and comments on 110 theoretic and 216
empirical studies. He also discusses many of the different approaches and problems of analysis in
empirical studies.
Cameron (1988) first portrays several different and important theoretical aspects of the deter-
rence theory. Then he surveys the empirical evidence of 79 studies and especially comments on
methodology issues of these studies (e.g., identification problems, variable structures, etc.) and on
their contradicting results. As the studies above, he sums the existing literature only qualitatively
and gives a subjective picture of the current situation at that time. He concludes that “much of the
literature seems impaired by bias due to measurement error” and argues that there is need for a
further development of the underlying theory.
In their book Eide et al. (1994) give a thorough overview of the determinants of crime, the
rational offender and utility-based models. They then delve into the methodological issues of em-
pirical studies based on macro data. They review shortly 15 correlational studies and then report
the results and properties of 21 cross-sectional studies; including the socioeconomic coefficients
of these studies. In contrast to the surveys above, they give some statistics of the studies’ results: a
table with the bounds of the retrieved elasticities and their corresponding median for various meth-
ods. This can be interpreted as a first small step towards a numerical summary of the deterrence
literature. Furthermore, they review 18 other empirical studies using time series and individual
data. The book is concluded with several analyses of Norwegian data with conventional and more
sophisticated methods.
Even after more than 30 years of empirical research Polinsky and Shavell (2000) still remark
that “empirical work on law enforcement is strongly needed to better measure the deterrent ef-
fect of sanctions, especially to separate the influence of the magnitude of sanctions from their
probability of application”.
2.1.3 Other Theories
Note that the ecologist would say that the environment is
causing the criminal to act, whereas the economist would say
that the criminal is acting taking his environment into account.
Chapman (1976)
This quote puts it aptly that there is more than one way to understand criminal behavior - even
if the reasoning is fully compatible with rational choice theory. While many studies implement
covariates which could be interpreted in the setting of the following theories, most authors do not
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comment on them in this fashion. Refer to the meta analysis done by Pratt (2004) for empirical
studies which specialize on some of the subsequent theories. These approaches should be inter-
preted as complements and not as competing theories. Some summaries of the following theories
are condensed versions of the descriptions given by Pratt (2004).
Broken Windows Theory
This theory, introduced by Wilson and Kelling (1982), suggests that individuals more readily
engage in crime if their neighborhood shows signs of decay. In this scenario broken windows,
abandoned buildings, graffiti or simply very lenient treatment of misdemeanors imply a lower
(perceived) probability that an offense will be prosecuted or cleared. However, social decay “is
accompanied by physical deterioration, as homeowners and small business people put less time
and money into maintaining their buildings”(Spelman, 1993). Therefore, broken windows may be
just an indicator for the underlying social decay which is accompanied by more crime.
Lochner (2001) tests the broken windows hypothesis and finds no effect. Perceived arrest prob-
abilities (for theft and burglary) are uncorrelated with various neighborhood characteristics (gang-
activity, lawlessness, abandoned buildings or drunks on the street). In another study he finds no
relationship between the beliefs of the probability of arrest and the information about the arrests
of other random individuals and local neighborhood conditions (Lochner, 2003).
Corman and Mocan (2002) test the hypothesis in New York by including the arrest rates of
misdemeanors among the crime specific arrest rates, police manpower and prison population for
various Index I offenses. Significant effects are only found for robbery and motor vehicle theft.
Kelling and Sousa (2001) also use New York data but only the arrest rate for misdemeanors is
negative and significant. They interpret this as an approvement of the broken windows theory.
Funk and Kugler (2003a) approach the broken windows theory by analyzing the effect of lesser
offenses (burglary and theft) on more severe crime (robbery). Using Swiss data they find that an
increase in burglary and theft lead to an increase in robbery but not conversely. They conclude
that a tougher enforcement on minor crimes also reduces major crimes.
However, concentrating on minor offenses may also backfire because arrest for misdemeanors
may later increase severe crimes (Sherman et al., 1998) and resources tend to be misallocated. For
example, neighborhood watches are not used where it would make sense (lack of trust) and are
used where it does not make much sense (neighborhoods in the middle class with low crime rates).
Contrarily, they point out that such neighborhood watches may increase the fear of crime while
having no measurable effect on crime rates. Nonetheless, having good ties to the police reduces
crime significantly.
Similar to the arguments of the broken windows theory, Posada (1994) theorizes that when
random increases in crime are not counteracted by more efforts in deterrence, the perceived rate
of apprehension decreases and the random increase in crime may become permanent. This leads
to the notion of Sah (1991) that “past crime breeds future crime”.
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Life-Cycle Theory
Basically the theory states that criminals start their career by committing minor crimes and then,
by accumulating criminal capital, proceed to more severe offenses. Usually, (detected) criminal
activity then recedes when a certain age is reached (see also subsection 2.3.4). Therefore, the age
structure affects crime trends. However, Marvell and Moody (1991) argue “that the age/crime
relationship is probably exaggerated because the high arrest rates for younger persons are due
partly to their lesser ability to escape arrest, younger persons commit more group crime, and the
age structure of victims should be taken into account”.
Funk and Kugler (2003a) present evidence, using Swiss data, for the increasing severeness
of committed offenses as the criminal becomes more experienced. Marvell and Moody (1991)
analyze 90 studies about the relationship between the age structure and crime. Although there is
only little evidence they cannot conclude that there is no relationship. However, forecasts based
on demographic trends do not seem to be helpful in explaining crime.
Anomie/Strain- and Social Disorganization Theory
The social disorganization theory goes back to Shaw and McKay (1972) who observed that juve-
nile crime was not distributed evenly in Chicago but was concentrated on “slum neighborhoods”
regardless of the local ethnic composition. The observation of receding individual crime rates
when moving to less crime prone areas lead to the conclusion that crime is a function of neighbor-
hood dynamics and not necessarily of individual characteristics. Low social ties, high mobility,
low socioeconomic status and “criminal traditions” are characteristics of these “slum neighbor-
hoods”. The theory was very popular in the 50s and 60s until interest shifted from group dynamics
to individual processes and has now become more popular again. This recurring interest is - at
least to some extent - based on the inclusion of “intervening mechanisms”; the indirect effect of
social disorganization on crime via other variables (like family disruption). Kelly (2000) finds that
economic factors and deterrence seem to be important for property crime, while social influences,
in line with the strain and disorganization theory, are better suited to explain violent crime.
The anomie (or strain) theory was developed by Merton (1938) who argues that the rigid adher-
ence to conventional (American) values may also foster crime whereas the disorganization theory
is based on the rejection of these values. In the USA more emphasis is put on (visible) economic
success and the pursuit of the “American Dream” (that working hard enough will eventually pay
off). However, poor people are more limited in their possibilities in this race to success. This dif-
ference between compulsion and limited possibilities lead to a weakening of cultural norms which
Merton calls “anomie”. As with the social disorganization theory, interest in the the anomie theory
was very high in the 50s and 60s and then receded until it rose again in the 90s when Messner and
Rosenfeld (1997) reformulated the theory and integrated “an institutional structure dominated by
the economy” (Pratt, 2004).
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Absolute Deprivation/Conflict Theory
Conflict theory (Bonger, 1916), in a simplified form, divides society into two groups with the
upper class having more political authority or social power than the lower class. Crime is then
interpreted as a label put on some behavior of the lower class by members of the upper class. As
a consequence - although the same deviant deeds are committed by members of both classes -
prosecution and punishment tends to be more intense for the lower class. While some areas seem
to fit this theory quite well - like conflicts between workers and management or victimless crimes
like vagrancy - classic crimes like robbery and rape are more problematic.
Absolute deprivation theory essentially gives some explanations where crimes may originate
from. First, poverty - as an important characteristic of the lower class - may directly cause crime.
For example, theft and robbery may be (at least subjectively) necessary for some people to survive.
Second, poverty may be viewed as a consequence of a “wrong” social arrangement and thus
indirectly cause crime when the lower class strives for a change.
Relative Deprivation and Inequality Theory
While absolute deprivation theory is based on the absolute poverty of social groups, Blau and
Blau (1982) point out that “racial socioeconomic inequalities are a major source of much criminal
violence” rather than absolute poverty. Although not being poor by monetary standards people
may think that society withholds something which they are entitled to. It is the inequality which
induces subcultures (especially for youths) which may “bring young persons into contact with
the law”. Furthermore, they observe that “aggressive acts of violence seem to result not so much
from lack of advantages as from being taken advantage of, not from absolute but from relative
deprivation”.
Routine Activities Theory
Cohen and Felson (1979) identify three kinds of measures relevant for crime: motivated offenders,
suitable targets and absence of capable guardianship. “Convergence in space and time of the
three minimal elements of direct-contact predatory violations” is assumed to be correlated with
increased victimization. They define “routine activities” as the “recurrent and prevalent activities
which provide for basic population and individual needs”. Daily routines and - to some extent -
economic success increase the amount of potential victims and reduce the presence of guardians.
The theory presumes the existence of motivated offenders and provides little means how to change
these motivation. As Pratt (2004) puts it: “presented with opportunities (suitable targets) divorced
from capable guardians (either formal or informal), crime happens.” Cohen et al. (1980) present a
variation of the routine activities approach by concentrating more on the situational opportunities
in a given area.
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Social Support and Altruism Theory
Social support or altruism theory focusses on the relationship between characteristics of social
aggregates and the insulation of crime. Social support is viewed as provisions supplied by the
community, the government, social networks, the family and other sources (Cullen, 1994). Social
altruism is also assumed to be negatively correlated with crime rates. Chamlin and Cochran (1997)
define social altruism to be “the willingness of communities to commit scarce resources to the aid
and comfort of their members, distinct from the beneficence of the state”. Sometimes it may be
unclear whether a state is supportive or altruistic because activities (like rehabilitation) can be
attributed to both areas. Furthermore, any crime reducing effect may belong to other side effects
(e.g., better socioeconomic conditions resulting from a rehabilitation program).
Subcultural Theories
Following the social support and altruism theory, social and cultural conditions may prevent peo-
ple from engaging in crimes. Hence, it is assumed that there exist social and cultural influences
which increase crime. Sources of such violent or deviant subcultures are presumed to be found in
urban areas and - only applicable for the United States - in the South.
In the 20th century the South of the United States stood out with its high rates of violent crime.
Some researcher argue that “certain cultural norms contained in the South may predispose indi-
viduals to not only engage in violent behavior, but also to approve of such actions on the part
of others” (Pratt, 2004). Many different cultural norms are identified to be such factors like the
historical tradition of chivalry or the tendency to resort to violence when defending the honor of
a woman. Many explanations are given why these norms are concentrated in the South (e.g., dif-
ferent religious perspective or the bitterness of having lost the civil war). Also other factors are
characteristic for the South like the high rate of firearm ownership.
The often found positive relationship between the size of the population and the crime rates have
also been subject to a cultural interpretation. Following Fischer (1975) the probability that people
with unconventional lifestyles and interests meet each other increases with the population size.
Second, urban regions provide the opportunity for people with unconventional lifestyles to form
subcultural groups. Finally, these groups compete against each other for geographic and social
space. This leads to a greater identification with group-values and larger within-group cohesion.
And, “since subcultural values tend to follow a process of diffusion from one generation to the
next, the positive association between population size and rates of crime and deviance will tend to
persist over time” (Pratt, 2004).
Reintegrative Shaming and Stigmatization Theory
Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming (Braithwaite, 1989) describes punishment as a tool
which can either amplify or dampen crime, depending on how it is applied and recognized. Stigma
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may, on the one hand, prevent crime by the expected reduction in social (e.g., diminished respect
and avoidance by friends, family and neighbors) and human capital (e.g., lowered or missing
income). On the other hand, once stigmatized, recidivism may become more likely (Fajnzylber et
al., 1998). The latter effect is supported in an analysis by Tittle et al. (2003) whereas the former
effect is not. Consequently, they recommend that the shaming theory needs more clarification and
refinement “to specify more carefully the conditions under which shaming processes inhibit or
enhance criminal probabilities”. However, using a sample of residents from Shanghai, Lu et al.
(2002) conclude that there is no effect within the family but a significant shaming effect in regard
to the residents in the neighborhood.
At this point it is worthwhile to note that “individuals asked to judge undesirable behavior tend
to explain their own behavior as a consequence of external environmental factors while attributing
the deviant behavior of others to poor moral character” (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1987). For
further references see Tittle et al. (2003).
Other Theories
While the above theories are all forward-looking most penal laws also contain a backward-looking
aspect: retribution. This means that punishment is not only assessed by its deterrent effect (on the
offender and the public) but also by the severity of the offense (Rawls, 1955). This follows from
the simple idea that wrong-doing merits punishment: the offender should suffer according to his
guilt and the depravity of his crime. “The intention of providing a deterrent is not a purpose of
punishment in retributive theory per se” (Avio, 1987).
In the context of drunk driving, Soper and Thompson (1990) note that deterrence is linked
to implementation theory (Edwards, 1980). Whenever means of deterrence require bureaucratic
action their effectiveness depends on their implementation. These are the communication and the
predispositions of public officials towards that policy, the resources of the public officials as well
as the bureaucratic structure of the involved agencies.
A completely different approach is the identification of genetic differences between offending
and non-offending people. While this does not mean that anyone is a “born criminal” or not, there
are genetic differences which seem to increase unsocial behavior. See, for example, Moffitt (2005)
for more information and references.
2.2 Particularities Regarding Offenses
Blind commitment to a theory is not an intellectual virtue: it is
an intellectual crime.
Imre Lakatos, Philosophical Papers Volume 1, 1977
In the following, many studies - but not all of them - are cited for a number of reasons. While
many authors follow the usual way of regressing the crime rate on some other rates and interpret
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the coefficients, numerous studies contain more information than that. Some authors use or con-
struct unusual variables, new or alternative ways to circumvent problems, introduce innovative
ideas or uncommon interpretations to well known variables. Furthermore, there are some data
problems in the deterrence literature which require special consideration, aside from the typical
difficulties encountered in many studies using cross sections, time series, experiments or sur-
veys. The next subsections deal with such particularities in regard to the studied offenses, various
aspects and features of analysis and other interesting aspects. The mixture of different, comple-
mentary and contradicting results is also expressed in these subsections.
2.2.1 Classic Offenses
The simplest schoolboy is now familiar with facts for which
Archimedes would have sacrificed his life.
Ernest Renan, Souvenirs D’enfance et de Jeunesse, 1887
Spengler (2004) is a unique German study in respect of the utilized data. Merging different data
bases from the German states he is able to consider the full punishment cascade (arrest rate, con-
viction rate, imprisonment- and probation rate, sentence length and monetary fines, see page 43)
for adults, adolescents and youths for various types of offenses. After considering many potential
methodological problems, the arrest and conviction rates (but not the punishment) are found to
be significant deterrents. The same data is used by Entorf and Spengler (2005) who add that the
conviction rate is the most important deterrent and, therefore, the increasing discontinuation of
criminal prosecution in Germany is counterproductive. In addition to that, the regional distribu-
tion of crimes in municipalities in Baden-Wuerttemberg is studied by Spengler (2004). He finds
that the mobility of delinquents is of great importance for theft.
Morris and Tweeten (1971) compare the effectiveness of police manpower in 754 U.S. cities.
In a 2SLS analysis they estimate the coefficients for the police of all cities and for nine categories
(small to large city). Then the coefficients are adjusted - using the available covariates - in such a
way that all cities have the same crime rate. The results show that the police are most effective in
middle-sized cities and that police deter in all but large (more than one million inhabitants) cities.
Some authors emphasize that short and long term effects should be distinguished when analyz-
ing crime. Usually error correction models are used in these cases. Diez-Ticio (2000) finds short
term deterrent effects of the clearance rate on robbery, burglary and auto vehicle theft. However,
in the long run only the deterrent effect for robbery remains.
Corman (1981) employs the difference between the ranks of courts to judge deterrence for prop-
erty crime. A conviction by a higher court implies longer proceedings and more severe records.
While arrest rates, conviction rates and sentence lengths have only small deterrent effects, “court
processing does matter to the potential offender, even court outcome held as a constant factor”.
Therefore, plea bargaining and other measures which result in more cases resolved at lower court
level may increase crime rates.
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Some deterrents are rather unorthodox. Ayres and Levitt (1998) study the usage of LoJack
devices in cars in U.S. cities. These are GPS-senders built into a car which enable a swift recovery
of a stolen car by the police. The usage of such devices in an area does indeed deter motor
vehicle theft but purchasing is only benevolent for those car owners without an insurance (not the
specific LoJack in a car deters, but the general usage in a large area). Goodman (1997) finds very
significant deterrent effects when police officers could use their private cars with a visible mark,
identifying them as police officers.
It is obvious that crime induces direct costs15 (broken inventory, injuries, loss of goods, etc.).
However, the indirect costs are also manifold (psychic costs, expenditures for protection, avoid-
ance of dangerous areas, abdication of activities, etc.). For example, Philipson and Posner (1996)
report that in the USA 300 billion dollars are spent on private security, which is much more than
by the government (100 billion dollars in 1995 as reported by Ayres and Levitt (1998)).
2.2.2 Death Penalty
Any punishment has several goals. They include correction and
retribution. There is no correction in the case of the death
penalty, only retribution. It is even unclear to whom it applies,
since a man whom the state eliminates doesn’t feel anything
after that.
Vladimir Putin, Interfax, 2006
The basic idea of the effect of capital punishment is simple: “if rational people fear death
more than other punishment, the death penalty should have the greatest deterrent effect” (Ehrlich,
1977a). Some authors have pointed out (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973), however, that execution
might not be the most severe punishment and it is therefore not a question of whether capital
punishment deters or not. What matters is the question whether capital punishment does signifi-
cantly deter more than the alternative punishment (usually lifelong imprisonment). Nonetheless,
the focus of the majority of studies lies on the absolute deterrent effect of capital punishment.
Among the 82 studies which do include results on the death penalty, almost all use data from
the USA (71) or Canada (5). Avio (1979) is one of the authors using Canadian data. He empha-
sizes that the Canadian time series (1927-1960) is of better quality, compared to the data Ehrlich
(1975a) used. He also points out that “criminal homicide is the relevant variable of interest in an
empirical investigation of the deterrent effect, since an offender may not know in advance the legal
classification of his crime; the courts alone decide whether the homicide was ultimately a murder
or a manslaughter offence”. Even resorting to the results which are most in favor of the deterrence
hypothesis - using 2SLS and various specifications - no deterrent effect of the death penalty is
found. In contrast, Layson (1983) extends Avio’s data to 1977 (the abolishment of the capital
punishment; but only three executions occurred in that extended time frame) and finds significant
15Although a thief may have negative costs because he gains property, these benefits are of minor importance.
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deterrent effects of capital punishment. However, he softens his statement in the conclusion and
puts more emphasis on the fact that there is an important negative time trend in the homicide rate.
A few years later, Avio (1988) published a study in which he puts more attention on the measure-
ment bias of the execution rate. Avio argues that many previous results of studies which use the
simple quotient of executions and convictions are overestimated. He uses the proportion of exe-
cutions to executions and commutations as the probability of execution. He argues that “there is
no readily apparent reason why offenders would utilize a less reliable forecast of their prospects”,
and emphasizes the inferiority of the usual proxies of the risk of execution. Avio (1987) analyzes
two models with Canadian data: a retributive model and a deterrence model and finds that both
are not significantly different but the latter explains more variance.
One of the most popular studies, which fueled much of the following debate about the effec-
tiveness of the death penalty, was Ehrlich (1975a) and Ehrlich (1977a), who finds very significant
deterrent effects of the death penalty. Layson (1985) gives an overview of the ensuing discussion
about misspecification problems, data quality, functional forms and other problems. In his study,
he confirms the deterrent effect of capital punishment but, contrary to Ehrlich, finds no effect of
unemployment or race. Donohue and Wolfers (2005) summarize several studies about the death
penalty in the United States, reevaluate them and fix several mistakes. Additionally, they compare
the United States with Canada and come to the conclusion that all outcomes are too fragile and
that the number of executions is too low to draw any noteworthy and robust conclusion. Using
instrumented variables, while considering serial correlation, Ehrlich and Brower (1987) reevaluate
Ehrlich’s time series data and confirm his previous results. Additionally, they employ a court in-
dex of important sentences to represent the court production function and find that it significantly
deters homicides.
Hoenack and Weiler (1980) use Ehrlich’s (corrected) data and argue that his negative coeffi-
cients of the execution rate probably rely on the reaction of the legal system towards the homicide
rate. By using a different murder supply function they only find the conviction rate to be a signif-
icant deterrent. Passell and Taylor (1977) also criticize Ehrlich’s study by arguing that his results
are not robust (e.g., under different compositions of variables and transformations). In a reply,
Ehrlich (1977b) refutes these arguments, and presents - by using old and new data - new results
which support the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Cover and Thistle (1988) also reevaluate
Ehrlich’s and many subsequent studies and conclude that most of them (all but Layson (1985) de-
pend on the implemented functional form) do not offer stable results and that the deterrent effect
of the death penalty has to remain doubtful. Furthermore, the outcome of a study may largely
depend on the choice of covariates. Depending on their composition, anything from significant
deterrence to absolutely no effect may be found (Leamer, 1983; McManus, 1985; McAleer and
Veall, 1989). Cloninger (1977) picks up on much of the criticism of Ehrlich’s studies and con-
cludes that executions (and partially the imprisonment probability) are deterrents. Yunker (1976)
remarks that old data (UCR data before 1959) is not suitable for studying any deterrent effects (due
to identification problems) and many of the usual problems (measurement bias, omitted variable
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bias, autocorrelation and spurious correlation) can be neglected. He concludes that, using data
after 1959, the death penalty significantly deters. Zhiqiang (2004) also reevaluates Ehrlich’s data
and finds deterrent effects while distinguishing between states with and without death penalty.
Abolishment of the death penalty does not only diminish deterrence in that particular state but
also in the other states.
The death penalty moratorium in the United States in the seventies is used as a natural experi-
ment by many researchers to study the deterrent effect of the death penalty (Chressanthis, 1989).
Almost as much criticism followed these studies. Donohue and Wolfers (2005) emphasize that
“the homicide rate in Canada has moved in virtual lockstep with the rate in the United States,
while approaches to the death penalty have diverged sharply”. While Canada practically stopped
executing in 1962, the United States16 suspended the death penalty from 1972-76. The rise and
fall of the homicide rates in Canada was very similar to that in the U.S. although the death penalty
remained abolished in Canada. A similar event is used as a quasi-experiment by Cloninger and
Marchesini (2001). They use a one-year-moratorium for the death penalty in Texas and find that
homicides significantly increased in that year. After executions were resumed the homicide rate
receded to its former level although the number of executions were doubled. They argue that
this indicates a short-term deterrent effect of the execution rate which diminishes as executions
increase. Some crimes do not happen often enough to calculate a rate. Although this basically
applies to all crimes and deterrence measures (e.g., robberies in city districts on a daily basis) it
may pose a severe problem for executions. Even without a moratorium most countries or states
execute people only rarely (compared to other crimes and punishments). To circumvent this prob-
lem, some authors assume at least one execution in that period; for example, Ehrlich (1975a) does
it to take the logarithm. However, Peck (1976) points out that even very small probabilities may
cause problems in such an analysis. Some authors like Avio (1988) take the average of several
periods or implement a bayesian belief updating system to calculate execution probabilities for
periods without any executions (Layson, 1985).
Levitt (2001) emphasizes that the analysis of panel data is suited better to study the deterrent
effect of the death penalty. He uses U.S. state data from 1950 to 1990 and finds no deterrent effect
of the execution rate. However, when fixed effects are replaced by interaction terms between
state and decade, the imprisonment rate (per capita) is a significant deterrent. He argues that
simple fixed effects are not applicable because the state-effects may slowly change over time.
Berk (2005) points out that some deterrent results may rely heavily on the data from Texas; Texas
executes more people than any other state in the USA. However, in his analysis data from Texas
make up only for 1% of all observations. If these are removed (treating them as outliers) any
deterrent effect of capital punishment disappears.
Zimmerman (2004) argues that the mere existence of the death penalty does not deter, while
16At this point we emphasize that some states abolished the death penalty long ago (Iowa), some states did not
execute anyone on death row for a long time (New Jersey executed no one since 1963 and abolished the death
penalty 2007) while others do execute fairly often (Texas).
2.2 Particularities Regarding Offenses 25
an actual execution does deter within a short time frame (the year the execution takes place). He
calls this an “announcement effect”, which is reflected by significant execution rates but insignif-
icant conviction rates and is supported by the assumption that potential murderers will be better
informed about executions than conviction statistics. Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2003) use panel
data of all U.S. states and find significant effects - but they did (practically) not consider any mea-
sures of the probability of punishment. Dezhbakhsh et al. (2001) do so in another panel data study
and find significant effects for all deterrents (arrest-, conviction- and execution rate). However, to
be on death row without a pending execution lowers the deterrent effect of the conviction proba-
bility for homicide. Both approaches are combined by Shepherd (2004) who uses monthly panel
data. The execution rate and the time on death row are found to be significant deterrents. She con-
cludes that an execution has a short-termed deterrent effect - especially in conjunction with a short
time on death row. She also emphasizes that many lower homicide rates in states without a death
penalty are actually higher when they are adjusted (i.e., standardized by demographic factors).
Grogger (1990) uses high frequency data and studies very short termed effects of executions on a
daily basis (7-14 days before and after an execution) but cannot detect any deterrent effect. Katz
et al. (2003) doubt that a deterrent effect of the death penalty (when it exists) can be shown with
the usual data because the variation in the crime rates is simply not large enough: there “simply
does not appear to be enough information in the data on capital punishment to reliably estimate
a deterrent effect”. Moreover, Donohue and Wolfers (2005) note that the debate about the death
penalty “may be driven by ideology and advocacy motives”. It may even be possible that statistical
complexity is used to “silence the debate rather than enlighten policymakers”. This is especially
important in the case of capital punishment: “unfortunately, the history of the death penalty debate
is replete with examples of plausibility being sacrificed on the altar of sophistication”.
A completely different financial approach is taken by Cloninger (1992) who interprets the dif-
ferent crime types as assets a criminal can invest in. Therefore, the problem that “those conditions
that cause crime rates to rise in general may induce increases in the homicide rate that overwhelm
the negative effect produced by executions” may be avoided. He concludes that executions (al-
most) only affect the homicide rate and deterrence is effective. Instead of the usual UCR data,
Sloan et al. (1994) employ data from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and find
that the death penalty and more police are related to less homicides. Avio (1979) notes that in the
USA, in 1950, the number of people killed during police operations was three times higher than
those executed (while it was only half as large in Canada).
Cloninger and Marchesini (2001) emphasize that it is not a single study which “causes any
neutral observer pause” but the sheer number of different studies using different data and method-
ologies which come to the same conclusion that capital punishment deters. However, Donohue
and Wolfers (2005) point out that these “estimates may reflect omitted factors related to the politi-
cal economy of punishment”. A feedback effect may lead to positive (or less negative) correlations
because the increased crime rates may increase the demand for more punishment. A contrary ef-
fect may be induced when “more vigorous deployment of the death penalty might occur at the
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same time that the government elects to get tough on crime”. In this case, all punishments are ex-
pected to get harsher and used more often such that the deterrent effect of the death penalty pales
in comparison. Furthermore, the public support for the death penalty may depend on the current
crime rates: more homicides may frustrate the public and lead to more executions or, when the
execution rates remains constant, undermine the support of the death penalty.
Whether or not there is a general deterrent effect, there is certainly a diminishing effect on crime
“since execution eliminates categorically the possibility of recidivism” (Ehrlich, 1975a).
2.2.3 Drugs
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from
here?” “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to”,
said the Cat. “I don’t much care where. . . ”, said Alice. “Then it
doesn’t matter which way you go”, said the Cat. “So long as I
get somewhere”, Alice added as an explanation. “Oh, you’re
sure to do that”, said the Cat, “If you only walk long enough.”
Lewis Caroll, Alice in Wonderland, 1865
Drug consumption can lead to increasing crime rates. Either due to physical or psychic conse-
quences of the drug consumption itself or crimes committed to obtain the required money to buy
drugs. Additionally, solving problems between drug dealers or consumers cannot be moderated
by the police and may lead to more violent crime (Resignato, 2000). Using a German state panel,
Entorf and Winker (2002) find that drug crimes significantly influence rape and property crimes.
As a consequence, ignoring the drug issue in a study of deterrence may introduce a small positive
bias. However, Resignato (2000) cannot find such effects in a study of 24 U.S. cities.
Since institutional resources are limited, redeploying police resources from other offenses to-
wards drug related crimes may reduce the latter but increase all other crimes (Benson et al., 2001;
Resignato, 2000). Moreover, any distortion of the drug market equilibrium is assumed to be ac-
companied by violent crime. Rasmussen et al. (1993) and Benson et al. (1998) also study this
effect by analyzing the interdependencies between violent, Index I or Index II crimes and drug
related arrests in Florida. Indeed, they conclude that the increased efforts on the war against drugs
lead to an increase of other offenses. Benson et al. (1992) argue in the same fashion that only a
small portion of drug-criminals commit property crimes (20%) and react to changes of deterrence
measures in regard to property crimes. Since in the USA arrestees of drug crimes are generally
imprisoned, overcrowded prisons might lower deterrence overall and thus lead to more property
crimes. This could even imply more illegal income for drug users and more drug consumption.
The same is observed for the homicide rate. An increase of drug enforcement activity by 1% is
associated with an increase of the homicide rate by about 0.1%−0.17% (Brumm and Cloninger,
1995a). Therefore, it makes more sense to concentrate on property crimes which would decrease
the income and consumption of at least those drug users who rely on property crime.
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On the other hand, Kaplan (1983) argues that it may be just the illegality of drugs which leads
to more illegal activities and not the drug usage itself. Illegality implies more problems getting or
remain employed, forces prices upwards and drug users into a criminal subculture. Furthermore,
recidivism is much lower for those convicted for drug offenses only than those who also engage
in non-drug crimes (Kim et al., 1993). However, measuring drug consumption might is difficult
(Entorf and Winker, 2002). Using drug casualties is unappropriate (because it depends on thy
quality and type of drugs, lags, etc.) as well as is the number of new drug consumers (inaccurate
approximation). They resort to the official number of drug offenses although this is also not
perfect.
Another aspect is that the police may succumb to other incentives. In the USA the Federal Com-
prehensive Crime Act of 1984 allowed the police to keep the proceeds from assets seized. Mast
et al. (2000) find that the police spend, as a consequence, too much resources on drug enforce-
ment activities instead of drug treatment. In this context it should be mentioned that according to
Swimmer (1974a), too much money is spent on the police in cities with low and medium levels of
crime while police expenditures are too low in high-crime cities.
Silverman and Spruill (1977) point out that the price of cocaine explains much of the varia-
tion in crime. The type of drug and its consumer is also important when considering deterrence.
DeSimone and Farrelly (2003) analyze the effectiveness of increases in the price and enforcement
of marijuana and cocaine on the consumption by male adults and youths. They find that adults -
juvenile drug demand is not price sensitive at all - decrease consumption of both drugs when the
price of cocaine increases (see also DeSimone (2001)); increasing prices for marijuana has no ef-
fect at all. Enforcement, measured by the probability of arrest for possession of these drugs, seem
to be effective. Cross-arrest effects indicate that these drugs are complementary goods. Farrelly et
al. (1999) conclude that even marijuana and legal drugs are complementary goods and that deter-
rence is affective for adults but not for youths. This is supported by McGeorge and Aitken (1997)
who study Australian students in states where the usage of cannabis is legal and states where it
is illegal. No differences were found at all - only the knowledge of related laws and penalties
were somewhat inaccurate. Lenton (2000) summarizes some studies about the criminalization of
possessing and using marijuana in Australia and finds that there is neither a general nor a specific
deterrent effect. Therefore, the famous false-signal effect of the legalization of marijuana is in-
valid (because nobody reacts to this signal) and the stigma of such a drug record has only negative
effects on the further life of the delinquent. Burkett and Jensen (1975) point out that, surveying
senior-class students from three U.S. high schools, conventional ties and peer involvement may be
even more important than the subjective probability of detection. Nevertheless, that probability is
negatively influencing the consumption frequency significantly.
A very good testing ground can be found in the U.S. military and their no-tolerance drug pol-
icy. The personnel is randomly tested and any drug detection is followed by immediate dismissal.
These constellation should provide very clear results. However, while the harsh punishment sig-
nificantly deters (Mehay and Pacula, 1999), the effects are not as strong as expected. In a very
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similar setting, Borack (1998) compares the U.S. Navy and the general population and concludes
that the random testing in the Navy deters much (over 50%) of the potential drug usage.
2.2.4 Tax Evasion
In fact, the puzzle of tax compliance is that most people
continue to pay their taxes. [. . . ] Although it is clear that
detection and punishment affect compliance to a degree, it is
equally clear that these factors cannot explain all, or even most,
tax compliance behavior.
Alm et al. (1992b)
In general, it is assumed that tax evasion has a fairly low detection probability which is usually
overestimated by the public and is punishable by fines or imprisonment. As for other offenses, the
results for tax evasion are mixed. Feld and Frey (2004) remark that “taxpayers should evade more
than they actually do”.
As is reported now and then for usual crimes, Isachsen et al. (1985) find, using Norwegian data,
deterrent effects of the detection probability and the severity of punishment. However, Sheffrin
and Triest (1992) point out that the effect of the detection probability may be overestimated when
the interaction between authorities and tax payers is not considered. They survey U.S. tax payers
and find that quarrels with the authority slightly deters but also reduces the subjective probabil-
ity of future detection. Subsequently this might lower future tax returns and reduce any stigma
effect. Additionally, menacing actions by the authority may backfire while factual and technical
arguments foster tax honesty. This complies with the notion by Anderson and Stafford (2003) that
people tend to to follow the “lightning doesn’t strike twice” saying: once an offense is detected
the perceived probability of a future detection is reduced by a large margin. The availability thesis
(Spicer and Hero, 1985) implies a contrary conclusion: people adjust their subjective probability
of detection upwards when they are caught and downwards otherwise.
Alm et al. (1990b) disentangle regular tax payments (including tax avoidance) and tax evasion
in Jamaica in regard to tax rates and deterrence. They find that increased deterrence leads to a
reallocation from tax evasion to tax avoidance accompanied with a small reduction in the overall
tax revenues. Another aspect is that increasing taxes may even increase all (property) crimes
because taxes are only paid for legal activities which increases the incentives for illegal income
generation (Vire´n, 2001).
It may also be important to distinguish more and less severe tax evasion. Smith (1992) finds that
the probability to be caught for minor tax evasion does deter while that for severe tax evasion does
not. Deterrence seems to work very well when the tax payers have accurate information about the
detection probability but does not work at all when this information is not available (Spicer and
Thomas, 1982). Thurman (1991) distinguishes between the “sin of omission” and “sin of com-
mission”: while the first relates to underreporting (omitting some income) and may be passive,
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the latter refers to the active action of overstating deduction. All in all, he can’t find any deterrent
effects but overstated deduction is affected by the perceived threat of guilt. Sheffrin and Triest
(1992) conclude that self-reports are more suited for research than audit-reports because many vi-
olations happen by mistake. Likewise, Beron et al. (1988) classify overstated deductions as easy
and underreporting as hard to detect. Moreover, they give a short description of how the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) detects possible tax evaders by looking for outliers in the reporting behav-
ior. They find a significant but minor deterrent effect of the audit probability. Bosco and Mittone
(1997) made an experiment with 60 Italian students and find no effect of the audit probability. Fur-
thermore, the amount of evaded taxes is too high when the audit probability is of medium size and
the main influencing factors are moral necessities. Pudney et al. (2000b) distinguish between the
decision to evade and the evaded amount. Using an experiment with 270 Turkish people they con-
clude that the tax rate influences both the probability and the evaded amount while the expected
sanctions only affect the former. Similar evidence is found by Benjamini and Maital (1985) who
find that increasing the tax rate fosters tax evasion while the probability of detection has no major
impact. They add that the probability of detection is underestimated and that risk averse people
evade less. Bosco and Mittone (1997) remark that the degree of risk aversion is more important
than the audit probability.
However, Hessing et al. (1988) cast some doubt on results based on surveys. They use both a
survey and official data from the Netherlands and come to the conclusion that there is no correla-
tion between them and their implications contradict each other. A different approach is to measure
tax evasion by comparing the national accounts measure of primary income and the income re-
ported to the tax authorities (Feld and Frey, 2004).
Tax evasion or the attitude towards free riding17 is often studied with laboratory experiments
(usually playing games with students). Evading taxes does not exclude anyone from the consump-
tion of public goods. As an example, Anderson and Stafford (2003) let U.S. students spend money
on a public good or keep it. The public good had a doubled return, distributed among all students.
Keeping was detected and punished at different rates and with various sentences (the parameters
of the experiment). In theory, depending on the expected punishment, free riding or keep nothing
are dominant strategies. They find that the probability and severity of punishment are effective but
not the expected punishment. They conclude that probability and severity are not substitutes and
these results are applicable to tax evasion. Indeed, Friedland et al. (1978) also report in an experi-
ment - keeping the expected punishment constant - that monetary fines deter while the probability
of detection does not. Park and Hyun (2003) use an experiment with 15 students in South Korea
and find that the penalty rate deters more than the audit rate. Furthermore, tax education improves
tax honesty and there is an obvious tendency towards free riding. Small detection probabilities are
overestimated and, even when these are zero, some participants remain honest (Alm et al., 1992b).
When players are allowed to punish other players for free riding, the free-riding strategy remains
17“One would like everyone else to pay true tax while evading oneself.” (Benjamini and Maital, 1985)
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dominant. Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) made an experiment with Swiss students and find that these
do - contrary to theory - make fairly often use of the punishment option, thereby reaching even
more efficient states. The cooperation is even higher when the players know each other. How-
ever, Bosco and Mittone (1997) point out that evading taxes may even increase welfare when the
taxpayer is convinced that he is paying too much taxes relative to the provided public goods.
Benjamini and Maital (1985) emphasize the phenomenon of sub-certainty in the context of tax
evasion: the sum of the weighted probabilities V (p) and V (1− p) is smaller than one. Further-
more, very low probabilities are often overweighed. A similar problem is reported by Casey and
Scholz (1991) who observe that people do weigh single probabilities equally to the product of
multiple probabilities (of similar size). In an experiment the subjects were confronted with either
a single punishment probability or several probabilities (detection-, conviction- and punishment
probability). While both probabilities of punishment were equal the latter was perceived to be
higher. Spicer and Hero (1985) note that - under great uncertainty - people tend to replace rational
optimization by some rule of thumb.
Analyzing experiments with U.S. students Alm et al. (1990a) find that tax amnesties as well
as the penalty for tax evasion has not the intended effects. Neither does an increased penalty nor
does an amnesty foster tax revenues. However, a combined strategy (a tax amnesty followed by
increased penalties) does lead to significantly increased tax revenues. According to Ritsema et al.
(2003), people directly affected by an amnesty can be categorized using three groups (intentional,
unintentional and neutral) who behave differently. While the lack of money is a main reason of
tax evasion for intentional noncompliance, perceived unfairness by the system is important for the
neutral group. No such main influences are found for unintentional noncompliance.
When dealing with tax evasion it is also important to consider the general attitude towards
the tax system. Fairness (the treatment by the authorities) and reciprocity (the individual acts
as the masses do) influence tax evasion behavior. A respectful treatment by the authorities can
bolster tax morale while an authoritarian treatment can crowd it out (Feld and Frey, 2004). While
fairness has a positive influence it mainly affects those people who had already contact with the
authorities (Smith, 1992) but has only little direct effects on all others (Scott and Grasmick, 1981).
Normative responsibility and deterrence are found to be complementary factors (Smith, 1992).
However, Alm et al. (1992b) find no difference in the formal addressing, with and without explicit
reference to tax evasion, indicating the absence of a normative influence. In a small experiment
with eight students Alm et al. (1992b) also analyze the formulation of the experiment (one neutral
and one explicitly mentioning tax evasion) but found no differences and thus neglect moral factors.
Perceived fairness may also be negatively affected by the probability of detection and thus even
lower the tax revenue (Frey and Feld, 2002). Fortin et al. (2004) employ an experiment with
Canadian students and - avoiding unobserved heterogeneity and identification problems - come to
the conclusion that the audit probability does not deter and only fairness effects are significant.
The general attitude towards the tax system is also studied by Steenbergen et al. (1992). Although
the knowledge of a tax reform and its social consequences are found to be important, the overall
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effects are negligible.
While, in general, richer people are found to evade more, people from the middle class do al-
most not evade at all (Beron et al., 1988). However, Alm et al. (1992a) find in an experiment with
U.S. students that tax evasion increases when income decreases or tax rates increase. Spicer and
Lundstedt (1976) point out that some tax evasion may occur to balance perceived unfairness be-
cause many believe that only the rich and companies are responsible for tax deficits. Attitudes and
behavior in regard to tax evasion may also vary between different groups. Ge¨rxhani and Schram
(2006) compare pupils, students, teacher and university staff in the Netherlands and Albania. They
find that the audit probability does deter in the Netherlands but not in Albania. Furthermore, the
differences within the groups are in some cases larger than across the two countries.
2.2.5 Environmental Offenses
They are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they
can see nothing but sea.
Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, 1605
The most frequently studied environmental offense is the spillage of oil in rivers, harbors or
oceans. Weber and Crew (2000) study oil spillage in the ocean. They use the fines and the prob-
ability and celerity of punishment as deterrents and find that all but the probability are effective.
Anderson and Talley (1995) distinguish the detection probability by the vessel type and conclude
that it is only effective for barges but not for tankers while shipping under the U.S. flag is the
most important determinant. Epple and Visscher (1984) employ data of the U.S. coastguard on
an individual and aggregated level. Using the spill size and the spill rate they find strong enforce-
ment effects. Cohen (1987) also studies tankers and barges and the effects of the surveillance of
oil transfers, patrols and inspections. In regard to the size of the spills the former are effective
deterrents while inspections are not. Gawande and Wheeler (1999) use the U.S. coast guard as a
representative for a non-profit governmental organization. They use poisson regressions of acci-
dents (fatal, non-fatal and pollution) on inspection-hours and conclude that inspections deter and
do not depend on the specific type of inspection (hull, machine or books). Grau and Groves (1997)
emphasize that the detection probability is the most important deterrent and that fines play no role
because they are too low. Weber and Crew (2000) report exactly the opposite: while fines and the
celerity of punishment effectively deter, the probability of detection does not.
Aside from oil spillage, most other studies are concerned with waste regulations, e.g., Stafford
(2002) or Magat and Viscusi (1990), or water pollution (Storey, 1979). Magat and Viscusi (1990)
find strong immediate deterrent effects of inspections in the pulp and paper industry on pollution
levels and the rate of compliance. Storey (1979) finds only very mixed results for water pollution
in England and Wales (where the “consent on local level” approach is used in contrast to the U.S.
approach of “one law for all”) with monetary fines seeming to be the most effective deterrent. It
may be argued that some deterrence - especially for companies with a good reputation - result
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from reputation effects. However, according to Karpoff et al. (1998) this seems not to be the case;
at least not for listed companies. They find that legal penalties, which do not correlate with firm
size and are hard to predict, are decisive and that these legal penalties reduce the share values
while the reputation effect is negligible.
There are even some studies dealing with rather odd topics like the attitude towards fishing
quotas (Hatcher et al., 1999). They use a survey of English fishermen and find that - considering
the feedback effect between the subjective probability of detection and exceeding the quota - the
probability is a significant deterrent. Moral and peer influences are also very important while the
attitude towards the legitimacy of the quotas is not. Similar results are found by Furlong (1991)
who surveys Canadian fishermen. The subjective detection probability and the conviction rate de-
ter; although not significant, the expected punishment is more effective than a licence revocation.
2.2.6 Drunk Driving
In nature there are no rewards or punishments; there are
consequences.
Horace A. Vachell, The Face of Clay, 1906
Although economists are normally less skeptical towards the deterrence doctrine than sociolo-
gists and criminologists, this relationship is reversed for DUI offenses (Benson et al., 2000). This
may result from the notion that the perceived probabilities are so low in practice that the reac-
tions should be inelastic. Aside from the large number of potentially drunk drivers there might
be another reason for low detection and arrest probabilities in the USA: most people who drink
and drive come from “middle income groups with more political ties”. Policemen might be more
reluctant to arrest them, especially for states without breath-test laws which allow immediate legal
tests of the Blood Alcohol Content (BAC), as Saffer and Chaloupka (1989) point out.
Nevertheless, there are basically three classes of instruments for the government to influence
drunk driving (Stout et al., 2000): administrative regulation, criminal laws and tort liability. Ad-
ministrative regulation can affect the behavior of consumers via regulation of the alcohol industry
(which influence the consumption of alcohol). This can be achieved by a monopoly control sys-
tem (state owned stores or licensing), advertising practises or by influencing the price of alcohol
(via taxes). Criminal laws are meant to deter, although some also incapacitate (either by imprison-
ing or license revocation). Among such laws are mandatory minimum punishments (fines or jail
or license revocation), fines, ban of open containers of alcohol in vehicles, administrative per se
laws, sobriety checkpoints and many others. These are meant to increase the severity, certainty or
celerity of punishment, thereby deterring DUI. Tort liability laws impose “civil penalties, usually
in the form of monetary damages, on those who are found to be at fault in causing harm”. For
example, dram shop and social host laws allow people injured by an alcohol-impaired person to
sue those who have served the alcohol to that person.
BAC limits are widely used to define and reduce drunken driving. Mann et al. (2001) give an
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overview of studies analyzing the introduction or change of BAC limits in an international context.
While there is a great variety in results, there seems to be some beneficial effect in almost all cases.
Although many of these effects are only small or temporary, there are also some lasting effects
to be found. Nonetheless, these effects seem to be attributable to general deterrence and are not
only applicable to driver with BAC levels around the legal limit. Stout et al. (2000) cite several
studies which report mixed results for administrative regulation and criminal laws. However, they
are confident that tort liability is a useful tool to reduce DUI.
Similar to the cascade from detection to punishment (refer to page 43), the same principle
should apply to laws in the context of DUI-offenses. As Saffer and Chaloupka (1989) note,
laws which increase the detection probability (e.g., breath-test laws, reduced BAC limits, sobriety
checkpoints, etc.) should be, in theory, more effective than subsequent laws (e.g., minimum terms,
licence revocation, etc.).
Most studies about DUI can be classified into two categories: surveys or natural experiments.
The latter usually consist of an analysis of one or more laws introduced at a certain point in time
and its influence on accidents or DUI-related arrests (usually with dummies in a time series anal-
ysis). For example, Evans et al. (1991); Mann et al. (2002); Ross and Klette (1995); Chaloupka
et al. (1993); Rogers and Schoenig (1994); Foss et al. (1998) and Glass (1968) use such regime
changes. However, as Maghsoodloo et al. (1988) point out, such new laws are likely to be effec-
tive only when the perceived difference (before and after the law change) is large enough and an
education effect can take place. Surveys are often used in conjunction with young people who are
generally assumed to be more prone to drunken driving. For example, Rabow et al. (1987) ask
young college students about their drinking and driving habits. Classic deterrence variables like
the probability of detection or knowing DUI-victims are not significant. However, beside social
influences, the knowledge of reducing the risk of apprehension (e.g., knowing how to cover ones
own drunkenness) is effective. Richardson (2003) considers potential influences of the subjective
probability of detection, pointing out that drunken people are, per definition, not fully rational and
are no longer capable of assessing the risks, costs and probability of being caught. Among several
new laws introduced at state level, only the introduction of sobriety checkpoints found to be sig-
nificant. Licence revocation is considered more severe than fines or imprisonment. Nevertheless,
none of these punishments are significantly influencing the individual drinking-and-driving habits.
Many authors argue that laws and other deterrents only apply to a small group of potential
drunk drivers (Houston and Richardson, 2004; Soper and Thompson, 1990). While non-drinkers
do not react per definition, hardcore drinkers are also assumed to be unaffected in their habits
(Yu, 2000; Foss et al., 1998). Thus, only those people who belong to neither of these two groups
can be deterred (Mann et al., 2003). Indeed, studying U.S. high school seniors who had drunk in
the last 30 days, Grosvenor et al. (1999) find that only those react to the probability of detection
(but not to the severity of punishment) who are characterized as binge drinkers while all others
do not react at all. Similarly, in the case of general traffic laws, Ross et al. (1990) argue that such
laws mostly affect people who already drive carefully and not the targeted group which is rather
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immune to such threats. Furthermore, the knowledge of DUI-laws is, especially in the USA, quite
low and heterogeneously distributed. According to Berger and Marelich (1997), only 30% know
the actual BAC limit while more than 80% of all Australians and Norwegians do. Although the
sanctions in the USA are more severe than in Norway these are judged less relevant in the USA.
Although such knowledge increased in the eighties, this was accompanied by a large reduction in
the perceived probability of detection (Snortum and Berger, 1989). The knowledge of DUI-laws is
extraordinarily poor for non-drinkers and notorious drinkers (Kenkel and Koch, 2001). Foss et al.
(1998) report that heavy drinkers may recognize law changes and their effect on the probability and
severity of punishment but think that they are not affected. However, Berger and Snortum (1986)
do not find any correlation between this knowledge and drunken driving. A representative survey
of Canadian people analyzed by Wilson and Jonah (1985) indicates that the alcohol consumption
of the past seven days is the best predictor for DUI, as well as that non-drinking drivers have
the highest and impaired drinking driver have the lowest risk perception. They conclude that
“impaired driving may be just one [. . . ] syndrome typified by high-risk behavior”. Similarly,
Mann et al. (1996) conclude that alcohol consumption is the most important factor affecting fatal
accidents while membership of Alcoholics Anonymous is negatively related to the latter.
Others argue that positive general deterrence may be more important than negative general
deterrence. In the USA grassroots organizations like Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD,
founded in 1980) have increased public awareness of the DUI-problem and initiated an anticipa-
tory deterrent effect (Rogers and Schoenig, 1994). According to Snortum and Berger (1989), the
government began to take concrete action in 1983. Many laws to diminish the DUI-problem fol-
lowed and, depending on the employed data set, distinguishing these two effects can be difficult.
Evans et al. (1991) find weak evidence for some combinations of new laws but conclude that the
reduction of accidents was more likely to be caused by the increased awareness of the general
public. Berger and Snortum (1986) claim that the moral attitude is more important than deter-
rence. Berger and Marelich (1997) also emphasize that it is important to differentiate between
general prevention in the context of deterrence and norms (for example, Norwegians disapprove
of drunken driving in general while Americans do not). Snortum and Berger (1989) add that men
in the USA “have traditionally carried both a social obligation to drink and a social responsibil-
ity to drive”. He also concludes that laws seem to have only short term effects (the probability of
punishment is overestimated in the beginning and then wears off) while there is a long term educa-
tional effect. While summing up studies dealing with jail terms and drunken driving (in the USA)
in regard to specific and general deterrence, Voas (1986) notes that “drinking and driving was
socially acceptable and juries tended to be lax in their treatment of offenders”. He also remarks
that the “more subtle role of the jail sentence in conditioning public attitudes toward drinking and
driving by raising the penalty for committing this offense” had not been studied at all.
Vingilis et al. (1988) use impulse functions and monthly data on fatal accidents with and without
alcohol. Fatal accidents are well suited for this purpose because everyone involved has to be
tested for alcohol. They study the effect of a law in Ontario which requires a drunken driver to
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be deprived of his driving licence for 12 hours. They conclude that there is probably a deterrent
effect but it quickly diminishes after a few months. The rapid deterioration of a deterrent effect
is a result which is also found in many other studies. Mann et al. (2002) also use Canadian data
(from Ontario) where drunken drivers are deprived of their licence for 90 days. Although the
results are somewhat mixed they tend to favor a deterrent effect. Fatal accidents (total, at night,
youths and youths at night) are also studied by Saffer and Chaloupka (1989) for U.S. states. Using
cross section and fixed effects estimations they conclude that all analyzed breath testing laws are
significantly deterring drunk driving. These results are contradicted by Ruhm (1996) who finds no
such effects but argues that an omitted variable bias (omitted influence of grass root organizations
like MADD and beer taxes) are responsible for an overestimation of the deterrent effect. The
most important variable he - as well as Chaloupka et al. (1993) - identifies are beer taxes. More
expensive beer leads to less drinking which implies less drinking and driving. Berger and Snortum
(1986) also state that the general consumption of alcohol is more important than deterrence and,
according to Ruhm (1996), more robust to alternative specifications. Using a large bunch of
deterrence variables in an U.S. panel Whetten-Goldstein et al. (2000) also find no obvious effects
on fatal accidents (except administrative per se laws for adults and minimum fines for youths).
Similarly, Mullahy and Sindelar (1994) use individual and state data from the USA and conclude
that many law adjustments had no effect (not even short termed). Only fines, licence revocation
and beer taxes have large deterrent effects. However, using data from the NCHS (in regard to
alcohol related mortality), Sloan et al. (1994) find no effect of fines and licence revocation (and
minimum jail terms as well) while they find a deterrent effect of dram shop laws and the police on
fatal accidents.
Levitt and Porter (2001) present a model which is capable of deriving the participation rate in
fatal accidents - without knowing the actual numbers - under the assumption of equal mixing:
homogeneity in time (year, weekend, hour) and regions. With that model the increased risk of a
drunken driver of being involved in a fatal accident can be estimated. Taxes on alcohol and fines
are studied and they report that punishment is effective for those individuals without prior records.
While those already convicted are more careful and less noticeable. Another unusual approach is
taken by Sloan and Githens (1994) who analyze premium penalties imposed by insurers for drunk
driving and other chargeable accidents. Using a survey of insurers they find that “imposing pre-
mium surcharges for a charge of drunk driving has a significant deterrent effect on the probability
of drinking and driving”.
Another aspect is the implementation of new or harsher laws in practice. For example, Ross
(1987a) reports that the introduction of an administrative licence revocation law (to increase the
swiftness of punishment) had a small deterrent effect which could have been greater if the police
and judges would have made more use of it. A large portion of his study deals with the accep-
tance and usage of that law by the police and judges and the - at best, mediocre - coverage by
the media. Soper and Thompson (1990) also report that deterrence is only found to be effective
when it is implemented efficiently; e.g., by training of the police accompanied with a good infor-
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mation policy and coordination. Harsher sentences and fines may even have some perverse effect
because offender will more often insist on trials and appeals and thus lengthen the time frame
between delinquency and punishment (Ross et al., 1990), thereby reducing the deterrent effect of
the celerity of punishment.
Although U.S. data is used very often, there are several studies analyzing other countries. Es-
pecially, Scandinavian countries are quite often subject of DUI-studies because “it is common
knowledge that among the advanced industrial nations, they have some of the most restrictive reg-
ulations in regard to the availability of alcoholic beverages for sale, and that they maintain some of
the most punitive and rigorously enforced laws with respect to drunkenness and driving” (Votey,
1978). Ross and Klette (1995) use the “abandonment of mandatory jail for impaired drivers in
Norway and Sweden” but do not find any significant effect with an interrupted time series ap-
proach. Ross (1975) uses time series from Norway and Sweden and, finding no effects, dismisses
the notion that the DUI laws in Scandinavia have a measurable impact as the “the Scandinavian
Myth” implies. However, Votey and Shapiro (1983) use Swedish data on a monthly basis and find
that the expected jail time and fines have some deterrent effect while the arrest rate and licence
revocation have large deterrent effects. Using data from Norway and Sweden, Votey (1978) finds
deterrent effects of the probability of punishment as well.
The costs of combating DUI are addressed in Kenkel (1993). Using survey and panel data he
finds that indirect (for example, taxes on alcohol) and direct measures (e.g., minimum sentence,
checkpoints) are effective but costly. Especially, laws and taxes usually affect all people - even
those who never drink and drive. On the other hand, some deterrent measures (like fines) work
by generating costs (almost) only for the offender. Likewise, Votey and Shapiro (1983) point out
that licence revocation lays the burden on the individual offender while jail time, for example, has
to be paid by the whole society. Levitt and Porter (2001) calculate the costs of accidents (under
the influence of alcohol, using U.S. data) to be 16-30 cents per mile. If these external cost were
internalized, each arrest would have to be accompanied by an 8000$ fine.
2.2.7 Crime Switching
To see what is general in what is particular, and what is
permanent in what is transitory, is the aim of scientific thought.
Alfred N. Whitehead, An Introduction to Mathematics, 1911
Koskela and Vire´n (1997) present a crime-switching model in which criminals switch from
on type of crime to another, if the expected punishment makes one type offense less attractive.
They test their model with Finnish crime data (vehicle theft and robberies) and relative arrest and
punishment rates. They find deterrent effects which support their hypothesis. In another study,
Koskela and Vire´n (1994) partition the general populations into criminals and non-criminals by
their productivity in the legal sector (using wages, tax rates, social payments, punishment, etc.).
Using Finnish data of auto thefts, they find “that the rate of return from illegal activity has a
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positive, and the apprehension rate and the severity of punishment a negative, effect on auto thefts
both in the short run and in the long run”. Again, they find evidence for the applicability of their
crime-switching model. This view is supported by Holtmann and Yap (1978) who use crime and
imprisonment rates in the USA for robbery, burglary and theft. Although not the focus of the
study, Fabrikant (1979) also finds such changes in a mixture of offenses when the probability of
failure (of an offense) changes. In a similar way, Levitt (1998c) argues that violent crimes are
substitutes for each other (as well as property crimes) and uses this assumption to distinguish
deterrence from incapacitation. In contrast, no substitution effect is found by Merrifield (1997), if
the expected return of the former offense diminishes.
2.2.8 Youths
Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything
that counts can be counted.
Albert Einstein
Generally youths, in contrast to adults, are threatened with less severe punishments. While these
form of clemency is accepted world wide, there may be unintended consequences. Levitt (1998a)
points out that juvenile violent crime did grow twice as quickly as that of adults in the eighties and
nineties ins the USA. He finds that sixty percent of this difference can be explained by the more
lenient punishment of juvenile offenders. There is a sharp drop when youths reach adulthood
but there appears to be no strong relationship between the criminal involvement before and after
reaching adulthood. In Levitt and Lochner (2001) they employ a different set of data and find,
using a differences-in-differences model, that crime is reduced in the transition phase between the
age of 17 and 18. However, these reductions are not significant in most cases. In regard to property
crime, there is weak evidence that youth- and adult crimes are substitutes (youths replaces adults)
while there is also weak evidence that they are complements (adults are role models for youths)
in regard to violent crime (Levitt, 1998a).
Mocan and Rees (2005) cite several studies which note that youths in the USA do not (or only
very weakly) react to deterrence measures and become more violent in their criminal actions.
They use representative micro data of 1995 and come to the conclusion that “juveniles do respond
to incentives and sanctions as predicted by economic theory”. Furthermore, the ratio between
male and female juvenile offenders is about two to one.
2.2.9 Other Offenses and Laws
The plural of anecdote is not data.
Roger Brinner
Besides the offenses already mentioned, several other very interesting types are considered in
the literature.
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Gun Laws
Canada introduced a law in 1977 to restrict the carrying of firearms. In principal, such laws
can have two different consequences: potential offenders may have less access to firearms which
would lead to fewer armed robberies; or more victims are unarmed and become easier to rob which
would lead to an increase of armed robberies. Mauser and Maki (2003) study robbery, armed
robbery and armed robbery with firearms in Canada during that time. They use all combinations
of covariates and do not find, using OLS, any consistent results (halve of the results support
deterrence theory, the other halve does not). GLS showed a slight positive effect of the law,
implying that robbers, who tend to ignore such laws, have larger chances to encounter unarmed
victims. The probability and severity of punishment are correctly signed but not significant.
John Lott and David Mustard are probably the most popular advocates for “right-to-carry con-
cealed handgun gun” laws in the scientific literature18. In Lott and Mustard (1997) they use county
panel data of the USA and find, relying on dummy variables, large significant effects of such laws
for Index I crimes and substitution effects into property crimes. Additionally, they conclude that
the monetary gains (by deterred crimes) are much larger than the marginal monetary drawbacks
(e.g., deadly incidents).
Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (1998) reevaluate Lott’s data and refrain from using dummy variables
to analyze the effect of such laws. Instead, they compare the coefficients of the exogenous vari-
ables of two different regressions: counties with and without such laws. If the change of the
parameters is significant, concealed-handgun-laws have an effect. Overall, only murder is slightly
reduced by the usage of such gun laws for some states (which do not have such a law). The
positive effect on many robbery rates is explained by the low potential threat of concealed guns
because robbers are often already armed and thus protected against armed resistance. In another
study, Dezhbakhsh et al. (2001) use Lott’s data and find that NRA (National Rifle Association)
memberships are associated with higher murder rates. Cook and Ludwig (2002) add that guns
provide a valuable loot for offenders and, using data from the UCR and NCVS, conclude that the
deterrent effect is outweighed by the increased incentives. A different approach is implemented
by Ludwig (1998). He utilizes the minimum age required to possess a gun and the age information
of the cleared homicides. If these gun laws do deter, the homicide rates for adults should decrease
while the rates for juveniles should be unaffected (or increase in the case of replacement). Using
a differences-in-differences-in-differences approach, he cannot find any deterrent effect. Summa-
rizing the literature, Levitt (2004) concentrates on the receding crime in the USA in the 90s and
concludes that gun control laws and carrying concealed guns laws had no effect.
In an a answer to Black and Nagin (1998), who point out several flaws in Lott’s work, Lott
harshly rejects their criticism and gives a reevaluation of his data set and shows that violent crime
increased until the gun laws were passed and than sharply dropped after a short lag (Lott, 1998).
Very strong deterrent effects are also found by Bronars and Lott (1998) who add that there also
18A large portion of the literature about this topic is somehow related to Lott.
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exist serious spillover effects because “criminals tend to move across communities more readily
in response to changes in concealed handgun laws than in response to changes in arrest rates”.
Studying safe-storage gun laws Lott and Whitley (2001) find no evidence that such laws “reduce
either juvenile accidental gun deaths or suicides”. Contrarily, they report that these laws “impair
people’s ability to use guns defensively” and even increase violent and property crime.
Sports
Several authors utilize changes of rules in the world of sports. McCormick and Tollison (1984)
use an annual basketball tournament in the United States (1954-1983) to draw conclusions from
sports concerning the effect of the police on the arrest rate and subsequently the crime rate. They
analyze the introduction of a third referee in 1979 and find that the number of fouls are reduced by
34% while the number of false decisions is also reduced. Additionally, the variance of the results
diminish and the games end with higher scores. They conclude that more police should indeed
reduce crime.
Studying the introduction of a second referee in the National Hockey League (NHL) in some
games of the season 1998/99, Allen (2002) reports that the number of detected fouls increased.
This effect is declared to be a reporting effect (more “offenses” can be detected with a second
referee). The model used can explain non-violent fouls very well while violent fouls seem to hap-
pen randomly. The failure to detect any deterrent effect may result from the usage of inadequate
data as Levitt (2002a) points out. In his model, using the same season, the number of actual mi-
nor fouls did not change significantly while, at the same time, the second referee did not change
the probability of detecting such fouls as well. In the season 1999/2000, the second referee was
used in randomly selected games. Using an instrumentation (the actual number of games played
with one referee is used as an instrument because the number was equal for all teams at the end
of the season) approach, Heckelman and Yates (2003) distinguish monitor and deterrent effects.
While they find strong monitoring effects for fouls, penalty minutes, minor and major penalties,
no deterrent effects are found.
The English Premiere League is used by Witt (2005) to identify deterrent effects of the tighten-
ing of rules in 1998. He finds that the number of red cards remained constant while the number of
yellow cards significantly increased. Thus, he argues that there was a deterrent effect because in-
creasing the pool of fouls punishable by a red card (e.g., tackle from behind) lead to a substitution
by less severely punishable offenses.
Corruption
Since reliable data about corruption is difficult to obtain, there are only some isolated studies.
Vinod (1999) uses the corruption perception index (based on a survey of “business people, risk
analysts, and the public”). He employs the ratio of judges to population as the independent vari-
able and concludes that increasing the efficiency of the legal system indeed decreases corruption.
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Goel and Rich (1989) use the ratio of officials convicted for bribery to all officials. Both con-
ditional conviction rate and the sentence length are significant while police expenditures are not.
Furthermore, bribery increases when unemployment or consumption increase or wages decrease.
In Goel and Nelson (1998) they use the conviction rate as the dependent variable and find “that
government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong posi-
tive influence on corruption” while only the police expenditures and the number of other justice
department employees are significant deterrents.
Cheating in the Classroom
Although “cheating in the classroom” is certainly a very specialized topic, there are several studies
which deal with this type of malpractice. Results are ambiguous. Mixon and Mixon (1996)
asked economic students and find mixed results for the probability of punishment and correctly
(i.e., supporting the deterrence hypothesis) signed variables for the severity of punishment. No
deterrent effects are found by Bunn et al. (1992) using another survey of economic students.
Nevertheless, other results are that peer influences (knowing of other students who cheat) and bad
grades (penalty is less threatening) foster cheating behavior.
By contrast, Houston (1983) report, asking psychology students, that good students cheat more
but do react to threats of punishment while bad students cheat less but do not react to threats.
However, the threats are only effective when their severity passes some threshold. The gender os
the students is not relevant.
Other Offenses
While most studies deal with standard offenses or deterrence measures, there are some studies
which are out of the ordinary. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998) analyze riots in U.S. cities in the
sixties. As expected, ethnic reasons are important factors, not police variables. Sirakaya and Uysal
(1997) analyze the compliance of tourists with local guidelines in the USA, Canada and Ecuador.
Using three factors - deterrence, education and awards/motivation - they find that only education
is relevant. Fujii and Mak (1979) and Fujii and Mak (1980) use data from Hawaii and find that
increasing tourism also increases crime (especially burglary and rape) in general and that crime
is more concentrated in areas populated by tourists. They advise to reduce the overall number of
tourists and to concentrate more on wealthier visitors. Tourists in Hawaii are also studied by Ghali
et al. (1983) who come to similar conclusions but find such effects for theft but not for burglary.
Although arson is classified as an Index I crime, almost no study considers it. Cloninger (1981)
and Cloninger (1990) are exceptions and he concludes that arson, interpreted as an instrument
used for insurance fraud, is significantly deterred by the corresponding clearance rate. Another
unusual study is that of Braithwaite and Makkai (1991). They analyze corporate deterrence by
surveying managers of Australian nursing homes and do not find any influence of the severity of
punishment but some effects for the probability of punishment on official compliance. Landes
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(1978) studies airplane hijacking in the USA. The arrest rate and sentence length are found to
be significant deterring hijacking while the conditional conviction rate is not. He distinguishes
between ex ante (e.g., screenings) and ex post (e.g., marshals) deterrence measures and considers
a trend using international data.
Insurances can have the perverse effect of increasing the number of insured events (e.g., un-
employment insurance may increase unemployment). However, Cameron (1989) uses state-data
and concludes that no such effects can be found for victim compensation rewards for rape and
aggravated assault. Clarke (1966) studies school boy absconding and its corporal punishment in
1960-1964 in Kingswood, United Kingdom. During that time absconding school was punished
by strokes with a cane. He finds that juniors are not affected while seniors are. This is explained
by psychic pressure (homesickness, indisposition) which is more dominant for younger boys.
Commonly, offenders are assumed to be aware of their illegal or undesirable behavior. This may
not be true in all cases, even if they are fully aware of the consequences because the punishment
may have refined their point of view about the offense. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) report an
experiment they made in an Israeli kindergarten. Many parents picked up their children too late
so that the kindergarten teachers had to stay longer. Therefore, a fine was introduced for parents
who showed up too late. Instead of relieving the problem, the occurrences of late parents even
increased because they interpreted the fine as a price which they payed for coming too late. Since
the fines were moderate, they seemed to be smaller than the opportunity costs of arriving earlier.
They conclude that this reasoning might be transferred to similar problems like tax evasion. It
seems reasonable that other misdemeanors, like false parking or speeding, may also apply to this
scenario.
2.3 Particularities Regarding Analysis
Economists have inherited from the physical sciences the myth
that scientific inference is objective, and free of personal
prejudice. This is utter nonsense.
Leamer (1983)
In this section we draw attention to the multitudes of potential problems arising in the field of
empirical deterrence research and how they are addressed. However, we will not discuss many
of the usual problems arising in empirical studies like, for example, co-integration, unit roots,
etc. and how they are treated. Most studies can be categorized into the categories data analysis,
surveys and experiments and apply to one nation (or a subset of it).
Studies across multiple nations have to cope with several additional problems. Fajnzylber et
al. (1998) point out that many offenses are defined very differently across nations. They resort to
homicide which should be the most homogenous crime. In a study of 40 countries from 1970 to
1994 they use five year averages (panel data) or 25 year averages (cross section) because the data
is very heterogenous and contains missing data.
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Besides the analytical problems addressed in subsection 2.3.1, it is quite disappointing that it
still seems necessary to state that “simply finding a correlation between two variables is no guide
to whether there is any relationship between the two. In the social sciences it is essential to avoid
such naı¨ve comparisons as they are generally misleading and unreliable.” (Denny et al., 2004).
Such studies should not be underestimated, as Hashem Dezhbakhsh points out (quoted in Donohue
and Wolfers (2005)): “the academic survival of a flawed study may not be of much consequence.
But, unfortunately, the ill-effects of a bad policy, influenced by flawed research, may hurt genera-
tions”. Independent of the kind of analysis, it is obvious that each study may contain multitudes
of further potential problems of which most cannot be fully solved. Some of these may arise from
“bad” data, nasty error terms, model misspecification or unknown independencies. Yunker (1976)
emphasizes that “if potential, hypothetical problems like these are taken too seriously, they would
effectively abrogate the possibility of any kind of statistical investigation, because one or another
of them could apply to practically any imaginable project.” We agree with Yunker and his conclu-
sion that “awareness of these problems is certainly desirable as a means of avoiding blind reliance
on statistical evidence that is possibly misleading, but at the same time it would be highly dubious
to disregard entirely apparently very strong statistical evidence just because one or more of them
might conceivably apply”.
Aside from the common ways of analyzing crime data, there are some unusual approaches.
Among these, Viscusi (1986) studies crime by analyzing the risk-rewards trade-off, utilizing the
existence of compensating differentials. Finding that the premium makes up to two-thirds of the
whole crime income, he concludes that “the results bolster the findings of other studies supporting
the empirical importance of criminal deterrence”. Another interesting model - derived from the
principal agent theory - is introduced by Cohen (1987) who remarks that, in some cases, offenses
happen unintentional. While he regards environmental offenses, other fields are also possible
(e.g., tax evasion). Under optimal conditions no monitoring costs and optimal fines are the first
best solutions.
2.3.1 Data Analysis
The government are very keen on amassing statistics. They
collect them, add them, raise them to the nth power, take the
cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never
forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance
from the village watchman, who just puts down what he damn
pleases.
Anonymous English Judge, quoted by Sir Josiah Stamp in Some
Economic Matters in Modern Life, 1929
Many data sets, especially those providing official rates, offer several measures concerning the
probability of detection and punishment: arrest or clearance rates, prosecution rates, conviction
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rates, police budgets or manpower, and others. Variables which represent the severity of punish-
ment are found more sparsely. In most cases, the average sentence length (for actually convicted
individuals or served by those released) is used. When these variables are missing, unusable or
undesired, several alternatives have been implemented (e.g., execution rates, license revocation,
and many other).
Most studies can be categorized by three classes: cross section, time series and panel data. Al-
though all three classes can be used to study deterrence, Entorf and Spengler (2002) emphasize
that “when assessing the impact, it is mainly the cross sectional dimension and not the time di-
mension from which deeper insights might be expected” and conclude that “it is the appropriate
use of panel data that copes with problems arising in empirical crime research”.
In principle, each committed offense is the starting point of a cascade.
1. An offense may be reported to, or detected by the police. The probability that an offense is
recorded by the police depends mainly on its type.
2. If reported, the offense may be cleared by arresting or identifying the offender. Again, the
probability varies largely by the type of offense (e.g., it is usually low for theft and high for
homicide). For several offenses (e.g., shop lifting) reporting and clearing is closely linked.
3. If identified, the offender may be prosecuted (if there is sufficient evidence and the prose-
cution does not dismiss the action).
4. Conditional upon prosecution the offender might be convicted.
5. Conditional upon conviction, the offender might have to pay a fine, get a probation or be
sent to prison. The kind of sentence depends on the type of offense and on the criminal
history of the offender.
6. If sentenced to a term in prison, the offender has to spend the whole time or just a part of it
in prison.
Because each step is conditioned on the step before, theory tells us that the marginal deterrent
effect is reduced in each step. Therefore, an increase of one percent in the arrest rate deters more
than an increase of one percent in the imprisonment rate (Wolpin, 1978b). Naturally, any anal-
ysis depends on the quality of the available data. In regard to studies about crime in the USA,
the NCR is the most commonly used source. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
takes great care to publish reliable and consistent data, their sources remain the individual police
departments. And, as Witt and Witte (2000) point out: “at the level of the individual police de-
partment, both administrative and political changes can lead to abnormalities in reported data or
to failures to report any data.” Especially old data (i.e., older than 1960) may be inappropriate to
study deterrence (Yunker, 1976). It is common (at least in the USA and Germany) to associate
several offenses committed by a person at the same time (e.g., burglary and homicide) only with
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the most severe offense. This leads to an underestimation of lesser offenses (Becsi, 1999; Spen-
gler, 2004). Furthermore, it may happen that one crime is committed by several people (e.g., a
motor vehicle theft by four people) resulting in several arrests, convictions and penalties for one
crime (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991).
Some authors argue that the usual rates to measure the probability of detection and punishment
are not the proper or optimal measures to use. Cloninger (1994) argues that the police presence,
measured by the quotient of police and the number of violent crimes, is superior to such rates.
Some countries require other measures. For example, Italy is known for its slow prosecution and
organized crime in the south. For this reason, Buonanno (2003) uses a measure for the celerity
of punishment which is fitted to the Italian scenario and the non-clearance rate. Deterrent effects
can be found for the north of Italy while the south is much less affected because “organized
crime considerably reduces the efficiency of criminal justice and effectiveness of police force”.
Organized crime is also used by Marselli and Vannini (1997) to explain insignificant effects of
the sentence length (successors and quarrels between them). Tittle and Rowe (1974) suggest that
arrest rates (and other rates) may only be effective above a certain threshold value (0.3).
The severity of punishment may also pose a problem. As already mentioned, probation (see
section 2.1) may operate in the opposite direction than a prison sentence. However, even the
empirical effect of imprisonment may depend on the definition of that variable (Avio and Clark,
1978). Many studies use the (mean) imprisonment length of the released inmates; but these lengths
do not reflect the actual but the past severity. Furthermore, the mean sentence length may be
biased if the number of convicted criminals changes in each period, even if the distribution of
punishment remains the same. Avio and Clark (1978) use the actual mean sentence length and
adjust it for parole and remission, and conclude that it is superior to the usual measures but the
support for deterrence remains weak. In a cross-sectional study Pogue (1975) uses the difference
between the sentences of the local U.S. district court and the overall average of all district courts.
Another approach to the severity of punishment is taken by Kessler and Levitt (1998) who employ
a difference-in-difference model. They use an increase in the level of punishment for severe
offenses in California (the treatment group is defined by the severe offenses) and compare it with
the non-severe offenses in California. By subtracting the difference for the United States they
conclude that, in the first years, the effect is solely based on deterrence.
Spelman (2000) scrutinizes the prison population and argues that the large decline in crime in
the USA in the nineties is only partially caused by the massive expansion in prison capacities and
prison population at that time. He argues that this expansion was inefficient because it was respon-
sible for only 25% of the decline in crime. van Tulder and van der Torre (1999) come to contrary
conclusions using data from the Netherlands. They find that spending in prison infrastructure is
more efficient than spending more on police since investment in the latter does only marginally
influence the clear-up rate. Donohue and Levitt (2000) propose a different explanation of the large
decline of crime in the USA in the nineties: abortion was legalized in 1973, which is supposed to
have led to a large decrease (15−25 years later) of children who grew up in problematic surround-
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ings. Levitt (2004) cynically comments on the approaches to explain this drop: “although experts
failed to anticipate the decline, there has been no shortage of hypotheses to explain the drop in
crime after the fact”. Marvell and Moody (1994) study λ (the crime rate of active offenders) and
the influence of prison population with several lags. Because prison population deters only up to
a lag of one year, they argue that only an incapacitating effect is at work but not deterrence.
In the case that official institutions work on their limit, some rates will be overestimated (Cham-
bouleyron and Willington, 1998). When the legal system is overburdened, a higher arrest rate
will, ceteris paribus, imply a lower conviction rate19. They try to avoid this bias by using rates per
capita as covariates (therefore the denominators are not influenced by other deterrence measures)
and perform one regression per deterrence variable; see section 2.3.1 for more information about
this measurement bias. Meera and Jayakumar (1995) use this reasoning to argue that the positive
effect of prison overcrowding in Malaysia results from the diminishing probability of imprison-
ment. Bodman and Maultby (1997) also shortly touch this problem in the case of Australia but
find only weak evidence that more crime leads to a lower efficiency of the legal system (while
resources remain constant).
Using sophisticated methods of analysis does not guarantee good results. The statistical model
and its analysis should fit the data to make sound conclusions possible. Studying burglaries in
England and Wales, Deadman (2003) observes that the forecasting model which does not rely on
distinguishing between short- and long-run effects does achieve the best results. He concludes
that there seems to be no long-run equilibrium in regard to the studied time series of burglaries.
On the other hand, Sridharan et al. (2003) conclude in their study that “results using regression
approaches are biased and the measured effects are not reliable because of the serially correlated
errors”. Because of seasonal-, trend- and random effects, they prefer Autoregressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) and structured time series models instead of “simple” regression mod-
els. Entorf (1996) finds that simple OLS leads to more pronounced deterrent effects than more
sophisticated estimators (general IV, error corrected models).
A very important issue of the official crime rates is their reliability. There are several reasons
why official statistics may inherit systematic anomalies. Crime rates rely heavily on the readiness
of the population to report crimes. Comparisons of victimization reports and official statistics
reveal different deviations for most offenses. The best fit is usually to be found for homicide
(if detected) and motor vehicle theft (reporting is required to get a compensation from the insur-
ance). Very large gaps can be found for lesser offenses and those which only have a low clearance
probability. For example, in the USA in 2004, only 41.4% of all crimes were reported to the
police; 49.9% of all violent and 39% of all property crimes. The highest reporting rate (exclud-
ing homicide) is found for completed motor vehicle theft (94.8%) while the lowest for attempted
purse snatching (17.5%) and completed theft below 50$ (18.8%) (Pastore and Maguire, 2004).
Soares (2004) compares international victimization reports and crime statistics and finds that the
19When crime remains constant, the decreasing conviction rate will bias its deterrent effect upwards.
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reporting behavior is mainly influenced by the grade of development of a nation (measured by the
GDP). People in more developed nations more readily report a crime but remain unaffected by
their criminal behavior.
All in all, there is a multitude of potential problems, such as those sketched above and described
in the following subsections. Some authors try to consider them, some do not. Some simply use
OLS and hope that all biases will (hopefully) cancel each other out or are sufficiently small.
Aggregation Bias
Aggregation can occur over the crime categories and (or) over the studied units.
Ideally, every deterrence and crime variable refers to one specific type of crime. In practice,
however, this cannot always be done. Many data sets do only contain information about aggre-
gated types of crime on various levels. Some aggregations are generally assumed to be harmless
(at least no none complains about it) like not distinguishing various robberies (e.g., of defenseless
people, female victims, with firearms, etc.). Other are more problematic, like combining murder
with manslaughter, armed with unarmed robberies or even merging whole categories. The latter
is studied by Cherry and List (2002) who analyze 70 U.S. counties in the eighties using Index I
crimes and their aggregation to property and violent crimes. They conclude that this aggregation
leads to unacceptable distortions. Avio and Clark (1976) also emphasize that such aggregations
“may lead to unjustified generalizations about individual crime types, and in fact may invalidate
such studies as a legitimate attempt to subject the economic model of crime to empirical verifica-
tion”. However, disaggregation (of property crimes) is not an ultimate goal because the offender
cannot be sure in all cases how the police (or the judge) will classify the planned crime (Heineke,
1978b) - or that the crime evolves as planned. For example, a burglary may be classified as a
larceny or a planned petty theft may escalate to a robbery.
The classic aggregation bias goes back to Theil (1954) and is the deviation of the macro pa-
rameters from the average of the corresponding micro parameters. However, the question whether
or not micro level data (i.e., data about individuals) is superior to aggregated data (e.g., county-,
state- or country data) cannot be unambiguously answered. Although the deterrence theory is
based on individual responses to incentives, some authors (like Decker and Kohfeld (1990a) or
Nagin (1978)) argue that deterrence is meant to influence society itself or, as Nagin (1978) puts it:
“general deterrence is inherently an aggregate phenomenon since it is reflected in the behavior of
the entire population”. However, this may cause some statistical problems because “an equation
that holds true for an individual can also be applied to a county, state or nation, only if the func-
tional form is invariant to aggregation” (Dezhbakhsh et al., 2001). This is not the case for log or
double-log equations (the sum of log-equations is not another log-equation). Ehrlich (1973) points
out that the individual response of offenders to deterrent measures is inhomogeneous because it
may vary by their grade of specialization. However, even if aggregation is applicable, there are
large differences in the possible levels of aggregation. Lott and Mustard (1997) emphasize that
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“the very different results between state and county-level data should make us very cautious in
aggregating crime data and would imply that the data should remain as disaggregated as possi-
ble”. At least, failing to incorporate systematic differences (e.g., rural and urban data) is certainly
a potential problem in any such an analysis.
Measurement Bias
A measurement bias (also called reporting bias) occurs when the implemented probability does not
reflect the “true” probability. It is already addressed in very early studies like Ehrlich (1972). As
Pudney et al. (2000a) point out, the measurement error has a random and a systematic component.
The random component refers to the prosecution of offenses. Whether the offender is arrested,
convicted or sentenced can be seen as a Bernoulli trial. Therefore, even if all crimes are perfectly
recorded, the according rates will be binomially distributed around the true values. A systematic
error may be introduced by the reporting behavior of the victims or witnesses (under-reporting)
and can bias any calculated coefficients. Shifting focus of the police, arrest characteristics, plea
bargaining and congestion of the system may pose additional problems (Nagin, 1978).
Depending on the type of offense, the reporting behavior of the population varies by a large
margin. On the one hand, many crimes may happen unnoticed: stolen goods are not missed,
unsuccessful burglaries not detected, offenses not recognized to be illegal, and similar cases. Even
if an offense is witnessed or detected as such, victims might not report it because the costs to report
the crime (“waste of time”) exceed the expected psychological or materialistic gain; e.g., due to
the low probability to solve the crime (Avio and Clark, 1976). The smallest difference between the
true and reported crime rates should be found for murder (because of the severity) and auto vehicle
theft (because a stolen car has to be reported to get any money from the insurance). However, since
an offender cannot know for sure - at least in most cases - whether his crime will be detected and
reported to the police or not, the (deterrent) effects on reported crimes should be similar to those
which remain unreported (Levitt, 1997b).
According to Denny et al. (2004), as long as the reporting behavior does not vary systemati-
cally, or is correlated with other regressors, this does not pose any problems and only adds to the
random error term. Or, as Levitt (1998b) states it in more detail: “as long as crime is the left-hand
side variable in the analysis, random measurement error will increase the standard error of the
estimates, but will not bias the parameter estimates. Only measurement error in reported crime
rates that is systematically related to the policy being evaluated will bias the estimates”. However,
especially for cross-sectional data, there may be such systematic differences.
Some authors try to circumvent this bias by adjusting the official rates. Myers (1982) uses
victimization reports and, basically, divides the official crime rate by the probability that a crime
will be reported. His estimates of the deterrent measures remain negative. Alternatively, instead
of the usual clearance rate, the self-reported number of crimes can be used as the denominator.
This is done by Craig and Heikkila (1989) who find deterrent effects with this rate but not with the
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usual clearance rate. Goldberg and Nold (1980) even divide the reporting probability into urban
and individual partitions and use the reporting probability in addition to the clearance rate. Only
the former is significant. Adjusting macro-data with crime rates from victimization reports is also
done by, besides other authors, Cohen and Land (1984) and Lee and McCrary (2005).
A ratio bias, often not distinguished from measurement bias, may be introduced when the ex-
ogenous and endogenous variables are mixed in one equation. For example, the typical clearance
rate includes the number of offenses in its denominator. As pointed out by Nagin (1978) and sev-
eral other authors (refer to Levitt (1998c); Avio (1988) or Denny et al. (2004) for more detailed
information) this can bias the estimates downwards20: “if the intensity with which crime reports,
clearances, and arrests are manipulated varies either cross-sectionally or over time, then an inverse
association will be generated between crime rates and both clearance rates and arrests per crime,
even in the absence of any deterrent effects.” Concerning the arrest rates, Eide et al. (1994) note
that the elasticity becomes more negative when the portion of unreported offenses decreases. In
this context, Avio (1988) compares the estimates of the effect of capital punishment. Instead of
using one of the usual execution rates (executions divided by convictions or homicides), he uses
the sum of executions and commutations, thus avoiding the ratio bias. He concludes that estimates
which are based upon the usual rates are considerably more in favor of deterrence. Instead of the
usual conviction rate, Funk and Kugler (2003b) use the absolute number of convictions after con-
trolling for lagged crime (thus they analyze the change in convictions at a given crime level). It
is quite common to lag the explanatory variable, as Levitt (1998c,a); Entorf and Winker (2002) or
Bedard and Helland (2000) do. Furthermore, it is likely that reporting errors are correlated with
education, unemployment, income inequality, etc. (Fajnzylber et al., 1998) which are included as
covariates in most empirical analyses of deterrence.
Chambouleyron and Willington (1998) argue that using the clearance-, conviction- and impris-
onment rate in one equation gives the correct coefficient of the imprisonment rate but not the cor-
rect coefficient of the clearance- and conviction rate (since they share the same terms). Therefore,
they replace the imprisonment rate by the imprisonments per capita and re-estimate the equation
and take the conviction-coefficient to be the true one. In a last step, they also replace the convic-
tion rate by the convictions per capita and estimate a third time to calculate the true coefficient of
the clearance effect.
Pudney et al. (2000a) as well as Levitt (1998c) conclude that the measurement bias is not rel-
evant in practice. Contrarily, Cherry (1999) reports that measurement bias can lead to a gross
overestimation of deterrence. He compares an U.S. city panel (using fixed and random effects) to
pooled regressions and detects no bias for homicide, rape and motor vehicle theft but a large bias
for all other offenses. The largest bias of 70% is found for burglary. Many authors, like Fujii and
Mak (1979), simply explain wrongly signed results by dominating reporting effects.
20In fact “more sophisticated analysis suggests that the direction of the bias depends upon the actual supply elasticity
response” (Avio, 1988), but it is usually assumed to be negative in practice. Ehrlich (1973) also argues that effects
in both directions may occur.
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A completely different aspect is mentioned by Avio and Clark (1976), who note that clearance
and conviction rates may vary locally. In rural areas suspects might be arrested only when a
conviction seems to be certain (resulting in lower clearances but higher conviction rates), while
the contrary may be the case in urban areas (high arrest- but low conviction rates).
Simultaneity Bias
In principle, an increase of the police resources (e.g., manpower, budget or equipment) should
lead to a decrease in crime due to more deterrence. While this may be true on the individual level,
a feedback effect may mitigate this in an empirical analysis with aggregated data21 for various
reasons.
• In the long run, crime and law enforcement (e.g., police, laws, etc.) affect each other. More
law enforcement reduces crime, and less crime may lead to reduced law enforcement - as
well as the other way round: more crime leads to an increased demand for protection. This
means that, even if a deterrent effect exists, law enforcement may be positively correlated
with crime. The same applies to the level of punishment, which may be increased to meet
increased levels of threat of crime, resulting from an increased demand of safety and pro-
tection (Koskela and Vire´n, 1994; Ehrlich and Brower, 1987); however, only in rare cases
punishments are lessened when crime decreases. Even when the official level of punish-
ment remains the same, judges may impose harsher sentences as a reaction to increased
crime rates (Avio and Clark, 1976).
• Law enforcement expenditures are mainly used to “clean up” after crime and have only little
in common with deterring future crime (McPheters and Stronge, 1974).
• In order to avoid budget cuts (or reduced increases), the police may want to exaggerate
the actual official crime rates to keep the actual demand for police at least on its current
level. This can be done by accepting more charges or by splitting some crimes into several
categories or by intensifying activities in crime prone areas (Rasmussen et al., 1993).
• Crime deters punishment due congestion of the legal system (Ehrlich and Brower, 1987).
As crime increases, but the resources of the police and courts do not, the efficiency of the
police, courts and the prison system (e.g., arrest and conviction rates, actual imprisonment
lengths) decreases, when they are already working at their limits.
• More police effectiveness (e.g., induced by a larger budget, more officers, etc.) may de-
crease the number of false arrests. Therefore, the arrest rate may decrease while the convic-
tion rate increases, although real crime levels remain constant (Sandelin and Skogh, 1986).
21The similarity to demand and supply functions is noted by Kenkel (1993): interaction effects have to be considered
when dealing with macro data but not when analyzing micro data.
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Similar to the measurement bias an increase in the police force or budget may also increase the
capability to handle and manage reports by the public and to detect more crimes by themselves
(Carr-Hill and Stern, 1973). Thus, increased crime rates, accompanied with more police resources,
are often associated with a diminished number of unrecorded cases. Indeed, this explanation is
used in many cases when the police variables carry the wrong sign (e.g., by Carr-Hill and Stern
(1973); Greenwood and Wadycki (1973); Thaler (1977) or Meera and Jayakumar (1995)). Using
monthly data from New York City Corman et al. (1987) conclude that “criminal behavior is more
sensitive to changes in sanctions than law enforcement agencies are to changes in crime”.
The budget argument (maintaining high crime rates to avoid budget cuts) is also often used
as an explanation for positive associations between police variables and official crime rates (as
Benson et al. (1998) do). However, according to Benson et al. (1992), most studies concentrate on
Index I crimes, while police invest most resources in combating Index II crimes (especially drug
offenses). This might already explain many inconclusive coefficients of police expenditures or
manpower. Besides these police variables, all other variables - which may be altered when society
is faced with increased crime rates - may be potentially affected too. Among these are judges or
juries in their readiness to convict (Hoenack and Weiler, 1980) or harsher penalties.
There are several ways to mitigate a potential simultaneity bias. Statistical methods may re-
move such feedback effects (e.g., instrumented estimators) by using some variables which affect
the police resources but not the corresponding crime rate. These are then used to estimate the
“true” police resources which are then used in the final estimation. The main problem lies in
the identification of such instruments of sufficient quality. Weak instruments may render any cal-
culated estimators unusable. This identification issue seems to be the largest problem - refer to
Eide et al. (1994) for a more extensive discussion and examples. Wolpin (1980) emphasizes that
these restrictions have to be driven by theory. In combination with aggregated data, Trumbull
(1989) criticizes 2SLS estimates in general, because the instruments are often not based on the-
ory, in-between variance may be introduced artificially and inhomogeneity of the analyzed units
may introduce a bias. Since OLS is more efficient than 2SLS, the latter is only appropriate when
simultaneity is shown to be a problem.
One of the most popular studies in this context is certainly Levitt’s usage of electoral cycles
(Levitt, 1997b) as instruments. He argues that the number of police officers is periodically ad-
justed just before elections occur. Since these elections are periodical and determined by general
logistical reasons, these elections do not influence crime. Levitt then uses these elections as an
instrument to estimate police variables. With these instruments he finds significant deterrent ef-
fects of the police. This instrumentation has been cited in dozens of other studies but only rarely
implemented - Spengler (2004) is an exception but he does not consider it to be useful. This did
not come by surprisingly, because McCrary (2002) shows that Levitt’s results are all based on
a typo in the implemented algorithm (he used the standard deviation instead of its reciprocal as
weights). With the corrected version the results are largely insignificant. In a reply, Levitt (2002b)
apologizes, replaces and expands his set of instruments with fire men and achieves similar results
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(same point estimates; however, these are not significant). Nevertheless, his results seem not to be
as convincing as he wants them to be. Up to day, his first paper has been cited many times while
McCrary’s article and Leviit’s reply have not (Nilsson (2004) and Klick and Tabarrok (2005) are
exceptions). This is at least, from a scientific point of view, disappointing. In another study, Levitt
(1996) uses prison overcrowding as an instrument.
Hakim et al. (1978) employ a very simple line of reasoning to circumvent this bias: police ex-
penditures or manpower is only interpretable as a deterrent when it leads to more arrests. There-
fore, any deterrent effect is contained in the arrest rate and the police variable explains something
else but not deterrence. On the other hand, Goodman (1997) proposes to incorporate police man-
power per capita (which has a positive influence) and then to use police density as a deterrence
measure (which has the expected negative sign).
In the case of the death penalty, Zimmerman (2004) derives some instruments from public
choice theory. Among others, he uses the number of state murders committed by strangers and
the proportion of murders which happened under non-felony circumstances, and the proportion
of non-white offenders to estimate the arrest and conviction rates. Furthermore, he resorts to
indicators about past botched executions and prisoners released from death row.
Feedback effects may also be dealt with by using lagged variables. However, only a few authors
consider or even mention the problem that the assumption of strict exogeneity (that the explanatory
variables are uncorrelated with each error term at all leads and lags) may not hold. Among these
authors Fajnzylber et al. (1998, 2002a,b); Witt and Witte (2000) and Andrienko (2002) incorporate
and consider the concept of weak exogeneity (that each error term may be correlated with future
leads but not with the current and lagged values of the explanatory variable). Machin and Meghir
(2004) argue that the bias in their analysis (violation of strict exogeneity can make some estimators
inconsistent or biased) should be negligible, while Neumayer (2003) and Reilly and Witt (1996)
simply assume that weak exogeneity holds for some variables.
It may be argued that potential criminals need some time to perceive any changes in the prob-
ability of punishment. On the other hand, police resources definitely require some time to adjust
to the current crime rates, due to reallocation of budget resources and manpower, recruiting and
training of new personal, etc. (Goodman, 1997). Assuming the latter effect is of more impor-
tance, many studies employ lagged police variables, because police variables should be much less
affected by future crime rates while crime rates should react to past changes in police resources.
In this context, Greenberg and Kessler (1982b) argue that the results in a 2SLS estimate with only
two points in time may depend heavily on the assumed lag-structure. Using data of 130 U.S.
cities, they are able to find positive significant results for police expenditures as well as negative
significant results. Alternatively, high frequent data as in Corman and Mocan (2000) or Corman
and Mocan (2002) may be used to circumvent simultaneity. They use monthly police data from
New York because police manpower cannot be adjusted to crime on a monthly basis. Moreover,
several authors, like Goodman (1997), argue that even yearly data may be sufficient because the
police and government need at least one year to react to crime rates.
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Comparing cross sections and time series may also help to reduce simultaneity bias. Wolpin
(1980) observes that “feedback relationships should differ in relative importance over different
observations sets. If deterrence relationships did not so vary, bounds on deterrence could be
established within a single equations framework.” He argues that long run differences in the level
of crime should dominate short run fluctuations in cross sections but not in time series. Therefore,
estimates of deterrence tend to be underestimated in cross sections and, because congestion should
be a greater problem, to be overestimated in time series.
Incapacitation Bias
When a criminal is imprisoned he cannot commit further crimes while locked away (neglecting
crimes within the prison). Assuming that he would commit further crimes, if he had not been im-
prisoned, the crime rate will decrease. This negative effect is not related to general deterrence and
should be taken into account when analyzing crime data. If this is not the case, this incapacitation
bias will lead to an overestimation of the deterrent effect. This bias can be avoided, for example,
by analyzing shocks in the severity of crimes using VAR-models (Funk and Kugler, 2003b). If
sentences are usually conditional prison sentences, no incapacitation effect is present. If the mean
served prison sentence is sufficiently large, any short term effect cannot be affected by incapac-
itation22. Wolpin (1978b) compares the deterrent effect of two types of sentences imposed on
guilty offenders (prison or non-prison sentence). Another possibility is to introduce the concept
of imperfect foresight to the model. Only anticipated changes in the deterrent rates can effectively
deter while all other effects have to be attributed to incapacitation. Wolpin (1978b) concludes that,
for crimes against the person, the incapacitation effect is almost equal to the deterrent effect (in
both models of perfect and imperfect foresight).
Levitt (1998a) studies juvenile crime and uses the transition from juvenile to adult courts to
distinguish deterrence and incapacitation. Deterrence implies a sharp reduction in the transition
while incapacitation implies a smoother transition due to lags in the arrest and imprisonment pro-
cess, as well as mild sentences in the beginning because juvenile records are sealed after reaching
adulthood. The sharp drop found in the data indicates that the incapacitation effect is very small.
In another paper, Levitt (1998c) uses cross-crime effects to isolate deterrence from incapaci-
tation. When the arrest rates for one crime increase, deterrence predicts an increase in all other
crimes because criminals will switch to other, relatively less deterred crimes (for crime switching
see also subsection 2.2.7). In contrast, incapacitation predicts a decrease in all crimes, since the
number of available offenders is reduced. He finds that deterrence is more relevant than incapaci-
tation.
Levitt (1996) supplies evidence that the costs of a prisoner is of the same magnitude as the
social harm an offender causes. However, Holtmann and Yap (1978) point out that the relative
22The improved incapacitation effect of a sudden increase in the average sentence length becomes relevant not before
the old average sentence length is surpassed.
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costs of imprisonment for theft is too high when compared with those of robbery and burglary
because the loss in the case of theft is usually quite low.
Misspecification Bias
Model uncertainty is composed of at least two parts: sampling uncertainty and specification un-
certainty. While the former ever decreases as sample size increases, the latter remains constant
(Leamer, 1983). Including unimportant variables or omitting variables which are not correlated
with other explanatory variables do just inflate the standard deviations, but omitting important
variables can lead to a systematic bias. While the former does just decrease the predictive power
of the model, Entorf and Spengler (2002) note on the latter “that the higher the influence of the
omitted variable on the explained variable and the higher the correlation between the included and
the excluded variable are, the higher will be the omitted variable bias of the estimated coefficient
of the included variable”. While the number of observations is usually limited the number of
applicable covariates is not.
Mustard (2003) studies misspecification effects for the conviction rate and the sentence served,
while keeping the arrest rate in the equation. He uses panel data from four U.S. states on county
level. Because the arrest rate is negatively correlated with the other two variables (the conviction
rates and sentenced served of the marginal offender decreases when the clearance rate increases),
effects of the arrest rate are underestimated up to 50% when omitting such important variables
(e.g., the elasticity of the arrest rate for auto theft expands from −0.0027 to −0.0052 when con-
viction rate and sentenced served are added to the model). Gyimah-Brempong (1986) reports,
analyzing all cities in Florida, that not distinguishing important social and economic variables by
race leads to a large bias for the minority. For example, the unemployment rate is dominated by
whites, and non-whites are found to be more prone to crime. However, when using the white and
non-white unemployment rates, the non-white dummy becomes insignificant and changes its sign.
Ruhm (1996) studies the effect of omitted variables for DUI offenses and finds that omitting
the effect of organizations like MADD, or factors like beer taxes, lead to an overestimation of the
effects of anti-DUI laws. Similarly, Entorf and Winker (2002) (using German data) and Benson et
al. (1992) (using U.S. data) argue that ignoring drug consumption (at least in times with high drug
consumption) will lead to misspecified models and biased results. However, while the marginal
deterrent effects may be altered, their signs seem to remain correct (Eide et al., 1994).
In general, not considering other important variables (when they are correlated with included
variables) can bias the estimates in any direction. Pogue (1986) argues that the results, e.g., those
of Ehrlich (1973), are overestimated because “it is possible to obtain statistically and quanti-
tatively significant crime prevention effects by selecting a particular equation specification, for
example, one that includes relatively few exogenous variables, or a particular cross-section year”.
As described in section 3.4, any desired result may be achieved when the specification is chosen
accordingly. Especially among natural- and quasi experiments, as well as in the analysis of crime
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data, it is quite common to use dummy variables as the relevant deterrence variables. However,
Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (1998) point out that any analysis based only on a regime shift effect, mea-
sured by a dummy, may be biased when other regressors also correlate with the dummy. Leamer
gives a nice and simple example of deriving different conclusions from the same data set:
The applied econometrician is like a farmer who notices that the yield is somewhat
higher under trees where birds roost, and he uses this as evidence that bird droppings
increase yields. However, when he presents this finding at the annual meeting of the
American Ecological Association, another farmer in the audience objects that he used
the same data but came up with the conclusion that moderate amounts of shade increase
yields.
Leamer (1983)
To minimize model misspecification, many authors analyze numerous specifications to test
whether their favorite specification remains unaffected; or simply to find the “best” specifica-
tion according to a chosen statistic (e.g., van Tulder and van der Torre (1999) use the R2). Other
authors employ data mining methods, as described in more detail in section 3.6, like Extreme
Bounds Analysis (EBA) or Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to extract robust estimators.
Replacement Effect
In some cases local efforts to combat crime do only redistribute crime to other places. This effect
is commonly called replacement or spillover effect. For example, using camera or lightning on
specific crime prone places or intensifying patrols in certain areas may just displace crimes to
lesser monitored sites.
Mehay (1977) studies the Los Angeles metropolitan area using the differences in patrol intensity
to detect such spillover effects. Although he finds such effects, these are only small and of minor
importance. Fabrikant (1979) hypothesizes that the criminals spatial choice depends on economic
gain and competitive pressure and he finds that juveniles prefer to commit offenses in their own
districts. This is also supported by Chaiken et al. (1974) and Farley and Hansel (1981) who report
that delinquents tend to commit their offenses near their homes (with the exception of rape), and
that the relative deprivation and central city decline is more important than the relation between the
city and metropolitan population. Data of the metropolitan area of Montreal in Canada (Furlong
and Mehay, 1981) also seem to indicate such spillover effects. These may bias results when
estimating deterrent effects of the police. Additionally, replacement effects may induce more
spending on law enforcement than would be necessary without such effects (Rasmussen et al.,
1993). However, Press (1971) does not find such displacement effects. He studies an increase of
policemen on the street in the 20th district of New York and finds that crimes (visible from the
street) were significantly reduced but no effects could be observed in the neighboring districts.
Similar to replacement effects is another phenomenon. Even if crime is not pushed out, negative
effects can occur because people tend to move away from areas with higher crime rates if they
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can afford it. This may lead to increasing crime rates because the remaining population is more
prone to crime; such a vicious circle may accelerate the neighborhood decline (Katzman, 1980).
Burnell (1988) finds that crime reduces the house values; not even for the affected area but also for
neighboring municipalities. Clark and Cosgrove (1990), studying willingness-to-pay for public
safety, also find that crime affects land values. People in the more crime prone central city are
willing to pay less for public safety than those living in safer suburban areas.
Wealth effects are also associated with the distribution of crime. Hakim (1980) studies the
metropolitan areas of Camden and Philadelphia, and reports that wealthier cities spend more
money on police but also attract more criminals from nearby areas with a good traffic connec-
tion. The overall effect is that crime increases for those cities, although police expenditures are
increased as well. A similar effect is observed for areas with many tourists like Hawaii. Fujii and
Mak (1979) analyze the agricultural displacement in Hawaii (changes of employment in the agri-
cultural and hotel sectors) and report that tourism significantly fosters property crime and rapes
(tourists bear twice the risk than residents to become a victim). Local displacement is also found
for security appliances (e.g., alarm devices) when the number of potential victims is large enough
(Ayres and Levitt, 1998). Clotfelter (1978) adds that private security measures may also cause a
replacement effect, diverting crime to lesser protected victims or houses. He indicates “that the
greater the relative importance of such a displacement effect, the more private protection will tend
to be oversupplied, from a social viewpoint”. Furthermore, there may be an isolation effect when
people avoid, in fear of victimization, locations they would have visited otherwise.
Beside the spatial component, Chaiken et al. (1974) also study replacement in time. They
analyze a large increase in police presence in subways during the night in New York. While there is
a significant deterrent effect during the night, two other effects are also observed: a phantom effect
during the day (the number of offenses decreased although police presence remained constant),
and an increase of offenses in buses. After eight months, the deterrent effects had faded and crime
increased significantly. They conclude that this “tends to confirm that potential offenders do in
fact try to estimate the risks of criminal activity”.
Short- and Long Term Effects
While many studies do not - or simply cannot - distinguish between immediate effects and ef-
fects in the long run, some do. There are especially two analytical approaches: VAR- and error-
correcting models (ECM). These approaches are used by several authors and belong to the com-
mon tools of advanced statisticians.
VAR-models are used to determine the effect of a shock in one variable in a system over time.
Witt and Witte (2000) study the effect of the prison population on crime and find that the number
of prisoners (serving more than one year) has no short-term but negative long-term effects on the
crime rate. Corman et al. (1987) emphasize that standard time series analyses suffer from weak
identification restrictions which may be circumvented by using VAR-models. Funk and Kugler
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(2003b) argue that the “major advantage of VAR estimations, compared to traditional panel data or
cross-sectional analyses, lies in the better understanding of the crime-reducing impact of harsher
governmental enforcement”.
Error correcting models are usually estimated with standard regression methods like OLS. How-
ever, difference operators and lag structures can be used to distinguish a long term equilibrium
from short termed deviations. Entorf and Spengler (2000) study crime in western Germany, using
static and dynamic (ECM) panel estimators. The short and long termed coefficients are quite sim-
ilar, “indicating a relatively quick convergence to equilibrium”, and support the deterrence theory.
Pyle and Deadman (1994) emphasize that “incorporating error-correction mechanisms, highlight
the need to build a convincing dynamic model of criminal activity and its relationship to the econ-
omy as a whole”. They study time series of robbery, burglary and theft in England and Wales
and find that there is a significant tendency of crime to “bounce back in the long term, so that the
long-run equilibrium relationship is restored”.
Another aspect is the time frame between the actual change in deterrence and the perceived
change. Studies using yearly data usually use the crime rates and deterrence variables of the
same year. However, this official information is usually not available until, at least, the follow-
ing year23. However, the “enforcements measure to be used in the regression equations should
reflect the expected sanctions, not the level of sanctions observed after the deterrence effect has
operated” (Magat and Viscusi, 1990). It is not obvious how fast potential offenders adjust their
perception of deterrence. Eide et al. (1994) argue that it is more likely that potential offenders
base their perceptions on several years. In contrast, authors like Corman and Mocan (2000) use
high-frequency data (e.g., monthly data) because potential offenders can adjust their perceptions
in such short time frames but institutional changes (e.g., the number of employed police officers)
require more time. Nevertheless, it is unclear how fast offender really adjust their perceptions and,
consequently, some authors utilize lag-structures which optimize their model by some criteria, as,
for example, Masih and Masih (1996) or Corman and Mocan (2000) do.
Functional Form
Although there is a huge variety of functional forms implemented to model crime, two stand out:
the simple additive and multiplicative form. Trumbull (1989) argues that the functional form
should be chosen which optimizes the model quality (using Box-Cox-Transformations) while
Hoenack et al. (1978) state that the “econometric structure should be specified in the mathemat-
ical form which conforms most closely to behavioral expectations”. Ehrlich (1977a) emphasizes
the multiplicative relationship between the probability and severity of punishment in the case of
capital punishment and Mendes and McDonald (2001) for all offenses. Mendes (2004) shows that
when decomposing the logarithmic rates the deterrent effects of these factors are almost equal.
She concludes that the usual assumption, that criminals are risk preferrers (i.e., the probability is
23For these studies subjective measures are usually unavailable anyway.
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more influential than the severity), may be just an artifact of the implemented functional form.
Furthermore, disregarding the multiplicative structure bears an intrinsic weakness when dealing
with very low detection probabilities. Even Marchese Beccaria (1819) noted that very low detec-
tion probabilities had to be compensated by more severe punishment. However, the probability
and severity of punishment affect crimes independently in an additive model. Stafford et al. (1986)
concentrate on the difference between an additive and interactive model. They compare additive,
matching and satisfaction balance models using U.S. homicide data and experiments. In all cases
the interactive model explains more variance; and punishment deters more (i.e., is more signifi-
cant) if the variance of a model decreases.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
When comparing different sets of objects (for example, counties or states), it seems reasonable
to assume that there are factors which systematically vary among these objects and influence the
outcome under study but cannot be accounted for. When these effects are constant in time, fixed or
random effects absorb these influences in a panel data analysis. However, cross-sectional data may
be severely affected by unobserved heterogeneity. Not considering these effects can considerably
bias the estimates. Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) show that the estimated elasticities can be
reduced by 30% when unobserved heterogeneity is considered. Unobserved influences may also
vary in time (e.g., common shocks influencing all units differently). Additionally, these influences
do not have to be stationary; refer to Coakley et al. (2006) for more information about these
problems and estimators which are employed in these cases. However, time-varying and not
stationary unobserved heterogeneity are not considered in the empirical deterrence literature.
2.3.2 Experiments and Surveys
An experiment is like a radio: if we twiddle the knobs at
random, there’s no telling what we will find, nor any guarantee
that it will be in a language we understand, even though the
radio itself may be in perfect working order. On the other hand,
if the radio is accurately tuned, we can expect to hear
something, and also, which is especially important, we can
expect others whose radios are similarly tuned to hear the same
thing.
Eiser (1986)
Aggregated crime data is, naturally, not usable to test the deterrence hypothesis on the individual
level. Therefore, individual data are usually acquired in two different ways: conducting laboratory
experiments or using surveys. The big advantage that these data may provide is the possibility to
make use of the subjective perceptions of the probability and severity of punishment. Such data
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may be more close to the theory of deterrence, while it might be less useful to draw conclusions
for public policy (see section 2.3.1).
Classic experiments commonly take place in controlled surroundings, such as games or treat-
ments, while quasi and natural experiments usually exploit changes in the environment, which are
assumed to be exogenous, and use aggregate data (e.g., law changes). The experiment which may
be closest to a classic medical experiment was done by Sullivan et al. (2001). The memory of four
groups were tested (RAVLT-test) who simulated to be affected by a disease lowering the memory
performance. Two groups were given an abstract warning that any simulation could be detected
somehow, but the test results did not show any deterrent effect of that warning. Most laboratory
experiments, conducted as games, can be found in the literature about tax evasion and deterrence;
refer to subsection 2.2.4 for more references and information.
Experiments in the field are also conducted. Press (1971) studies an increase of 40% of po-
licemen on the streets in the 20th district of New York. He detects significant decreases in “outer
crimes” which are visible from the streets; indoor crimes were not affected. Laycock (1991) made
an experiment in three villages in South Wales in which some inhabitants marked their property
and announced this to the public (e.g., using clearly visible signs on the window or door). Indeed,
the burglary rate significantly decreased in the following two years for the participants but not for
the other villagers. Chaiken et al. (1974) study a large increase of police presence in the New York
subways during the night and find a strong deterrent effect (even during the day) which lasted for
eight months. In the years 1976-78 special cars were used in the city of Stockton to detect drunken
drivers during the night at weekends (Voas and Hause, 1987). BAC levels and the number of ac-
cidents decreased during all nights but not during the day. Retting et al. (1999) study the effect
of red light cameras in Oxnard. These cameras reduced the crossing of red lights not only for
those stoplights with cameras, but also those nearby (while no effect was detected in nearby cities
without such cameras). Another traffic experiment was done by Michaels (1960) who studies the
patrol density in Wisconsin on several routes (4 experimental and 3 control routes). The only ef-
fect he finds is a reduction in the speed-variance but no other deterrent effect is detected (in regard
to the average speed, speeding and accidents). Buikhuisen (1974) reports an experiment in two
Dutch cities. The percentage of worn tires was measured in both cities but only in one city it was
made public that the police was looking especially for worn tires. Indeed, only in the experimental
city the percentage of worn tires was significantly lowered.
Many political decisions also provide good opportunities to test certain hypotheses. For exam-
ple, Hansen and Machin (2002) use the introduction of minimum wages in the United Kingdom
to study the relationship between wages and crime. Indeed, they find that crime is significantly
reduced in areas in which very low wages were common. Other quasi-experiments are commonly
found in the literature about drunk driving (see subsection 2.2.6), which study the impact of new
laws against DUI activities.
Authors using survey data usually use public surveys, like the NCVS or NLSY in the case of
the USA, or conduct their own surveys. Some of these are representative, some are not and often
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this status is simply undefined. These surveys can be sorted into three categories: cross-sectional,
longitudinal (multiple cross sections) and panel surveys. Although cross-sectional surveys have
been used in many studies, these are criticized to be unable to distinguish the deterrent effect from
an experiential effect (see, for example, the studies of Saltzman et al. (1982); Minor and Harry
(1982) and Bishop (1984a) who use two-wave surveys, and a discussion on this problem). Surveys
are, besides experiments, very prominent in the research of tax evasion and in the sociological and
criminological literature.
Lochner (2001) develops a model with a bayesian belief updating system. Offenders adjust
their subjective probability upwards if they are caught, and downwards if their deeds remain un-
detected. He tests his model with data from the NLSY97 and National Youth Survey (NYS). He
finds that the real probabilities are grossly overestimated. The adjustment process of the clearance
rate and the severity of punishment takes several years. Real and subjective rates are not corre-
lated for youths and then slowly converge towards the official rates. In another study about his
belief updating system, Lochner (2003) concludes that the individual perception of the probability
of arrest is hard to explain but is influenced by prior arrests (of oneself or friends), the general
clearance rate, age and other factors. While the actual probabilities are generally overestimated
the perceived order is correct.
Using a survey of 1700 pupils from Arizona, Erickson et al. (1977) conclude that the subjective
severeness of offenses is the decisive factor which dominates the subjective probability and sever-
ity of punishment. In fact, the probability and severity are correlated so much that they cannot be
disentangled. Thus, not negative but positive deterrence - the preventive effect of the normative
attitude - is found to be the decisive factor.
2.3.3 Social, Human and Criminal Capital
The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor,
who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy, to
invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of the civil
magistrate that the owner of that valuable property, which is
acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many
successive generations, can sleep a single night in security. [. . . ]
Where there is no property, or at least none that exceeds the
value of two or three days labour, civil government is not
necessary.
Smith (1789)
In principal, social, human and criminal capital represent the knowledge and skills accumulated
by individuals in these categories. For example, Williams and Sickles (2002) use education and
social ties to measure social capital. They find that accumulating social capital reduces (property)
crime; i.e., the potential loss of social capital deters. Gyimah-Brempong (1986) emphasizes that
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criminal capital, in case of the USA, has to be distinguished, at least for the white and non-white
population, because general social and economic measures cannot achieve this.
Leung (2002) studies social, human and criminal capital of lower-class youths in Montreal.
He employs logit models to identify the influence of education, work, friends and family and
general deterrents (police expenditures) on self reported delinquency. While police is insignificant,
motivation in school and living with two parents are negatively, while having delinquent friends
are positively correlated with delinquency.
Although juvenile law is more lenient, the expected punishment for adults may reduce juvenile
crime because, due to dynamic deterrence, these punishments reduce the expected human capital
in the future (Levitt, 1998a). One consequence is that harsher punishments may reduce crimes in
the short run but increase crime in the long run since criminal capital becomes more important
relative to human capital.
Recidivism might be interpreted as failure of special deterrence. However, Ehrlich (1972) re-
marks that “it might rather be the result of choice dictated by opportunities”. Being in prison in-
creases criminal capital24, while decreasing human capital (e.g., lowering future income). There-
fore, it is not surprising when the individual optimal participation in crime remains unchanged or
even tips towards crime. Whether or not the loss in human and social capital exceeds the gain
from increased criminal capital depends on the individual case. More on that topic can be found
in Meyer (2007) who studies social capital and delinquency for Germany using a large survey of
prisoners and non-incapacitated people.
A model of human capital and crime is developed by Lochner (2004) who considers the skill
to learn, income and the opportunity costs to unlearn (due to imprisonment) and various offenses.
Using data from the UCR and NLSY, he concludes that older, intelligent and educated people do
commit less simple offenses except for white-collar crimes.
Mocan and Bali (2005) argue that crime behaves acyclically because crime will decrease less
when deterrence is increased than crime would increase in the case of decreasing deterrence. This
follows from the assumption that offenders build up criminal capital which lessens the efficiency
of deterrence. They find evidence for this thesis in the case of property crime but not, as expected,
for homicide and rape. In another study, Mocan et al. (2005) develop a two stage model, in which
the first step consists of the allocation of time in the legal and illegal sector, taking into account
potential income in both fields and deterrence measures. Each individual can accumulate capital
in both sectors. In the second step, depending on the earned income, consumption is determined.
In the long run, depending on the chosen conditions, the model inhibits one (only legal or illegal
activities) or a second (mixture of legal and illegal activities) equilibrium.
More criminal capital may also imply that more experienced criminals will be detected less
often or concentrate on crimes which are more inconspicuous (Benson et al., 1992). Crimes,
which require more skill and experience may be more affected by conviction rates while other
24Crime skills may be trained in prison (Avio and Clark, 1976).
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depend more on clearance rates (Avio and Clark, 1976).
2.3.4 The Typical Age Curve
It is the mark of an instructed mind to rest assured with that
degree of precision that the nature of the subject admits, and not
to seek exactness when only an approximation of the truth is
possible.
Aristotle
It is known since Quetelet (1831) and commonly observed that criminal activity rises strongly
for young juveniles, reaching its peak around the beginning of adulthood (about the age of 20)
and then recedes (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983). Hirschi and Gottfredson (1985) even argue
that age is a primary variable to explain crime. The observed age curve can be explained by
different means. Lochner (2004) uses a model, based on the accumulation of human and criminal
capital evolvement (see subsection 2.3.3), and notes that youths commit less simple crimes as
soon as they start to work. He presents another explanation in Lochner (2001), in which the
curve follows from a model of individual belief updating. Older people do not become criminals
because they never adjust their perceived probabilities of arrest downwards, while older criminals
adjust their probability upwards until crimes stop to pay off. He adds that unambitious criminals
drop out of the criminal market faster than ambitious (and more skilled) offenders. Cohen and
Land (1987) argue that age structure, business cycle, criminal opportunity and the imprisonment
rate can explain most of the annual homicide and motor vehicle theft rates. Steffensmeier and
Harer (1987) report that about 40% of the drop in crime rates in 1980-84 can be explained by age
adjustments. However, Greenberg (1985) or Shavit and Rattner (1988) cast doubts on some of
these explanations.
There is a large branch of literature dealing with the number of crimes committed by an offender
(called λ ), which is important when studying criminal careers - and criminal careers depend heav-
ily on the age structure. For further references, see Free Encyclopedia (2008) for a bibliography
about criminal careers.
2.4 Particularities Regarding Covariates
There must be no barriers to freedom of inquiry. There is no
place for dogma in science. The scientist is free, and must be
free to ask any questions, to doubt any assertion, to seek for any
evidence, to correct any errors.
Robert Oppenheimer
Hale (1999) points out that “any model of crime trends must include variables which might be
considered to capture the deterrence effects of the criminal justice system”. This encompasses
62 2 Deterrence and Crime
a vast pool of possible covariates, of which some are included in most studies if available (like
unemployment, race, education and income) while many others are used less often. Pogue (1975)
argues that economic factors may also influence criminal behavior indirectly by partially deter-
mining the basic attitude towards society and its values. Commonly, the desired measures are not
available and are estimated by proxy variables. Any analysis which lacks these influences might
be severely biased in any direction (see section 2.3.1). For example, Sridharan et al. (2003) studies
the abolishment of parole and increased punishment for felony offenders in Virginia, 1995. The
obvious deterrent effects for murder and rape are nullified when unemployment is included in the
model. The influential role of the composition of variables is also pointed out by McManus (1985)
in his re-evaluation of a study about the death penalty in the USA. His approach is similar to an
Extreme Bounds Analysis (see subsection 3.6.4) in such a way that he makes several groups of
covariates, according to the hypothesized prior belief of a researcher (from a “right winger” to a
“crimes of passion” advocate). He shows that the evaluated results can not be considered robust
because the outcomes vary from strong deterrence to absolutely no effect.
In regard to western nations, many economic, social and environmental factors are regarded
to be important when studying crime. There are only some rare studies in English which are
concerned with African, ex-Soviet or Asian nations. These few studies indicate that their crime-
structure differs from western nations by a large margin (Mui and Ali, 1997).
Gross and Hakim (1982) point out that crime characteristics also vary by local transport con-
nections. They analyze the metropolitan area of Philadelphia and find that suburban communities,
which are easily accessible, attract offenders from other areas. More detailed results are deliv-
ered by Ihlanfeldt (2003), who studies rail stations in Atlanta, Georgia, and finds that the effect
of rail stations on crimes is conditional. “Rail access does increase crime within those neighbor-
hoods that are both close to poor people and are not high-income”, while rail-transit even reduced
crime for the representative white suburban neighborhood. Like Ihlanfeldt, Thaler (1977) finds,
using detailed data about city districts of Rochester, that the probability of arrest decreases as the
distance between the home of the offender and the site of crime increases.
2.4.1 Unemployment
An optimist thinks this is the best of all worlds. A pessimist
fears the same may be true.
Doug Larson
The relationship between crime and unemployment has been subject to numerous studies. Field
(1990) reports that studies about crime and unemployment reach back to the 19th century. Al-
though of primitive nature, these studies asserted that economic downturns are positively corre-
lated with property crimes25. Only in the last decades, deterrence and unemployment variables
are analyzed at the same time. In fact, most of those studies which use deterrence as a covariate,
25However, these studies are not included in our data base because they do not provide any measures of deterrence.
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focus on unemployment. Deadman and Pyle (2000), studying a long time series of burglary in
England and Wales, conclude that unemployment fosters burglaries, while Wong (1995) comes
to the same conclusion using crime data of England and Wales from the 19th century. However,
these results may depend on the chosen models, because Field (1990) also uses data from England
and Wales, but identifies consumption as the primary driving force which renders unemployment
irrelevant. A more detailed analysis is done by Hale (1999) who uses an error correction model
to distinguish short and long term effects. Studying burglary and theft in England and Wales, he
concludes that unemployment and consumption have only short termed effects (unemployment
positive and consumption negative). Long term effects are detected for the decreasing size of
the manufacturing and producing industry which is explained by the long term increase in the
low-skilled unemployment sector.
Corman et al. (1987) use monthly data from New York City and don’t find relevant effects of
unemployment on property crime. Contrarily, Ralston (1999) uses U.S. time series and detects
significant effects of cyclical and frictional unemployment as well as technical unemployment in-
teracting with the arrest rate of whites. Diez-Ticio (2000) emphasizes that the short- and long term
effects may be different. He finds no distinctive short term effect but reports that unemployment
reduces crime (robbery, burglary and auto vehicle theft) in the long run. Bodman and Maultby
(1997) find that long term unemployment leads to more property crimes, while the strength of this
effect is smaller for women and short term unemployment. Machin and Meghir (2004) remark
that the significance of unemployment on crime vanishes when they introduce spatial fixed effects
into their model. Similarly, Field (1990) reports that the effect of unemployment vanishes in the
case of property crime when he uses consumption as a covariate.
Weinberg et al. (2002) use individual data from the USA and concentrate on unskilled male
workers. While the general unemployment rate and wages have no significant effect on crime, the
unemployment and wage development for this subgroup have a significant impact. Especially the
long-term wage development is important for the long-term crime progression. Educated men are
not affected by these factors. The difference between the desired and actual time of employment
of teenagers is used by Good and Pirog-Good (1987) to catch frustration effects. They find that
among black teenagers, fewer engage in crime while white teenagers are unaffected and higher
police activities only affect whites. This indicates that “blacks apparently view employment and
crime as alternative income-generating activities”. They argue that reducing unemployment for
high-risk black youths additionally reduces crime.
Empirical studies often find that the employment for young workers is significantly reduced
when a minimum wage (above the market wage) is introduced (or increased). Since increased
unemployment can also increase crime, Chressanthis and Grimes (1990) test this hypothesis26
with U.S. data. While they find only effects for homicide, rape and motor vehicle theft, Hashimoto
(1987) finds evidence supporting this theory for all teenage UCR crime rates.
26They also give many references to the associated literature.
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Mocan et al. (2005) point out that increasing unemployment may increase crime which impli-
cates the accumulation of criminal capital. When unemployment is reduced, the criminal capital
should then dampen the decreasing effect on crime. Similarly, Sherman et al. (1998) argue that
special prevention is less effective for unemployed people.
2.4.2 Income, Welfare and Poverty
I know that you believe that you understood what you think I
said, but I am not sure you realize that what you heard is not
what I meant.
Robert McCloskey, U.S. State Department spokesman
The potential relevance of income influencing crime has been known for about 150 years, as
can be seen by von Mayr (1867) who reported a positive relationship between the price of rye
(a reverse proxy of real income and consumption) and property crime in Bavaria (as quoted in
Field (1990)). In theory, measures of income have two opposite effects. On the one hand, lower
levels of income can motivate property crime (as a second income, decreasing opportunity costs)
and violent crime (due to frustration). However, it can lower property crime as well because the
overall value and availability of loot is reduced and homes are more often occupied (Ensor and
Godfrey, 1993). Which effect dominates depends on the wage distribution (Machin and Meghir,
2004). Hence, at least two different variables should be used - such as real income to proxy
potential loot and wages to measure opportunity costs of crime (Doyle et al., 1999).
Using Swedish panel data, Nilsson (2004) finds that the social class below 40% of the median
income is more prone to burglary and auto vehicle theft, while the average income is negatively
related to property crimes (property is better protected). Contrarily, the 90% quantile of the income
distribution is positively related to property crime, which is explained by the more valuable and
available loot. Machin and Meghir (2004) also conclude that crime rises when the income of the
lowest 25% decreases. Danziger and Wheeler (1975) emphasize that, studying time series and
cross sections from the USA, combating income divergence is more effective than deterrence in
reducing crime. Furthermore, more deterrence can lead to more false convictions and does not
reduce the social gap. Myers (1982) also reports that “higher income is a better deterrent to some
crimes than increased punishment”. In contrast, Doyle et al. (1999) detect no effect of income
inequality but “find that crime is most elastic with respect to wages in sectors that use low-skilled
labor”, and that good labor market conditions have a negative effect on crime in general. Using
panel data from England and Wales, Witt et al. (1998) use wage differences and unemployment but
find only significant effects for shop lifting. In a study of the U.S. county Mahoning, Liu and Bee
(1983) implement local data of unemployment and the close-downs of plants. They summarize
that local economic variables are important, not nationwide statistics.
Instead of using income, Sesnowitz and Hexter (1982) use the incurred losses reported to insur-
ances in the case of burglaries. They argue that “the present study provides more direct support
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for the hypothesis that thieves respond to the amount available for stealing”. A different approach
is taken by Goldberg and Nold (1980) who calculate different burglary probabilities for vari-
ous values of loot which are then used in the deterrence model. Zhang (1997) studies the effect
of welfare-programs on crime and finds that potential offenders who are risk-avers refrain from
crimes when welfare payments are stopped in the case of a conviction.
Weinberg et al. (2002) emphasize the importance to distinguish between unskilled and educated
men. Using data from the USA, they find that wages and other economic conditions have no effect
on (higher) educated men in regard to crime. However, unskilled young men - two thirds of all
prison inmates in the USA have no high school graduation - significantly react to changes in
wages and unemployment in their delinquent behavior. Viscusi (1986) emphasizes the importance
of income even more: the standard approach (regressing deterrence on crime) is only valid if
there are no differences in crime income levels. In his analysis, he does not only find significant
deterrent effects but also concludes that deterrence is a major determinant of the criminal income.
2.4.3 Education
There is only one good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance.
Socrates
Education may be associated with more or less crime. On the one hand, it increases human
capital as well as the current income and thus increases the opportunity costs of crime. It may
also have a civilization effect (Usher, 1997) which tends to increase the reluctance to commit an
offense. However, education may increase crime as well for several reasons, as Ehrlich (1975b)
points out. The marginal product of labor is larger in the illegal than in the legal sector (more
criminal capital is accumulated than human capital); higher education may lead to less under-
reporting (see also section 2.3.1); education may be a proxy for “the average permanent income in
the population, thus reflecting potential gains to be had from crime, especially property crimes”;
and some crime rates may be “directly related to inequalities in schooling and on-the-job training”.
Besides including education as a covariate in an analysis, like numerous authors do, Lott (1987)
explicitly studies whether lower education increases crime. He uses data from U.S. counties to
study youth delinquency in regard to the type of attended school (public or private). Indeed, he
finds that youths from public schools are more prone to youth related crimes. Using data from
England and Wales of the 19th century, Wong (1995) finds that increasing education reduces
crime. Bodman and Maultby (1997) point out that effects from education (and similar variables
like immigrant- or native status) might affect unemployment directly and crime just indirectly.
Fajnzylber et al. (1998) come to the conclusion that “there is a delayed effect of educational
effort on crime alleviation” because education does not affect the delinquent behavior of youths,
but affects them when they reach adulthood. Additionally, there are indirect effects due to the
influence of education on their economic and social status.
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2.4.4 Other Variables
Facts do not “speak for themselves”. They speak for or against
competing theories. Facts divorced from theories or visions are
mere isolated curiosities.
Thomas Sowell
Many authors have found that the portion of black people (Dezhbakhsh et al., 2001) or non-
whites do significantly increase the homicide rate. However, Pogue (1986) argues that non-white
variables might not measure racial effects but are “a fairly good proxy for the frequency of broken
homes”. Blacks (or non-whites) are often found to be more prone to crime than whites which is
often explained by their worse economic status. However, Gyimah-Brempong (1986) reports that,
for example, the unemployment rate is dominated by whites and when the unemployment rate is
considered separately for both groups, the non-white variable becomes insignificant. Nevertheless,
Mocan and Rees (2005) use representative micro data of juveniles in the USA and find significant
race effects, even when considering many personal, family and neighborhood characteristics.
Besides for DUI offenses (see subsection 2.2.6) alcohol consumption may increase crime rates.
On the one hand, alcohol consumption may increase the probability of detection by impairing
the offender (Ensor and Godfrey, 1993). On the other hand, some offenses are often committed
under the influence of alcohol (e.g., loitering, assault). The former, however, applies foremost
for offenses which require no or little planning like assault or robbery and for these offenses
deterrence is assumed to be less effective.
Aside from studies about the death penalty (e.g., to distinguish “harsh” from “lenient” states),
political variables are not used that often. While variables for different government constellations
are significant in a German panel data (Entorf, 1996), these effects become insignificant when
fixed effects are added to the model. Fischer (2004) and Feld and Frey (2004) analyze, aside
several other variables, the various levels of democracy of Swiss cantons to identify important in-
fluences on crime and tax evasion. However, direct democracy has no effect on crime but increases
the tax morale.
It is commonly assumed that crime is more of a problem in cities; i.e., areas with a high popu-
lation density. However, Howsen and Jarrell (1987) find that there is a U-shaped influence. This
means that areas with a very low population density show high crime rates as well. Witt and Witte
(2000) use the female labor force participation rate as a proxy for the social development of a
society and find that the former is strongly and positively correlated with crime rates, although
they “cannot unambiguously say that increases in female labor force participation cause crime”.
The existence of state lotteries and its influence on crime rates is studied by Mikesell and Pirog-
Good (1990) with a U.S. panel. Previously, state lotteries were found to reduce illegal gambling as
well as acting “like a regressive tax to the relative detriment of low income individuals”. However,
they find that having state lotteries increase crime rates significantly by three percent.
2.5 Interim Summary 67
2.5 Interim Summary
Justice is conscience, not a personal conscience but the
conscience of the whole of humanity. Those who clearly
recognize the voice of their own conscience usually recognize
also the voice of justice.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 1967
All in all, there is clearly an abundance of potential problems, biases, attitudes and theoretical
approaches when empirically studying deterrence; in addition to all other usual difficulties ana-
lyzing time series, cross sections, surveys, other data or experiments. Brier and Fienberg (1980)
summarize some economic studies about deterrence - especially from Ehrlich, Forst and Loftin -
and discard all their results. In particular Ehrlich is harshly criticized by them for not disclosing
his data and bad workmanship. Assessing the literature of the past decades, their fundamental cri-
tique seems to be grossly exaggerated, but it is obvious that there is such a vast arsenal of studies
with different results that everyone can pick out the results he likes best.
However, even faced with the different approaches described in this chapter, it seems not to be
impossible to incorporate them in one all-embracing framework of individual decision making.
Independent of the theoretical background and favor of a researcher, we think that the question
of deterrence is empirically testable and that the existing studies should contain enough viable
information to be a good basis for a deeper analysis. The numerous discrepancies, approaches,
techniques, cultural differences, etc. literally demand to be exploited by a meta analysis - to reveal
the reasons for this heterogeneity, how properties of the authors, their techniques or the studied
populations affect the results; and if there is any basic deterrent effect when other influences are
removed.

3 Meta Analysis
In questions of science the authority of a thousand is not worth
the humble reasoning of a single individual.
Galileo Galilei
Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do not believe in anything
simply because it is spoken and rumored by many. Do not believe in anything simply
because it is found written in your religious books. Do not believe in anything merely
on the authority of your teachers and elders. Do not believe in traditions because they
have been handed down for many generations. But after observation and analysis, when
you find that anything agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of
one and all, then accept it and live up to it.
Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama
“Meta-analysis is used to provide a quantitative summary of the literature” (Rose, 2004). Or
to be more precise: the primary goal of a meta analysis is to extract more information about a
common question from a set of studies than the sum of each single study would yield. There are
two ways to achieve this. The first is to make a new study using the accumulated raw data of all
available studies while the second way is to exploit the reported results of these studies. When
dealing with empirical studies about deterrence it is obvious that there is no way to use the former
method of analysis because the data sources, on which these studies are based, are in most cases
unavailable, not compatible, very heterogenous and unlikely to be summable at all in practice.
Nowadays, the most common form of meta analysis, at least in economics, is to statistically ana-
lyze the outcomes - which are interpreted as observations - and characteristics of empirical studies
about a common topic. When narrowed down to the outcomes only, a meta analysis requires very
similar studies which are most likely merely replications of each other. This kind of analysis was
very popular and practical in the beginning1. Refer to Hedges and Olkin (1985) for more infor-
mation about pitfalls, statistical methods and applications of these kind of meta analysis as well
as Johnson et al. (1995). However, studies which share most of the non-sample properties are not
common in sociology and economics. We explicitly include a very wide scope of studies which,
as described in chapter 2, show very heterogenous characteristics and we control for most of these
differences in the analysis. In general, we refer to the concept of meta regression analysis (Stanley
1The medical sector was the first to broadly make use of meta analyses because medical studies have, more or less,
the same test design.
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and Jarell, 2005) and regress the results of the included studies on study characteristics and other
factors. This kind of meta analysis has become quite popular in economics; see Knell and Stix
(2005); Longhi et al. (2005); Smith and Huang (1995); Stanley (2005b); Waldorf and Byun (2005)
or Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005), for applications and further references.
The basic procedure can be divided into three steps. First, we describe the identification and
collection of the relevant literature in section 3.1. Second, in section 3.2 we show how the rele-
vant information is extracted from the collected literature and processed to make it accessible for
further analysis. And finally, the meta analysis is performed in sections 3.5 and 3.6, preceded by a
description of the data in section 3.3. Publication bias is considered in section 3.4. The project was
interdisciplinary and worked on by two different teams, one in Heidelberg and the other in Darm-
stadt. The team in Heidelberg was responsible for the sociological and criminological literature,
while the economic and miscellaneous literature was researched and processed by us.
At this point we should mention Pratt (2004) again, who also performs a meta analysis of
empirical studies about crime. However, he uses a rather small set of studies and includes deter-
rence only as one among many other crime theories (a selection from theories can be found in
subsection 2.1.3) and does focus on the social aspects of these crime theories. Furthermore, the
set of covariates he uses is, compared with our data, quite small and his regressions are applied
separately for each theory.
Entorf and Antony (2002) and Mu¨ller (2003) are preceding studies made in Darmstadt to
demonstrate the feasibility and usability of a meta regression analysis of empirical deterrence.
Although these authors use only very small sets of studies, they show that our task, to perform an
extensive meta analysis, can be expected to be worthwhile.
3.1 The Search Process
. . . all ideas need to be heard, because each idea contains one
aspect of the truth. By examining that aspect, we add to our
own idea of the truth. Even ideas that have no truth in them
whatsoever are useful because by disproving them, we add
support to our own ideas.
John S. Mill, On Liberty, 1859
Nijkamp and Poot (2002) summarize the basic principle of the search process: the first step
before any meta analysis can be carried out is the selection of the included studies. Coverage, de-
fined as the extent to which the studies are representative of the targeted population and precision
- the quality and the proximity to the topic at hand - are two very important issues. Unfortunately,
these tend to vary inversely.
We explicitly and intentionally do cot comply with precision. Instead of selecting only studies
with (supposedly) good quality, we collected all studies and incorporate quality issues into the
meta analysis. Furthermore, deterrence theory in general covers so many different fields that a
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concise and narrow selection seems to be futile. While some authors of meta analyses search
only in very few data bases2 we include as many sources as possible. We do not only consider
published studies and books but also searched, like van der Sluis et al. (2003), for unpublished
studies (i.e., discussion or conference papers, reports, etc.).
The research took place in 16 criminological, sociological and economic data bases with the
search terms “Abschreckung”, “Generalpra¨vention” and “deterrence” Depending on the data base,
the search took place in one or more of the following categories: title, key words, abstract or full
text. Additionally, we retrieved all articles which include references to Becker (1968) or Ehrlich
(1973) (if the data base allowed this kind of search). Finally, each bibliography of every retrieved
and relevant study was scrutinized for additional deterrence studies3 (similar to Oosterbeek et
al. (2004)). The search process resulted in 9422 references which were stored in a data base of
references.
3.1.1 First Stage of Filtering
He that leaveth nothing to chance will do few things ill, but he
will do very few things.
George Savile, 17th century
After eliminating multiple and obviously unsuitable references4 in the first stage of processing,
3598 references remained, as depicted in table 3.1.
The number of references after the first stage does not say anything about the kind or quality
of a data base because the elimination of duplicates followed no specific ordering. The fact that
at least 787 references to relevant literature are taken from the bibliographies of acquired studies
shows that, as depicted in subsection A.1.2, at least the coverage of older studies tends to be quite
bad in these data bases.
3.1.2 Second Stage of Filtering
Nothing will ever be attempted, if all possible objections must
first be overcome.
Samuel Johnson, Rasselas, 1759
In the second stage, the remaining references were categorized, distinguishing economic, soci-
ologic and other references, and assigning each reference a number for its (presumed) empirical
relevance5; from certainly being an empirical test of the deterrence hypothesis to unlikely to con-
tain any relevant empirical information.
2Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) and Knell and Stix (2005), for example, only searched in EconLit and
some selected leading journals.
3Refer to subsection A.1.2 for further information about the impact of this additional step.
4These include, for example, literature about nuclear deterrence or market entry deterrence, anti-trust literature,
book reviews, oviposition deterrence and similar biological subjects.
5The relevance was judged by the available information, like title, abstract, authors, journal, etc.
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Like Beyleveld (1980) does, we exclude certain topics (besides the obviously irrelevant litera-
ture). We exclude studies dealing with the following topics.
• Specific deterrence. Articles which explicitly study the effect of punishment on recidivism
of individual persons or groups. Some exceptions are made, for example, when the used
data consisted only of prisoners but the focus was more on general deterrence.
• Psychological research. Research on the effects of punishment from a behavioral point of
view. Also, no articles studying animals were included.
• Theoretical Studies. Articles which study methods, theories and other theoretical concerns
regarding empirical deterrence without a relevant application.
• Studies solely about norm- or law abiding people (e.g., Orviska and Hudson (2003), im-
moral but legal behavior (e.g., Konar and Cohen (2000)) or implicit and abstract deterrence
(e.g., the firm size in Alexander and Cohen (1999)).
We explicitly also include studies dealing with driving under the influence, speeding, cheating
in classrooms, tax evasion, environmental offenses and violating requirements (safety measures,
pollution limits, etc.). All6 remaining studies were acquired to the best possible extend, following
their presumed relevance. When a study was unavailable, we acquired more information from
third parties in the internet to determine its relevance. Table 3.2 contains the result of the second
stage process.
After acquiring7 and looking through 1966 studies and carefully discarding 1632 other refer-
ences to studies which were not attained, 840 relevant empirical studies remained. For further
interesting statistics of these references see subsection A.1.1.
3.1.3 Main Resources
1966 studies have been acquired. Several studies are freely available (mostly newer working
papers, government reports). Most studies were retrieved from electronic libraries of German
universities (which had a subscription to the journal or had access to JSTOR or similar services).
If electronic access was not available, they were scanned and e-mailed (postal deliverance for
books) to us by a library of a German university, which had the journal or book in their shelves, for
a small fee of about 5e (8e for books). This is a service nearly all German universities provide
and is called SUBITO. 609 studies have been attained using SUBITO. Last but not least, some
studies were attained from acquainted researchers (e.g., Mark Cohen, Horst Entorf and Hannes
Spengler provided several studies) or we, if their study was unavailable to us, asked researchers
per email. However, only very few answered and send us a copy.
6Although we could have done so, 203 references were not acquired because it would have been too expensive and
any relevance was unlikely.
7For some statistics about the acquisition of the literature refer to tables 3.2 and 3.4.
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Table 3.2: Category, relevance and availability in the 2nd stage of research process
Acquired category relevance
before after
strong medium low strong medium none sum
Economics 216 237 269 268 138 316 722
Sociology 171 316 232 355 135 229 719
Others 237 181 107 217 143 165 525
Sum 624 734 608 840 416 709 1966
Not acquired category relevance
before after
strong medium low strong medium none sum
Economics 127 58 152 0 0 337 337
Sociology 160 414 405 0 0 979 979
Others 162 39 115 0 0 316 316
Sum 449 511 672 0 0 1632 1632
The left columns contain the number before reading the acquired studies and getting more information about
unattainable studies. The right columns describe the final categorization of the studies thereafter. Medium rele-
vance means that the study is empirical and about crime but does not contain any relevant and usable deterrence
variables. Low and no relevance indicate that a study is not empirical or not about crime. The bold cells give the
number the relevant studies for the meta analysis.
The numbers for sociological studies of medium relevance is somewhat larger because studies, which were at-
tained in Heidelberg, received no previous ranking and were all treated as being of medium relevance. Addi-
tionally, several studies from Heidelberg, which were not attained, could not be unambiguously classified as “not
acquired” or “not relevant” and were assigned to the latter category.
After the acquisition of all studies and their analysis was finished, a new copyright law was
passed in Germany. One of its consequences is that, if the copyright holder provides an (usually
expensive) access to a study, the SUBITO service we used becomes prohibited. Since the average
price for such studies is somewhere between 25$ and 45$, we would have been unable to reach
such a level of coverage. Therefore, we are lucky that the passing of that law occurred, by chance,
just after we finished this work.
3.2 The Data
The trouble with doing something right the first time is that
nobody appreciates how difficult it was.
Walt West
The information the relevant studies provide has to be stored in a common data base to make it
usable in a meta analysis. It is of utmost importance to have access to as much relevant information
about the studies as possible. Therefore, we stored all relevant information in a unified, single data
base. Since the teams worked independently in separated locations, the interface to enter the data,
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and the meta-data base itself, has to fulfill several conditions.
The Interface of the Data Base
The data base had to be accessed from anywhere at anytime on any platform but only from autho-
rized persons. Several individual levels of rights had to be assigned to all people involved (from a
guest-access which only allows the inspection of the data to full administration rights). Since new
variables or data structure were introduced or modified during the course of the project, the data
had to be easily and transparently maintained. Backup-management and a data format which is
easy to handle was also important. Furthermore, functions to prevent users from making incorrect
or invalid entries, calculating values and to guide users efficiently through the entry forms were
implemented.
Therefore, the interface was written in HTML, CSS, JavaScript and PHP; the data base was re-
alized with MySQL and both were hosted on a web site. MySQLDumper was used for the backup
management and PHPMyAdmin for administering the MySQL data base. The web-interface con-
sists of 6573 lines of code and provides an universal and flexible way to fit the individual needs of
this project.
The Data Structure
The sets of variables to capture any relevant information was developed in Heidelberg and com-
pleted in Darmstadt. The data we collected can be categorized by two information criteria: study-
and estimate-related data. The first part covers all general information about the study itself (char-
acteristics of the publication, the author, the kind of study, the utilized data, quality aspects of the
study, etc.) while the second part captures characteristics of each estimate8 (characteristics of the
independent and dependent variables, the used explanatory variables, aspects of the model, de-
tailed information of the result, etc.). To evaluate the data we merged both parts by duplicating the
study variables for each estimate. A study which provides n recorded results is thus represented
by n rows (i.e., observations) in the date base - the first part of each row is exactly the same, the
other part may be more or less different (depending on the results) as depicted in table 3.3.
Preparation of the Data
During the whole process it became necessary to manipulate, convert and to study the structure
of the data, to recalculate certain values and to find and remove errors derived from inconsistent
data. To make this possible we programmed a tool which provides the necessary features9. The
most important are:
8By estimate we mean a result a study reports. For example, if a study tests the deterrence hypotheses for each of
the seven Index I crimes in the United States with one regression, it contributes seven estimates to our data base.
When we use the term observation, we usually refer to elements of our data base.
9To a certain extend, some features can be realized with the MySQL syntax as well.
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• Converting the MySQL data bases into a flexible text-format and merging the two data sets
into one.
• Calculating weights and, if possible, missing values (values of significance, converting
statistics, adjusting signs, etc.).
• Detecting and deleting unused variables, generating new variables from others, converting
the format of variables and conditionally renaming variables.
• Support the researcher in detecting inconsistent data (e.g., different or missing discipline of
an author) and to provide an automated and menu-guided usage.
The tool was programmed in Java to keep the independency on any Operating System and
consists of 2331 lines of code.
3.2.1 Data Entry Description
We are usually convinced more easily by reasons we have found
ourselves than by those which have occurred to others.
Blaise Pascal, Pense´e, 1657
In the following, we give some rough description of the data, some statistics about the data
entry process and important information about the relevant variables we use in the meta analysis.
Time constrains prevented us to enter all 840 studies into the data base. Eventually, 700 studies
were recorded, 350 by the team in Heidelberg and 350 by us. The team in Heidelberg recorded all
estimates a study provided while we considered only one estimate for each crime and data set a
study used (similar to van der Sluis et al. (2003)). This was necessary because we recorded all of
the economic studies which often repeat an analysis with little variation in the variables to verify
the robustness of a result10. Recording all these estimates would have taken too much time, and
we decided that it would be better to include more studies (with a reduced number of estimates)
than to use a reduced number of studies with all estimates11. In Rupp (2006) - a paper very
similar to Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) - we showed that, under certain assumptions, taking random
estimates leads to better results than taking the median (as Rose (2004) did) or mean value. Even
more important, it would have been very difficult to record a mean or median value, when results
also differ in other properties (e.g., are calculated with different subsets or specifications, which
is usually the case).
Beside the results (in the literature often referred to as effect sizes), we also recorded as many
properties as possible about the study design and the implemented methods. Although this is
10In economics and other fields, a result is usually assumed to be fragile if it can be reversed or mitigated by minor
changes in the specification.
11“All explicitly reported estimates” would be a better expression because some studies refer to further unreported
results. Usually these, in some cases up to several thousands, are not published for reasons of parsimony, or
because they are all similar.
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often done in meta regression analysis (e.g., Murphy et al. (2003); van der Sluis et al. (2003);
Oosterbeek et al. (2004); Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005), etc.), the scope of recorded
information in this meta analysis is unique. Results which are explicitly reprints from another
study are not considered. Out of 7822 recorded values (including 1680 values favored by the
author12, but not randomly chosen), 7641 provide the sign (e.g., whether the reported estimate
supports the deterrence hypothesis or not). To compare the reported values in a meta analysis,
it is common to use the associated t-values reported by the studies (Stanley and Jarell, 2005).
However, it would also be possible to use ordered logit (or probit) methods with the p-values of
the results, like in Waldorf and Byun (2005).
For the 350 economical and “other” studies entered in Darmstadt, we have detailed statistics
at our disposal. These statistics which provide information about the data entry process can be
found in table 3.4. They can also be used to estimate the additional time required to enter the 140
omitted studies.
Table 3.4: Statistics of the data entry process of all 350 studies in Darmstadt
Statistic sum mean sd min max
Pages 7090 20.26 15.82 3 121
Estimates 10695 30.56 66.05 0 764
Stored estimates 3140 8.97 12.29 0 127
Time to read 22605 64.59 36.71 5 245
Time to enter 10075 28.79 23.35 5 225
Time (total) 32680 93.37 50.75 15 420
Time per page 3.71 1.55 0.95 13.93
Time per estimate 5.48 3.82 0 25
Time saved 14345 40.99 105.29 -7.72 1289.06
All times are given in minutes.
Stored estimates: the estimates stored in the data base (one estimate per crime and source); Time (total): total time
for reading the study and entering the estimates into the data base; Time per page: time to read a study per page;
Time per estimate: the time required to enter the data per recorded estimate; Time saved: the estimated saved
time by the recording scheme (only one random estimate per crime and source) estimated by OLS (regressing
Estimates on Time (total)).
3.2.2 The (Normalized) t-Value
Everything which is merely probable is probably wrong.
Rene´ Descartes
We chose to extend the usual procedure to rely solely on the reported, original t-values, by using
all given values of significance (transforming them into t-values) and then normalizing them.
12Estimates with the property “favored by the author” were always recorded and it is noted in the data base whether
they are also randomly chosen. Favored estimates which are not randomly chosen may be analyzed in the future
and are neglected in this study. Fox example, Rose (2004) analyzes the results favored by the author of each study.
3.2 The Data 79
Normalization removes any systematic differences caused by the various t-distributions (which
depend on the degrees of freedom and the implemented estimator), so that weighting them by the
degrees of freedom (or just the sample size like in Knell and Stix (2005)), is not necessary. The
procedure follows these rules:
1. If a t-value is reported, we take it as it is.
2. If a coefficient and its standard deviation is reported, we calculate the corresponding t-value,
regardless of the used estimator13
3. If only the significance of a F- or χ2- test is given,
a) the value is transformed into a t-value, if the degrees of freedom are given;
b) if the degrees of freedom are not given, they are approximated by the number of ob-
servations and covariates;
c) if the number of observations and covariates is not given, it is approximated by a
median number of 232 and 15 respectively.
4. If only the category of the p-value (not significant, 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001) is given, the
corresponding t-value is approximated by the following rules:
a) an uniformly distributed number between the upper and lower limit of the category is
chosen, representing the “exact” p-value14;
b) the corresponding t-value of this p-value is calculated, assuming two-sided tests15,
according to the following rules:
i. using the degrees of freedoms, if reported;
ii. if the degrees of freedom are not reported, they are approximated by the number
of observations and covariates;
iii. if these are not reported too, they are approximated by the median number of 232
and 15 respectively.
5. If an estimate supports the deterrence hypothesis it’s t-value is provided with a negative sign
and with a positive sign otherwise.
6. All t-values are normalized:
a) a t-value is transformed into the corresponding p-value using the reported or approxi-
mated degrees of freedom and the t-distribution;
13We acknowledge that some of these values are only asymptotically t-distributed or even not at all. However, we
prefer this inaccuracy, which should be quite small, to losing such estimates.
14However, this implies that even, in absolute values, the largest t-values calculated in this fashion are much smaller
than the largest t-values reported by several studies; see table 3.5.
15If the study reports one-sided tests, this is considered in the data base accordingly.
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b) this p-value is transformed by the inverse normal distribution to a value of significance
which is independent of the number of degrees of freedom.
Due to limited precision, we were not able to normalize t-values16 below -38. This affects
11 t-values, including eight which are favored by the author but are not randomly chosen; so,
practically, only three t-values are affected. Some authors remove outliers in their meta analysis
(e.g., Murphy et al. (2003) or Knell and Stix (2005)), but we want to keep them since we have no
prior knowledge (except the sample size) of what could cause such outliers. However, since the
relative difference between the t-values and their normalized counterparts can be quite large, we
did not want to include them unadjusted and chose to transform these few outliers by the following
formula, to conserve most of their relationship:
tnew :=
log(|told|)
log(|tmin|)tmin,
where tmin is the smallest normalized t-value. This reduces the influence of these extreme values
and retains the relationship between those values, at least at a logarithmic scale. In the case of
the three values (excluding the eight favored values), this means the following transformations:
−582→−64.81134,−86.517→−45.40674 and −40.58823→−37.7018. Some of the effects
of this normalization procedure can be seen in tables 3.5 and 3.6.
Table 3.5: Comparison of the original and transformed (normalized) t-values
t-values mean median min max % #e #s
Overall −1.40 −1.37 −64.81 19.05 41.66 6530 663
Original −1.66 −1.69 −64.81 15.16 44.93 2662 285
Calculated −2.18 −1.47 −37.70 19.05 42.90 888 98
Transformed −0.95 −0.89 −4.97 3.96 38.36 2980 328
Overall: all t-values; Original: all t-values reported in a study; Calculated: all t-values which were calculated by
a given coefficient and sd; Transformed: p-values transformed into t-values.
% is the percentage of estimates which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level
in a two sided test. #e is the weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are
based on.
Weighting
As mentioned before, it was necessary to restrict ourselves to one estimate per crime and source
per study. This makes it necessary to weigh the estimates in our data base in some way. In
principle, there are three different approaches from which we chose the last one:
16In fact, this depends on the t-value and the degrees of freedoms simultaneously. Although being a very subjective
limit, defining these t-values as outliers seems very practical.
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1. Leave everything unchanged: i.e., use the unweighted estimates. However, studies which
present numerous estimates would squeeze out the effects of studies with only a few (Stan-
ley, 2005a). Moreover, “our” studies (i.e., those recorded in Darmstadt) would be under-
represented (see table 3.6).
2. Treat each estimate equally: weight each estimate in such a way that the sum of all weighted
estimates of each study is equal to the total amount of results it contains. This would be an
approximation of the case in which we record all results and would bias the analysis in favor
of those studies with many results.
3. Treat each study equally: weight every estimate by the inverse number of the estimates
in the data base belonging to the corresponding study. If a study recorded by the team in
Heidelberg provides n estimates, it is weighted by 1/n. A study recorded by us, of which m
out of n estimates are in our data base, each is weighted by 1/m. Therefore the sum of all
weights of each study amounts to one.
Since “our” studies seem to differ significantly from the others, which can be readily appreciated
by examining table 3.6, and the number of results per study varies substantially (from one to
several hundred), we decided to use the latter weighting scheme.
Table 3.6: Weighted (normalized) t-values distinguished by the source of data
Source obs. % mean median sd min max
Both, unweighted, not normalized 6530 100.00 −1.30 −0.91 7.77 −582 20.93
Both, unweighted 6530 100.00 −1.15 −0.91 2.70 −64.81 19.05
Darmstadt, unweighted 2320 35.53 −1.57 −1.20 3.61 −64.81 19.05
Heidelberg, unweighted 4210 64.47 −0.92 −0.75 1.99 −17.91 11.72
Darmstadt, weighted 2320 48.16 −1.76 −1.61 3.66 −64.81 19.05
Heidelberg, weighted 4210 51.84 −1.07 −1.11 2.36 −17.91 11.72
Both, weighted, not normalized 6530 100.00 −1.51 −1.37 4.51 −582 20.93
Both, weighted 6530 100.00 −1.40 −1.37 3.08 −64.81 19.05
The rows of the unweighted data refer to the first weighting scheme: leave everything unchanged. The rows of
the weighted data refer to the third weighting scheme, which weights each study equally. Naturally, the number
of observations and the extreme values are not affected by weighting. The % column indicates the fraction of the
whole data set belonging to this row (measured either by the number of observations or sum of weights).
We acknowledge that there might be more weighting schemes possible, like using some impact
factor of the publications (van der Sluis et al., 2003), removing heteroscedasticity (Murphy et al.,
2003), using the sample size or the time frame (Knell and Stix, 2005) or adjusting for significance
(Waldorf and Byun, 2005) or others, like the inverse variance of the results, number of results,
number of regressors, R2, etc. (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005). However, we refrain
from using any of them because we do not want to mix different weighting schemes.
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3.2.3 Adjustment of Variables
Nothing exists except atoms and empty space; everything else is
opinion.
Democrites of Abdera, Diogenes Laertius IX
Our meta-data base contains many variables with missing entries. There are two main reasons
for this: either the information is not available from a study (e.g., whether the used data is rep-
resentative, some characteristics of surveyed people, the year the data was gathered, etc.) or the
information is not applicable for a particular study (e.g., survey characteristics for a time series
study, name of a journal for a book, etc.). Since we want to include as much data as possible in
a multivariate analysis, we treat missing or not applicable information as zero values. Excluding
these estimates would either result in an empty data set (there are always variables not applicable
to a study) or restricting the analysis to very narrow subsets (with rarely more than a few dozens
observations). Imputing variables is only reasonable for specific subsets and would be very diffi-
cult, even in these subsets. Although there are variables which could be imputed every applicable
method would be questionable (e.g., the nationality of the author or whether the used data is rep-
resentative). Also, variables are not independent. For example, the used data set will be correlated
with the nationality and the field of the authors. Furthermore, it is not easy to identify the correct
neighbors to generate the imputed values. Thus, we do not exclude estimates with missing values
at all but treat missing information as unique zero-values17.
We also removed those variables which had (almost) no entries. While removing unused vari-
ables does not pose any problems, removing variables with almost no entries is somewhat ques-
tionable. Losing information is never desirable but we have many variables with almost no vari-
ation which would make a further analysis even more difficult - especially in regard to the data
mining methods. Therefore, we excluded those variables with less than seven (15) entries regard-
ing study (estimate) related information. This amounts to a minimum variation of 1% (0.2%).
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Basic research is like shooting an arrow in the air and, where it
lands, painting a target.
Homer Adkins, Nature, 1984
Before delving into the multivariate dependencies, it is important to get a feeling for the data.
This can be done in a very convenient way by illustrating certain properties and relationships of
the data. Interdependence of certain variables with the (normalized) t-values are also of interest.
A full list of all available variables with summarizing statistics can be found in the codebook in
section B.1.
17There are some rare cases when a variable can take the value zero (e.g., the percentage of males in a sample) but
these are negligible.
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3.3.1 Study-Related Description
Yet to calculate is not in itself to analyze.
Edgar A. Poe, The Murders in the Rue Morgue, 1841
Herein are contained all tables and graphs which improve the knowledge about study-related
variables; i.e., variables which cannot vary within each study. We begin with a summary of the
countries related to the studies contained in our data base.
Table 3.7 makes it obvious that the deterrence literature is dominated by authors, data and
journals from the United States of America18. More than three quarters of all authors worked
in the USA at the time of writing, used U.S. crime data and published in U.S. based journals -
even 20.41% of all authors who did not work in the USA at the time of writing used U.S. crime
data. This is not unexpected because there are many data sets (crime data and surveys) available
for the USA; some starting in the early 1930s (although the reliability of those early data sets is
questionable). The United Kingdom, Canada and Germany (and partially Australia) make up for
the major part of the rest. Germany, and maybe the Netherlands, seems to be the only non-anglo-
saxon country with a relevant portion of published studies. However, this may result from, at least
to some extent, the inclusion of German expressions in our search terms.
Table 3.7: Most frequent countries
Country workplace % studied % published %
Australia 16 2.20 13 1.82 4 0.57
Canada 34 4.68 28 3.92 23 3.29
Finland 6 0.83 7 0.98 0 0.00
Germany 22 3.03 19 2.66 31 4.43
Israel 9 1.24 4 0.56 0 0.00
Netherlands 8 1.10 8 1.12 18 2.57
Other 35 4.82 47 6.58 14 2.00
Sweden 6 0.83 9 1.26 3 0.43
Switzerland 8 1.10 8 1.12 1 0.14
United Kingdom 30 4.13 33 4.62 56 8.00
USA 552 76.06 538 75.35 550 78.57
The columns may not sum up to 700, since some studies are written by authors from different countries, analyze
different countries simultaneously or the information is not available; only the country of publication is unam-
biguously determined. The percentages are calculated from these data and always sum up to one; all deviations
are based on rounding.
In fact, from 451 studies which use a public data base, 163 (36.14%) use the Uniform Crime
Report (UCR) - the official data base about crime in the USA, compiled by the FBI. The other
63.86% are made up of surveys (e.g., the National Household surveys or National Longitudinal
18To determine the country of publication of a journal, we first referred to the country of the founding editor and, if
that information was not available, of the leading editor, the editor who receives the manuscripts, the majority of
co-editors or the publisher.
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Survey of Youth for the United States), the German Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik (PKS) and other
data sets. All other either do not specify the origin of their data, use data collected by themselves
(mostly surveys) or use confidential data.
Overall, 848 authors are involved in the 700 studies we have included in our meta-data base.
Most of them appear only once (75.83%) or twice (14.03%). The authors who contribute at least
six studies are given in table 3.8: 64 authors (7.55%) contribute three to five studies and are not
shown. Merely 2.59% of all authors are involved in 22.71% of all studies. It is not surprising that
William C. Bailey and Raymond Paternoster come first, both being sociologists and (Co-) authors
of more than 15 studies; the economists Steven D. Levitt and Dale O. Cloninger following close
behind. From these top 22 authors only the German Horst Entorf and Finnish Matti Vire´n did not
work in the USA at the time of writing.
Table 3.8: Most frequent authors
Author N Author N
Bailey, William C. 20 Piquero, Alex R. 8
Paternoster, Raymond 16 Rasmussen, David W. 8
Levitt, Steven D. 12 Waldo, Gordon P. 8
Cloninger, Dale O. 11 Hakim, Simon 7
Grasmick, Harold G. 10 Witte, Ann D. 7
Ross, Laurence H. 10 Entorf, Horst 6
Benson, Bruce L. 9 Erickson, Maynard L. 6
Nagin, Daniel S. 9 Marvell, Thomas B. 6
Chiricos, Theodore G. 8 Pogarsky, Greg 6
Ehrlich, Isaac 8 Tittle, Charles R. 6
Gibbs, Jack P. 8 Vire´n, Matti 6
All authors with at least 6 contributing studies are listed.
The disciplines of all authors are, more or less, evenly spread (43.23% economists, 40.55% so-
ciologists, criminologists and jurists). Regarding the disciplines of the publisher19 the relationship
is reversed (36.34% and 45.35) which is not surprising, because economists more readily publish
in journals outside of their subject than sociologists and criminologists do20. Table 3.9 depicts this
in more detail.
All in all, the 700 studies we recorded are mostly published in journals (86.29%), followed
by working- and conference papers (5.71%) and books (5.57%). 2.43% are not classified. 199
journals publish the 604 journal articles, whereas 120 journals contribute only a single article; the
major part, namely 326 articles (53.97%), stem from just 25 journals (12.56%) and are shown in
table 3.10. The Criminology-Journal stands out by contributing 30 studies, fifty percent more than
19This can be, for example, a journal, a department or an institution.
20Jurists are an exception here: 27% of their studies are published in economic media, which is the largest cross-
discipline share of all. However, this discipline just appears in 26 studies in our meta-data base.
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Table 3.9: Disciplines of authors and publishers
Publisher discipline Author discipline
Law Crim. Econ. Soc. Psych. Other Sum
Law 7 7 15 5 1 2 37
Criminology 8 43 15 64 3 10 143
Economics 7 1 207 10 2 12 239
Sociology 2 15 22 80 2 13 134
Psychology 0 0 0 5 12 3 20
Other 2 7 29 11 8 44 101
Undefined 0 0 3 0 0 0 3
Sum 26 73 291 175 28 84 677
While all disciplines of the publisher are classified, some authors could not be categorized (the missing 23 studies).
Discipline of the publisher is unique while multiple authors can contribute multiple disciplines to a study-entry.
the second most frequent journal. All major disciplines are present in the top five (except the law
discipline, which first appears in the 13th place). The listed journals make up for 43.75% of all
law articles, 76.19% of all criminological, 53.08% of all economic, 67.2% of all sociological and
28.89% of all other journal articles.
The oldest study in our data base was published 1952, the newest in 2006. Not surprisingly,
the data used in the studies is older, since it requires some time to collect and analyze the data,
newer data is not available or simply not of interest. Some studies are even especially interested
in old data (e.g., those which include data from the 19th century). The distributions of the year of
publication and the mean year21 of the used data are shown in figure 3.1. The median time span,
conditional on multiple points of time, is exactly 120 months.
A steady stream of empirical studies about deterrence started in the late sixties, reaching a first
peak in the late seventies with the heated discussion fueled by Ehrlich (1973) and Ehrlich (1975a).
With the exception of some years, the number of publications slowly receded until the mid nineties
when it reached new heights and kept its pace until today.
The steady flow of studies can, at least partially, be viewed under two different aspects: a dimin-
ishing interest in the deterrence research and a larger acceptance of deterrent measures in other
fields of research (like unemployment in Smith et al. (1992); Witt et al. (1998) or Levitt (2001))
to minimize an omitted variable bias. This can be verified by figure 3.2. The number of studies
which use deterrence variables only as covariates can be interpreted as a lower bound, because
we classified deterrence variables as covariates only in the case the authors do not interpret22 the
corresponding coefficients. Furthermore, studies which do not focus on deterrence but include
deterrence measures as covariates had a lower probability to be detected during our research.
21The mean year is the mean of the first and last year the data refers to, which is available for 593 studies.
22For example, if the effect of unemployment on crime is the focus of the study but the authors spend a considerable
amount of space on interpreting the negative effect of the arrest rate as a deterrent factor, the according observation
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Table 3.10: Most frequent journals
Journal n category
Criminology 30 criminology
Journal of Law and Economics 20 economics
Law and Society Review 19 sociology
Applied Economics 17 economics
Accident Analysis and Prevention 17 other
Journal of Criminal Justice 16 criminology
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 16 criminology
American Economic Review 15 economics
American Sociological Review 15 sociology
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 15 criminology
Social Forces 14 sociology
Social Science Quarterly 14 sociology
Journal of Legal Studies 14 law
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 12 sociology
Review of Economics and Statistics 12 economics
Social Problems 10 sociology
Economic Inquiry 10 economics
Journal of Quantitative Criminology 9 criminology
Journal of Studies on Alcohol 9 other
Southern Economic Journal 8 economics
International Review of Law and Economics 8 economics
Journal of Public Economics 8 economics
Crime and Delinquency 7 criminology
Journal of Political Economy 7 economics
Journal of Behavioral Economics 7 economics
All journals with at least 7 contributing studies are listed.
The kind of data employed is spread rather evenly over the major categories - time series,
cross sections, surveys and panel data (in that order) - while experiments appear only sparsely.
Aggregated, almost two thirds (65.81%) is “typical” crime data, while 23.87% and 9.16% is
survey and experimental data. Consequently, this is also reflected by the studied objects: counties,
states, people and nations (in that order) are studied in most cases. 61.96% of all studies implement
regional data and 30.49% of the data is derived from people and groups. These observations are
visualized in figure 3.3.
We also included several variables to catch some quality related measures for each study. From
some of these, we constructed a quality index starting at 0 (neither the author nor the reader
report any problems) and ending at 8 (author and reader report major problems in the study).
Summarizing these into three categories, we can say that 189 studies (27%) are rather flawless,
438 do contain some problems (62.57%) and 73 studies are problematic (10.43%). We stress that
in our meta-data base is not considered being only a covariate.
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Figure 3.1: Year of publication and used data
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this measure should not be overrated, because it is not easy to decide how many problems a study
may have and how severe they are - it depends heavily on what the author does, reports and how
frankly he is to the reader. Eventually, there is no such thing like a flawless empiric study without
any problems.
Finally, we want to report that 79% of all studies use covariates and, therefore, control for other
influences. In table 3.11, we show the key statistics of the number of results (i.e., the observations
in our meta-data base) reported in the studies.
3.3.2 Estimate-Related Description
There are no facts, only interpretations.
Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Notebooks, 1900
In this subsection, all reported values are weighted values to compensate for the unequal record-
ing scheme we had to use (refer to subsection 3.2.1). Consequently, the reported frequencies are
all weighted and may reflect the true frequency only approximately (rounding error) and are not
equal the number of observations in the meta-data base.
We included all relevant studies we could find, whether they studied deterrence or simply used
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Figure 3.2: Year of publication diversified by focus of the studies
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Table 3.11: Number of reported results in the studies
Method mean median sd min max n
Bivariate 4.161 0.0 14.014 0 155 700
Multivariate 17.682 6.0 47.692 0 764 700
Bivariate? 12.240 4.5 21.908 1 155 238
Multivariate? 21.716 8.0 52.024 1 764 570
Bi- and Multivariate refers to the kind of analysis the deterrence variable is subject to. Rows with ? are conditional
on the existence of such observations. Many authors report that they have calculated much more results (up to
many thousands) but do not report them for reasons of parsimony or lack of available space. n refers to the number
of corresponding studies.
such variables as covariates for other problems. The latter was the case in 14.23% of all observa-
tions. In most cases (54.92%), the observations relate to an analysis using crime data, in 24.56%
they relate to a survey, 12.26% belong to an experiment or miscellaneous method23. Observations
corresponding to deterrent effects of the death penalty are distinguished from the rest, although
23The numbers given in subsection 3.3.1 are based on study-properties; the small deviations stem from studies which
report results based on different kind of data.
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Figure 3.3: Kind of the employed data and studied objects
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they would belong, in most cases, to the crime data category, and make up for the remaining
8.26%. In table 3.12, we report the most commonly used exogenous variables. Those which
appear in less than 1% of all data are not listed and merged with the category “other”24.
In most cases, the effect of the death penalty is measured by the execution rate (57.65%) or
by uncategorized measures (20.87%), like the coverage of executions by the media (Forst, 1977;
Stack, 1990) or the time interval between sentence and execution (Bailey, 1980a). In the case of
crime data, variables which measure the probability of punishment dominate. After the “other”
variable, the arrest rate (17.11%) comes first, followed by the number of police officers (13.86%),
the clearance rate (9.33%), police expenditures (8.10%), the conviction rate (6.88%) and the two
regime shift25 variables (6.28% and 6.10%). Only the latter and the mean sentence length (7.43%)
measure the severity of punishment. This is not surprising, since the severity of punishment is
often not available or not applicable (for example, if the probability and severity of punishment
are measured on different aggregation levels).
In surveys, the most prominent question is the expected probability of arrest by the police
(28.26%), followed by the uncategorized variables (18.19%) and the expected probability of
punishment by justice (17.58%). The severity of expected punishment is used more frequently
(13.14%), as expected, than in the case of crime data. The same can be observed for experiments
(and miscellaneous methods), where the actual variation of the detection probability (30.67%)
is directly followed by the actual variation of the severity of punishment (18.23%). After the
uncategorized variables (17.97%), the same order is observed for experimental variation of the
24We analyzed every “other” category and extracted every variable which appeared quite frequently. Therefore, there
is no major variable hidden in that category.
25These are indicator variables which measure a shift in the deterrence regime; e.g., the introduction of new laws.
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probability (15.76%) and severity of punishment (15.65%). This is quite reasonably, because it
is much easier to ask people about the severity of punishment or to vary it in experiments than to
attain such information in a reliable and appropriate fashion from existent crime data.
Table 3.12: Most frequently used deterrence variables diversified by the kind of data
Variable n % studies
Death penalty 792 100.00 82
Execution rate 457 57.65 58
Other 165 20.87 22
Existence of death penalty 91 11.44 14
Percentage of all convictions 65 8.24 11
Conviction rate 26 3.25 4
Crime Data 3589 100.00 410
Other 629 17.52 122
Arrest rate 614 17.11 115
Police strength 497 13.86 88
Clearance rate 335 9.33 66
Police expenditures 291 8.10 51
Conviction rate 247 6.88 74
Probability dummy 225 6.28 32
Severity dummy 219 6.10 32
Mean sentence length (sentenced) 137 3.83 48
Mean sentence length (served) 129 3.60 35
Inspections 73 2.04 11
Incarcerations (absolute or per capita) 63 1.75 19
Incarceration per crime 56 1.55 13
Incarceration rate 45 1.24 20
Fine 44 1.23 18
Convicted per crime 42 1.16 11
Surveys 2534 100.00 175
Probability of detection by police 716 28.26 84
Other 461 18.19 46
Probability of punishment by justice 445 17.58 55
Severity of punishment 333 13.14 55
Probability of punishment by friends or family 157 6.20 25
Severity of punishment by friends or family 92 3.60 16
Probability of punishment by others 85 3.37 13
Previous experience with police or justice 82 3.22 6
Probability of punishment by employment law 59 2.33 9
Type of punishment 48 1.90 8
Severity of punishment by others 44 1.75 8
Severity of punishment by employment law 42 1.66 5
Probability of other kind of punishment 40 1.56 5
Probability of detection by others 39 1.54 7
continued on the next page. . .
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. . . last page of table 3.12 continued
Variable n % studies
Probability of detection by friends or family 31 1.22 5
Severity of other kind of punishment 30 1.17 5
Experiments 337 100.00 89
Actual variation of detection probability 103 30.67 30
Actual variation of punishment severity 61 18.23 20
Other 61 17.97 17
Experimental variation of punishment severity 53 15.76 19
Experimental variation of detection probability 53 15.65 19
Net gains (person is delinquent) 8 2.34 2
n is the number of occurrences and % the corresponding percentage (both weighted). studies is the number of
studies which use that variable. If not listed separately, rates do also include the absolute numbers. Variables for
surveys always relate to expectations. Some columns may not sum up exactly due to rounding or multiple entries.
All entries with less than 1% (13 variables) were merged with the category Other.
end of the table 3.12
As with the deterrence variables used in the studies, we summarize the variables measuring
crime in table 3.13. Since crime data is studied in most cases, the crime rate and the number of
reported crimes are very prominent (first and fourth place with 44.92 and 11.21 percent). The
second place is taken by the self reported delinquency rate (17.98%) which is usually often used
in surveys. Accidents (4.25%) are commonly used in DUI-studies to measure the extent of drunk
driving, while the violation of prescriptive limits (3.04%) belongs to studies which focus on envi-
ronmental offenses (e.g., oil pollution, exceeding fishing quotas, etc.).
Table 3.13: Most frequently used endogenous crime variables
Variable n % studies
All 7259 100.00 699
Crime rate 3261 44.92 319
Self reported delinquency rate 1305 17.98 132
Other 993 13.67 117
Reported crimes (absolute number) 814 11.21 85
Accidents 309 4.25 33
Probability of future delinquency (respondent is delinquent) 282 3.88 31
Violations of prescriptive limits 221 3.04 24
Probability of fictitious delinquency (respondent is delinquent) 79 1.09 10
n is the number of occurrences and % the corresponding percentage (both weighted). studies is the number of
studies which use that variable. Some columns may not sum up exactly due to rounding or multiple entries. All
entries with less than 1% (9 variables) were merged with the category Other.
We generally use the term crime although this is not literally correct. While crimes are studied in
most cases (91.40%), misdemeanors (9.85%) and other offenses (e.g., deviant behavior, cheating
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in class rooms, etc.) are also studied, as shown in table 3.14. The classification is not always
easy, because offenses may be judged differently across countries (and even between states). For
example, we treated driving under the influence as crimes, because it is in most cases measured
by fatal accidents with intoxicated drivers or offenses punishable by jail sentences26.
Table 3.14: Formal severity of the studied offenses
Variable n % studies
All 7260 100.00 699
Crimes 6636 91.40 646
Misdemeanors 715 9.85 80
Formal deviant behavior 198 2.73 26
Breaking of rules 162 2.23 16
Informal deviant behavior 118 1.62 19
Other 103 1.42 11
n is the number of occurrences and % the corresponding percentage (both weighted). studies is the number of
studies which use that variable. Some columns may not sum up exactly due to rounding or multiple entries.
Drunk driving is generally treated as a crime. All entries with less than 1% (0 variables) were merged with the
category Other.
Besides these broad categories of the severity of the recorded crimes, we have, of course,
recorded each studied crime in more detail. These are listed in table 3.15. It is not astonish-
ing that the Index I crimes play a very dominant role - as mentioned before, most studies use U.S.
crime data and especially the UCR - homicide, rape, assault, robbery, larceny, burglary, vehicle
theft (and arson). Besides these, DUI (12.33%) and tax evasion (7.09%) are also studied fairly
often. All other offenses are studied less frequently; many offenses appear only a few times (e.g.,
arson, cheating or airplane hijacking).
Authors implementing multivariate methods usually use covariates to control for other effects.
We have recorded all those covariates and report these in table 3.16. This table does not include
any other deterrence variables27, although they are available in our meta-data base. The Other-
category was scrutinized and new variables were generated from any covariates which appeared
reasonably often. Income, unemployment, race and age are the most frequently used covariates.
They are commonly available in various data bases for many countries and are common proxies for
different incentives of crime. Income (40.80%) can be interpreted in two quite different ways: as
a proxy of wealth, which increases the opportunity costs of crime, or as a proxy for the property
value, which increases the incentives of crime (see subsection 2.4.2). Similar, unemployment
(37.21%) can also be interpreted in two ways: either increasing crime (more available time, lower
opportunity costs) or decreasing it (decreasing property values). Race (31.61%) is most often
26We are aware of the fact that driving with low but illegal BAC levels, is usually a misdemeanor.
27When regressing a crime rate on the arrest rate and sentence length, the latter is technically a covariate when we
look at the significance of the arrest rate.
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Table 3.15: Most frequently used endogenous crime categories
Variable n % studies
All 7259 100.00 698
Homicide 1582 21.49 250
Robbery 919 12.65 215
Larceny (Index I, general) 902 12.43 200
Driving under the influence 895 12.33 95
Burglary 891 12.27 197
Assault 724 9.98 179
Other crimes 689 9.50 104
Vehicle theft 645 8.89 145
Tax evasion 515 7.09 54
Other 501 6.90 62
Rape 494 6.81 129
Overall crime 469 6.46 69
Drug (general) related 309 4.25 56
Other Misdemeanors 277 3.82 40
Fraud 269 3.70 48
Larceny (more than 50e or 50$) 234 3.23 46
Petty theft 191 2.63 37
Environmental crimes, Violations of prescriptive limits 166 2.28 18
Negligent assault 138 1.91 39
Damage to property 98 1.14 19
Manslaughter 90 1.24 18
Drug (soft) possession 80 1.10 9
Speeding 74 1.02 9
n is the number of occurrences and % the corresponding percentage (both weighted). studies is the number of
studies which use that variable. Some columns may not sum up exactly due to rounding or multiple entries. All
entries with less than 1% (11 variables) were merged with the respective category Other.
used to differentiate black and white people in the USA. It is often assumed28 that black people
are more often involved in crimes than white people. Age (27.87%) and youth (20.33%) are also
used very often since it is common knowledge that (detected) crime is decreasing with age after
reaching its height for youths and young adults (see subsection 2.3.4). Fixed- and random effects
are not usually called covariates. However, since these are used to pick up effects of unobserved
heterogeneity by the introduction of dummy variables, they fit in this category quite well. Random
effects seem to play no significant role in the deterrent literature. Since individual data only
rarely studied, compared to aggregated data, is is not surprising that personal information like risk
propensity, previous incarcerations or the social class appear at the bottom of the table. However,
norm acceptance and morality appear relatively often.
28Gyimah-Brempong (1986) gives a good summary of what leads to this assumption and how it dissolves when
controlling for other appropriate influences.
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Table 3.16: Most frequently used covariates
Variable n % studies
All 4579 100.00 543
Other 4110 89.76 501
Income 1951 40.80 223
Unemployment 1704 37.21 211
Race (black, white, etc.) 1448 31.61 179
Age 1276 27.87 163
Youths 931 20.33 119
Sex 895 19.54 127
Population (-growth) 749 16.37 98
Fixed Effects (time) 743 16.22 90
Fixed Effects (spatial) 614 13.40 81
Education 596 13.02 76
Income inequality (Gini) 541 11.81 68
Urbanity 527 11.52 73
Poverty, welfare 408 8.91 54
Marital status 375 8.18 51
Time trend 336 7.34 45
Nationality 197 4.30 26
Labor force 189 4.12 25
Personal characteristics 179 3.91 24
Norm acceptance 139 3.03 25
Consumption 126 2.75 16
Alcohol (-consumption) 121 2.64 17
Property value 113 2.48 15
Religion 107 2.33 17
Morality 98 2.15 15
Previous convictions 98 2.14 14
Social Integration 90 1.97 15
GDP 88 1.92 12
Miles (or km) driven 81 1.78 11
Drug (consumption) 78 1.70 11
Random Effects 61 1.33 10
Risk propensity 55 1.20 9
Previous incarceration 53 1.17 7
Social class 48 1.05 7
n is the number of occurrences and % the corresponding percentage (both weighted). studies is the number of
studies which use that variable. Some columns may not sum up exactly due to rounding or multiple entries. All
entries with less than 1% (8 variables) were merged with the category Other.
end of the table 3.16
The studies use a vast arsenal of statistical methods. From simple comparison of percentages to
complex multivariate estimators. These methods are shown in table 3.17. The bivariate methods
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are dominated by the Pearson correlation (40.96%) and simple differences (typically before/after
comparisons, 16.98%). Most of the multivariate methods are OLS (48.07%) or 2SLS (13.58%)
regressions. Although similar to the bivariate case, it is not comparable because a very large class
of estimators is contained in these regressions. OLS (2SLS and others as well) does only refer
to the regression model, not to the specific model specification. Usage of error-corrections, lag
structures, transformations and weights were recorded in other variables.
Table 3.17: Most frequently used statistical methods
Variable n % studies
Bivariate 2451 100.00 242
Pearson correlation 1004 40.96 119
Differences (of means, percentages, etc.) 416 16.98 39
Gamma 208 8.49 21
ANOVA 184 7.50 15
Other 161 6.58 17
χ2-test 147 6.00 12
OLS Regression 88 3.61 13
Kendall’s τ 73 2.99 7
T-test (dependant) 48 1.97 5
T-test (independent) 46 1.89 5
Spearman’s ρ 40 1.62 4
Point-biserial correlation 35 1.42 5
Multivariate 4808 100.00 571
OLS regression 2311 48.07 316
2SLS regression 653 13.58 96
Other 524 10.89 90
Logit or probit 461 9.59 58
ARIMA-models 278 5.79 32
Tobit regression 206 4.27 28
GLS regression 101 2.09 14
Path analysis 80 1.67 14
Poisson regression 69 1.43 11
Other ML-methods 65 1.36 9
VAR-models 60 1.25 9
n is the number of occurrences and % the corresponding percentage (both weighted). studies is the number of
studies which use that variable. Some columns may not sum up exactly due to rounding or multiple entries. All
entries with less than 1% (5 and 5 variables) were merged with the respective category Other.
3.3.3 Description of the Endogenous Variables
What men really want is not knowledge but certainty.
Betrand A. Russell
We have recorded four different properties which characterize the effect of the analyzed deter-
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rence variables: the sign, the p-value and the (normalized) t-statistic29 on the estimate-level and
the opinion of the author on the study-level. As in subsection 3.3.2, the reported frequencies are
all weighted and do not represent the exact numbers in the meta-data base. The sign is avail-
able for 7085 observations: 5241 (73.98%) observations have a negative (and thus tend to be in
accordance with the deterrence hypothesis) and 1844 (26.02%) have a positive sign. However,
not all observations have a usable test-statistic; only 6530 p- and t-values could be recorded or
transformed. Their distribution is illustrated in table 3.18 and figure 3.4.
Table 3.18: Distribution of the p-value categories
p −.001 −.01 −.05 −.1 −1 +1 +.1 +.05 +.01 +.001 All
N 672 835 1216 279 1820 1142 52 282 138 96 6530
% 10.28 12.79 18.62 4.27 27.87 17.48 0.8 4.32 2.11 1.46 100
The first row corresponds to the categories of the p-values (two-sided tests), diversified by the sign of the result.
The second and third row contain the frequencies and percentages of the occurrences; due to weighting and
rounding the columns may not sum up exactly.
While 4820 (73.81%) (normalized) t-values are negative (1710 or 26.19% are positive), 2720
(41.66%) are even smaller than −1.96, the typical 5%-level of significance (however, 506 or
7.75% are larger than 1.96). Although simple vote-counting30 has become obsolete it is worth-
while to look at figure 3.4 which presents the mean and median, as well as the quantiles (table 3.19)
of the (normalized) t-values. They indicate that it is more plausible to keep the deterrent hypoth-
esis than do discard it. Assuming that there is no deterrent effect (i.e., under the null hypothesis),
the probability to observe a value of −1.4 or lower is about 8% (p-value of one-sided test). How-
ever, assuming that the existence of a deterrent effect would lead to a “true” value of −1.96, than
the probability of observing a value of−1.4 or larger would be about 29%31. Hence, the observed
value is more likely to reject the null hypothesis of no deterrence than the null hypothesis of an
deterrent effect which would lead to an average value of −1.96.
The obvious spikes at the usual levels of significance can be partially explained by the trans-
formation procedure of the p-values into t-values (subsection 3.2.2). The dent between the two
major spikes is located at the mean value and may be explained by a possible publication bias (as
explained in section 3.4).
It is remarkable that the mean and median values are almost identical and the 10% and 90%
quantiles lie symmetrically around the mean. The distance from the positive 99% quantile and
maximum to the mean is much shorter than on the negative side. The distribution is heavy tailed
on the negative side and short tailed on the positive.
29See subsection 3.2.2 for details about the normalization and imputation procedure.
30Vote-counting (i.e., how often a hypothesis is supported by the studies) is known to suffer strongly from error of
the second kind, which increases with the number of studies (Hedges and Olkin, 1985).
31Both probabilities would be equal if the “true” t-value is −2.8.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of the (normalized) t-values
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Table 3.19: Statistics of the (normalized) t-values
statistic min 1% 10% 50% 90% 99% max mean sd n
value -64.81 -10.92 -3.89 -1.37 1.37 5.85 19.05 -1.40 3.07 6530
Beside these objective criteria, we have also the opinion of the authors32 at our disposal. We
recorded the opinion for three broad crime categories (violent-, property- and other crimes) with
5 possible values - from strong agreement to strong disagreement with the deterrence hypothesis.
The value in between corresponds to studies from which no usable opinion could be extracted or
the degree of agreement depends heavily on different conditions. If an author does not distinguish
between these crime categories, we assign his opinion to all three crime categories. From these
variables, we generated an overall rating index Oall in the following way:
Oall, j :=

⌊
∑Oc j/∑1Oc j
⌋
, if
(
∑Oc j
)
/
(
∑1Oc j
)
< 0;⌈
∑Oc j/∑1Oc j
⌉
, if
(
∑Oc j
)
/
(
∑1Oc j
)
> 0;
0, if
(
∑Oc j
)
/
(
∑1Oc j
)
= 0.
Whereas the sums are over the associated crime categories c for each study j. This index, and that
for each crime category, can be seen in figure 3.5.
The first obvious observation is that the agreement with the deterrence hypothesis is consistently
weaker in the case of the severity of punishment. This holds for all three crime categories; whilst
being the weakest in the case of other crimes, followed by property crimes. Surprisingly, the best
relationship between crime and the severity of punishment is found for violent crimes, although,
these crimes are least affected by rational considerations (at least in theory). This may result from
the more severe punishment (longer sentences, prison instead of fines, etc.) for violent crimes
compared with property or other offenses. Regarding the probability of punishment, the picture
is more intuitive: the agreement is strong for property crimes, while it is ambiguous for the other
two categories. The partial agreement in the case of violent and other crimes is much stronger than
the disagreeing opinions, while the strong agreement is on the same level as the disagreement (in
regard to the probability). Additionally, the partial agreement is always the strongest; only in the
case of property crime the strong agreement is almost equally large. In the case of the severity of
punishment the opinions are almost evenly spread with the exception of “other” offenses: although
the columns show a similar behavior, the disagreement is somewhat stronger.
Aggregating over all three crime categories, the authors do, more or less, agree with the de-
terrence theory in the case of the probability of punishment. When we aggregate over crime
categories and kinds of punishment, the agreement outweighs disagreement by a large margin.
This is based on the fact that the probability of punishment is studied more often than the severity
of punishment33.
32We are aware of the fact that the interpretation of the authors’ statements by the reader may be problematic.
33In most cases this simply follows from the unavailability of appropriate data.
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Figure 3.5: Opinion of the authors about the deterrence hypothesis
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3.4 Publication Bias
The econometric art as it is practiced at the computer terminal
involves fitting many, perhaps thousands, of statistical models.
One or several that the researcher finds pleasing are selected for
reporting purposes. This searching for a model is often well
intentioned, but there can be no doubt that such a specification
search invalidates the traditional theories of inference. [. . . ] all
the concepts of traditional theory, utterly lose their meaning by
the time an applied researcher pulls from the bramble of
computer output the one thorn of a model he likes best, the one
he chooses to portray as a rose.
Leamer (1983)
When analyzing data, writing and publishing a study, the reported results may be biased for
various reasons:
• The researcher initiative bias. This bias is introduced if the researcher intentionally or neg-
ligently forces his results in one direction. This may happen by inappropriately cleaning the
data, using misspecified models or choosing inappropriate methods for evaluation. Then the
“true” distribution of estimates the data yields does systematically differ from the distribu-
tion of the published estimates (Glaeser, 2006).
• The publication bias. This bias is introduced by publishing only those results, which seem
to support some hypothesis and holding back those results, which do not (or vice versa).
The distribution of the published estimates differs systematically from the distribution of
the calculated estimates.
• Any other unintentional or unavoidable bias. Even if the author has done everything possible
his estimates may still differ systematically from the distribution of the “true” estimates.
This may be caused by the data itself, lack of knowledge about better methods, missing
important variables and other reasons.
It is not surprising that different results can be drawn from the same data source, when enough
free parameters are available, as Dijkstra (1995) puts it: “by simply adding one regressor one can
obtain essentially every set of desired regression coefficients and predictions as well as t-values
and standard errors.”
Detecting a bias of the third category is merely of theoretical relevance and infeasible to mea-
sure in practice. Therefore, we will deal with the first and second category only. These are are
undistinguishable to us since we have only access to the published studies. Subsequently we sub-
sume these three categories in the following as publication bias. As McManus (1985) remarks,
it is only natural and understandably that a researcher picks these specifications which he thinks
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are the best, “those that make the strongest case for the researcher’s prior hypothesis”. Hopefully,
publication bias arises out of the good intention to report the results he thinks best, and not to
mislead the public by reporting the results he likes best. Donohue and Wolfers (2005) emphasize
this by remarking that such a bias “may occur without any of the authors being aware of it: they
might simply want to report useful findings, and evidence falsifying a null hypothesis is typically
regarded as more valuable”.
Publication bias as a problem has long been recognized by medical researchers and social sci-
entists (Sterling, 1959; Rosenthal, 1979) and has also become popular in empirical economics (de
Long and Lang, 1992). Traditionally, it is assumed that researchers, reviewers, editors and even
readers are more willingly to accept positive results - i.e., the significant rejection of the null hy-
pothesis of no effect (Stanley, 2005a). The most important reason to expect this, are that reviewers
and editors might more readily accept results which are consistent with conventional views; only
models are selected which show expected characteristics; researchers might want to get results
consistent with their theory; everyone is more confident with significant results than inconclu-
sive statistics; inadequate techniques might lead to (in)significant results or that suspicious data
(outliers) may be wrongly excluded from a study.
Furthermore, the published results may tend to be more significant than they ought to be, since
results - or even whole studies - which are insignificant may remain in the ’file-drawer’34. It has
to be remembered that such omitted results are assumed to be insignificant - and not to have (as
assumed by Rosenthal) an effect size or significance of zero (Scargle, 2000).
Usually, the publication process only refers to refereed journals and, as a consequence, attempts
are made to minimize the publication bias by either requiring prior registration of studies (as is
done by leading medical journals (Krakovsky, 2004)) or by including working papers and drafts in
a meta analysis (e.g., Florax et al. (2002); Nijkamp and Poot (2005)). We think that neither method
is sufficient for typical economic problems35, since the main bias may be introduced during the
conception and calculation of the estimations:
[. . . ] there is much uncertainty as to the “correct” empirical model that should be used
to draw inferences, and each researcher typically tries dozens, perhaps hundreds, of
specifications before selecting one or a few to report.
McManus (1985)
Advances in technology have decreased the costs of running tests and alternative specifications.
The consequence is that “the ability of researcher to influence results must be increasing over time”
(Glaeser, 2006) and newer results should be faced with more scepticism. Techniques concerning
meta analysis and publication bias which are used in the medical field are not applicable here,
34In fact, publication bias was initially called the ’file-drawer’ problem by Rosenthal (1978, 1979) and modified by
Rosenberg (2005) and still refers to the intentional omitting of results (Scargle, 2000)
35This is especially the case in the field of empirical economics, where the researcher is free to chose his models and
the estimation techniques. Furthermore, the “published” working paper version is usually already very close to
the final version.
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because they are too specialized (medical tests are almost always conceptualized as controlled
experiments).
In theory, omitting insignificant results should be less of a problem in criminometrics, as pointed
out by Eide et al. (1994), since evidence supporting or rejecting the deterrence hypothesis should
be of equivalent importance - as is the case in some economic theories like the natural rate hy-
pothesis (Stanley, 2005b). Nonetheless, authors preferring the deterrence hypothesis might omit
insignificant or positively signed results, while those authors who do not like the deterrence hy-
pothesis, might do the contrary. Insignificant results may be disliked by both types of authors:
although insignificance already implies the absence of an affect, many people who oppose the
deterrence hypothesis seem to “prefer” positive and significant results to discard any deterrent
effect. Therefore, no reasonable prior assumption about the properties of the potential omitted
studies can be made and methods based on the file-drawer approach should not be applied here.
Stanley (2005a) advises against this approach anyway.
There is also a self-cleaning effect in every field of research: competition. A published study
may be an incentive for other researchers to refute its results - even if it would have not been of
any interest on its own (Glaeser, 2006). In the deterrence literature, there certainly was and is a
strong scientific competition going on. As a consequence, increased scepticism of sceptic results
is appropriate.
3.4.1 Methods to Detect Publication Bias
People must not attempt to impose their own truth on others.
The right to profess the truth must always be upheld, but not in a
way that involves contempt for those who may think differently.
Truth imposes itself solely by the force of its own truth.
Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II), 1991
Some authors try to circumvent publication bias by interpreting “missing” studies as “missing
values” and augment them (Smith et al., 1997), but this seems unfeasible in our case. Most
standard graphical methods, as summarized in Stanley (2005a), are also not applicable here, since
they are based on the interpretation of graphs which are not compatible to our weighting scheme.
However, we present some other graphs in subsection 3.4.2.
The principle of the main method we employ in subsection 3.4.3 is rather simple. In the case
that an effect exists, the significance value should increase as the sample size increases (and the
standard deviation decreases), whereas it should be independent of the sample size in the case of
no effect. Leamer (1983) already pointed out that any null hypothesis can be rejected - whether
reasonable or not - if the sample size is large enough. Usually, we don’t expect this relationship
to hold perfectly but it should, at least, be positive and significant when an effect exists (Stanley,
2005a). This test is used in many studies (see, for example, Stanley (2005a) and Waldorf and
Byun (2005)).
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Case I - Effect Does Not Exist
When there is no underlying effect, which implies that the null hypothesis β = 0 is true, then
t =∼ t(0,ν) (= β/s in the standard regression analysis) and
E[log |t|] = logν−Ψ(
ν
2 )− γ−2log2
2
,
whereas ν is the number of degrees of freedom, Ψ is the DiGamma-function and γ is the Euler-
constant.
This immediately leads, as explained in section A.2, to E[log |t|] =−(2log2+ γ)/2+O(1/ν).
Thus, regressing log(|t|) on α0 and α1 logν should result in α0 ≈−0.635 and α1 = 0.
Case II - Effect Does Exist
It it obvious that, if there is an effect, the t-value must increase as the sample size increases,
because the estimation error decreases. Actually, if the hypothesis β = 0 is false, the t-value will
follow the non-central t-distribution. As described in Stanley (2005a), footnote 10, E[|t|] = |β |σb
where σb := σ [(XT X)−1b ]
1
2 is the b-th diagonal element. Since the limit of XT X/n is a finite,
positive definite matrix σb is proportional36 to 1/
√
n.
Thus, regressing log(|t|) on α0 and α1 logn should result in α1 = 1/2 and some α0 (its value is
not important).
3.4.2 Visual Analysis
Figuring things out for yourself is the only freedom anyone
really has. Use that freedom.
Jean Rasczak in Starship Troopers, 1997
As mentioned before, our specific weighting scheme and the lack of a sufficient number of
standard deviations, render many standard methods unusable (for example, a Galbraith plot is not
compatible with weighting). Nevertheless, some plots are still helpful to judge how influential a
publication bias may be.
A simple way to detect an obvious bias is to plot the histogram of the absolute (normalized)
t-values. Prominent breaks of the distribution at the usual levels of significance are indicators of a
publication bias. Another way to detect some misbehavior of the distribution of significance values
is to standardize all (normalized) t-values within each study, and then to plot these standardized
values. This procedure should make the variables more comparable by taking out the different
levels and variations of each study. Any major breaks in the distribution of these standardized
values can be interpreted as a indicator of publication bias.
36Since the diagonal elements of XT X increase in n, those of (XT X)−1 decrease in n.
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Since a histogram plot is not compatible with our analytic weights (wa), our weighting scheme
is approximated by the following frequency weights:
w fi = round
(
wai
min(wa)
)
.
Besides expanding the numbers of observations to meaningless values, deviations in the basic
statistics are only introduced by rounding (the median remains the same, the first three moments
change only by 0-2.5%), as shown in table 3.20.
Table 3.20: Comparison of the (normalized) t-values with analytic and frequency weights
Weighting mean median variance skewness kurtosis n
Analytic −1.404 −1.368 9.453 −1.948 31.210 6530
Frequency −1.402 −1.368 9.463 −1.982 31.862 135227
n is the number of observations; in the case of the frequency weights it is inflated by multiplying the analytic
weights by the inverse of their smallest value to achieve whole numbers.
Usually the sign of the significance value is neglected and just the absolute values are consid-
ered. This procedure is correct and enhances the visual interpretation as long as the bias occurs
for both signs in a similar fashion. Since it may be argued that positive (or negative) estimates
of deterrent effects suffer more from a bias, we always consider both cases. The corresponding
histograms can be found in figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Histograms of all (normalized) t-values
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Although the spikes at the usual levels of significance are obvious, they cannot be interpreted
as easily due to the transformation procedure from p-values into t-values (see subsection 3.2.2).
Since the distribution of the true t-values (i.e., which were given by the study) does not show
such a conspicuous behavior, as can be seen in figure 3.7, these spikes are largely based on the
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transformed p-values. How much this process distributes to these differences, cannot be judged
unambiguously from these pictures - the number of significant p-values seems much to high (or
the number of insignificant p-values is too low). Or to put it differently, the portion of insignificant
p-values does not match those given by the (true) t-values.
Figure 3.7: Difference between the true and transformed (normalized) t-values
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Looking at the basic statistics in table 3.21 of the true and transformed (normalized) t-values,
we see that they are indeed quite differently distributed.
Table 3.21: Comparing statistics of the true and transformed (normalized) t-values
Variable mean median sd min max n %w
True t −1.7865 −1.6744 3.8155 −64.8110 19.0480 2811 54.35
Transformed t −0.9481 −0.8892 1.7308 −4.9732 3.9604 3719 45.65
n is the number of observations, %w is the fraction of the summed weights of the corresponding category. “true”
t-values are those which (or all necessary ingredients) are given explicitly by a study while “transformed” t-values
are calculated or approximated by p-values or other sources.
Regarding the histograms, we have not taken into account the clustered structure (the values are
not independent within studies and their levels may be very different across studies) of our data.
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One way to mitigate the problem is to locally normalize the t-values:
t lj,i :=
t j,i− ti
σti
,
whereas t j,i is the (normalized) t-value j from study i and ti are all (normalized) t-values from
study i. Aside from studies with only a single estimate, we have also to remove studies with
two estimates, because t l1,i (and t
l
2,i) evaluates to sign(t1,i− t2,i)
√
0.5, independent of the actual
(normalized) t-values.
Dropping the studies with one or two estimates, we lose 284 observations (193 studies repre-
senting 27.76% of all weighted data). We then calculate the normalized values within each study,
which should better represent the clustered structure. Table 3.22 gives the summary statistics of
the local (normalized) values and figure 3.8 shows the histograms of these locally standardized
(normalized) t-values.
Table 3.22: Statistics of the locally standardized (normalized) t-values
Variable mean median sd min max n
Mean t −1.2652 −1.1870 2.0107 −17.1570 9.5653 6246
Sd 1.7157 1.3129 1.5384 0.0279 13.3750 6246
Standardized t 0.0000 −0.0189 0.9180 −5.5969 4.3330 6246
All values refer to the within-statistics of each study. Studies with only one or two estimates are dropped. n is the
number of observations of the remaining 503 studies.
Figure 3.8: Histograms of all locally standardized (normalized) t-values
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The sparse mid (and the flat beginning of the histogram) is obvious and it cannot be explained
by the transformation because both kinds of t-values share, in principle, the same behavior (refer
to figure 3.9). It is important to remember that values around zero represent the mean (normalized)
t-values within each study.
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Figure 3.9: Histograms of the true and transformed locally standardized (normalized) t-values
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The visual analysis suggests that there are not enough values around the mean value of each
study. This would explain both figures; that for all values, as well as the figure for the true and
transformed values. Therefore, the conclusion of the visual analysis is that either many values of
low or medium significance are missing or have partially been replaced by more significant - or
very insignificant - values.
3.4.3 Analytical Analysis
I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer,
to treat everything as if it were a nail.
Abraham H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science, 1966
In principal, we analyze the dependence of the absolute (normalized) t-values on the underlying
sample size. The larger the sample size, the larger the value of significance should be if an effect
exists. The following analysis is based on 5050 observations (representing 81.44% of the data)
for which the sample size is available.
Regressing the logarithm of the absolute (normalized) t-values on the logarithm of the sample
sizes (table 3.23), there is a significant and positive relationship to be found, although it is small.
This can also be verified with the corresponding plot in figure 3.10. In all regressions we use the
studies as clusters37 because the observations within each study are certainly not independent. On
the other hand, the ratio between clusters and observations is quiet small, so that we also show the
results of a standard OLS regression.
Figure 3.10 indicates that the relationship largely depends on those estimates based on large
sample sizes. Besides the sample size, there may be many other reasons driving the size and
significance of the coefficient. Some of these are tested and reported in table 3.24.
37This means that the diagonal of the covariance matrix is only constant within each cluster.
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Table 3.23: Regressing log(|t|) on log(n)
Variable coef. robust sd t p
log(n) 0.0448951 0.0203802 2.20 0.028???
Constant 0.0896568 0.1103612 0.81 0.417?
The regression is based on 5049 observation from 548 studies using clustered and robust standard errors (using
the studies as clusters). R2 = 0.0045, F(1,547) = 4.85, P(F) = 0.028, root mean square error (RMSE) is 1.1899.
The symbols ?,?? and ??? represent the significance in a regression without clustered standard errors at a 10,5 and
1% level.
Figure 3.10: Relationship between log(t) and log(n)
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Table 3.24: Coefficients from regressing log(|t|) on log(n) for specific subsets
Subset coef. robust sd t p n %w cluster
All 0.04490 0.02038 2.20 0.028??? 5049 100.00 548
True t 0.02421 0.02503 0.97 0.334? 2371 57.77 329
Transformed t 0.09522 0.03196 2.98 0.003??? 2678 42.23 248
t < 0 0.04328 0.02141 2.02 0.044??? 3645 74.67 503
continued on the next page. . .
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Subset coef. robust sd t p n %w cluster
t > 0 0.06598 0.04147 1.59 0.113??? 1404 25.33 299
n≤ 60 0.09354 0.14737 0.63 0.527 1305 26.52 159
60≤ n < 250 −0.17363 0.14013 −1.24 0.217?? 1219 26.40 162
250≤ n < 500 0.85946 0.42491 2.02 0.046??? 1025 16.21 108
n≥ 500 0.09770 0.05323 1.84 0.068??? 1500 30.87 189
#est. ≤ 2 0.07476 0.04565 1.64 0.105 153 19.25 101
3≤ #est. ≤ 5 0.03804 0.05973 0.64 0.526 311 17.34 93
6≤ #est. ≤ 11 0.03503 0.04053 0.86 0.389 675 20.85 115
12≤ #est. ≤ 25 −0.00909 0.03643 −0.25 0.803 1248 23.53 129
#est. ≥ 26 0.09179 0.04224 2.17 0.032??? 2662 19.03 110
S: Europe −0.01965 0.07106 −0.28 0.783 736 12.87 69
S: USA 0.04787 0.02234 2.14 0.033??? 3989 76.61 420
S: Other 0.11029 0.09963 1.11 0.273?? 324 10.52 59
S: Economists 0.01007 0.02669 0.38 0.706 2147 48.11 265
S: Soc. & crim. 0.06384 0.03994 1.60 0.112??? 2497 35.92 197
S: Others 0.17227 0.05384 3.20 0.002??? 380 15.04 80
S: Journal 0.05602 0.02208 2.54 0.011??? 4043 85.30 466
S: Book −0.03650 0.07795 −0.47 0.643 362 5.48 30
S: Paper −0.03076 0.05668 −0.54 0.590 644 9.22 52
S: Cross sections 0.00301 0.06189 0.05 0.961 1198 23.58 131
S: Time series 0.03773 0.03687 1.02 0.308?? 1444 32.00 171
S: Panel data 0.09055 0.03958 2.29 0.024??? 1006 17.26 96
S: Crime data 0.03956 0.02516 1.57 0.117??? 3234 65.52 358
S: Surveys 0.14302 0.04778 2.99 0.003??? 1735 27.58 155
S: Experiments 0.05778 0.08665 0.67 0.508 188 10.11 55
Crime data 0.04079 0.02781 1.47 0.143??? 3048 61.32 340
Surveys 0.17936 0.05945 3.02 0.003??? 1732 25.98 148
Experiments 0.06537 0.04650 1.41 0.164?? 269 12.70 68
Bivariate 0.14258 0.03593 3.97 0.000??? 1491 22.07 153
Multivariate 0.01938 0.02249 0.86 0.389? 3558 77.93 467
The first regression is based on 5049 observation from 548 studies using clustered and robust standard errors
(using the studies as clusters). Some categories do not some up to one because of missing or multiple entries.
Variables with a preceding “S:” are measured on the study-level while all others are based on the estimates. n
is he number of observations in the corresponding category. %w is the fraction of the summed weights of the
corresponding category. The symbols ?,?? and ??? represent the significance in a regression without clustered
standard errors at a 10 ,5 and 1% level.
end of the table 3.24
We have to be cautious when interpreting the results from table 3.24, because most coefficients
are close to zero and the categories are based on different numbers of observations. Nevertheless,
it seems to be that the data offers some clues. There is no evidence, if a publication bias is present,
that positive or negative results are more affected. However, there are suspicious results when we
look at studies with moderate sample sizes. It seems to be, consulting figure 3.10, that there are
too many low absolute (normalized) t-values, with sample sizes between 250 and 500, than there
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should be. On the other hand, there seem to be too many large absolute values for results based on
sample sizes between 60 and 250. The high coefficient for surveys may be based on the fact that
the results scale more heavily with the sample size than other research methods do. For example,
panel data is expected to yield much lower coefficients than Pearson correlations. On the other
hand, panel data are usually based on many observations and, therefore, the significance of their
results scale much better than in the case of cross sections or time series. The fact that journals
have the “best” coefficient contradicts with the common hypothesis that publication bias is more
readily found in (refereed) journals. The contrary is the case: results published in working papers
and books, which are usually not subject to a referee process, have even the wrong sign but are not
significant. So, if at all, these are biased towards zero. The relationship between the sample size
and significance is more profound for bivariate methods. To some extent, this may be attributed to
the dominant usage of Pearson correlations, multivariate methods which do not have t-distributed
standard errors under the null hypothesis, or their complexity. The difference between economists
on the one side and sociologists, criminologists and jurists may be partly explained by the fact that
economists do use bivariate methods and surveys less often. There seems to be no relationship
in the case of studies about Europe (mainly the United Kingdom and Germany). Whether this
is based on some artifacts of the data, publication bias or a weaker deterrent effect cannot be
unambiguously judged here. It is somewhat disappointing that no clear assertion can be made
for the true t-values. This may be partly explained by the fact that t-values are much more often
reported by economists who use multivariate methods and employ crime data.
As pointed out by Stanley (2005a), the absence of any relationship can lead to two different
conclusions: either there is a publication bias present or there is simply no effect. The latter
option is often left aside in the literature, leading to false conclusions and thus has to be considered
separately. In the case of the deterrence literature this seems not to be the case, because there is an
overall relationship and insignificant results for specific subsets should be based on a bias rather
than on the absence of an effect.
Even if there is an effect, the regression itself cannot tell us the characteristics of the bias. Usu-
ally, there will be clusters around the typical regions of significance, which reduce the influence
of the sample size. As shown in subsection 3.4.2, it seems to be that there is a shift away from
“medium” insignificance in the distribution but no obvious clustering.
Other Evidence
We have also some other statistics at our disposal. We know whether the deterrence variable
was the main focus of an estimation or just a covariate (e.g., in studies analyzing the effect of
crime on unemployment). In principle, the mean effect should be independent of the focus of
the estimation. However, the mean (normalized) t-value for studies which focus on deterrence is
−1.47 (the median is −1.44), while the values for estimates which do not focus on deterrence,
differ significantly (mean−1.02, median−1.01). This tentative evidence should not be overrated,
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because estimates, which do not focus on deterrence, may lack important features to minimize
potential errors, biases and other specialities found in the deterrence literature.
3.4.4 Subsequent Consequences
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
Carl E. Sagan, The Dragons of Eden, 1977
We could find only some evidence of publication bias. Since the data is very heterogenous,
it is not surprising that the analytical analysis has not produced any large coefficients but most
of them are correct (positive and significant). The main problem seems to be the reported re-
sults based on medium sample sizes. Results based on 60 to 250 observations are significantly
biased towards zero, while those, based on 250 to 500 observations, show the opposite behavior.
Overall, there seems to be a lack of results lying near the mean of each study - and these means
are distributed around −1.27. This value might not be appreciated very much by researchers,
because those results are neither clearly insignificant nor are they in range of the usual levels of
significance. Therefore, it is not surprising that values from this region are found less often than
expected. However, the calculated coefficients do not allow us to adjust the (normalized) t-values,
as in Stanley (2005a), because we cannot identify their distribution. Even an author with no ill
intentions might respecify his model until it looks well behaved, which may lead to the described
sparse areas. In the multivariate analysis (see section 3.6), which controls for many model prop-
erties, this might not be that much of a problem, while the interpretation is more difficult for
bivariate and overall statistics, like the average or median (normalized) t-value.
The consequences for this meta analysis is to keep this in mind and be careful. We cannot
correct this potential publication bias, since there is no way to distinguish unbiased from biased
estimates. The least we can do is to split the number of observations into two variables; each taking
the value zero in the case of negative (positive) normalized t-values, to eliminate the technical
influence of the sample size of each estimate. Nevertheless, we should take heed of the advise
from Glaeser (2006) that “if we are faced with the choice between no information and biased
information, the latter option is preferred”.
3.5 Bivariate Statistics
Now that we have all this useful information, it would be nice to
do something with it. (Actually, it can be emotionally fulfilling
just to get the information. This is usually only true, however, if
you have the social life of a kumquat.)
Unix Programmer’s Manual
The extent of the support of the deterrence hypothesis varies largely between different groups.
In this section we show several key statistics for some selected groups. These relationships should
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not be overrated, since correlations with other unaccounted variables may be the main reason for
many dependencies (see section 2.3.1).
A first impression of the dependencies is given by the simple correlations between the (nor-
malized) t-values and the available variables in table 3.25. The largest correlation coefficients
belong, as expected, to variables related to the used sample size of the estimates. In the case a
deterrent effect exists, the t-values scale with the sample size as explained in section 3.4. It is
obvious that variables, which relate to economic authors, journals, studies and economic theories
come all with quite negative coefficients, while those relating to the criminological field are all
positive38. These coefficients are not surprising because it is commonly assumed that economists
more readily agree with the deterrence hypothesis, while criminologists are rather sceptical about
it. Another observation is that all significant coefficients relating to experiments are negative as
well. It is a curious result that reporting tests of significance is negatively correlated with the
(normalized) t-values on the study-level but positively on the estimate-level. Estimates, which are
based on simple correlations seem to yield more positive values, while logit (and probit) estimates
are negatively correlated. It is also interesting that using the strength of the police yields more
positive values, similar to those estimates which do not focus on deterrence. Newer studies, work-
ing papers and reports, as well as those estimates based on youth-samples come along with rather
negative (normalized) t-values.
In the subsequent subsections, most tables show the mean and median (normalized) t-value,
as well as the percentage of estimates which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and
are significant at a 5% level. All entries are sorted by their median. For each group an Analysis
of Variance (ANOVA) is performed with the most frequent entry as the reference category. All
entries which are not significant at a 5% level, but are interesting for some other reasons, are
written in italic.
3.5.1 Study-Related Groups
Although to penetrate into the intimate mysteries of nature and
thence to learn the true causes of phenomena is not allowed to
us, nevertheless it can happen that a certain fictive hypothesis
may suffice for explaining many phenomena.
Leonhard Euler, Introductio in analysin infinitorum, 1748
In the following, we will present the dependency within certain study-related groups. This
means that the grouping variable is constant within each study. We inspect the relationship be-
tween several interesting variables and the (normalized) t-values and comment on it.
As depicted in table 3.26, compared to U.S. authors, studies from authors of the most frequent
and largest European countries (the United Kingdom and Germany) yield significantly better re-
sults (in favor of the deterrence hypothesis). Their medians are−1.85 and−1.83, which is almost
38The user tr recorded all economic studies, the user aw most of the criminological and sociological studies.
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Table 3.25: Significant correlations with the (normalized) t-values
Variable coef. variable coef.
Study: size of first realized sample −0.235?? Study: publication, year −0.056
Study: size of second realized sample −0.119?? Study: author, Isaac Ehrlich −0.056
Study: user, tr −0.113?? Study: complete sample −0.055
Study: publication, economics −0.110?? Estimate: exogenous, survey, other −0.055
Study: error and plausibility checks −0.103?? Study: journal, Review of Economics and Statistics −0.053
Estimate: sub-sample of youths −0.103?? Estimate: deterrence is focus-variable −0.053
Study: institute, economics −0.099?? Estimate: exogenous, binary category −0.050
Study: journal, Economic Inquiry −0.097?? Study: cross section +0.050
Estimate: number of observations −0.093?? Study: sample individuals, first population, pupils +0.051
Estimate: covariate, Fixed effects (spatial) −0.092?? Study: institute, criminology +0.051
Study: author, economics −0.092?? Estimate: exogenous, not in logs +0.052
Study: economic, rational choice theory −0.091?? Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, existence of death
penalty
+0.052
Study: main location > 500000 inhabitants −0.091?? Study: journal, Criminology +0.053
Study: rate of return of second sample −0.088?? Estimate: deterrence is covariate +0.053
Study: experiment (laboratory) −0.085?? Study: author, criminology +0.055
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, experimental varia-
tion of probability of detection
−0.081?? Study: user, aw +0.055
Study: author, psychology −0.080?? Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, execution rate +0.055
Study: sample individuals, second population, miscella-
neous
−0.076?? Study: author, William C. Bailey +0.056
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, yes −0.076?? Estimate: multivariate method, path analysis +0.057
Estimate: covariate, marital status −0.076?? Estimate: covariate, urbanity +0.061?
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, relates to the present −0.075?? Study: author, sociology +0.063?
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, arrest rate −0.074?? Estimate: bivariate method, correlation +0.065?
Estimate: covariate, personal characteristics −0.073?? Estimate: covariate, previous convictions +0.066?
Study: institute, psychology −0.072? Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police expenditures +0.067?
Estimate: exogenous, other transformation −0.068? Estimate: test of significance +0.067?
Study: sample unit, second population, individuals −0.067? Study: institute, miscellaneous +0.069?
Study: experimental −0.066? Study: sample unit, first population, states +0.071?
Estimate: endogenous, other −0.066? Study: journal, Criminal Justice +0.072?
Study: sample unit, first population, individuals −0.066? Estimate: covariate, poverty, welfare +0.073??
Estimate: exogenous, in logs −0.065? Estimate: study type, death penalty +0.079??
Study: publication, working paper, report −0.064? Study: not experimental +0.082??
Study: tests of significance −0.061? Estimate: weighted model +0.088??
Study: sample base, second population, complete coun-
try
−0.060? Study: traditional theory +0.111??
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, conviction rate −0.059? Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police strength +0.126??
Estimate: multivariate method, logit, probit −0.058 Study: publication, criminology +0.130??
Study: first population, United Kingdom −0.057?
A correlation coefficient is listed if its absolute value is larger than 0.05, is significant at the 0.01% level (two-
sided test) and varies in at least 1% of the data. ? marks p-values which are smaller than 5 · 10−6 and ?? those
below 5 ·10−9.
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40% smaller than those of U.S. authors. Contrarily, Canadian authors find deterrent effects in
much fewer cases (the percentage39 is reduced by one third, compared with those authors from
the UK and Germany). Estimates from Australian authors do not significantly differ from those
of U.S. authors. The statistics of the authors from less frequent countries (“other”) are also in-
teresting: the mean and median estimate is much more negative than those from U.S. authors,
while the percentage is much lower. This could mean that the results from those authors are more
concentrated in the negative “no man’s land”, which is rather uncommon in our meta-data base
(refer to section 3.4 about publication bias).
Table 3.26: Differences by the authors’ nationality
Nation mean median % #e #s
Finland −3.03 −2.92 80.00 50 5
Israel −1.64 −2.15 53.60 85 9
UK −1.87 −1.85 48.76 275 28
Germany −1.86 −1.83 42.15 208 22
Netherlands −1.11 −1.46 43.58 81 8
Other −1.81 −1.44 34.91 239 24
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
USA −1.38 −1.29 41.90 5143 522
Australia −1.30 −1.01 44.87 132 13
Switzerland −0.80 −0.99 38.81 66 7
Canada −0.86 −0.89 31.22 336 34
Sweden 0.15 −0.15 7.87 61 6
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
As mentioned before, it is almost common knowledge that economists more readily agree with
the deterrence hypothesis than criminologists and sociologists. This view is supported by ta-
ble 3.27. Psychology is, undisputable, number one in that list with a median of −2.15 and a
percentage of 65.59%. These authors mostly study alcohol related offenses which yield rather
negative results. Economics is the second most dominant category in favor of deterrence; the
estimates have a median of −1.67 and 43.82% are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and
significant. As expected, sociologists show significantly less results in agreement with deterrence
(median −1.01, percentage 38.67%). With a median of just −0.62 and a percentage of 33.31%,
criminologists are at the very bottom of that list. Authors from “other” disciplines, which are
more or less not related to deterrence research (e.g., mathematics, medicine, etc.), produce esti-
mates which are very similar to the overall mean.
39In this context, “percentage” always refers to the percentage of (normalized) t-values which are consistent with the
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Table 3.27: Differences by the authors’ discipline
Discipline mean median % #e #s
Psychology −2.58 −2.15 65.59 275 27
Economics −1.73 −1.67 43.82 2807 287
Overall Mean −1.40 −1.37 41.71 6101 617
Other −1.17 −1.33 41.25 767 76
Law −1.17 −1.11 38.53 233 23
Sociology −1.07 −1.01 38.67 1690 170
Criminology −0.93 −0.62 33.31 738 75
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
As stated in section 3.4 about publication bias, results may be different for various types of
publication. Journals make up for the most studies we included (table 3.28). Working papers
(including discussion papers, official reports, etc.) is the only category in which the (normalized)
t-values are significantly different (the mean of −2.26 is quite smaller than −1.34 from the jour-
nals); but this difference is almost nullified when we look at the median or the percentage (−1.37
and 43.43% compared to −1.35 and 41.74%). All in all, there seems to be no major differences
between the various types of publication; only that the average (normalized) t-value is more neg-
ative (−1.93) for books (the median of 1.57 and the percentage of 46.38% are different, but not
significantly).
Table 3.28: Differences by the type of publication
Type mean median % #e #s
Edited volume −1.62 −1.63 43.82 261 28
Book −1.93 −1.57 46.38 98 10
Other −1.19 −1.41 31.89 214 22
Working paper −2.26 −1.37 43.43 322 34
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
Journal −1.34 −1.35 41.74 5635 569
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
Most studies are published in five countries, dominated by U.S., as shown in table 3.29. How-
deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two-sided test.
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ever, there are almost no differences. Only the Netherlands stick out with a very low percentage
(28.99%) and an average (normalized) t-value near zero (−0.46). An interesting observation is
that studies in Canadian publications report more negative (normalized) t-values (median −1.67)
than the average, while authors from Canada report less negative (−0.89) values.
Table 3.29: Differences by the country of publication
Country mean median % #e #s
UK −1.53 −1.82 47.57 539 54
Canada −1.42 −1.67 39.37 234 23
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
Germany −1.50 −1.34 36.92 299 31
USA −1.41 −1.29 41.84 5101 518
Netherlands −0.46 −0.96 28.99 166 17
Other −1.59 −0.94 41.16 190 20
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
We distinguish the discipline of the publisher in table 3.30. Economic (and psychologic) pub-
lications are much more supportive of the deterrence theory (−2.15 and −1.73, 67.45% and
45.50%), while sociological (−1.33, 40.64%) are significantly less supportive. Criminological
publications appear, after a large gap, at the very bottom of the list (−0.51, 30.85%). It is not as-
tounding that there are no major differences to table 3.27 because sociologists and criminologists
only rarely publish in economic media (as illustrated in table 3.9).
Table 3.30: Differences by the publishers’ discipline
Discipline mean median % #e #s
Psychology −2.12 −2.15 67.45 183 18
Economics −1.86 −1.73 45.50 2348 241
Other −1.54 −1.42 45.24 945 96
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.70 6426 651
Sociology −1.15 −1.33 40.64 1267 128
Law −1.56 −1.20 38.25 346 34
Criminology −0.62 −0.51 30.85 1335 134
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
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In table 3.26, we have seen the relationship with the countries the authors worked in. Although
many authors study data of their own country, there are some differences. Looking at table 3.31,
which shows the statistics diversified by the studied countries, some countries remain fairly stable
in their position: Finland remains at the top (median −2.65, percentage 83.40%), while the UK,
Germany and the USA remain at their positions as well. Australia switches from below the mean
almost to the top (from −1.01 to −2.24 and from 44.87% to 64.39%). Sweden remains at the
lower part of the table, but has now a more reasonable (higher) percentage (7.87% to 24.65%).
Studies using Canadian data have estimates which are in least agreement with the deterrence
hypothesis (−0.52, 28.26%). Although some crimes are studied more often in a country than in
another (e.g., drunken driving in scandinavian countries or marijuana consumption in Australia),
there is no obvious explanation why results based on Canadian data are in “worst” compliance
with the deterrence hypothesis.
Table 3.31: Differences by the studied nation
Nation mean median % #e #s
Finland −2.93 −2.65 83.40 60 6
Australia −1.74 −2.24 64.39 112 11
UK −2.17 −2.02 54.07 327 33
Germany −1.96 −1.83 42.24 177 19
Netherlands −1.79 −1.37 41.98 81 8
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
USA −1.37 −1.30 41.84 5008 507
Other −1.37 −1.19 31.88 407 43
Switzerland −0.97 −1.03 38.81 66 7
Sweden −1.31 −0.69 24.65 92 9
Canada −0.70 −0.52 28.26 280 28
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
During the last 40 years much has or may have changed in the literature about deterrence:
data, data quality, cultural backgrounds, estimation technology, attitudes of authors, the audience,
offenders, and much more. Figure 3.11, however, reveals that there are no obvious time effects.
Nevertheless, we have partitioned the estimates into five categories40. There are indeed some
significant differences, as shown in table 3.32, but the differences are neither easily interpreted,
nor are these very pronounced. If at all, there is a periodical pattern. However, these results are
not robust when redefining the time categories.
40As always in such cases we chose the thresholds in such a way that each category contains an approximately equal
number of observations.
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Figure 3.11: Temporal development of the (normalized) t-values
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We make the same comparison with the utilized data. Table 3.33 shows that the median values
differ as much as in the case of the year of publication; the percentages only partially. Although
the entries are all significantly different from the newest data (median −0.92, 36.49%), there is a
slight trend in the order of the rows. If we exclude the oldest data, studies using newer data seem
to produce less significant results. Additionally, the ordering is somewhat different from that in
table 3.32 because there is, if at all, a time trend instead of a periodic pattern.
The number of reported estimates certainly depends on the type of publication, because there
is much more room to present results in books and working papers than in journals. The mean
number of published estimates is 22 (median 8); the largest number is 764 (the smallest zero).
The corresponding ANOVA can be found in table 3.34. Although not significant there is an
obvious descending order with an increasing number of estimates. This may be, at least partially,
explainable by technical reasons: presenting more results is commonly done for robustness checks
(often by economists), which come along with more “contaminated41” estimates. Another reason
is that simple correlation coefficients, which are associated with insignificant values (table 3.47),
appear often in large numbers in a study.
41When evaluating numerous specifications a certain percentage may suffer from a misspecification bias.
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Table 3.32: Differences by the year of publication
Years mean median % #e #s
1979-1986 −1.42 −1.68 46.26 1225 125
1987-1994 −1.36 −1.53 43.05 1428 147
2001-2006 −1.90 −1.46 44.97 1412 141
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
1952-1978 −1.12 −1.18 39.25 1237 125
1995-2000 −1.15 −1.06 34.06 1229 125
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
Table 3.33: Differences by the year of utilized data
Years mean median % #e #s
1966-1974 −1.11 −1.61 43.71 962 97
1975-1982 −1.17 −1.31 42.93 1023 103
1983-1988 −2.21 −1.20 41.73 824 85
Overall mean −1.33 −1.19 39.25 4862 494
1875-1965 −1.05 −0.94 32.07 998 103
1989-2004 −1.25 −0.92 36.49 1056 106
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
It may be reasoned that the design of a study may lead to different results. It is obvious that
experiments come along with very negative (normalized) t-values (−2.1 to −2.45, 58.57% to
65%), as table 3.35 shows. The effect of the other designs are not that obvious. Surveys appear
at the upper, middle and lower part of the table, depending on their design. Estimates based on
reported crimes are below the mean. However, most of the non-experiments are not significantly
different from studies based on time series (the reference category, −1.34, 41.69%).
Section 3.3 shows that 27.6% of all studies come from the top 22 authors (2.6% of all involved
authors). It is reasonable to assume that individual preferences of the authors may lead to different
estimates, depending on their personal attitude and other reasons. We stress that table 3.36 does
not show any (clear) evidence for a publication or author bias; authors may prefer different meth-
ods, offenses, countries and other things which may lead to more or less significant estimates.
The most striking result is that, among these 22 authors, the percentage of theory-consistent and
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Table 3.34: Differences by the number of reported estimates
Number mean median % #e #s
0-2 −1.58 −2.09 53.96 1349 133
Overall mean −1.46 −1.41 42.82 5320 540
3-5 −1.25 −1.41 42.11 791 79
6-11 −1.29 −1.33 39.69 967 98
12-25 −1.60 −1.10 40.17 1021 104
26-764 −1.49 −1.00 35.49 1192 126
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
Table 3.35: Differences by the design of a study
Design mean median % #e #s
Experiment (by institution) −2.55 −2.45 63.33 102 10
Experiment (laboratory) −2.63 −2.36 58.57 285 28
Experiment (by researcher) −1.03 −2.10 65.00 102 10
Survey (once) −1.55 −1.60 45.63 1161 119
Experiment (natural) −1.26 −1.60 44.90 197 20
Overall mean −1.41 −1.37 41.69 6479 658
Time series −1.39 −1.34 39.06 2235 224
Survey (panel) −1.50 −1.32 44.52 367 38
Panel data −1.57 −1.13 38.68 1000 101
Cross section −1.12 −1.04 37.00 1517 156
Survey (multiple) −1.46 −0.86 36.15 205 22
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
significant results is almost doubled in the top five rows compared to the bottom five. While the
upper position of Isaac Ehrlich (−3.34, 73.65%) and William C. Bailey (−0.26, 13.92%) in the
last row is not surprising, it is rather curious to find Steven D. Levitt (−0.83, 32%) among the bot-
tom five. As stated before, there are only two authors who did not live in the USA at the time of
writing and both appear above the mean (−1.37, 41.66%); Matti Vire´n has the highest percentage
(80%), while Horst Entorf42 is slightly above the mean (42.96%).
42Although his entry is just below the mean and the reference group, the corresponding mean and percentage indicates
that he has to be associated, with the “upper” part.
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Table 3.36: Differences by prominent authors
Author mean median % #e #s
Simon Hakim −2.91 −3.47 63.82 67 7
Isaac Ehrlich −3.13 −3.34 73.65 64 7
Matti Vire´n −3.03 −2.92 80.00 50 5
Harold G. Grasmick −2.14 −2.58 72.61 101 10
Dale O. Cloninger −1.77 −2.23 63.79 97 11
Laurence H. Ross −2.39 −2.10 67.74 63 7
Greg Pogarsky −1.50 −2.03 53.24 61 6
Daniel S. Nagin −0.73 −1.79 45.19 87 9
Theodore G. Chiricos, Gordon P. Waldo −1.55 −1.61 49.51 81 8
David W. Rasmussen −1.64 −1.45 28.13 81 8
Bruce L. Benson −1.61 −1.45 29.94 92 9
Charles R. Tittle −0.90 −1.38 47.71 61 6
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
Raymond Paternoster −1.55 −1.33 37.01 156 16
Other −1.38 −1.29 40.69 5058 513
Horst Entorf −2.51 −1.20 42.96 55 6
Ann D. Witte −1.32 −1.20 38.21 66 7
Maynard L. Erickson −1.22 −0.87 34.29 41 4
Jack P. Gibbs −1.13 −0.85 31.19 61 6
Steven D. Levitt −0.61 −0.83 32.00 112 11
Thomas B. Marvell −1.17 −0.76 39.56 61 6
Alex R. Piquero −0.84 −0.61 31.42 81 8
William C. Bailey −0.35 −0.26 13.92 173 17
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category. Gordon P. Waldo and Theodore G.
Chiricos appear together in all of their studies.
As mentioned before, we have build an index which relates to the subjective quality of each
study. It consists of the magnitude and quantity of problems reported by the author and the extent
of unreported problems judged by the reader (i.e., the user who recorded the study). We have
aggregated this index into three categories: good, medium and poor quality. Again, we emphasize
that there is no such thing like a flawless study; not all problems can be coped with by corrective
measures and some may lie deep in the available data source. While the estimates of poor studies
differ significantly from those of medium quality, the order in table 3.37 is, all in all, somewhat
inconclusive. Studies of medium quality (−1.25, 39.44%) are less in favor of the deterrence
theory than those of poor (median−1.59, percentage 46.41%) and good quality (−1.65, 45.25%).
Although the averaging effect of the sheer size of the category of medium quality may partially
explain this, the order remains a bit strange. The first and last rows are practically identical (in
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regard to the mean (normalized) t-value) while their median and percentage differ.
Table 3.37: Differences by the quality of a study
Quality mean median % #e #s
Good quality −1.38 −1.65 45.25 1840 187
Poor quality −1.77 −1.59 46.41 538 56
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
Medium quality −1.37 −1.25 39.44 4152 420
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
Each study has to rely on some data. This can be public crime data (like the UCR in the
USA, the PKS in Germany, public surveys or non-public data like the combination and linkage of
various data sources, confidential data, experiments, self conducted surveys etc. Table 3.38 shows
that there are no significant differences in the estimates when we categorize them according to the
implemented data source. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that studies using the UCR come
along with the smallest (normalized) t-values (−1.07, 36.99%), while those estimates based on
non-public data yield “better” values (−1.68, 47.29%).
Table 3.38: Differences by the public data base
Data base mean median % #e #s
PKS −1.93 −1.78 37.32 75 8
None −1.46 −1.68 47.29 1714 175
Overall mean −1.38 −1.33 41.04 5900 600
Other −1.33 −1.31 39.36 2618 264
UCR −1.33 −1.07 36.99 1494 153
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
As already described in subsection 3.3.3, we have an index of the general opinion of the author
at our disposal, aggregated over all crimes. Table 3.39 is more or less a verification and plausibility
check. As expected, all categories are significantly different from the reference category (partial
approval) and all three statistics are in descending order (from −2.66, 64.5% to 0.32, 8.02%).
Even the Undefined category is in the middle (−0.91, 35.41%), although it is not to be mixed
up with something like “indifference”; it accumulates all not unambiguously definable opinions:
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usually these happen to be studies lacking any usable statements which could reveal the opinion
of the author or, which happens quite often, the opinion depends heavily on various conditions.
Table 3.39: Differences by the overall author opinion
Opinion mean median % #e #s
Full approval −3.07 −2.66 64.50 1377 142
Partial approval −1.87 −2.08 54.48 2151 215
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
Undefined −0.75 −0.91 35.41 832 86
Partial disapproval −0.58 −0.52 24.54 1158 118
Full disapproval 0.37 0.32 08.02 1012 102
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
3.5.2 Estimate-Related Groups
Models are to be used, but not to be believed.
Henry Theil, Principles of Econometrics, 1971
Now, we will consider those grouping variables which may change for each estimate. Again,
we present one table and a comment for each selected variable.
Although we have already classified the type of each study in table 3.35, we have another
specification on the estimate-level. In table 3.40 we explicitly distinguish estimates which are
concerned with the death penalty and aggregated survey, experiment and crime data. In contrast
to the specification on the study-level, the types of each estimate can change within a study, al-
though this is only rarely the case. The most striking fact of is at its very bottom: the estimates
concerned with the death penalty (−0.43, 26.61%). Whether this depends on the large scepticism
towards the deterrent effect43 of the death penalty in the United States, or whether there is indeed
no (measurable) effect, the table does not tell. The order of the other categories correspond to
these of the specification on the study-level: experiments are associated with the most deterrent
effects (−2.10, 55.59%), while crime data and surveys yield about the same results and are not
significantly different.
Before looking at the individual offenses, table 3.41 reveals that estimates associated with the
violation of rules in games (−2.01, 54.19%) or misdemeanors (−1.81, 49.23%) are significantly
more often in accordance with the deterrence hypothesis. On the other hand, estimates associ-
ated with deviant behavior do support the deterrence hypothesis significantly less often (−0.97,
43In fact, only 5% of all estimates (from four studies) concerned with the death penalty, do not use U.S. data.
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Table 3.40: Differences by the type of estimate
Type mean median % #e #s
Experiment −1.71 −2.10 55.59 832 85
Crime data −1.48 −1.40 41.12 3569 387
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
Survey −1.35 −1.22 40.61 1595 168
Death Penalty −0.57 −0.43 26.61 534 79
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
41.99%). However, it should be noted that more than 80 percent of all estimates deal exclusively
with crimes; only 8.5% are exclusively about non-crimes.
Table 3.41: Differences by the formal severity of an offense
Type mean median % #e #s
Violating game-rules −1.56 −2.01 54.19 158 16
Misdemeanors −1.41 −1.81 49.23 620 76
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
Crimes −1.38 −1.34 41.25 5974 613
Other −0.75 −1.34 34.39 96 11
Informal deviant behavior −1.26 −0.97 41.99 113 19
Formal deviant behavior −0.81 −0.60 29.34 161 23
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
Researchers implement various variables to measure crime. The most common way is the usage
of the respective crime rate for estimates based on crime data, and the self reported delinquency
for surveys. While estimates using the crime rate are associated with less deterrent effects (−1.13,
37.63%) than the overall mean (−1.37, 41.79%), table 3.42 displays significantly “better” values
(i.e., more supportive of the deterrence hypothesis) for estimates which use the absolute number
of reported crimes (−1.90, 48.21%) or the probability of future delinquency (−2.03, 51.01%).
Estimates using accidents (−1.69, 46.16%) or violations of prescriptive limits (−1.73, 46.39%)
are also significantly “better”. Some studies about general deterrence use recidivism44 as as the
44Studies using recidivism are usually about specific deterrence. As mentioned in section 2.1, we have included some
of these studies for various reasons.
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exogenous variable. For these individuals there is no support for the deterrence hypothesis at all
(0.53, 13.46%).
Table 3.42: Differences by the implemented endogenous variable
Endogenous variable mean median % #e #s
Probability of future delinquency (surveyed is delin-
quent)
−1.38 −2.03 51.01 266 30
Number of reported crimes (absolute number) −1.18 −1.90 48.21 722 77
Violating prescriptive limits −1.70 −1.73 46.39 187 22
Other −2.00 −1.71 46.97 668 88
Accidents −1.43 −1.69 46.16 274 31
Self reported delinquency −1.45 −1.45 43.44 1184 127
Overall mean −1.41 −1.37 41.79 6429 657
Crime rate −1.36 −1.13 37.63 2918 302
Probability of delinquency of fictitious offense (sur-
veyed is delinquent)
−0.77 −0.94 27.43 78 10
Recidivism 0.23 0.53 13.46 44 5
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
Table 3.43 shows the statistics distinguished by the various crime types. Very prominent is
the upper part which is clearly dominated by non-violent crimes (malicious mischief being the
only exception), while the lower part is exclusively made up by violent and drug-related crimes.
The offenses which are in best accordance with the deterrence hypothesis are speeding (−2.21,
50.06%), tax evasion (−2.09, 53.04%), fraud (−1.90, 49.33%) and environmentally related of-
fenses (−1.67, 46.57%). Sexual assault (−0.5, 28.67%; except rape, which is more in the middle),
negligent assault (−0.36, 35.60%), manslaughter (0.04, 17.87%) and the possession of drugs are
all only very weakly related to deterrent effects. Surprisingly, vehicle theft (−1.18, 39.48%),
which is usually called the best property crime to measure deterrence (minimal reporting bias),
is found somewhat below the overall mean. It is also noteworthy that dealing with soft drugs is
more affected by deterrence than dealing with hard drugs (median of −0.63 and 0.04, percentage
of 40.31% and 23.38%).
We also study the exogenous variables in each of the following categories: the death penalty,
reported crimes, surveys or experiments. Table 3.44 shows the corresponding statistics of these
four categories (the elements of each category are ordered by their median values). While the
overall support of a deterrent effect of the death penalty is low, estimates using its existence
have especially “bad” values (0.15, 11.97%), while the uncategorized estimates have very “good”
values (−1.49, 39.96%). This may indicate that there are ways to detect some deterrent effect but
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Table 3.43: Differences by the types of crime
Type mean median % #e #s
Speeding −1.53 −2.21 50.06 72 9
Tax evasion −1.90 −2.09 53.04 474 53
Larceny (severe) −1.42 −2.08 51.64 207 43
Drunk driving −1.60 −2.00 50.72 787 92
Malicious mischief −1.44 −2.00 50.80 93 19
Larceny (inferior) −1.14 −2.00 51.78 173 35
Fraud −1.72 −1.90 49.33 257 47
Other −1.62 −1.68 43.60 460 60
Environmental crimes, Viol. of prescriptive limits −0.99 −1.67 46.57 151 17
Burglary −1.24 −1.44 43.91 795 182
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.55 6518 662
Larceny (Index I, general) −1.30 −1.28 40.76 821 190
Other misdemeanors −1.59 −1.27 43.73 206 29
Vehicle theft −1.04 −1.18 39.48 558 133
Robbery −1.28 −1.16 39.74 789 196
Rape −1.44 −1.10 38.49 452 118
Other crimes −1.09 −1.06 40.12 526 78
Homicide −1.17 −0.88 34.41 1415 237
Crime rate (general) −1.07 −0.87 32.81 402 64
Assault −1.24 −0.81 38.07 661 167
Drug related crime (general) −1.03 −0.72 40.13 288 55
Drug dealing (soft) −1.22 −0.63 40.31 42 8
Sexual assault −0.92 −0.50 28.67 33 17
Negligent assault −0.85 −0.36 35.60 119 36
Manslaughter −0.38 0.04 17.87 81 17
Drug dealing (hard) −0.43 0.04 23.38 29 7
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. No reference category is used because multiple entries were common.
not with the usual measures (i.e., simple execution rates or law-dummies).
We have a much more detailed set of variables for reported crimes. Most deal with the prob-
ability of punishment and can be found in the upper part, while those related to the severity are
in the lower part. As expected, the police expenditures and strength45 have “bad” values (−1.01,
30.53% and 0.03, 21.67%). While most (except the incarceration rate) variables of the convic-
tion cascade (see page 43) are more in favor of the deterrence hypothesis, rates with crime in the
denominator have especially “good” values. Among the variables which measure the severity of
45By police strength we usually refer to all variables which measure the police force (e.g., the number of officers,
employees, etc.).
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punishment, the mean sentence length (−1.41, 33.64%, in opposition to the mean time in prison
(−0.69, 22.08%) at the end of the table) and the regime shift dummy (−1.57, 39.90%) yield the
“best” values.
Similar to the estimates based on reported crimes, those based on surveys can also be roughly
divided into two parts: most variables which relate to the probability of detection and punish-
ment are in the upper part of table 3.44, while those relating to the severity of punishment are
in the lower part. In both cases, variables concerned with friends and family come before those
dealing with justice. The estimates using the probability of punishment by friends or family have
especially “good” values (−2.43, 57.66%).
Regarding experiments we see, again, basically the same picture. Using experimental and ac-
tual variation of the detection probability yield very “good” values (−3.05, 76.03% and −2.10,
57.87%), the estimates implementing the variation of the severity of punishment do the opposite
(−1.16, 34.45% and−1.01, 41.51%). In both cases the experimental variation yield slightly “bet-
ter” estimates than actual variation, indicating that deterrence can be more readily detected, when
the parameters are more in control of the researcher.
Compared to the estimates from reported crimes, surveys and death penalties, the number of
observations is most evenly spread for the experiment-categories. All in all, variables which
correspond to probability measures are associated with “better” results than those dealing with the
severity of punishment; this is true for all categories.
Table 3.44: Differences by the exogenous crime variable
Variable mean median % #e #s
Death penalty
Other −1.19 −1.49 39.96 97 19
Percentage of all convictions −0.72 −0.56 20.28 45 11
Execution rate −0.65 −0.51 26.55 315 57
Overall mean −0.63 −0.43 26.27 515 78
Existence of death penalty 0.17 0.15 11.97 67 14
Crime data
Convicted per crime −3.27 −3.46 81.99 41 11
Incarceration per crime −2.60 −2.39 57.41 59 13
Probability dummy (regime shift) −1.97 −2.15 63.93 228 31
Arrest rate −2.10 −1.94 49.05 619 110
Clearance rate −1.84 −1.93 47.41 344 65
Conviction rate −2.30 −1.83 46.11 255 71
Fine −1.95 −1.71 44.96 43 16
Other −1.57 −1.66 45.09 558 101
Severity dummy (regime shift) −1.73 −1.57 39.90 234 32
Mean sentence length (sentenced) −1.20 −1.41 33.64 133 45
Overall mean −1.47 −1.40 41.12 3550 386
Police expenditures −0.39 −1.01 30.53 258 45
continued on the next page. . .
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. . . last page of table 3.44 continued
Variable mean median % #e #s
Probation rate −1.17 −0.91 31.89 23 10
Inspections −1.26 −0.82 31.84 79 11
Incarceration rate −1.28 −0.77 30.10 42 18
Mean sentence length (served) −0.68 −0.69 22.08 112 29
Incarcerations (absolute or per capita) −0.80 −0.48 24.96 57 17
Police strength −0.07 0.03 21.67 513 84
Surveys (all in expectations)
Probability of punishment by friends or family −2.05 −2.43 57.66 105 25
Probability of punishment by employment law −1.76 −2.06 52.51 39 9
Probability of punishment by justice −1.49 −1.68 45.83 292 53
Probability of detection by police −1.47 −1.63 44.83 466 82
Overall mean −1.36 −1.25 40.86 1563 168
Other −2.27 −0.86 35.55 244 35
Severity of punishment by friends or family −0.90 −0.86 23.73 62 15
Probability of punishment by others −0.91 −0.83 24.31 59 13
Probability of other kind of punishment −0.88 −0.80 12.18 26 5
Severity of punishment by justice −0.82 −0.64 32.24 211 53
Previous experience with police or justice −0.52 −0.40 31.82 56 6
Type of punishment −0.46 −0.26 19.53 17 6
Severity of punishment by others 1.57 −0.07 32.35 29 6
Probability of detection by others 1.36 0.76 25.47 27 7
Experiments
Experimental variation of probability of detection −3.10 −3.05 76.03 136 19
Other −1.85 −2.52 63.37 141 15
Actual variation of probability of detection −1.35 −2.10 57.87 258 27
Overall mean −1.75 −2.09 55.45 806 83
Experimental variation of severity of punishment −1.12 −1.16 34.45 140 18
Actual variation of severity of punishment −1.63 −1.01 41.51 137 19
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
end of the table 3.44
It is well known that an omitted variable bias may pose a problem in studies about deterrence
(see section 2.3.1). Depending on the included variables the significance of the estimates may
vary considerably. As table 3.45 makes obvious, the inclusion of certain variables seem to make a
relevant difference (the largest median is 0.04, the smallest −2.37). Naturally, some of the listed
variables are only applicable for certain kinds of studies (e.g., GDP for studies analyzing nations
or states, time trends for studies with a time dimension, etc.). Therefore, the listed categories may
be strongly affected by other influences. Conditional on the usage of covariates, estimates which
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consider the GDP (−2.37, 51.85%), the labor force (−2.09, 52.49%), consumption (−2, 50.26%),
drug usage (−1.94, 48.76%) and spatial fixed effects (−1.82, 48.76%) come along with values
which are more in favor of the deterrence hypothesis. This could be evidence that the wealth of a
nation and its consumption expenditures can be interpreted as proxies for the opportunity costs of
crime. It also seems to be important to control for drug usage and unobserved heterogeneity, if ap-
plicable. By contrast, alcohol consumption (−0.44, 22.49%), social integration (−0.35, 22.73%),
risk propensity and previous convictions (0.04, 17.8%) are accompanied with “bad” values. This
could mean that these variables take over some of the effect of the implemented deterrence mea-
sures. The large difference between previous incarcerations and convictions (the median differs
by 102%, the percentage by 63%) can be interpreted as a warning that such simple correlations
only indicate relationships - neither do they imply cause, nor do they claim completeness. It is
also noteworthy that income, unemployment, race, age, sex and youths are the most commonly
used covariates. They are common variables in most data bases and are placed shortly under the
overall mean.
Table 3.45: Differences by the used covariates
Variable mean median % #e #s
GDP −2.27 −2.37 51.85 89 12
Labor force −2.23 −2.09 52.49 165 22
Consumption −1.99 −2.00 50.26 130 16
Drug usage −2.46 −1.94 48.76 84 11
Fixed effects (spatial) −2.26 −1.82 48.74 651 80
Marital status −2.36 −1.67 46.41 367 50
Previous incarceration −1.10 −1.65 47.79 58 7
Time trend −1.39 −1.63 36.71 351 44
Property value −1.67 −1.61 42.24 123 15
Miles driven −1.22 −1.59 36.85 85 11
Fixed effects (time) −1.78 −1.44 40.16 782 88
Unemployment −1.43 −1.40 40.04 1742 203
Overall mean −1.41 −1.37 40.29 4682 523
Education −1.77 −1.33 37.76 569 72
Youths −1.60 −1.31 40.07 920 112
Other −1.36 −1.31 39.12 4190 482
Income −1.49 −1.28 38.02 1920 220
Sex −1.47 −1.27 40.08 936 124
Race −1.36 −1.17 38.49 1467 173
Age −1.36 −1.07 39.13 1319 159
Morality −1.12 −1.04 27.06 106 14
Random effects −0.69 −1.01 18.87 66 10
Personal characteristics −2.70 −1.00 43.22 193 23
Population (-growth) −1.09 −0.98 33.81 745 92
Poverty, welfare −0.54 −0.91 33.54 416 52
continued on the next page. . .
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. . . last page of table 3.45 continued
Variable mean median % #e #s
Acceptance of norms −0.95 −0.88 33.56 140 23
Income inequality −1.21 −0.84 31.67 522 64
Social class −1.24 −0.80 28.66 52 7
Religion −0.98 −0.77 30.11 112 16
Nationality −0.97 −0.63 25.04 212 26
Urbanity −0.77 −0.59 29.41 533 71
Alcohol (consumption) −0.58 −0.44 22.49 109 16
Social integration −0.51 −0.35 22.73 95 15
Risk propensity −0.26 −0.25 14.22 50 7
Previous convictions 0.17 0.04 17.80 106 14
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. No reference category is used because multiple entries were common.
end of the table 3.45
In contrast to other meta analyses, our focus variables are not always the main variable in the
included studies. Some authors use deterrence measures simply as covariates (e.g., analyzing
unemployment and crime). In fact, there is a significant difference between the (normalized) t-
values from estimates which focus on the deterrent effect and those which do not. The former
have a mean value of −1.47 (median −1.44) while the latter values average to −1.02 (median
−1.01). Moreover, the percentage of significant values, consistent with the deterrence hypothesis,
falls from 42.80 to 35.04 (see table 3.46). However, there are at least two opposite explanations of
this relationship. On the one hand, it could be that models in studies which incorporate deterrence
variables as covariates, are rather inappropriate to measure deterrence (e.g., miss important vari-
ables or error corrections). Another explanation could be a publication bias: studies concentrating
on deterrence are simply biased towards “better” results.
Table 3.46: Differences by the focus on deterrence
Focus mean median % #e #s
Main focus −1.47 −1.44 42.80 5564 575
Overall Mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
Covariate −1.02 −1.01 35.04 966 104
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
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Table 3.47 shows the statistics diversified by the implemented bivariate methods. These are
obviously dominated by the (Pearson) correlations (38.7% of all applicable estimates), which are
significantly closer to zero than all other (−0.68, 32.11%). Most other methods, even the (often
plain and simple) differences of values (−2.08, 54.09%) yield results significantly more in favor
of the deterrence hypothesis. It is obvious that the overall mean for bivariate methods seems
to result mainly from the correlations - all other bivariate methods yield results which, more or
less, strongly agree with the deterrence hypothesis. For the sake of completeness, we have also
recorded whether there is any corrections for simultaneity (not applicable for bivariate methods)
or other error-correction (no observation).
Table 3.47: Differences by the bivariate methods
Method c mean median % #e #s
Kendall’s τ (ordinal) no −1.99 −2.67 57.26 56 7
Bivariate regression no −3.04 −2.66 73.84 32 9
Other no −1.99 −2.45 56.83 166 23
χ2-test no −2.24 −2.39 68.37 97 12
Spearman’s ρ (ordinal) no −1.88 −2.19 66.12 30 4
Differences (mean, percentages, etc.) no −1.67 −2.08 54.09 258 30
ANOVA no −1.59 −1.81 49.76 140 15
Point biserial correlation no −1.59 −1.37 49.82 25 5
Overall mean no −1.37 −1.37 45.13 1594 203
Gamma (ordinal) no −1.13 −1.16 36.42 148 20
Pearson correlation no −0.78 −0.68 32.11 617 95
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. c marks methods which some-
how corrected for simultaneity or other problems. % is the percentage of estimates which are consistent with the
deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the weighted number of all valid
estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are not significant in the ANOVA
at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting or some selected groups. The
underlined entry is the reference category.
The most frequent multivariate method is OLS (48.5%), followed by 2SLS (or more stages)
with 14% and Logit or Probit models (10% of all multivariate methods). Since these methods
are quite general, we recorded whether they have any corrections for simultaneity or implemented
other error-corrections mechanisms. The results are given in table 3.48. We see that the estimates
based on Tobit (−3.05, 66.12% and −1.89, 49.4%) or GLS-estimates (−2.8, 88.46% and −2.54,
63.1%) are significantly “better” than those based on simple OLS (−1.32, 40.26% and −1.46,
37.29%). Using partial correlations, as is the case with correlations in the bivariate case, yield the
“worst” values (−0.1, 12.93%), on par with path analysis (0.22, 19.9%). However, some methods
are restricted to certain disciplines; e.g., path analysis is not used by economists. There is no
obvious tendency whether estimates based on methods with corrections do better correspond to
the deterrence hypothesis or not.
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Table 3.48: Differences by the multivariate methods
Method c mean median % #e #s
Tobit yes −2.55 −3.05 66.12 28 4
VAR no −3.06 −2.95 91.18 14 3
GLS yes −2.67 −2.80 88.46 26 4
GLS no −2.32 −2.54 63.10 83 11
ARIMA no −2.33 −2.42 63.07 67 8
Tobit no −2.02 −1.89 49.40 188 24
Poisson regression no −1.31 −1.76 39.74 19 5
2SLS, 3SLS no −1.40 −1.71 43.94 179 22
Poisson regression yes −1.18 −1.70 40.68 50 6
Logit, Probit yes −2.02 −1.68 23.76 40 5
ARIMA yes −1.49 −1.51 44.05 209 24
2SLS, 3SLS yes −1.40 −1.49 42.69 513 74
OLS yes −1.06 −1.46 37.29 578 85
Overall mean −1.41 −1.37 40.53 4936 549
OLS no −1.33 −1.32 40.26 1816 245
Logit, Probit no −2.02 −1.01 40.62 461 53
VAR yes −2.13 −1.00 41.67 27 4
Other ML yes −1.22 −1.00 34.05 48 7
Other yes −1.05 −0.92 33.16 188 36
Other no −1.25 −0.56 31.36 281 41
Partial correlation no −0.66 −0.10 12.93 42 10
Path analysis no 0.03 0.22 19.90 87 14
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. c marks methods which some-
how corrected for simultaneity or other problems. % is the percentage of estimates which are consistent with the
deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the weighted number of all valid
estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are not significant in the ANOVA
at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting or some selected groups. The
underlined entry is the reference category.
3.6 Multivariate Statistics
[. . . ] when flawless analyses are not obtainable, the best
alternative is to use several different approaches with the hope
that the batch as a whole will give reliable information.
Eide et al. (1994)
We already saw many interesting potential relationships in section 3.5. These bivariate insights
are valuable to get a feeling of the data and to pave the way for the tests of various hypotheses.
However, whether these hypotheses are true or not, cannot be fully tested in such bivariate anal-
yses, because the relevant variables are highly correlated with other variables. As Decker (1976)
points out “the identification and measurement of the variables relevant to any scientific inquiry
represents at once the most basic and primordial task”. Therefore, the identification of relevant
variables will be the primary goal of this section and subsection 4.2.2.
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The quote from Eide et al. (1994) fits this section perfectly. As a multitude of data and method-
ologies are used to study deterrence, we follow the same path in analyzing them. Since there is
no unique and predefined way for such an analysis, we employ several methods and try to find
trustworthy results.
3.6.1 The Variables
I pointed at the moon and some fool looked at my finger.
Zen saying
In principle, we have 306 unique variables at our disposal. After converting the nominal and
ordinal variables into binary variables, we reach a maximum of 1603 variables (see section B.1
for the complete codebook). This conversion is necessary to include any arbitrary set of variables
and to analyze them by various methods at any stage of an analysis. These converted measures
include, beside others, binary variables for all authors, countries and journals which appear in the
meta-data base.
Effectively, we have 6530 usable estimates in our meta-data base (henceforth called valid esti-
mates). Using all variables would imply a ratio of at least 4 : 1 between the number of observations
and variables, which is a considerably bad ratio. Furthermore, the number of variables is a lim-
iting factor for methods which rely on brute force approaches, and the usage of more than 500
variables often prohibits such methods. Variables with almost no variation are also quite useless,
since the explanatory power of a method is based on the variation of the variables; without suf-
ficient variation, the variable’s explanatory power quickly becomes a technical artifact. Last but
not least, presenting variables with only little variation is of doubtful benefit and likely a waste of
space. As already mentioned in subsection 3.2.3, we neglect those variables with less than seven
(study-related) or 15 (estimate-related) observations.
Hence, for calculative and parsimony reasons, we gather all dummies from some selected nom-
inal variables in a “other”-variable of its respective category. The limit is chosen manually and is
usually located at a break in the data (the frequency falling by a large amount). These correspond
to the following variables which are presented in section 3.3 in more detail.
• All authors who contribute at least six studies are incorporated as dummies. All other, with
five or less studies, are gathered in a “other” dummy variable.
• Each country in which an author worked at the time of writing, which is represented at least
six times, is included as a dummy variable. All other (four times or less) are summed in a
single dummy.
• All countries subject to a study, with at least seven occurrences, are included as dummies.
All other (four or less occurrences) are summed in a single dummy.
• All countries in which a study is published are assigned to a unique dummy, if it appears at
least 18 times. All other (four or less occurrences) are gathered in a single dummy.
134 3 Meta Analysis
• All journals which appear at least seven times are included as dummies (all with five or less
occurrences are gathered in a single variable).
These five steps lead to a total reduction to 523 variables. If not stated otherwise, all following
analyses are based on these variables. The ratio between the number of variables and observations
is now 12.5 : 1, which is still not good but at least acceptable. As before, the (normalized) t-values
are used as endogenous variable. When interpreting the coefficients in the following analyses we
have to keep in mind that the reference category of each included dummy may change, depending
on the selected sets of variables.
3.6.2 Factor- and Cluster Analysis
I can prove anything by statistics except the truth.
George Canning
Confronted with many and strongly correlated variables, it is natural and common to try to con-
dense these variables in some fashion. Factor- and cluster analysis are two well known analytical
methods to accomplish this.
Factor Analysis
The main reason to perform a factor (or principal components) analysis is to come up with a much
lower number of variables which still inherit most of the relevant information. In good cases
these new variables can be reasonably interpreted as generalized influencing factors. This is often
a good approach when dealing with a moderate number of variables which are, at least after a
proper rotation, orthogonal to each other.
It is not surprising that a principal component analysis with all variables does not bring forth
reasonable - or at least usable - results. Of 515 factors, 163 have an eigenvalue larger than one
and 11 larger than five (the largest are 26.5, 12.6 and 10.5). Although the factors with the largest
eigenvalues could, after applying different rotation methods, be interpreted in a reasonable way,
they are not usable in the subsequent analysis46. Nevertheless, those entries with meaningful load-
ings always covered much less than a dozen variables and the factors are practically meaningless
in predicting the (normalized) t-values (they did not perform much better than randomly chosen
variables).
Cluster Analysis
Partitioning the data might be useful to condense or to improve the understanding of the variables.
One problem is obviously the heterogeneity of the data structure and, consequently, the choice
46For example, the first factor contained information about survey characteristics, the third dealt with variables related
to experiments, the fourth with reliability-variables, etc.
3.6 Multivariate Statistics 135
of a proper dissimilarity measure. Nonetheless, cluster analysis, regardless of the implemented
method, seems to be unable to detect any relevant clusters.
For example, a single linkage cluster analysis produces one huge cluster containing most of the
observations and many little clusters with only a few. Looking at the top 16 clusters, we get one
containing 98.7% of all observations and 15 cluster with one to 18 observations. Other linkage
algorithms result in similar structures.
So, instead of condensing variables or objects we select variables by their importance.
3.6.3 Ordinary Least Squares
In the literature, too much emphasis is put on statistical
significance, implicitly assuming a statistically significant effect
is economically meaningful in terms of size.
Florax and de Groot (2002)
Although (weighted) ordinary least squares is used in all of the following regression methods,
we call those methods (simple) OLS which do not objectively select “important” variables. When
possible, we use robust clustered standard errors (each study is treated as a cluster). Although the
residuals of all estimates are significantly different from the corresponding normal distribution, a
visual inspection of each plot reveals that the deviations do not seem to be severe. Since we will
compare all implemented methods in section 4.2, we show the results of the OLS regressions of
all variables (table 3.49) and the set of variables which are significant at a 10% level in the first
regression (table 3.50). Variables which cause singularity problems are dropped by the algorithm
(22 out of 515 variables). In all regressions each dummy is to be interpreted in comparison to its
opposite property; e.g., the coefficient of the Author Isaac Ehrlich is to be compared to a study
without the participation of Ehrlich. If both values of a dummy are included in a regression,
they are compared to the missing values. In the following tables we include the variation of each
variable. For non-metric variables it indicates the percentage of entries which differ from the most
frequent entry. This means for dummy variables that the largest possible variation is fifty percent.
This information is important when interpreting some variables which are almost constant (i.e.,
have a very low variation) and influence only very few estimates. For reasons of parsimony, we
display only those variables in table 3.49 which are significant at a 25% level.
Table 3.49: Multivariate analysis - full OLS
Variable var. coef. t p
Study: not explorative 4.0 −0.546 −1.17 0.241
Study: measuring points 97.4 0.001 1.65 0.100
Study: year of first measure 84.4 −0.000 −1.70 0.089
Study: time span in months 63.2 −0.001 −1.44 0.150
Study: size of second population 0.9 0.001 1.18 0.238
continued on the next page. . .
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Variable var. coef. t p
Study: size of first realized sample 58.8 −0.000 −3.13 0.002
Study: size of second realized sample 2.4 −0.001 −3.12 0.002
Study: maximum age in first sample 5.7 −0.019 −1.82 0.069
Study: check for validity 2.1 4.587 1.24 0.214
Study: tests of significance 9.4 −0.604 −1.86 0.063
Study: number of bivariate estimates 32.4 0.013 1.98 0.048
Study: user, tr 48.6 −1.898 −1.95 0.052
Study: publication, journal article 13.7 0.545 1.50 0.135
Study: publication, working paper, report 4.9 −1.002 −1.22 0.224
Study: publication, not a dissertation or master thesis 2.3 −1.929 −2.32 0.021
Study: author, David W. Rasmussen 1.3 −2.134 −1.21 0.226
Study: author, Simon Hakim 1.0 −2.486 −2.11 0.035
Study: author, Raymond Paternoster 2.4 −1.388 −1.58 0.115
Study: author, Isaac Ehrlich 1.0 −1.294 −1.16 0.246
Study: author, Maynard I. Erickson 0.6 1.750 1.69 0.092
Study: author, Jack P. Gibbs 0.9 −1.982 −1.47 0.141
Study: author, Alex R. Piquero 1.3 −2.081 −1.95 0.052
Study: journal, Accident Analysis and Prevention 2.2 −1.634 −1.16 0.248
Study: journal, Studies on Alcohol 1.1 −1.665 −1.25 0.213
Study: author, Germany 3.2 2.641 1.51 0.132
Study: author, Switzerland 1.0 3.645 2.41 0.016
Study: author, Finland 0.8 −4.270 −2.33 0.020
Study: author, Australia 2.0 1.120 1.54 0.125
Study: author, Sweden 0.9 2.474 2.36 0.018
Study: author, other country 3.7 0.942 1.35 0.177
Study: author, criminology 11.3 0.907 1.77 0.077
Study: author, law 3.6 0.710 1.24 0.217
Study: publication, type not applicable 0.4 −3.226 −2.43 0.015
Study: institute, sociology 21.3 −0.723 −1.34 0.179
Study: experiment (laboratory) 4.4 −1.193 −1.21 0.228
Study: experiment (field, institutional initiative) 1.6 −1.746 −2.03 0.043
Study: first population, Canada 4.3 2.516 3.38 0.001
Study: first population, Netherlands 1.3 −1.594 −1.45 0.146
Study: sample base, first population, complete country 36.9 −1.624 −1.68 0.093
Study: sample base, first population, partial country 37.4 −2.006 −2.00 0.046
Study: sample base, second population, complete country 2.4 −2.811 −1.86 0.064
Study: sample base, second population, partial country 2.2 −4.687 −2.29 0.022
Study: sample unit, first population, miscellaneous 7.4 1.250 1.88 0.060
Study: sample unit, second population, individuals 1.7 2.792 1.61 0.108
Study: sample individuals, second population, population 2.6 5.075 2.47 0.014
Study: sample individuals, second population, miscellaneous 1.2 4.603 1.75 0.080
Study: complete sample 9.8 −0.773 −1.58 0.114
Study: PKS is public data base 1.2 2.496 2.30 0.022
Study: miscellaneous public data base 40.1 0.778 2.26 0.024
continued on the next page. . .
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Variable var. coef. t p
Study: UCR is public data base 22.9 0.506 1.32 0.187
Study: no public data base 26.3 0.702 2.17 0.030
Study: no class over-represented 0.9 1.840 1.41 0.158
Study: no disadvantaged group 0.6 −2.242 −2.12 0.035
Study: percentage of convicted > 75% 0.6 2.653 2.13 0.034
Study: main location > 500000 inhabitants 3.5 −1.869 −1.89 0.059
Study: main location < 5000 inhabitants 0.2 −7.691 −4.92 0.000
Study: does not claim to be representative 32.5 −0.301 −1.15 0.250
Study: claims to be representative 19.4 −0.547 −1.77 0.078
Study: does not check representativeness 26.9 0.395 1.71 0.087
Study: closed questions for pretest 21.5 1.374 2.45 0.014
Study: mixed questions for pretest 2.1 2.283 2.46 0.014
Study: Guttman reliability method 0.2 9.035 2.54 0.011
Study: miscellaneous reliability method 0.3 −3.552 −2.00 0.046
Study: correlational reliability method 0.2 −4.002 −2.03 0.043
Study: variables reliable 3.9 2.123 1.18 0.238
Study: validity test of some variables 1.5 −3.717 −1.25 0.213
Study: unknown if variables valid 0.3 −7.100 −1.58 0.114
Estimate: deterrence is focus-variable 14.8 −0.327 −1.18 0.240
Estimate: sub-sample 14.9 0.260 1.26 0.207
Estimate: sub-sample of males 1.4 −1.48 0.139
Estimate: sub-sample of non-urban area 0.8 −1.753 −1.52 0.128
Estimate: exogenous, index mean 0.0 −2.071 −1.53 0.127
Estimate: exogenous, index items miscellaneous 0.2 1.671 1.17 0.242
Estimate: exogenous, index items standardized 0.2 2.550 1.58 0.115
Estimate: study type, death penalty 8.2 3.145 1.19 0.234
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, incarceration per crime 0.9 −1.316 −1.47 0.143
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, convicted per crime 0.6 −1.422 −1.43 0.152
Estimate: exogenous, survey, is no experiment 0.9 2.789 1.88 0.061
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by police 7.1 −1.048 −2.98 0.003
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by justice 4.5 −1.235 −3.35 0.001
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by justice 3.2 −0.436 −1.24 0.217
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of other kind of punishment 0.4 −1.193 −1.39 0.166
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by friends or family 0.2 −1.658 −2.23 0.026
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by friends or family 1.6 −1.634 −3.97 0.000
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by friends or family 1.0 −0.678 −1.49 0.136
Estimate: exogenous, survey, time between offense and clearance 0.1 −1.293 −2.03 0.043
Estimate: exogenous, survey, relates to the present 21.3 2.299 1.39 0.164
Estimate: exogenous, survey, relates to the past 2.7 2.723 1.61 0.107
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, yes 7.2 3.426 1.95 0.052
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, no 5.4 3.397 1.89 0.060
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, relates to the present 13.9 −0.841 −1.47 0.142
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, relates to the past 0.5 −1.758 −1.32 0.188
Estimate: exogenous, relates to one year 42.7 0.663 1.62 0.107
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Variable var. coef. t p
Estimate: exogenous, relates to more than one year 12.1 −0.492 −1.20 0.232
Estimate: exogenous, metric category 36.8 1.959 1.80 0.073
Estimate: exogenous, interval category 9.1 1.746 1.46 0.145
Estimate: exogenous, binary category 18.8 1.923 1.75 0.080
Estimate: exogenous, nominal category 0.3 −3.318 −1.44 0.149
Estimate: exogenous, ordinal category 7.4 2.475 2.16 0.031
Estimate: exogenous, in differences 3.1 1.533 1.89 0.059
Estimate: endogenous, index miscellaneous 0.1 1.792 1.18 0.240
Estimate: endogenous, index additive, weighted 0.1 −1.001 −1.53 0.127
Estimate: endogenous, number of registered suspects 0.6 1.601 1.33 0.183
Estimate: endogenous, number of convicted to prison sentence 0.2 2.476 1.98 0.048
Estimate: endogenous, probability of delinquency of fictitious offense (sur-
veyed is delinquent)
1.2 1.895 1.77 0.077
Estimate: endogenous, recidivism 0.7 2.768 2.28 0.023
Estimate: endogenous, accidents 4.2 1.232 1.49 0.136
Estimate: endogenous, self reported delinquency since age of fourteen 0.6 2.619 2.73 0.007
Estimate: crime category, misdemeanors 9.5 −1.137 −3.04 0.002
Estimate: crime category, formal deviant behavior 2.5 0.735 1.37 0.170
Estimate: crime category, other 1.5 1.042 1.44 0.150
Estimate: offense, assault 10.1 −0.297 −1.24 0.214
Estimate: offense, negligent assault 1.8 0.695 1.74 0.083
Estimate: offense, burglary 12.2 0.251 1.40 0.163
Estimate: offense, larceny (severe) 3.2 −0.591 −1.89 0.059
Estimate: offense, drug possession (hard) 0.5 −2.585 −1.87 0.061
Estimate: offense, driving without a licence 0.0 −0.858 −1.38 0.168
Estimate: offense, drunk driving 12.1 0.638 1.76 0.079
Estimate: offense, fare dodging 0.4 0.592 1.51 0.132
Estimate: offense, fraud 3.9 0.531 1.55 0.121
Estimate: offense, tax evasion 7.3 0.600 1.54 0.124
Estimate: offense, other 7.1 −0.721 −1.86 0.064
Estimate: offense, vehicle theft 8.5 0.267 1.36 0.175
Estimate: offense, environmental crimes, violations of prescriptive limits 2.3 1.606 1.61 0.107
Estimate: property and violent characteristics 48.8 0.627 1.41 0.159
Estimate: endogenous, metric category 19.5 −1.749 −1.60 0.111
Estimate: endogenous, interval category 4.1 −1.532 −1.26 0.208
Estimate: endogenous, ordinal category 4.6 −3.203 −2.85 0.004
Estimate: endogenous, binary category 9.6 −3.269 −2.92 0.004
Estimate: endogenous, not in logs 32.0 1.232 1.73 0.085
Estimate: endogenous, in logs 26.8 1.285 1.74 0.083
Estimate: endogenous, other transformation 7.8 −2.009 −2.18 0.030
Estimate: covariate, age 20.2 −0.491 −2.02 0.044
Estimate: covariate, marital status 5.6 0.701 1.88 0.060
Estimate: covariate, profession 0.4 1.677 1.89 0.060
Estimate: covariate, social class 1.5 −1.489 −1.72 0.086
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Variable var. coef. t p
Estimate: covariate, drug usage 1.3 −1.124 −1.26 0.209
Estimate: covariate, morality 1.6 1.020 2.02 0.044
Estimate: covariate, personal characteristics 3.0 −0.720 −1.54 0.124
Estimate: covariate, random effects 1.0 1.054 1.45 0.147
Estimate: covariate, poverty, welfare 6.4 0.673 2.34 0.020
Estimate: covariate, urbanity 8.2 0.446 1.48 0.138
Estimate: covariate, GDP 1.4 −1.005 −1.53 0.127
Estimate: covariate, population (-growth) 11.5 0.434 1.64 0.102
Estimate: covariate, alcohol (consumption) 1.7 0.623 1.32 0.188
Estimate: covariate, consumption 2.0 −0.717 −1.41 0.159
Estimate: covariate, risk propensity 0.8 1.905 2.63 0.009
Estimate: no correction for simultaneity 19.3 −1.357 −1.98 0.048
Estimate: unweighted model 6.8 −0.477 −1.25 0.211
Estimate: bivariate method, ρ 0.5 −2.774 −1.57 0.117
Estimate: bivariate method, binomial 0.2 2.063 1.26 0.207
Estimate: multivariate method, COX regression 0.3 2.331 1.17 0.242
Estimate: square root of sample size for negative values 79.2 −0.014 −4.44 0.000
Estimate: square root of sample size for positive values 82.5 0.052 6.90 0.000
N = 6530, R2 = 0.478, number of cluster is 663, 22 out of 515 variables are dropped due to singularity problems.
The column var refers to the variation of a variable (i.e., the percentage of valid observations); the maximum
variation for dummy variables is fifty percent. c and t are the coefficients and the corresponding (normalized)
t-values of the included variables. The reference category for dummies is usually the opposite or, in the case of
multiple categories, the missing values.
end of the table 3.49
Since we use the set of variables which are significant at a 10% level as the most simple type of
variable selection in section 4.2, we present those results in table 3.50.
Table 3.50: Multivariate analysis - OLS of 10%-significant variables
Variable var. coef. t p
Study: measuring points 97.4 −0.000 −1.54 0.123
Study: year of first measure 84.4 0.000 1.33 0.184
Study: size of first realized sample 58.8 −0.000 −4.99 0.000
Study: size of second realized sample 2.4 −0.001 −7.21 0.000
Study: maximum age in first sample 5.7 −0.006 −1.14 0.256
Study: tests of significance 9.4 −0.661 −2.77 0.006
Study: number of bivariate estimates 32.4 0.009 1.82 0.070
Study: user, tr 48.6 −0.783 −3.78 0.000
Study: publication, not dissertation or master thesis 2.3 0.163 0.42 0.673
Study: author, Simon Hakim 1.0 −0.534 −0.63 0.527
Study: author, Maynard I. Erickson 0.6 0.451 1.23 0.218
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Variable var. coef. t p
Study: author, Alex R. Piquero 1.3 0.181 0.57 0.566
Study: author, Switzerland 1.0 0.566 1.62 0.106
Study: author, Finland 0.8 −1.732 −4.95 0.000
Study: author, Sweden 0.9 0.950 1.82 0.069
Study: author, criminology 11.3 0.267 1.03 0.304
Study: publication, type not applicable 0.4 −1.971 −2.43 0.015
Study: experiment (field, institutional initiative) 1.6 −0.877 −1.24 0.215
Study: first population, Canada 4.3 0.769 3.62 0.000
Study: sample base, first population, complete country 36.9 −1.694 −1.14 0.255
Study: sample base, first population, partial country 37.4 −1.896 −1.28 0.200
Study: sample base, second population, complete country 2.4 −1.637 −2.71 0.007
Study: sample base, second population, partial country 2.2 −1.306 −1.53 0.127
Study: sample unit, first population, miscellaneous 7.4 0.270 0.80 0.423
Study: sample individuals, second population, population 2.6 2.257 2.89 0.004
Study: sample individuals, second population, miscellaneous 1.2 1.920 2.42 0.016
Study: PKS is public data base 1.2 0.323 0.95 0.341
Study: miscellaneous public data base 40.1 0.433 2.20 0.028
Study: no public data base 26.3 0.316 1.48 0.139
Study: no disadvantaged group 0.6 −0.734 −1.88 0.061
Study: percentage of convicted > 75% 0.6 0.862 2.42 0.016
Study: main location > 500000 inhabitants 3.5 −1.583 −2.01 0.045
Study: main location < 5000 inhabitants 0.2 −2.453 −4.21 0.000
Study: claims to be representative 19.4 −0.140 −0.79 0.430
Study: does not check representativeness 26.9 0.478 3.01 0.003
Study: closed questions for pretest 21.5 1.100 4.15 0.000
Study: mixed questions for pretest 2.1 1.666 4.81 0.000
Study: Guttman reliability method 0.2 1.097 2.66 0.008
Study: miscellaneous reliability method 0.3 −2.030 −1.35 0.176
Study: correlational reliability method 0.2 −1.476 −4.96 0.000
Estimate: exogenous, survey, is no experiment 0.9 1.763 2.94 0.003
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by police 7.1 −0.675 −3.26 0.001
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by justice 4.5 −0.654 −3.10 0.002
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by friends or family 0.2 −1.330 −2.52 0.012
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by friends or family 1.6 −1.291 −4.52 0.000
Estimate: exogenous, survey, time between offense and clearance 0.1 −1.467 −2.88 0.004
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, yes 7.2 −0.688 −1.95 0.051
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, no 5.4 0.282 0.72 0.469
Estimate: exogenous, metric category 36.8 0.592 2.50 0.013
Estimate: exogenous, binary category 18.8 0.367 1.41 0.160
Estimate: exogenous, ordinal category 7.4 0.119 0.45 0.652
Estimate: exogenous, in differences 3.1 1.408 2.63 0.009
Estimate: endogenous, number of convicted to prison sentence 0.2 1.348 2.20 0.028
Estimate: endogenous, probability of delinquency of fictitious offense (sur-
veyed is delinquent)
1.2 0.021 0.04 0.965
continued on the next page. . .
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Variable var. coef. t p
Estimate: endogenous, recidivism 0.7 1.730 3.63 0.000
Estimate: endogenous, self reported delinquency since age of fourteen 0.6 0.692 1.50 0.135
Estimate: crime category, misdemeanors 9.5 −0.111 −0.46 0.642
Estimate: offense, negligent assault 1.8 0.702 1.75 0.080
Estimate: offense, larceny (severe) 3.2 0.002 0.01 0.995
Estimate: offense, drug possession (hard) 0.5 −1.956 −1.75 0.080
Estimate: offense, drunk driving 12.1 −0.144 −0.66 0.507
Estimate: offense, other 7.1 −0.191 −0.74 0.461
Estimate: endogenous, ordinal category 4.6 −0.565 −1.99 0.047
Estimate: endogenous, binary category 9.6 −0.681 −2.60 0.009
Estimate: endogenous, not in logs 32.0 0.164 0.51 0.611
Estimate: endogenous, in logs 26.8 −0.516 −1.40 0.163
Estimate: endogenous, other transformation 7.8 −0.904 −1.57 0.118
Estimate: covariate, age 20.2 −0.067 −0.34 0.735
Estimate: covariate, marital status 5.6 −0.028 −0.10 0.920
Estimate: covariate, profession 0.4 0.090 0.15 0.882
Estimate: covariate, social class 1.5 −0.620 −0.67 0.505
Estimate: covariate, morality 1.6 0.019 0.07 0.940
Estimate: covariate, poverty, welfare 6.4 1.124 3.50 0.000
Estimate: covariate, risk propensity 0.8 0.664 1.79 0.073
Estimate: no correction for simultaneity 19.3 −0.539 −2.36 0.019
Estimate: square root of sample size for negative values 79.2 −0.013 −3.58 0.000
Estimate: square root of sample size for positive values 82.5 0.054 6.85 0.000
N = 6530, R2 = 0.304, number of cluster is 663, all variables from table 3.49 which were significant at a 10%
level are selected. The column var refers to the variation of a variable (i.e., the percentage of valid observations);
the maximum variation for dummy variables is fifty percent. c and t are the coefficients and the corresponding
(normalized) t-values of the included variables. The reference category for dummies is usually the opposite
property or, in the case of multiple categories, the missing values.
end of the table 3.50
While most significant variables remain unchanged in terms of size and significance when pro-
ceeding from the large set to the smaller set, some variables change. Being not a dissertation or
master thesis (which applies to almost all studies) changes from being significant and negative to
positive insignificance. The indicator for Alex R. Piquero reverses its sign while the signs of all
other authors remain unchanged. This could be explainable when studies from that author have
some special properties which are not taken into account in the second regression. Severe larceny
switches from negative significance to positive insignificance, while drunk driving does exactly
the opposite, as well as the dummy indicating the logarithm of the endogenous variable. Finally,
the impact of most covariates is largely reduced in significance.
All in all, important factors correlated with support of the deterrence hypothesis are the eco-
nomic background in general (represented by the user tr who was responsible for all economic
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studies), Finnish studies, very large or small locations, studies which check the reliability of vari-
ables with correlations, use the probability and severity of punishment (and the celerity) by offi-
cials or friends and family in surveys, as well as estimates which are not corrected for simultaneity.
The opposite effect can be found when Canadian data is studied, when “other” public data bases
are used, when the studied individuals have almost all been convicted before, when authors do not
check representativeness, when closed or mixed questions are used in a pretest, when the exoge-
nous variables is metric or measured in differences, when the deterrence variable relates to prison
sentences or recidivism, and, finally, covariates relating to poverty and welfare are implemented.
Last but not least, the technical influence of the sample size and the size of the studied population
(which strongly correlates with the sample size) have to be mentioned.
When the results are compared with the bivariate analysis in section 3.5, noteworthy changes
are: German authors, when controlling for other effects, are now correlated with less support of
the deterrence theory, while studies from Alex R. Piquero are now associated with more support
in the larger set (table 3.49). The impact of many variables, which measure deterrence in surveys
and appeared to be associated with less support in section 3.5 is now reversed. The coefficients of
the covariates age, marital status and the social class switch their signs. Curiously, the correlation
between the studied offenses and the resulting (normalized) t-values are rather incompatible with
those from table 3.43.
3.6.4 Extreme Bounds Analysis
It would appear that we have reached the limits of what is
possible to achieve with computer technology, although one
should be careful with such statements, as they tend to sound
pretty silly in 5 years.
John von Neumann, 1949
The principle of EBA is to regress all possible combination of k (out of N) exogenous vari-
ables on the variable to be explained, and to track the distribution of the associated t-values, refer
also toe Leamer (1983, 1985) or Levine and Renelt (1992). After that, conclusions are derived
from analyzing the distribution of these t-values. In every regression we include an identical set
of five variables which we previously classified to belong to an appropriate model: the year of
publication, if it is published in a journal, whether the user tr recorded the study and, for reasons
explained in section 3.4, the square root of the sample size for negative and positive t-values. For
each regression we record the coefficient, the t-value, the R2 and the number of included observa-
tions. Inspired by Smith and Huang (1995), and in accordance to our previous analysis, we use
clustered standard deviations in all regressions.
After doing the calculations the main task is to identify the most important and reliable vari-
ables. To do this, we use three kinds of EBA-test criteria (a variation of those found in Florax and
de Groot (2002)) which are based on the statistical distribution of the tracked t-values:
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• A Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Test (A): a variable is considered important, if
the 1% and 99% quantiles share the same sign.
• A strong sign test (B): the influence of a variable is considered important, if all of its t-values
are of the same sign.
• An extreme CDF-Test (C): a variable is considered important, if the 99% confidence inter-
vals around the minimum and maximum of a variable do not include zero.
• To compare EBA with other methods which select only a few variables (about 50 variables),
we add an absurd test (D), which includes a variable only if a (1− 7.342 · 10−51)% confi-
dence interval around the mean does not include zero.
Since every variable is included in at least 128777 regressions47, there are still several variables
which pass test D easily. There is no specific ordering of the tests except that any variable which
passes test B also passed test A. Even a variable which passes the most restrictive test D may not
pass test C if the distribution of the variable’s t-values has rather long tails. However, we should
not be too impressed by the results, reminding the advice given by Lovell (1983): “it is ironic that
the data mining procedure that is most likely to produce regression results that appear impressive
in terms of the customary criteria is also likely to be the most misleading in terms of what it asserts
about the underlying process generating the data under study.”
However, we do not use EBA to find any underlying model structure but to find variables which
seem to have a stable influence in regard to the results a study provides. For reasons of robustness,
we may not want to include variables with very asymmetrical tails, which might indicate an un-
stable distribution. Therefore, by calculating two stability coefficients, we exclude those variables
X , which do not satisfy either
(X99%−X)/(X−X1%) ∈ [0.75,1.25] or (X/X50%) ∈ [0.99,1.01],
whereas Xy% is the y%-quantile of the distribution of variable X.
Although EBA is often used in economics (e.g., Levine and Renelt (1992); Sala-I-Martin (1997)
or Bartley et al. (1998)) and also in deterrence studies (e.g., McManus (1985) or McAleer and
Veall (1989)), it has several disadvantages. First, computing the statistics of all
(N
k
)
combinations
is, in practice, computationally impossible for even small k if N is large. Our own implementation
in STATA (Statacorp LP, 2005) requires one gigabyte of data per 3.6 million regressions and has
a runtime of O(Nk). Therefore, the largest k possible is three, resulting in
(515−5
3
)
= 21978620
regressions generating about 6GB of data, requiring about one week of calculation on a 4.2GHz
Athlon X2 using only one core (k = 4 would result in 2785 million regressions, taking 127x more
time to run and would generate about 1TB of data; it is unlikely that an optimized version of the al-
gorithm would make this feasible). Second, the vote-counting problem (Hedges and Olkin, 1985)
47This is the number of observations on which the interpretation of each variable is based.
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might increase the difficulty of interpreting the distributions, because errors of the second type
increase with the number of observations (in this case combinations). Third, it is an unresolved
problem whether the calculated t-values should be weighted, e.g., with the ML of the respective
model (Sala-I-Martin, 1997). Weighting can improve the quality of the conclusions (minimizing
the influence of obviously improper models) or dampen them (since all models, whether they have
a high ML or not, will most likely suffer severely from omitted variable bias).
Results from EBA could be further analyzed by applying a Response Surface Analysis (RSA),
as sketched by Florax and de Groot (2002). However, this is not done here due to computational
constraints (in combination with an EBA, the algorithm has a runtime of O(Nk+1)). Instead, we
apply a simple check for tail characteristics using the stability coefficients described above.
While interpreting the results, displayed in table 3.51, we have to keep in mind that all vari-
ables are accompanied by seven other variables of which five appear in every regression. Thus,
the linear effects of the year of publication, the journal as media of publication, the overall in-
fluence of the user tr (i.e., the study was recorded in Darmstadt) and the number of observations
are already taken care of. The reported statistics refer to the t-values across the regressions of all
three-dimensional (unordered) subsets of the remaining variables. Negative values indicate that
a variable enhances the compliance with the deterrence hypothesis (i.e., the null hypothesis is
discarded with larger confidence) as it increases (e.g., when the dummy variable is one). Positive
values indicate the reverse, while values near zero imply that a variable is not a significant determi-
nant in a study about general deterrence. We have to keep in mind that a variable, which is almost
never significant (e.g., most of its absolute t-values are below 1.96), but is negative (or positive)
in all cases, still indicates that it may have a strong influence on the (normalized) t-values. For
reasons of parsimony, we only display those variables which pass at least two tests (244 variables
are not shown).
Table 3.51: Multivariate analysis - extreme bounds analysis
Variable var A B C D mean sd min 1% 50% 99% max
Study: publication, number 83.3 1 1 0 0 1.70 0.17 0.22 1.10 1.72 2.18 3.07
Study: publication, year 100.0 1 1 0 0 −1.46 0.14 −2.49 −1.87 −1.46 −1.07 −0.31
Study: measuring points 97.4 1 1 1 0 −1.50 0.13 −2.36 −1.88 −1.50 −1.06 −0.44
Study: size of first realized sample 58.8 1 1 1 1 −4.10 0.06 −4.64 −4.31 −4.10 −3.91 −3.63
Study: rate of return of second sample 0.9 1 1 1 1 −1.61 0.08 −2.36 −1.93 −1.61 −1.31 −0.45
Study: error and plausibility checks 31.4 1 1 1 0 −0.80 0.11 −1.46 −1.13 −0.78 −0.56 −0.30
Study: tests of significance 9.4 1 1 1 1 −2.21 0.13 −3.58 −2.55 −2.21 −1.87 −1.54
Study: number of bivariate estimates 32.4 1 1 1 0 1.86 0.14 0.83 1.40 1.85 2.34 2.90
Study: user, mw 1.4 1 1 1 1 1.28 0.07 0.92 1.10 1.27 1.55 1.83
Study: publication, miscellaneous type 3.3 1 1 1 0 0.78 0.07 0.30 0.58 0.78 0.95 1.15
Study: publication, book 1.5 1 1 1 0 −0.52 0.06 −0.87 −0.68 −0.52 −0.35 −0.17
Study: author, Steven D. Levitt 1.7 1 1 1 1 1.63 0.09 0.95 1.41 1.62 1.99 2.52
Study: author, Simon Hakim 1.0 1 1 1 1 −1.35 0.07 −2.26 −1.52 −1.35 −1.17 −0.91
continued on the next page. . .
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Variable var A B C D mean sd min 1% 50% 99% max
Study: author, Daniel S. Nagin 1.3 1 1 1 1 1.30 0.08 0.52 1.01 1.29 1.55 1.80
Study: author, Raymond Paternoster 2.4 1 1 0 0 −1.31 0.17 −2.50 −1.76 −1.33 −0.80 −0.09
Study: author, Isaac Ehrlich 1.0 1 1 1 1 −3.73 0.21 −5.43 −4.19 −3.74 −2.85 −1.80
Study: author, Harold G. Grasmick 1.6 1 1 1 0 −2.15 0.17 −4.94 −2.52 −2.16 −1.80 −1.45
Study: author, Laurence H. Ross 1.0 1 1 0 0 −0.79 0.06 −1.34 −0.94 −0.80 −0.59 −0.05
Study: journal, Economic Inquiry 1.4 1 1 1 1 −1.23 0.04 −2.02 −1.38 −1.23 −1.10 −0.68
Study: journal, Criminal Justice 2.2 1 1 1 1 2.53 0.12 1.25 2.23 2.53 2.88 3.15
Study: journal, Law and Economics 2.8 1 1 1 1 −1.58 0.08 −2.13 −1.79 −1.57 −1.35 −0.86
Study: journal, American Economic Review 2.0 1 1 0 0 −1.66 0.15 −3.09 −2.19 −1.66 −1.25 −0.35
Study: journal, Social Forces 2.2 1 1 1 0 −2.39 0.18 −3.75 −2.91 −2.39 −1.78 −0.80
Study: journal, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 1.7 1 1 1 1 0.96 0.06 0.43 0.74 0.96 1.10 1.52
Study: journal, Review of Economics and Statistics 1.6 1 1 1 1 −1.12 0.06 −1.45 −1.27 −1.13 −0.92 −0.53
Study: journal, Crime and Delinquency 1.1 1 1 0 0 2.01 0.17 0.37 1.52 2.01 2.65 3.80
Study: journal, Quantitative Criminology 1.4 1 1 0 1 0.89 0.06 0.14 0.71 0.90 1.01 1.24
Study: journal, Southern Economic Journal 1.3 1 1 0 0 1.57 0.14 0.29 1.21 1.58 1.98 2.91
Study: journal, Social Science Quarterly 2.2 1 1 1 0 −2.22 0.16 −3.29 −2.65 −2.21 −1.74 −0.49
Study: journal, Legal Studies 2.0 1 1 1 1 −1.24 0.08 −1.82 −1.51 −1.24 −0.98 −0.66
Study: publication, USA 21.9 1 1 1 1 −1.79 0.11 −2.49 −2.12 −1.79 −1.47 −0.70
Study: publication, Netherlands 2.6 1 1 1 1 2.55 0.09 1.73 2.34 2.54 2.85 3.42
Study: author, Canada 5.2 1 1 0 1 3.09 0.20 0.47 2.41 3.11 3.42 3.82
Study: author, Switzerland 1.0 1 1 1 1 3.04 0.16 2.25 2.69 3.01 3.70 4.53
Study: author, Sweden 0.9 1 1 1 1 2.48 0.11 1.58 2.17 2.49 2.78 3.29
Study: author, psychology 4.2 1 1 1 1 −3.31 0.16 −4.24 −3.59 −3.34 −2.61 −1.66
Study: publication, economics 36.0 1 1 1 1 −1.80 0.11 −2.47 −2.07 −1.80 −1.37 −0.64
Study: publication, criminology 20.4 1 1 1 1 3.92 0.12 2.93 3.51 3.92 4.21 4.61
Study: institute, law 3.9 1 1 1 0 −1.04 0.08 −1.68 −1.24 −1.04 −0.78 −0.38
Study: institute, miscellaneous 14.9 1 1 1 1 3.25 0.13 1.94 2.86 3.24 3.65 4.12
Study: cross section 23.2 1 1 1 0 1.61 0.16 0.68 1.21 1.62 2.36 3.14
Study: experiment (field, institutional initiative) 1.6 1 1 1 1 −1.65 0.09 −2.06 −1.83 −1.66 −1.19 −0.80
Study: first population, United Kingdom 5.0 1 1 1 1 −1.29 0.07 −1.93 −1.57 −1.29 −1.13 −0.93
Study: first population, Canada 4.3 1 1 1 1 3.87 0.21 1.35 2.91 3.90 4.28 5.10
Study: first population, Finland 0.9 1 1 0 0 −4.97 0.61 −12.25 −6.31 −4.93 −3.72 −0.54
Study: first population, Australia 1.7 1 1 0 0 −1.06 0.12 −2.67 −1.56 −1.05 −0.75 −0.05
Study: first population, other country 6.2 1 1 0 0 0.79 0.08 0.22 0.57 0.78 1.03 1.90
Study: sample base, second population, complete country 2.4 1 1 0 1 −2.05 0.13 −2.88 −2.29 −2.07 −1.43 −0.30
Study: sample unit, first population, states 21.9 1 1 1 1 2.80 0.13 2.10 2.43 2.81 3.22 3.62
Study: sample individuals, second population, students 0.5 1 1 1 0 −3.41 0.25 −7.68 −3.99 −3.44 −2.42 −1.16
Study: sample of extreme groups 0.5 1 1 0 0 1.37 0.16 0.14 0.97 1.36 1.96 3.72
Study: complete sample 9.8 1 1 1 1 −1.21 0.06 −1.63 −1.37 −1.21 −1.06 −0.85
Study: miscellaneous public data base 40.1 1 1 1 0 1.26 0.13 0.37 0.83 1.28 1.62 2.55
Study: income above average 0.6 1 1 0 0 −0.80 0.09 −1.94 −1.13 −0.80 −0.57 −0.16
Study: upper class over-represented 0.6 1 1 0 0 −0.80 0.09 −1.94 −1.13 −0.80 −0.57 −0.16
Study: main location > 500000 inhabitants 3.5 1 1 1 1 −1.32 0.05 −1.72 −1.45 −1.32 −1.18 −0.99
Study: main location 100000-500000 inhabitants 1.4 1 1 0 0 0.33 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.32 0.49 0.86
continued on the next page. . .
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Variable var A B C D mean sd min 1% 50% 99% max
Study: mixed location 0.5 1 1 0 0 0.55 0.06 0.03 0.38 0.55 0.72 1.14
Study: does not check representativeness 26.9 1 1 1 1 2.46 0.12 1.73 2.15 2.44 2.83 3.32
Study: conditions for significance check fulfilled 49.2 1 1 0 0 0.80 0.09 0.09 0.54 0.80 1.06 1.46
Estimate: number of used covariates 74.1 1 1 0 0 1.03 0.10 0.21 0.68 1.04 1.29 1.67
Estimate: deterrence is focus-variable 14.8 1 1 1 1 −1.38 0.08 −1.99 −1.63 −1.39 −1.16 −0.63
Estimate: deterrence is a covariates 14.8 1 1 1 1 1.38 0.08 0.63 1.16 1.39 1.63 1.99
Estimate: sub-sample of males 1.4 1 1 1 0 1.74 0.12 0.94 1.39 1.75 2.10 2.60
Estimate: sub-sample of youths 1.3 1 1 1 1 −1.03 0.04 −1.31 −1.12 −1.03 −0.94 −0.37
Estimate: sub-sample of urban area 0.2 1 1 1 0 1.40 0.13 0.37 0.99 1.40 1.81 2.73
Estimate: sub-sample with high detection probability 0.3 1 1 1 1 −2.10 0.11 −3.01 −2.48 −2.10 −1.73 −1.34
Estimate: exogenous, index multiplicative 1.9 1 1 1 1 1.09 0.06 0.20 0.93 1.08 1.28 1.52
Estimate: exogenous, index miscellaneous 0.8 1 1 0 0 1.41 0.16 0.03 0.92 1.42 2.09 2.96
Estimate: exogenous, index items unprocessed 2.8 1 1 1 1 1.20 0.07 0.38 1.00 1.19 1.45 1.85
Estimate: study type, death penalty 8.2 1 1 1 1 3.23 0.15 2.16 2.77 3.25 3.60 5.31
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, arrest rate 9.5 1 1 1 1 −3.02 0.13 −3.94 −3.43 −3.00 −2.68 −2.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, conviction rate 3.9 1 1 1 1 −1.56 0.06 −1.90 −1.72 −1.55 −1.42 −1.10
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, incarceration rate 0.6 1 1 0 0 0.67 0.08 0.08 0.46 0.68 0.93 1.37
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, mean sentence length (sentenced) 2.0 1 1 1 0 1.83 0.15 0.91 1.48 1.84 2.59 3.27
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, mean sentence length (served) 1.7 1 1 0 0 1.65 0.18 0.04 1.08 1.67 2.13 2.87
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police expenditures 4.0 1 1 1 1 1.82 0.08 1.30 1.61 1.82 2.10 2.76
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police strength 7.9 1 1 1 1 3.09 0.08 2.62 2.88 3.09 3.33 3.89
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, other 8.5 1 1 1 0 0.62 0.07 0.20 0.43 0.63 0.80 1.50
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, probability dummy (regime shift) 3.5 1 1 1 0 −2.72 0.23 −5.05 −3.28 −2.73 −2.01 −0.70
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, severity dummy (regime shift) 3.6 1 1 1 1 −1.55 0.08 −2.28 −1.78 −1.55 −1.30 −1.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, incarceration per crime 0.9 1 1 1 1 −2.06 0.12 −3.32 −2.46 −2.05 −1.62 −1.08
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, convicted per crime 0.6 1 1 1 1 −2.40 0.10 −3.51 −2.69 −2.39 −2.16 −1.39
Estimate: exogenous, survey, type of punishment 0.3 1 1 1 0 1.41 0.11 0.58 1.13 1.40 1.79 2.39
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of other kind of punishment 0.4 1 1 0 0 2.32 0.24 0.34 1.50 2.33 3.06 4.26
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by friends or family 0.2 1 1 1 1 −2.74 0.18 −4.07 −3.23 −2.76 −2.12 −1.45
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by friends or family 1.6 1 1 1 1 −3.44 0.20 −4.71 −4.00 −3.46 −2.78 −2.05
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by friends or family 1.0 1 1 0 0 1.53 0.19 0.44 0.99 1.52 2.13 2.96
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by others 0.4 1 1 1 1 1.43 0.05 0.92 1.26 1.42 1.63 1.88
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by others 0.9 1 1 1 0 1.37 0.15 0.52 0.95 1.35 1.87 2.67
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by others 0.4 1 1 1 1 1.30 0.04 0.86 1.18 1.29 1.44 1.62
Estimate: exogenous, survey, time between offense and clearance 0.1 1 1 1 0 −1.09 0.09 −1.86 −1.43 −1.08 −0.87 −0.61
Estimate: exogenous, in differences 3.1 1 1 1 1 2.33 0.13 1.36 2.03 2.34 2.80 4.14
Estimate: endogenous, number of convicted 0.3 1 1 0 0 1.61 0.17 0.20 1.09 1.63 2.09 5.04
Estimate: endogenous, probability of delinquency of fictitious offense (sur-
veyed is delinquent)
1.2 1 1 0 0 1.60 0.20 0.26 1.01 1.59 2.15 3.09
Estimate: endogenous and exogenous relate not to the same offense 6.3 1 1 1 1 1.96 0.12 1.34 1.66 1.96 2.35 4.20
Estimate: crime category, other 1.5 1 1 1 0 2.13 0.17 0.55 1.72 2.12 2.84 3.73
Estimate: offense, manslaughter 1.2 1 1 0 0 0.72 0.10 0.05 0.42 0.72 1.14 1.87
Estimate: offense, negligent assault 1.8 1 1 0 0 0.80 0.10 0.25 0.55 0.80 1.14 1.86
Estimate: offense, burglary 12.2 1 1 1 0 1.36 0.09 0.62 1.05 1.36 1.62 1.95
continued on the next page. . .
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Variable var A B C D mean sd min 1% 50% 99% max
Estimate: offense, drug possession (soft) 0.7 1 1 1 0 1.38 0.11 0.59 1.12 1.37 1.82 2.51
Estimate: offense, drug possession (hard) 0.5 1 1 1 1 −1.26 0.03 −1.85 −1.40 −1.26 −1.21 −0.98
Estimate: offense, sexual assault 0.5 1 1 1 0 1.40 0.10 0.53 1.11 1.41 1.72 2.44
Estimate: offense, embezzlement 0.1 1 1 1 1 −1.62 0.09 −3.01 −1.96 −1.62 −1.37 −1.02
Estimate: offense, other crimes 8.1 1 1 0 0 1.10 0.10 0.09 0.85 1.11 1.41 1.80
Estimate: offense, crime rate (general) 6.2 1 1 1 0 1.15 0.09 0.54 0.88 1.17 1.36 1.67
Estimate: offense, vehicle theft 8.5 1 1 1 0 1.32 0.09 0.59 1.04 1.32 1.56 1.86
Estimate: offense, environmental crimes, Violations of prescriptive limits 2.3 1 1 1 1 1.47 0.07 0.72 1.25 1.47 1.71 2.10
Estimate: violent characteristics 15.1 1 1 1 0 −1.40 0.10 −2.36 −1.66 −1.40 −1.13 −0.38
Estimate: endogenous, metric category 20.0 1 1 0 0 2.27 0.19 0.07 1.68 2.28 2.76 3.29
Estimate: endogenous, interval category 4.1 1 1 0 0 1.19 0.17 0.25 0.75 1.18 1.75 2.85
Estimate: endogenous, binary category 9.6 1 1 1 1 −2.15 0.11 −2.71 −2.40 −2.16 −1.82 −0.62
Estimate: endogenous, other transformation 7.8 1 1 1 1 −1.20 0.06 −1.76 −1.42 −1.20 −1.08 −0.38
Estimate: endogenous and exogenous relate to the same time 28.0 1 1 0 0 −0.98 0.12 −1.97 −1.29 −0.99 −0.62 −0.05
Estimate: endogenous occurs before exogenous (lagged endogenous) 1.3 1 1 1 1 2.05 0.07 1.25 1.86 2.05 2.27 2.55
Estimate: covariate, sex 14.3 1 1 0 0 −0.57 0.09 −1.29 −0.87 −0.57 −0.32 −0.04
Estimate: covariate, nationality 3.3 1 1 1 1 2.73 0.12 1.94 2.41 2.74 3.09 3.80
Estimate: covariate, profession 0.4 1 1 0 0 0.83 0.09 0.11 0.51 0.84 1.06 1.77
Estimate: covariate, social integration 1.5 1 1 1 0 2.05 0.17 0.64 1.52 2.04 2.59 3.28
Estimate: covariate, religion 1.7 1 1 1 0 1.31 0.12 0.39 0.96 1.31 1.66 2.23
Estimate: covariate, drug usage 1.3 1 1 1 1 −0.88 0.06 −1.30 −1.12 −0.88 −0.75 −0.59
Estimate: covariate, previous convictions 1.6 1 1 1 1 2.93 0.18 1.65 2.32 2.93 3.50 4.18
Estimate: covariate, personal characteristics 3.0 1 1 1 1 −1.51 0.05 −1.90 −1.66 −1.51 −1.33 −1.01
Estimate: covariate, fixed effects (spatial) 10.0 1 1 1 1 −1.74 0.09 −2.71 −2.12 −1.73 −1.54 −1.29
Estimate: covariate, random effects 1.0 1 1 1 1 2.48 0.11 1.30 2.07 2.50 2.77 3.29
Estimate: covariate, other 35.8 1 1 1 0 2.08 0.17 0.88 1.53 2.11 2.58 3.09
Estimate: covariate, time trend 5.4 1 1 0 0 1.60 0.15 0.30 1.16 1.62 1.97 2.77
Estimate: covariate, poverty, welfare 6.4 1 1 1 1 3.25 0.10 2.37 2.94 3.26 3.51 3.95
Estimate: covariate, urbanity 8.2 1 1 1 0 1.92 0.15 1.15 1.60 1.92 2.57 3.99
Estimate: covariate, GDP 1.4 1 1 1 0 −1.04 0.07 −1.72 −1.24 −1.03 −0.85 −0.47
Estimate: covariate, population (-growth) 11.5 1 1 1 0 1.43 0.11 0.57 1.10 1.44 1.76 2.21
Estimate: covariate, alcohol (consumption) 1.7 1 1 1 1 2.41 0.12 1.47 2.06 2.42 2.69 3.39
Estimate: covariate, labor force 2.5 1 1 1 1 −1.65 0.10 −2.41 −1.94 −1.64 −1.38 −0.77
Estimate: covariate, risk propensity 0.8 1 1 1 0 4.67 0.33 2.51 3.53 4.68 5.85 7.37
Estimate: no correction for simultaneity 19.3 1 1 1 1 −2.09 0.12 −3.08 −2.44 −2.11 −1.76 −0.58
Estimate: correction for simultaneity (with methodology) 9.1 1 1 1 1 2.13 0.12 0.68 1.87 2.14 2.49 3.20
Estimate: weighted model 6.8 1 1 1 1 1.13 0.06 0.56 0.98 1.12 1.32 1.69
Estimate: unweighted model 6.8 1 1 1 1 −1.13 0.06 −1.69 −1.32 −1.12 −0.98 −0.56
Estimate: bivariate method, bivariate regression 0.6 1 1 1 1 −2.70 0.12 −3.26 −2.96 −2.71 −2.25 −1.72
Estimate: bivariate method, correlation 9.5 1 1 1 1 2.43 0.16 1.21 2.00 2.43 2.84 3.82
Estimate: bivariate method, point biserial correlation 0.4 1 1 1 0 −1.33 0.12 −2.80 −1.88 −1.34 −1.04 −0.64
Estimate: bivariate method, ρ 0.5 1 1 1 0 −1.38 0.15 −3.01 −2.05 −1.37 −1.03 −0.43
Estimate: bivariate method, t-test for independent samples 0.5 1 1 1 1 −1.57 0.07 −3.16 −1.77 −1.56 −1.40 −1.24
Estimate: bivariate method, τ 0.9 1 1 1 1 −2.42 0.13 −3.33 −2.79 −2.42 −2.08 −1.29
continued on the next page. . .
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Variable var A B C D mean sd min 1% 50% 99% max
Estimate: multivariate method, OLS 24.2 1 1 1 0 1.83 0.15 0.48 1.35 1.85 2.27 3.01
Estimate: multivariate method, GMM 0.8 1 1 1 1 3.06 0.20 0.79 2.40 3.09 3.61 4.42
Estimate: multivariate method, other ML method 1.1 1 1 1 0 2.77 0.20 0.73 2.11 2.80 3.49 4.34
Estimate: multivariate method, GLS 1.7 1 1 1 1 −3.20 0.14 −3.91 −3.55 −3.21 −2.62 −2.07
Estimate: multivariate method, VAR 0.6 1 1 1 0 −1.05 0.10 −2.19 −1.35 −1.04 −0.74 −0.44
Estimate: test of significance 5.5 1 1 1 0 0.95 0.08 0.37 0.78 0.95 1.15 2.17
Estimate: no test of significance 5.5 1 1 1 0 −0.95 0.08 −2.17 −1.15 −0.95 −0.78 −0.37
Estimate: square root of sample size for negative values 79.2 1 1 1 1 −3.38 0.07 −4.35 −3.67 −3.37 −3.26 −3.04
Estimate: square root of sample size for positive values 82.5 1 1 1 1 6.21 0.07 5.76 6.06 6.20 6.44 6.98
A, B, C and D correspond to the four tests of significance described in subsection 3.6.4. The column var refers to
the variation of a variable (i.e., the percentage of valid observations); the maximum variation for dummy variables
is fifty percent. All other values are properties of the distribution of the t-values in the regressions. For reasons of
parsimony we report only those variables in this table, which pass more than one test; 244 variables which only
pass test A or are not considered stable are not shown (in fact, only 114 out of 515 variables do not pass test A).
The reference category for dummies is usually the opposite property or, in the case of multiple categories, the
missing values.
end of the table 3.51
The results concerning the countries of the authors are, at large, compatible with the bivariate
analysis in section 3.5. Canadian, Australian, Swedish and authors from Switzerland have more
positive t-values, while authors from the U.S., UK and Finland48 have more negative t-values.
The results for the author-variables, which pass at least one of the tests, are also in line with
table 3.36 with the exception of Nagin, who has now a positive effect on the (normalized) t-values
and Marvell who has a negative effect.
Surprisingly, the only disciplines of the authors to pass the tests are psychology and miscella-
neous; the direction of their influences are as expected (table 3.30 seemed to suggest that being
an economist, sociologist or criminologist would also be important). Nevertheless, these effects
are found in the characteristics of the publisher and the institutional background of the authors.
Authors from an economic or law institution present more negative results, while authors with a
criminological or miscellaneous background seem to have the opposite effect. The same applies
to the type of the publisher.
Looking at the specific journals delivers a more diversified picture: while all significant crim-
inological journals have rather positive values, economical, sociological and other journals can
be found on both sides. The number of selected journal shows no obvious tendency towards a
specific discipline.
It is also noteworthy that journals are associated with rather positive (normalized) t-values,
while books and working papers are associated with a negative effect. Assuming that a publication
bias is, if at all, more present for studies published in journals, this would imply that the results are
48In fact, only Matti Vire´n comes from Finland.
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slightly biased towards zero. However, recalling table 3.24 casts some doubts on this reasoning
because analytical evidence indicates a publication bias for books and working papers but not for
journal articles.
Those studies which examine Canadian data, use cross sections, employ a miscellaneous pub-
lic data base, present large numbers of bivariate estimates or study the states of a nation, stand
out and have a positive effect on the (normalized) t-values. The opposite effect is found among
studies which employ complete samples, experiments, data from the United Kingdom, Australia
or Germany, use data from large cities, report checks of significance or checks for plausibility and
errors.
Looking at the implemented covariates, the results of table 3.45 are largely replicated. Con-
trolling for spatial fixed effects, labor force, GDP, drug usage and personal characteristics imply
more negative (normalized) t-values. Only the latter does not comply with the results from the
ANOVA. Smaller (i.e., more positive) effects are found when religion, population, urbanity, social
integration, alcohol consumption, random effects, nationality, previous convictions, poverty and
time trends are controlled for. Again, only the latter does not conform with the ANOVA.
There are only a few studied crimes which have a significant influence on the outcome of an es-
timate. Of those with a negative influence, no one passes more than one test. Malicious mischief,
speeding, severe larceny and drunk driving are compatible with the results from table 3.43 but pass
only the first test, while general drug related crimes have a negative effect (opposite to the results
from the ANOVA). Among the crimes with a positive effect, all are in line with the results from the
ANOVA and the following crimes pass more than one test: burglary, general crime rate, environ-
mental offenses, manslaughter, negligent assault, other crimes and vehicle theft. Environmental
offenses stand out by passing all four tests while the effect is ambiguous in the ANOVA.
The results of the variables which measure deterrence comply with table 3.42. Especially the
arrest and conviction rate and the regime shift dummies have a negative effect and pass three or
four tests. A positive effect is found among the sentence lengths and police related deterrence
variables. Among the implemented methods, the usage of correlations, OLS and 2SLS have a
very prominent positive effect on the (normalized) t-values, while ARIMA- and GLS-methods
imply more negative values. These are more or less in line with table 3.48.
It is also interesting to note that exogenous variables in binary form are negatively associated,
while metric variables and those measuring intervals have a positive (normalized) impact on t-
values. More negative (normalized) t-values are found when simultaneity is not accounted for,
the model is not weighted, deterrence is the focus of a study, a sample of youths is studied, the
exogenous variables are transformed in another form (than log or differences) or a violent crime
is studied. A positive effect is found when the deterrent variable and the endogenous variable
do not relate to the same offense, the number of included covariates increases, simultaneity is
methodologically accounted for, the deterrence variable is measured in differences or the study
is about the death penalty. The most significant variable is the square root of the sample size,
diversified by the sign of the t-values. This relationship indicates the existence of an effect and is
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described in section 3.4.
3.6.5 Stepwise Regressions
If I should throw down a thousand beans at random upon a
table, I could doubtless, by eliminating a sufficient number of
them, leave the rest in almost any geometrical pattern you might
propose to me, and you might then say that that pattern was the
thing prefigured beforehand, and that the other beans were mere
irrelevance and packing material. Our dealings with Nature are
just like this.
William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902
The idea of stepwise regressions is to include (or exclude) variables in a regression as long as
they enhance the regression-model. The degree of improvement can be measured by different
means. Some algorithms use the R2, the Bayesian or Akaike Information Criterion (BIC or AIC),
or other properties to measure the overall model-quality. However, other algorithms do not rely on
overall model properties but resort to attributes of the individual variables (e.g., the significance
of a variable).
We use the sw-algorithm implemented in STATA and the stepAIC-algorithm in R (R Develop-
ment Core Team, 2007). The first is based on the significance of the variables while the latter is
based on the improvement of the model-fit (measured by the AIC). Both algorithms are used in
conjunction with OLS and with the forward and backward strategy. Besides the usage in many
other fields, the principle of stepwise regressions has been applied in empirical deterrence studies
like Allison (1972); Cho (1972); Cloninger (1975); Gross and Hakim (1982); Norstro¨m (1983);
Meera and Jayakumar (1995); Velez et al. (1999); Freeman et al. (2006) and many more.
The sw-Algorithm
The sw-algorithm in- and excludes variables according to their significance in a model. In each
step, variables are either included if they are highly significant or excluded if they are not signif-
icant. Therefore, the choice of these two thresholds p1 and p2 are decisive. Lovell (1983) shows
that in the case of selecting the “best” variables from a large set of possible candidates, it does not
suffice to resort to the standard values of significance. When the pool of variables increases, the
set of those variables which are significant by chance will increase as well. We have more than 500
variables. Even if these are all independent and random, we would expect at least 25 variables
to pass the five percent significance threshold. However, in the search of the most influencing
variables we can circumvent this problem by reducing the threshold-values accordingly.
Lovell (1983) gives a handy formula to adjust those threshold values: αˆ := p · ck , where c is
the number of variables at hand and k is the number of desired significant variables. We have
515 variables out of which 493 can be used simultaneously in a OLS-regression (some have to
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be dropped due to singularity problems). A first regression, using all variables determined 44
variables to be significant at a five percent level. Since k must be arbitrarily chosen, we take
k = 50 for the inclusion- and a less conservative choice of k = 80 for the exclusion threshold
and set c = 493. So, instead of using 0.05 and 0.2 as the in- and exclusion probabilities, we
try to lessen the selection bias by using the adjusted thresholds of p1 = 0.05 50493 ≈ 0.005 and
p2 = 0.2 80493 ≈ 0.03.
Hendrey and Krolzig (2000) show that these adjustment can be avoided when the data mining
algorithm accounts for the selection bias as is the case with their software PcGETS. However, this
accumulation of statistical tools didn’t achieve any better results for a restricted test set of 200
studies49. Therefore, we resort to the well studied stepwise regression methods.
Backward Stepwise Regression
The basic procedure of the stepwise regression algorithms implemented in STATA is rather simple.
Both methods, backward and forward are very similar.
1. start with the full model,
2. exclude the least significant variable if its p-value is above p2,
3. include the most significant excluded variable if its p-value is below p1,
4. exclude the least significant included variable if its p-value is above p2,
5. re-estimate and repeat steps 3 to 4 until neither is possible.
Forward Stepwise Regression
The forward procedure typically finds less variables than the backward procedure but is method-
ologically almost identical:
1. start with the empty model,
2. include the most significant variable if its p-value is below p1,
3. exclude the least significant included variable if its p-value is above p2,
4. include the most significant excluded variable if its p-value is below p1,
5. repeat steps 3 to 4 until neither is possible.
The stepAIC-Algorithm
The applied algorithm is similar to the sw-algorithm. It adds and drops variables but evaluates
the changes in the model-fit (the Aikaike Information Criterion) instead of the significance values.
The algorithm stops as soon as any further improvement is smaller than a certain threshold-value;
see also Venables and Ripley (2002) for more detailed information.
We use the implementation in R with the default settings. Each algorithm is applied to the whole
data set (backward) and to the empty data set (forward). The results of these two algorithms are
given in table 3.52.
49One reason may be that it does fit time series models better than our data set of very heterogenous cross sections.
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Table 3.52: Multivariate analysis - stepwise regressions
sw stepAIC
Variable var 1c 1t 2c 2t 3c 3t 4c 4t
Study: publication, page begin 99.8 0.01 4.0 0.01 3.9
Study: publication, page end 100.0 −0.01 −4.3 −0.01 −4.1
Study: not explorative 4.0 −0.49 −2.6 −0.44 −2.4
Study: measuring points 97.4 0.00 3.1 0.00 3.1
Study: year of first measure 84.4 0.00 −2.9
Study: time span in months 63.2 −0.00 −3.0 −0.00 −2.9
Study: size of first population 24.9 0.00 2.9 0.00 2.3
Study: size of second population 0.9 0.00 4.8 0.00 3.8 0.00 1.6
Study: size of first sample 25.6 0.00 −3.7 0.00 −1.7
Study: size of second sample 1.2 0.00 4.9 0.00 −1.7
Study: size of first realized sample 58.8 0.00 −3.8 0.00 −4.9 0.00 −9.2 0.00 −7.8
Study: size of second realized sample 2.4 −0.00 −14.1 −0.00 −7.6 −0.00 −7.7 0.00 −5.5
Study: rate of return of first sample 13.0 0.00 1.6
Study: rate of return of second sample 0.9 −0.02 −2.3
Study: maximum age in first sample 5.7 −0.02 −4.3 −0.02 −3.5
Study: mean age in first sample 5.0 0.02 3.0 0.02 1.8
Study: check for validity 2.1 −0.43 −1.4
Study: tests of significance 9.4 −0.67 −3.4 −0.59 −2.6 −0.58 −4.5 −0.64 −4.8
Study: number of bivariate estimates 32.4 0.01 3.2 0.01 3.3 0.01 3.0
Study: user, tr 48.6 −1.11 −5.0 −0.53 −3.4 −0.65 −3.8
Study: user, aw 29.3 0.42 3.1 0.45 3.1
Study: user, mw 1.4 0.77 3.5 0.48 2.0
Study: publication, journal article 13.7 0.53 3.0 0.36 1.9
Study: publication, working paper, report 4.9 −0.97 −4.1 −1.11 −4.6
Study: publication, miscellaneous type 3.3 −0.48 −1.7 −0.60 −2.0
Study: publication, not a dissertation or master thesis, etc. 2.3 −1.63 −4.3 −1.53 −3.8
Study: author, Steven D. Levitt 1.7 1.94 6.3 1.75 5.3
Study: author, William C. Bailey 2.7 0.62 2.8
Study: author, David W. Rasmussen 1.3 −1.45 −4.6 −1.85 −5.5
Study: author, Theodore G. Chiricos 1.2 0.64 1.7
Study: author, Dale O. Cloninger 1.5 0.81 2.9
Study: author, Simon Hakim 1.0 −1.36 −4.1 −1.74 −4.9
Study: author, Raymond Paternoster 2.4 −0.76 −2.5 −0.83 −2.7
Study: author, Isaac Ehrlich 1.0 −1.63 −4.1 −1.70 −2.8 −0.71 −2.0 −1.17 −3.2
Study: author, Matti Vire´n 0.8 −1.54 −3.4 −2.54 −5.8
Study: author, Ann Dryden Witte 1.0 0.71 1.8
Study: author, Maynard I. Erickson 0.6 1.06 3.9 1.27 1.7
Study: author, Jack P. Gibbs 0.9 −1.42 −2.4
Study: author, Alex R. Piquero 1.3 −0.69 −2.0 −1.33 −3.6
Study: author, other author 22.5 −0.38 −3.2
Study: journal, Criminal Justice 2.2 0.54 2.0
Study: journal, Criminal Law and Criminology 2.2 −0.41 −1.8
continued on the next page. . .
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sw stepAIC
Variable var 1c 1t 2c 2t 3c 3t 4c 4t
Study: journal, Social Forces 2.2 −0.47 −1.8 −0.77 −2.9
Study: journal, Law and Society Review 2.8 0.55 2.4
Study: journal, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 1.7 0.50 1.9
Study: journal, Public Economics 1.1 1.07 2.4
Study: journal, Social Problems 1.6 0.53 1.7
Study: journal, Accident Analysis and Prevention 2.2 −0.82 −3.1 −0.98 −3.2
Study: journal, Studies on Alcohol 1.1 −0.99 −2.6
Study: journal, Criminology 4.5 0.43 2.5 0.51 2.8
Study: journal, Social Science Quarterly 2.2 −0.84 −4.3 −0.60 −2.5 −0.47 −1.9
Study: journal, Legal Studies 2.0 −0.49 −2.0
Study: publication, United Kingdom 8.3 0.60 4.3 0.69 4.8
Study: publication, Canada 3.6 −0.83 −2.8
Study: publication, Netherlands 2.6 0.61 2.8 0.64 2.9
Study: author, Germany 3.2 2.51 4.5 0.91 2.5
Study: author, USA 21.3 0.27 1.7
Study: author, Switzerland 1.0 1.41 4.6 3.25 5.2 3.35 5.3
Study: author, Finland 0.8 −0.43 −3.1 −0.97 −2.7
Study: author, Netherlands 1.3 1.50 2.6 1.02 3.0 1.56 3.8
Study: author, Australia 2.0 0.68 2.6 1.02 2.9
Study: author, Sweden 0.9 2.02 4.3 2.73 7.1 2.79 5.4
Study: author, other country 3.7 0.73 3.7 0.82 3.4
Study: author, criminology 11.3 0.63 5.1 0.61 4.3
Study: author, psychology 4.2 −0.43 −2.1 −0.58 −2.4
Study: author, law 3.6 0.27 1.5
Study: publication, economics 36.0 −0.58 −5.5 −0.46 −4.3
Study: publication, type not applicable 0.4 −1.40 −3.5 −2.07 −3.6 −2.67 −4.6 −2.97 −4.9
Study: publication, criminology 20.5 1.03 6.4
Study: publication, sociology 19.4 0.70 3.9
Study: publication, miscellaneous 14.1 −0.44 −3.3
Study: publication, psychology 2.8 −1.42 −5.3 −0.82 −2.8
Study: institute, sociology 21.3 −0.19 −1.6
Study: institute, miscellaneous 14.9 0.88 4.2 0.74 3.7 0.94 8.5 0.86 7.2
Study: cross section 23.2 0.48 2.7 0.39 3.8 0.29 2.6
Study: single survey 17.8 −0.51 −2.8 −0.73 −3.1
Study: repeated survey 3.1 0.93 3.6 0.45 1.5
Study: panel survey 5.6 −0.87 −3.2
Study: experiment (laboratory) 4.4 −1.47 −4.4
Study: experiment (field, researcher initiative) 1.6 1.39 4.3
Study: experiment (field, institutional initiative) 1.6 −0.97 −3.4 −1.23 −3.8
Study: experiment (natural) 3.0 0.47 2.3
Study: not experimental 15.9 −0.60 −2.1
Study: quasi experimental 8.8 −0.63 −2.2
Study: first population, Germany 2.7 −1.98 −3.6
continued on the next page. . .
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sw stepAIC
Variable var 1c 1t 2c 2t 3c 3t 4c 4t
Study: first population, United Kingdom 5.0 0.76 3.0
Study: first population, USA 23.3 0.61 2.3 1.00 4.8
Study: first population, Canada 4.3 0.56 2.7 1.39 4.6 2.04 8.3 1.98 7.9
Study: first population, Sweden 1.4 −1.00 −2.2
Study: first population, Finland 0.9 −0.42 −2.6
Study: first population, Switzerland 1.0 0.61 2.8 −1.24 −1.8 −1.40 −2.2
Study: first population, Australia 1.7 −1.10 −3.0
Study: first population, Netherlands 1.3 −1.22 −2.8
Study: first population, other country 6.2 1.31 3.4 1.48 5.7 0.56 3.2
Study: second population, other country 3.3 0.97 2.4
Study: sample base, first population, complete country 36.9 −1.82 −3.4 −1.77 −3.2
Study: sample base, first population, partial country 37.4 −2.16 −4.2 −2.05 −3.8
Study: sample base, second population, complete country 2.4 −3.60 −9.2 −2.99 −5.5 −2.22 −4.0
Study: sample base, second population, partial country 2.2 −3.51 −5.6 −3.95 −5.9 −3.78 −5.4
Study: sample unit, first population, states 21.9 0.45 2.6 0.40 4.2 0.37 3.8
Study: sample unit, first population, miscellaneous 7.4 0.97 6.5 0.92 6.0
Study: sample unit, second population, individuals 1.7 1.78 3.0 2.72 4.3
Study: sample individuals, first population, population 36.2 0.40 3.7 −0.51 −4.0
Study: sample individuals, first population, students 11.7 −0.55 −3.1
Study: sample individuals, first population, pupils 3.0 1.53 6.7 1.00 3.7
Study: sample individuals, second population, population 2.6 4.28 8.2 4.70 7.7 3.68 5.8
Study: sample individuals, second population, miscellaneous 1.2 4.71 6.5 3.70 5.4 3.36 4.4
Study: sample individuals, second population, students 0.5 −3.44 −3.5 1.80 2.9
Study: sample individuals, second population, pupils 0.2 3.44 6.0 1.59 1.4
Study: sample of extreme groups 0.5 1.21 2.2
Study: complete sample 9.8 −0.64 −5.2 −0.73 −5.8
Study: PKS is public data base 1.2 1.07 2.6 3.45 7.0 2.35 4.6
Study: miscellaneous public data base 40.1 0.96 6.9 0.83 5.6
Study: UCR is public data base 22.9 0.63 4.0 0.56 3.4
Study: no public data base 26.3 0.61 4.3 0.66 4.5
Study: income representative 1.1 0.58 1.5
Study: education below average 0.1 −1.69 −1.4
Study: no class overrepresented 0.9 1.62 3.2
Study: no social fringe group 0.6 −0.99 −3.1 −2.13 −3.6 −1.65 −2.7
Study: percentage of convicted > 75% 0.6 1.50 4.1 2.02 3.7 1.31 2.3
Study: percentage of convicted > 51−75% 0.3 −1.28 −2.9 1.13 1.8
Study: main location > 500000 inhabitants 3.5 −1.68 −2.3 −1.84 −9.1 −1.87 −8.9
Study: main location < 5000 inhabitants 0.2 −3.04 −10.2 −2.80 −4.9 −7.38 −7.7 −6.92 −7.0
Study: small cities overrepresented 1.1 1.00 2.6 0.74 1.8
Study: does not claim to be representative 32.5 −0.36 −4.0 −0.26 −2.9
Study: claims to be representative 19.4 −0.57 −4.5 −0.47 −3.5
Study: does not check representativeness 26.9 0.47 3.0 0.45 4.8 0.49 5.0
Study: checks representativeness 2.9 −0.63 −3.1
continued on the next page. . .
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Study: does not report representativeness checks 2.2 −0.80 −3.2 −0.75 −2.5 −0.92 −3.0
Study: reports representativeness checks 0.4 −1.34 −2.4
Study: closed questions for pretest 21.5 1.10 4.2 0.81 4.5 1.20 5.9
Study: mixed questions for pretest 2.1 2.06 5.0 1.43 4.5 1.56 4.7
Study: open questions for pretest 1.4 −1.04 −3.2 −0.76 −2.2
Study: Guttman reliability method 0.2 5.74 4.0 5.82 4.0
Study: miscellaneous reliability method 0.3 −4.42 −4.0 −3.87 −4.2 −4.45 −4.4
Study: correlational reliability method 0.2 −1.77 −10.6 −1.18 −5.5 −2.91 −3.6 −3.52 −4.2
Study: variables reliable 3.9 1.06 4.5 1.22 4.6
Study: validity test of all variables 0.2 3.88 2.9
Study: miscellaneous validity check 0.4 −1.85 −1.6
Study: criteria validity 1.0 1.32 2.7
Study: the variables are not valid 0.2 −1.64 −3.8
Study: conditions for significance check fulfilled 49.2 0.15 1.6
Study: conditions for significance check not fulfilled 3.6 0.52 2.6 0.44 1.9
Study: quality index 100.0 −0.09 −3.7 −0.06 −2.4
Estimate: exogenous, number of categories 35.3 0.00 2.0
Estimate: endogenous, begin of observation (year) 78.5 0.00 2.2
Estimate: endogenous, number of categories 17.3 −0.01 −1.8
Estimate: deterrence is focus-variable 14.8 −0.30 −2.8 −0.35 −3.4
Estimate: complete sample 14.9 −0.20 −1.9 −0.17 −1.7
Estimate: sub-sample of males 1.4 −0.51 −1.7 −0.50 −1.6
Estimate: sub-sample of adults 0.5 −0.66 −1.4
Estimate: sub-sample of youths 1.3 −0.59 −1.8 −0.68 −2.0
Estimate: sub-sample of non-urban area 0.8 −1.02 −3.0 −1.79 −4.2 −1.68 −3.8
Estimate: exogenous, index multiplicative 1.9 1.03 3.1
Estimate: exogenous, index additive 0.6 −1.05 −2.1
Estimate: exogenous, index mean 0.0 −1.15 −3.8 −3.76 −5.4
Estimate: exogenous, index items unprocessed 2.8 1.19 3.1 0.43 1.5 1.21 5.5
Estimate: exogenous, index items miscellaneous 0.2 1.79 2.2
Estimate: exogenous, index items standardized 0.2 0.63 3.4 2.26 2.8
Estimate: study type, crime data 45.3 −1.13 −8.8 −1.46 −4.3
Estimate: study type, survey 24.4 −2.13 −2.9 −3.10 −3.6
Estimate: study type, experiment 12.7 −2.65 −2.8
Estimate: study type, death penalty 8.2 1.20 4.5
Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, existence of death penalty 1.0 1.26 3.6 1.03 3.1 0.65 1.4
Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, execution rate 4.8 −0.52 −1.5
Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, other 1.5 −0.45 −1.6 −0.85 −2.0
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, clearance rate 5.3 0.56 3.3 0.57 3.2
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, arrest rate 9.5 −0.83 −3.4
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, conviction rate 3.9 −0.36 −2.1 −0.39 −2.2
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, parole rate 0.2 −1.09 −4.4
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, incarcerations (absolute or per capita) 0.9 1.61 4.7 1.50 4.3
continued on the next page. . .
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Estimate: exogenous, crime data, incarceration rate 0.6 0.77 2.0 0.67 1.8
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, mean sentence length (sentenced) 2.0 0.89 3.9 1.06 4.6 1.15 5.0
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, mean sentence length (served) 1.7 0.73 2.9 0.77 3.0
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police expenditures 4.0 1.43 3.3 1.54 8.3 1.48 7.8
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police strength 7.9 1.53 4.1 1.44 10.1 1.37 9.6
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, other 8.5 0.69 5.0 0.63 4.5
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, probation rate 0.2 1.08 1.5 1.11 1.6
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, incarceration per crime 0.9 −0.61 −1.8 −0.57 −1.6
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, convicted per crime 0.6 −0.88 −2.2 −0.83 −2.1
Estimate: exogenous, survey, surveyed is delinquent 2.9 0.55 2.5
Estimate: exogenous, survey, is experiment 23.1 0.94 1.6 0.94 1.5
Estimate: exogenous, survey, is no experiment 0.9 2.43 2.7 3.01 4.3 2.66 3.6
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by police 7.1 −0.85 −4.2 −0.65 −4.0 −0.75 −4.5
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by justice 4.5 −0.93 −4.6 −0.79 −4.0 −0.83 −4.3
Estimate: exogenous, survey, prob. of punishment by employment law 0.6 −0.87 −2.9
Estimate: exogenous, survey, prob. of detection by friends or family 0.2 −1.10 −3.1 −2.24 −3.9 −1.51 −2.1 −1.41 −1.9
Estimate: exogenous, survey, prob. of punishment by friends or family 1.6 −0.87 −3.5 −1.52 −5.8 −1.21 −4.4 −1.34 −4.7
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by others 0.9 0.54 1.5
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by others 0.4 1.49 3.0 1.35 2.7
Estimate: exogenous, survey, time between offense and clearance 0.1 −1.49 −2.8 −1.11 −1.4 −1.10 −1.4
Estimate: exogenous, survey, relates to the present 21.3 0.80 2.6 1.44 2.1 2.01 2.5
Estimate: exogenous, survey, relates to the past 2.7 1.08 4.0 1.13 3.5 1.92 2.6 2.60 3.2
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, yes 7.2 3.02 3.4
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, no 5.4 1.01 3.1 2.93 3.3
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, experimental variation of probability
of detection
2.1 −1.72 −3.9 −1.42 −5.4 −1.17 −4.0
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, other 2.2 0.46 1.8 0.44 1.5
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, relates to the present 13.9 −0.79 −3.3
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, relates to the past 0.5 −1.37 −2.2
Estimate: exogenous, relates to one year 42.7 0.39 2.3 0.86 7.4 0.64 4.8
Estimate: exogenous, relates to more than one year 12.1 −0.47 −2.8
Estimate: exogenous, metric category 36.8 1.55 3.4
Estimate: exogenous, interval category 9.1 1.57 3.2
Estimate: exogenous, binary category 18.8 1.56 3.4
Estimate: exogenous, nominal category 0.3 −3.59 −3.1 −2.62 −2.1
Estimate: exogenous, ordinal category 7.4 0.52 3.0 1.90 3.9
Estimate: exogenous, in logs 20.2 −0.21 −1.5 −0.28 −2.0
Estimate: exogenous, in differences 3.1 0.77 3.2 2.01 3.4 1.73 7.0 1.73 7.1
Estimate: exogenous, not in differences 0.2 1.25 1.8
Estimate: exogenous, not other transformation 10.1 −0.59 −3.9 −0.70 −4.3
Estimate: endogenous, index miscellaneous 0.1 3.06 6.2 2.09 1.9 2.06 1.9
Estimate: endogenous, index multiplicative 0.2 3.79 2.7 1.38 1.5 1.98 2.0
Estimate: endogenous, number of reported crimes (absolute numbers) 11.1 0.30 2.3
continued on the next page. . .
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Estimate: endogenous, number of registered suspects 0.6 1.35 3.1 1.50 3.3
Estimate: endogenous, number of convicted to prison sentence 0.2 1.33 3.8 2.19 3.1 2.16 2.9
Estimate: endogenous, probability of future delinquency (surveyed is
delinquent)
4.1 −0.31 −1.5
Estimate: endogenous, probability of delinquency of fictitious offense
(surveyed is delinquent)
1.2 0.68 2.0 1.36 3.6
Estimate: endogenous, recidivism 0.7 1.26 2.5 1.94 3.6 2.24 3.9
Estimate: endogenous, accidents 4.2 0.83 2.9 1.09 5.2 0.82 3.5
Estimate: endogenous, violating prescriptive limits 2.9 −0.71 −2.5
Estimate: endogenous, relates to less than one year 29.2 0.58 4.7 0.45 3.3
Estimate: endogenous, relates to more than one year 11.5 0.22 1.6 0.51 3.0
Estimate: endogenous, lifelong self reported delinquency 3.8 −0.46 −2.3
Estimate: endogenous, one year of self reported delinquency 8.2 0.41 2.3
Estimate: endogenous, self reported delinquency since age of fourteen 0.6 2.34 4.8 2.01 4.0
Estimate: endogenous, less than one year of unlimited future self re-
ported delinquency
1.2 −0.56 −1.5
Estimate: endogenous and exogenous relate not to the same offense 6.3 0.58 3.8 0.69 4.4
Estimate: crime category, misdemeanors 9.5 −0.98 −6.6 −0.96 −5.9
Estimate: crime category, formal deviant behavior 2.5 0.75 3.1 0.77 3.0
Estimate: crime category, violation of game-rules 2.4 0.74 2.7
Estimate: crime category, other 1.5 0.73 2.4 0.95 2.9
Estimate: offense, assault 10.1 −0.24 −2.1 −0.29 −2.4
Estimate: offense, negligent assault 1.8 0.64 2.4 0.79 3.0
Estimate: offense, burglary 12.2 0.22 1.9 0.29 2.5
Estimate: offense, larceny (severe) 3.2 −0.37 −1.8 −0.57 −2.7
Estimate: offense, drug possession (soft) 0.7 2.58 3.0 2.27 5.2 2.42 5.0
Estimate: offense, drug possession (hard) 0.5 −3.27 −2.4 −3.01 −5.0 −3.39 −5.4
Estimate: offense, drug related crime (general) 4.4 −0.52 −2.6
Estimate: offense, other sexual related crimes 0.8 0.59 1.5
Estimate: offense, speeding 1.1 0.74 2.2 0.72 1.8
Estimate: offense, drunk driving 12.1 0.30 2.0 0.46 2.6
Estimate: offense, fare dodging 0.4 1.19 2.0 1.03 1.8
Estimate: offense, fraud 3.9 0.34 1.8 0.31 1.5
Estimate: offense, tax evasion 7.3 0.49 2.8 0.53 2.9
Estimate: offense, embezzlement 0.1 −1.87 −2.9
Estimate: offense, other 7.1 −0.70 −4.3 −0.83 −4.6
Estimate: offense, vehicle theft 8.5 0.35 2.6 0.28 2.1
Estimate: offense, environmental crimes, Violations of prescriptive limits 2.3 1.43 4.7 1.14 4.3
Estimate: property and violent characteristics 48.8 0.37 2.3 0.37 4.6 0.44 4.6
Estimate: violent characteristics 15.1 0.21 1.7
Estimate: endogenous, metric category 19.5 −1.16 −2.1
Estimate: endogenous, interval category 4.1 −0.85 −1.4
Estimate: endogenous, ordinal category 4.6 −1.25 −5.6 −2.46 −4.2
continued on the next page. . .
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Estimate: endogenous, binary category 9.6 −0.63 −2.5 −1.17 −8.8 −2.46 −4.4
Estimate: endogenous, nominal category 0.3 −1.40 −1.6
Estimate: endogenous, not in logs 32.0 0.59 3.0 0.68 3.3
Estimate: endogenous, in logs 26.8 0.57 2.5 0.68 2.9
Estimate: endogenous, other transformation 7.8 −1.26 −2.4 −1.49 −9.3 −1.62 −9.7
Estimate: endogenous and exogenous relate to the same time 28.0 −0.57 −2.4 −0.92 −3.8
Estimate: endogenous occurs after exogenous (lagged exogenous) 25.6 −0.43 −1.7 −0.68 −2.7
Estimate: covariate, age 20.2 −0.33 −3.3 −0.35 −3.4
Estimate: covariate, marital status 5.6 0.43 2.5 0.53 3.1
Estimate: covariate, profession 0.4 0.87 1.6 1.04 1.9
Estimate: covariate, social integration 1.5 0.51 1.7 0.84 2.5
Estimate: covariate, religion 1.7 0.49 1.7 0.56 1.9
Estimate: covariate, social class 0.8 −1.06 −2.9 −1.51 −4.0
Estimate: covariate, drug usage 1.3 −1.22 −3.6 −1.38 −4.1
Estimate: covariate, acceptance of norms 2.2 −0.47 −1.7
Estimate: covariate, morality 1.6 0.52 2.9 1.05 3.5 1.00 3.1
Estimate: covariate, personal characteristics 3.0 −0.57 −2.5 −0.76 −3.1
Estimate: covariate, fixed effects (spatial) 10.0 −0.58 −4.4 −0.39 −2.8
Estimate: covariate, fixed effects (time) 12.0 −0.30 −2.4
Estimate: covariate, random effects 1.0 1.02 3.1 1.00 3.0
Estimate: covariate, other 35.8 0.15 1.6 0.21 1.8
Estimate: covariate, time trend 5.4 0.35 2.2 0.35 2.1
Estimate: covariate, poverty, welfare 6.4 1.03 3.5 0.97 3.3 0.69 4.8 0.73 4.9
Estimate: covariate, urbanity 8.2 0.80 3.2 0.41 3.2 0.44 3.4
Estimate: covariate, GDP 1.4 −0.98 −3.2 −1.04 −3.4
Estimate: covariate, population (-growth) 11.5 0.47 4.0 0.44 3.7
Estimate: covariate, alcohol (consumption) 1.7 0.67 2.5 0.92 3.2
Estimate: covariate, labor force 2.5 −0.34 −1.6 −0.35 −1.6
Estimate: covariate, consumption 2.0 −0.68 −2.7 −0.81 −3.2
Estimate: covariate, risk propensity 0.8 0.85 3.4 1.27 3.9 2.39 5.6 2.22 5.1
Estimate: not linear model 15.1 −0.41 −2.1
Estimate: additive model 6.3 0.26 1.4 0.35 1.5
Estimate: not additive model 1.6 0.81 2.1
Estimate: correction for simultaneity (with variables) 9.1 −0.40 −2.1
Estimate: no correction for simultaneity 19.3 −0.69 −3.3 −1.00 −8.9 −1.18 −7.6
Estimate: no error correction 12.8 0.22 2.0
Estimate: weighted model 6.8 0.41 2.8 0.35 2.4
Estimate: bivariate method, bivariate regression 0.6 −1.36 −2.9 −1.30 −3.4 −1.80 −4.3
Estimate: bivariate method, other nonparametric test 0.1 −2.08 −1.8
Estimate: bivariate method, correlation 9.5 0.59 4.0 −0.52 −2.6
Estimate: bivariate method, differences (means, percentages, etc.) 4.0 −0.56 −2.3
Estimate: bivariate method, point biserial correlation 0.4 −0.69 −3.0 −1.02 −1.9 −1.59 −2.8
Estimate: bivariate method, ρ 0.5 −2.23 −4.3 −3.03 −4.6
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Estimate: bivariate method, t-test for independent samples 0.5 −1.43 −2.7 −1.77 −3.2
Estimate: bivariate method, t-test for dependent samples 0.6 −0.99 −1.9
Estimate: bivariate method, τ 0.9 −0.64 −1.7 −1.33 −3.2
Estimate: bivariate method, ANOVA 2.1 0.82 3.2
Estimate: bivariate method, other 1.0 1.13 3.2
Estimate: bivariate method, Wilcoxon 0.2 −0.74 −2.8
Estimate: bivariate method, binomial 0.2 1.51 10.2 0.85 3.6
Estimate: multivariate method, OLS 24.2 −0.61 −3.2
Estimate: multivariate method, 2SLS 9.8 −0.60 −2.5 −0.64 −5.0 −1.39 −6.1
Estimate: multivariate method, GMM 0.8 0.78 2.0
Estimate: multivariate method, poisson regression 1.1 −0.43 −1.4 −1.07 −2.9
Estimate: multivariate method, other ML method 1.1 1.11 2.9
Estimate: multivariate method, other 5.1 −0.75 −2.3 −0.61 −3.9 −1.26 −6.6
Estimate: multivariate method, ANOVA 0.4 −1.69 −3.4 −1.57 −4.6 −1.69 −2.8
Estimate: multivariate method, GLS 1.7 −0.97 −2.5 −1.70 −6.2 −2.36 −7.0
Estimate: multivariate method, VAR 0.6 −1.07 −2.3
Estimate: multivariate method, path analysis 1.3 −0.60 −2.1 −1.30 −3.8
Estimate: multivariate method, ARIMA 4.2 −0.62 −3.4 −1.24 −5.0
Estimate: multivariate method, COX regression 0.3 1.89 8.2 2.63 4.9 1.82 2.7 1.66 2.4
Estimate: test of significance 5.5 0.54 3.0 0.52 2.8
Estimate: square root of sample size for negative values 79.2 −0.02 −4.2 −0.01 −4.5 −0.01 −12.5 −0.01 −13.3
Estimate: square root of sample size for positive values 82.5 0.05 6.9 0.05 8.2 0.05 28.8 0.05 26.5
Constant −1.36 −6.5 −1.89 −5.0 0.04 0.0 1.12 4.1
The numbers in the headline are: 1=forward (R2 = 0.282, 44 variables), 2=backward (R2 = 0.369, 81 variables),
3=forward (R2 = 0.4415, 215 variables), 4=backward (R2 = 0.4442, 258 variables). The first two regressions (1
and 2) have clustered standard errors (each study is one cluster), the last two do not. The selection criteria is the
significance of each variable in the first two regressions and the AIC improvement in the latter. c and t are the
coefficients and the corresponding t-values of the included variables. The adjusted in- and exclude probabilities
are 0.005 and 0.03 in the first two regressions. The column var refers to the variation of a variable (i.e., the
percentage of valid observations); the maximum variation for dummy variables is fifty percent. The reference
category for dummies is usually the opposite property or, in the case of multiple categories, the missing values.
end of the table 3.52
As expected, both backwards methods yield more variables (84 by the sw and 270 by stepAIC
algorithm) than those methods which start with an empty set (44 and 234). Due to the unavailabil-
ity of an existing implementation in R, the stepAIC-method does not use clustered standard errors
and therefore yields even more significant variables. Out of the 270 (234) variables 203 (174) are
significant at a 0.03 level and still 156 (141) are significant at a 0.005 level.
It is somewhat surprising that the stepAIC-algorithm has selected so many authors to be of ma-
jor influence. While most of the coefficients have the same sign as in the bivariate comparison
(table 3.36), some do not: Piquero has published significantly larger (i.e., less negative) normal-
ized t-values but his dummy has a negative sign in regression three and four. This means that much
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of his larger (normalized) t-values can be explained by other factors. There are only two authors
who are included in all four regressions: Ehrlich and Vire´n (the Vire´n-dummy and the Finnish
author dummy are identical) and both are negative. All other authors are either in line with the
bivariate results or appear only in one regression. Whether these author dummies should be inter-
preted as evidence of a publication bias or are more associated with unobserved heterogeneity is
difficult to judge in this context. Among the nationality of the authors, Sweden, Switzerland and
the Netherlands stand out, all bearing large positive coefficients, all being highly significant.
Concerning the discipline of the authors, experience suggests that criminologists and sociolo-
gists have larger (i.e., more positive) normalized t-values than economists. While this is supported
by the bivariate analysis (table 3.27), the stepwise regressions show a more differentiated picture.
Although the general trend is supported by the publication- and discipline-dummies, there are
differences within each discipline. For example, studies published in “Criminology” have larger
(normalized) t-values while those in “Criminal Law and Criminology” are smaller. The same can
be observed for “Social Problems” and “Social Sciences Quarterly”.
Among the implemented deterrence variables, the clearance rate seems to be very interesting.
While it is associated with more negative (normalized) t-values in the bivariate case, its influence
has been reversed in the regressions above. The mean sentence length has now a positive effect on
the (normalized) t-values (i.e., is less in favor of the deterrence hypothesis) while it is ambiguous in
the bivariate case. The same applies to the ‘other” deterrence variables. The rest of the deterrence
variables are in line with table 3.44.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that those models which use transformed exogenous vari-
ables tend in different directions. Untransformed variables or those in logarithms are associated
with more negative results. The opposite is the case for the endogenous variables. Most covari-
ates have still the same influence as in table 3.45, but some change. Age and especially personal
characteristics and the social class switch their signs and are now associated with more negative
(normalized) t-values. Marital status and the time trend also switch, but in the opposite direction.
In table 3.40 it seems to be that studies using surveys or crime data are associated with larger
(normalized) t-values. This picture is put into perspective by the results above. When other factors
are accounted for (e.g., disciplines of authors or publishers), results based on surveys and crime
data are even associated with more negative (normalized) t-values. As expected, the results for
studies about the death penalty yield larger t-values.
Results based on misdemeanors are significantly related to more negative (normalized) t-values,
while the opposite can be found for results which are based on accidents. This fits very well to
the common expectation that offenses based on utility considerations are more readily accessible
by deterrence measures, while drunk driving is often committed by people who do not react to
deterrence. The latter is also supported by the inclusion and the positive sign of the drunk driving
variable. Only vehicle theft does not fit into this picture. Regarding the studied offenses, some in-
teresting observations emerge: although only based on very few observations, the deterrent effects
based on the possession of hard drugs are strongly negative, while those based on the possession
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of soft drugs are almost equally strong but positive. This supports the view that possession (and
usage) of marijuana, for example, is less affected by anti-drug laws, while people more readily
react when, for example, crack is involved. Obviously, this might be partially explained by the
more severe penalty for possessing hard drugs and by the larger public acceptance of soft drugs.
It is somewhat surprising that almost all included variables describing the method of analysis
bear a negative sign. The correlation-dummy is a rare exception with inconsistent results (positive
sign by the sw-algorithm, negative sign by the stepAIC-algorithm). Although COX-regressions
are only rarely used, the associated dummy stands out because it is chosen by all four regressions.
The opposite effect is found for 2SLS and GLS models which are significantly associated with
smaller (i.e., more negative) estimates. Furthermore, it seems to be the case that methods which
do not consider simultaneity overestimate deterrent effects.
Other noteworthy observations are that results from studies using Canadian data are less in favor
of deterrence. The same applies when the nation under study does not belong to the most frequent
nations. Results which are entered by the user tr into the data base appear to be significantly
more negative. This is probably explained by the fact that he entered all economic studies while
all other users entered the sociological and criminological studies; tr also worked at a different
location, while all other users worked in the same department. The possibility of any intentional
bias can be excluded. Positively signed offenses included in the regressions are drunk driving,
environmental offenses, fraud, tax evasion, negligent assault, burglary, vehicle theft. Negatively
signed are severe larceny, assault, drug related crimes, as well as assault. Results are more in favor
of the deterrence hypothesis if deterrence is the focus of the study. The high significance of the
realized sample sizes is a bit odd. These variables are not diversified by the sign of the results, as
is the case with the number of observations. Since the latter are included in every regression, the
relationship, explained in section 3.4, should already be taken care of. Again, also the stepwise
regression methods include some variables with only very little variation. These seem to catch
some oddities in the data which cannot be explained sufficiently by more general variables.
3.6.6 Bayesian Model Analysis
In a world in which the price of calculation continues to
decrease rapidly, but the price of theorem proving continues to
hold steady or increase, elementary economics indicates that we
ought to spend a larger and larger fraction of our time on
calculation.
Wilder J. Tukey, American Statistican, 1986
The basic idea for both approaches is quite intuitive: calculate the probabilities of all models
using Bayes Theorem and chose the most probable (BMS) or use all of them (BMA), refer to
Raftery et al. (1997) and Hoeting et al. (1999).
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Bayesian Model Selection (BMS)
At first, for each model ∆, its probability over all possible models Mk, given the data D (δk is the
vector of model parameters of Model Mk), is calculated:
P(∆|D) =
K
∑
k=1
P(∆|Mk,D)P(Mk|D), with
P(Mk|D) = (P(D|Mk)P(M))(
∑Kl=1 P(D|Ml)P(Ml)
) and
P(D|Mk) =
∫
P(D|δk,Mk)P(δk|Mk)dδk.
Then, the models with the highest posterior probabilities are chosen. However, the implementation
of the estimator poses several difficulties (also see Koop and Potter (2003) or Chipman et al.
(2001)). The quality of the results may hinge on the selection of the hyper-parameters which are
necessary for the calculations (Chipman et al., 2001). They can be chosen manually, calculated
from the data or simply set to trivial values. Since we do not possess any usable information about
the priors, we chose to use uninformative priors. As usually, there are several other problems
to cope with: the huge model space involves all 2N models. Therefore, optimization algorithms
and monte carlo methods should be employed in our case. We resort to the BMA-package in
R. Since the algorithm can only cope with 200 variables simultaneously and has no monte carlo
features, we used a weakened version of test 4 from subsection 3.6.4 to preselect a reduced set
of variables. The level of significance was chosen in such a way that 199 variables are included
(plus the constant). Due to limited computational resources and algorithm restrictions we limited
the number of variables, which are simultaneously included in each model, to a maximum of 50.
Each BMA-regression then took about four days on a 4.2GHz Athlon X2 using only one core.
Basically, we will use BMS in a comparison of the methods in section 4.2 and simply select
those variables with a posterior probability larger than 0.9 (which are essentially all variables used
in the final BMA-model.
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA)
BMA is essentially the same as BMS, with the exception of using the information of all considered
models. Instead of the coefficient of the most probable model, BMA calculates the weighted (by
their posterior model probability) average of each coefficient. Ferna´ndez et al. (2001b) compare
BMA with EBA (as implemented by Sala-I-Martin (1997)) and find that BMA achieves better
results. BMA has also been applied to crime data by Raftery et al. (1997); Ferna´ndez et al.
(2001a); Liang et al. (2001) and Nott and Green (2004).
We note here that there are multiple other possibilities to chose the model-weights for calcu-
lating the coefficients. We chose BMA because it is used in the deterrence literature, is acknowl-
edged by many researches and - certainly an important argument - is implemented in an available
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statistical software package. Hansen (2007) compares several averaging methods (based on the
AIC, BIC, Mallows criterion and MMA - the Mallows Model Average estimator) and their per-
formance. Performing a simulation he concludes that the MMA estimator has the lowest risk
(expected squared error) and the weights based on the bayesian coefficients perform only better
when the number of observations and R2 is low. In contrast to the other weights, the risk of the
BIC-based estimator is not decreasing in the number of observations. Overall, the MMA estimator
is found to be performing best but could not be implemented into this analysis because the article
was published too late. Nevertheless, the BMA-results are given in table 3.53.
Table 3.53: Multivariate analysis - bayesian model averaging
Variable var p 6= 0 coef. sd
Study: size of first realized sample 58.8 100.0 −0.0001 0.000
Study: size of second realized sample 2.4 100.0 −0.0004 0.000
Study: tests of significance 9.4 100.0 −0.8635 0.119
Study: user, mw 1.4 100.0 0.8113 0.166
Study: author, Steven D. Levitt 1.7 100.0 1.2320 0.266
Study: author, Daniel S. Nagin 1.3 100.0 1.3570 0.281
Study: author, Isaac Ehrlich 1.0 100.0 −1.9980 0.327
Study: publication, criminology 20.5 100.0 0.4058 0.088
Study: publication, psychology 2.8 93.5 −0.7055 0.271
Study: institute, economics 41.8 100.0 −0.4757 0.088
Study: institute, miscellaneous 14.9 100.0 0.4654 0.101
Study: first population, Canada 4.3 100.0 0.9006 0.160
Study: first population, other country 6.2 100.0 0.59450 0.134
Study: sample unit, first population, states 21.9 100.0 0.5283 0.083
Study: sample individuals, first population, pupils 3.1 100.0 0.7591 0.187
Study: sample individuals, second population, population 2.6 100.0 0.8753 0.200
Study: complete sample 9.8 100.0 −0.8037 0.110
Study: main location > 500000 inhabitants 3.5 100.0 −1.6430 0.176
Study: does not check representativeness 26.9 100.0 0.4378 0.074
Study: mixed questions for pretest 2.1 100.0 1.1620 0.228
Estimate: deterrence is covariate 14.8 100.0 0.5168 0.094
Estimate: exogenous, index multiplicative 1.9 100.0 0.9222 0.230
Estimate: study type, death penalty 8.2 100.0 0.6196 0.122
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, arrest rate 9.5 100.0 −0.6628 0.115
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, conviction rate 3.9 100.0 −0.7776 0.168
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police expenditures 4.0 100.0 0.7563 0.171
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police strength 7.9 100.0 0.8597 0.128
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, probability dummy (regime shift) 3.5 100.0 −0.9804 0.191
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, severity dummy (regime shift) 3.6 100.0 −1.0500 0.183
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by others 0.4 100.0 2.1570 0.490
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, experimental variation of probability of
detection
2.1 100.0 −1.9570 0.232
Estimate: exogenous, in differences 3.1 100.0 0.9154 0.207
continued on the next page. . .
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Variable var p 6= 0 coef. sd
Estimate: endogenous, recidivism 0.7 94.7 1.3530 0.491
Estimate: endogenous, accidents 4.2 100.0 0.8311 0.181
Estimate: offense, drug possession (soft) 0.7 100.0 1.6650 0.408
Estimate: offense, drug possession (hard) 0.5 100.0 −2.5740 0.530
Estimate: offense, environmental crimes, violations of prescriptive limits 2.3 92.4 0.7232 0.292
Estimate: endogenous, binary category 9.6 100.0 −0.4611 0.116
Estimate: endogenous, not in logs 32.0 100.0 0.4240 0.077
Estimate: endogenous, other transformation 7.8 100.0 −0.9145 0.136
Estimate: covariate, fixed effects (spatial) 10.0 100.0 −0.66730 0.116
Estimate: covariate, poverty, welfare 6.4 100.0 0.78340 0.137
Estimate: covariate, urbanity 8.2 100.0 0.53860 0.123
Estimate: covariate, population (-growth) 11.5 100.0 0.43300 0.106
Estimate: no correction for simultaneity 19.3 100.0 −0.49180 0.088
Estimate: bivariate method, t-test for independent samples 0.5 100.0 −2.31400 0.427
Estimate: no test of significance 5.5 100.0 −0.65720 0.166
Estimate: square root of sample size for negative values 79.2 100.0 −0.01422 0.001
Estimate: square root of sample size for positive values 82.5 100.0 0.05388 0.002
constant 100.0 −0.96310 0.165
Bayesian model averaging with a maximum of 50 variables per regression. Algorithm supports only 200 variables,
therefore 199 variables were preselected by EBA (weakened version of test D). The column var refers to the
variation of a variable (i.e., the percentage of valid observations); the maximum variation for dummy variables is
fifty percent. Properties of the best model: R2 : 0.348, BIC: −2364; posterior probability: 0.805. The reference
category for dummies is usually the opposite property or, in the case of multiple categories, the missing values.
end of the table 3.53
The results are in line with the previous results. Among the authors, Levitt, Nagin and Ehrlich
are considered important enough to be included, while only the latter has a negative (finding more
deterrent effects) impact. Studies published in a criminological journal have a positive effect, in
opposition to psychological journals. When a Canadian population (or “other” country) is studied,
the results are also more positive, while they are more negative when large cities are studied. When
the death penalty is analyzed or the deterrence variable is just a covariate, the findings are less in
favor of the deterrence hypothesis.
Among the deterrence variables, the arrest and conviction rate, as well as regime shifts and
experimental variation of the detection probability are considered to be very important and have a
negative effect. The influence of using police measures as deterrence variables keep their positive
sign, while not correcting for simultaneity (which has negative effect) is also included. Drug
possession, distinguished by soft and hard drugs, is also signed as expected.
The covariates considered to be most important are poverty, urbanity, population and the usage
of spatial fixed effects, while only the latter has a negative influence. Studies which report tests
of significance are associated with lower (more in favor of the deterrence hypothesis) normalized
t-values while this is somewhat put into perspective on the estimate-level (having the opposite
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effect). As expected, the relationship between the square root of the number of observation and
the t-values is considered to be of great importance.
3.6.7 Other Methodologies
What egotism, what stupid vanity, to suppose that a thing could
not happen because you could not conceive it!
Philip Wylie and Edwin Balmer, When Worlds Collide, 1932
We also experimented with other methodologies and a much smaller test set. Although some
interesting results could be extracted, we would have to recode the whole data set to be able to
reasonably apply these techniques. Eventually, this would be beyond the scope of this study.
Among these methods were Decision Trees and Rough Set Data Analysis (RSDA). While no clear
cut results could be achieved from the Decision Trees - probably because our test set of 200
studies was too small - we could show promising results with RSDA (Rupp, 2005). For further
information about RSDA refer to Pawlak (1982, 1991) and Pawlak (1999) and the references in
our paper Rupp (2005).
Additionally, as indicated before, we used a trial version of PcGETS (Hendrey and Krolzig,
2000) to study our test set of 200 studies. Hoover and Perez (1999) show that the usability of
PcGETS as a data mining tool depends on the data. With “good” data, an adjustment of the sig-
nificance levels, such as in Lovell (1983), is not necessary in conjunction with PC-Gets. However,
our data set seems to belong to the set of “bad” data because a preliminary analysis showed that
the results were quite inconsistent and indecisive.
3.6.8 Interim Conclusion
If a person (a) is sick, (b) receives treatment intended to make
him better, and (c) gets better, then no power of reasoning
known to medical science can convince him that it may not have
been the treatment that restored his health.
Peter B. Medawar, The Art of the Soluble, 1967
In the previous subsections we have found many important variables. However, having such a
large arsenal of variables at our disposal makes the remark by Florax and de Groot (2002) note-
worthy, “that almost any relationship can be shown to be either significantly positive or negative,
provided the correct set of conditioning variables used”.
All in all, it should be fairly obvious that a bivariate analysis, as conducted in section 3.5, is
not sufficient to fully understand the relationships between the properties of the included studies
and their results in regard to the deterrence hypothesis. Under the assumption that the methods
of analysis are equally accurate, there are only a few variables which are judged to be significant
and of the same sign by all methods. For example, all indicate that studies providing some sort
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of significance tests are significantly associated with results which are more in line with the de-
terrence hypothesis. The same applies when Issac Ehrlich is an author of a study, deterrence is
the focus of a study, the studied offense is the possession of hard drugs, the endogenous variable
is a dummy or when no correction for simultaneity is implemented. The opposite effect is found
when a Canadian population is studied, the representativeness of the data is not checked, the death
penalty is studied or when poverty, welfare, urbanity or population (-growth) are used as covari-
ates. When a variable is included in every table - i.e., the variables just mentioned - all methods
agree on their signs. However, when drawing conclusions, it might be more practical to weigh the
methods differently or to consider variables which are not included in all tables.
The task will be to find those variables which are really meaningful. To accomplish this, two
steps seem to be important. First, as already done above, to identify those variables which share
the same properties in all estimations. Second, to judge the quality - in regard to precision and fit
- of the estimators and to interpret the results accordingly. The latter is be done in chapter 4.
4 Assessing the Quality of the Results
It doesn’t do to leave a live Dragon out of your calculations, if
you live near him.
John R. R. Tolkien, The Hobbit, 1937
The combination of some data and an aching desire for an answer does not ensure that a
reasonable answer can be extracted from a given body of data.
Wilder J. Tukey, American Statistician, 1986
In order to interpret the results from the previously performed regressions we have to answer
two questions. First, whether we are interested in a good fit of the data or if we want a good
prediction of a study’s results. Second, which criteria are applicable to judge whether a fit or
prediction is superior to another? A good fit requires a model which can replicate the data as well
as possible. This means that it has to incorporate the main factors, as well as to handle specialities
and oddities found in the data. Usually, this will lead to a model with a large pool of variables.
On the other hand, predicting the results of an unknown study (i.e., a study that is not included
in the estimation of the model) requires a model which catches the main influences while not
contaminating its results by anomalies from known studies. This should lead to a model with a
smaller pool of variables.
Since both aims - fitting and predicting - have their merits, we will analyze our models from
section 3.6 under both points of view. A model with a good fit can be used to understand the im-
portance and the effects of variables included in the model. Such models may help to understand
the influence of very special variables (e.g., a specific author). On the other hand, a model which
produces good predictions can be used to draw conclusions about unknown, future or hypothetic
studies. It may also catch more general influences, since it should better model the general un-
derlying mechanics. Combining both strategies - fitting and predicting - could also be helpful in
putting any conclusions on a firmer ground than relying only on one method.
4.1 Modus Operandi
Do not go where the path may lead; go instead where there is no
path and leave a trail.
Ralph W. Emerson
We use a large arsenal of criteria to judge how well a model performs. These criteria are split
into two parts. First, we use various loss functions (described in subsection 4.1.1) to measure
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the difference between the estimated and actual values. These functions almost all relate to the
error terms of each model and help us to identify important properties of a model’s performance.
Second, we calculate several classification rates (see subsection 4.1.2). These describe how well
the endogenous variable is estimated by the models in respect to some more general and very
important categories. The reasoning is that it may be more important to replicate, for example, a
significant and negative (normalized) t-value than to approximate its actual value.
To study the quality of the various estimators we employ several approaches. To study the fit of
the models we use the whole data set to calculate the fitted values. We also use some bootstrapping
to get the first and second moments of the values of the loss functions. To predict the data, and
for the bootstrapping, we randomly partition the data into a training and a test-set. The same
estimators as described in subsections 3.6.3, 3.6.4, 3.6.5 and 3.6.6 are studied.
We chose to use two ways to construct the test- and training sets. First, we randomly chose 50%
of the data to belong to the training set and the remaining 50% is assigned to the test set. Although
the size of 50% is unusually large for a test set, it is prerogative in our case because these values
are most likely not independent (many studies will be present in both sets). Second, we chose to
assign 90% of all studies to the training set. The latter approach better corresponds to the idea of
forecasting the outcome of an unknown (i.e., not included) study, while the first relates more to
the prediction of random data in general. Each forecast or fit is calculated with ten independently
and randomly generated training sets. The ten sets are the same for each estimator within the same
approach (e.g., a training set of 50% or 90%).
4.1.1 Loss-Functions
Just because you have a choice, it doesn’t mean that any of
them has to be right.
Norton Juster, The Phantom Tollbooth, 1961
We employ a wide variety of loss functions to distinguish various characteristics of the esti-
mators. A summary of fifty loss functions, from which we have taken some, is given by Andres
and Spiwoks (2000). Each loss function has its own merits and justification. Most of them are
symmetrical (punishing deviations in both directions equally), while asymmetrical loss functions
are also possible but are, at least to some extent, quite arbitrary.
• RMSE: the root mean squared error
√
∑Ni=1(yi−yˆi)2
N .
The most commonly used loss function. The lower its value, the better the estimates are.
Small errors (< 1) are less important than larger (> 1) errors.
• Cor.: the Pearson correlation between y and yˆ. There shouldn’t be any negative values; the
closer to one the better the estimates are.
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• Adj. R2: the classic adjusted R squared, 1− (1−R2) N−1N−k−1 , with k being the number of
regressors. It is the same as the correlation but adjusted for the ratio between the of number
of regressors and observations.
• U: Theil’s (new) inequality coefficient
√
∑Ni=1(yi−yˆi)2
∑Ni=1 y
2
i
and its decomposition
– U.bias = (y¯−
¯ˆy)2
1
N ∑
N
i=1(yi−yˆi)2
,
– U.var = (sy−syˆ)
2
1
N ∑
N
i=1(yi−yˆi)2
,
– U.cov = 2(1−ρ)sysyˆ1
N ∑
N
i=1(yi−yˆi)2
.
U should be zero in the case of a perfect, and one for the most naive estimator (the constant;
any values above one indicate that the estimator is worse than the naive estimator). The esti-
mation errors are divided into U.bias (systematic error in the mean value), U.var (systematic
error in the variance) and U.cov (unsystematic random error). These should add up to one
(except for rounding errors). The perfect estimator has a U.cov of one.
• RMSPE: the root mean squared proportional error,
√
1
N ∑
N
i=1(
yi−yˆi
yi
)2.
It is similar to the RMSE but measures the error relative to the true values. Therefore, it is
independent of scaling.
• CI.hit: the fraction of predicted values in a c · sy interval of y. In our case we set c to 0.5.
This measures whether or not the predicted values are “near” the actual values but does
not consider the size of the errors (similar as in Koop and Potter (2003) but with a tighter
bandwidth).
• Sign.: The percentage of correctly classified significant (normalized) t-values at a 5% level
(the categories are negative and significant as well as positive and significant). Although
this measure does belong to the classification ratings, it is also included in the loss functions
because a similar measure (the percentage of negative significant (normalized) t-values) is
included in many of the tables in section 3.5 as well.
• Neg2pos4: a loss function which punishes large deviations much harder in the case of posi-
tive values,
√
1
N ∑
N
i=1
(
1[yi≤0](yi− yˆi)2+1[yi>0](yi− yˆi)4
)
We implement this loss function because we have an abundance of negative but only rela-
tively few positive values. With this function we see whether an estimator fares better or
worse with positive values.
• FsRMSE: false sign root mean squared error,
√
1
N ∑
N
i=1 1[yi·yˆi<0](yi− yˆi)2.
This function is very similar to the RMSE-function but only punishes those estimates which
carry the wrong sign. We implemented this because the sign of an estimate is, to some
degree, even more important than the extent of its deviation.
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• Min. dev. and Max. dev.: the maximum max(y, yˆ) and minimum min(y, yˆ) deviation. Since
there are some outliers in the data which are not catched by any model, the minimum and
maximum deviation are only of academic importance.
• Mean pos.: the mean positive deviation 1N ∑Ni=1 1[yˆ1>yi] · |yi− yˆi|,
• Mean neg.: the mean negative deviation 1N ∑Ni=1 1[yˆ1<yi] · |yi− yˆi|,
• Mean abs.: the mean absolute deviation 1N ∑Ni=1 |yi− yˆi|.
By comparing the mean absolute and the mean squared error, we can judge wether the
estimator tends to vary around the actual values more closely with some large errors (larger
RMSE and smaller mean absolute error) or has less large errors but deviates more in general
(smaller RMSE and larger mean absolute error).
• A Log-predictive-Score LPS, somewhat similar to the original (see Good (1952)), but de-
fined as − 1N ∑Ni=1 log2(1−N (|yˆi− yi|/sˆ)); N is the inverse CDF of a standard normal
distributed random variable. A perfect fit would result in an LPS of 0.
• An adjusted LPS by adding a penalty 2k/N for the number of used regressors k (similar as
for the AIC).
Additionally, we perform a general encompassing test (a bit more simplified than in Clements
and Harvey (2004)), by regressing y = ∑#Ei=1βiyˆ(i)+ ε and analyzing the calculated coefficients
cEncomp. and the respective p-values pEncomp. (#E is the number of competing estimators yˆ(s)).
Good estimators should have coefficients near one and low p-values because they should contain
most of the required information (in the sense of minimizing the sum of squared errors).
When possible, we also calculate the 95% confidence intervals of the mean of each loss function
to see whether any method is significantly superior to the naive estimators. We call a model A
superior (inferior) to model B in regard to a certain loss function f, if the confidence interval of
f for model A does not include the mean value of f for model B and the mean of f (A) is better
(worse) than the mean of f (B).
4.1.2 Classification Ratings
While the loss-functions reflect the behavior of the error terms, it is also important to know
whether the estimators are able to catch more general characteristics and behavior of the data.
For example, it might be more important to estimate a t-value correctly to be negative or negative
and significant, than whether it is −2.5 or −5.5. To study these characteristics we employ several
categories:
Sign All (normalized) t-values are categorized to be negative or positive. We use this to have a
look at the general direction of the estimates. The correct sign might be considered more
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important than an exact estimate. Moreover, we examine each sign separately to see whether
an estimator fares better with results which tend to approve or disapprove of the deterrence
hypothesis.
Pos. Sign A (normalized) t-values belongs to this category if it is significant and positive.
Neg. Sign A (normalized) t-values belongs to this category if it is significant and negative.
20% sign. A (normalized) t-value belongs to this category, if it is significant at a 20% level (i.e.,
|t|> 1.28). Since values around zero might be considered as noise, we ignore these results
in this category.
20% pos. A (normalized) t-value belongs to this category, if it is significant at a 20% level and
positive (i.e., t > 1.28).
20% neg. A (normalized) t-value belongs to this category, if it is significant at a 20% level and
negative (i.e., t <−1.28).
5% sign. A (normalized) t-value belongs to this category, if it is significant at a 5% level (i.e., |t|>
1.96). Naturally, it is very interesting to see how well the estimators handle the significant
(normalized) t-values. We use the 5% level to discard results which do not significantly
approve (disapprove) of the deterrence hypothesis.
5% pos. A (normalized) t-value belongs to this category, if it is significant at a 5% level and
positive (i.e., t > 1.96).
5% neg. A (normalized) t-value belongs to this category, if it is significant at a 5% level and
negative (i.e., t <−1.96).
For these categories, which are assumed to be non-empty sets, we calculate two measures:
Precision The percentage of values which are correctly classified (e.g., if a category actually
contains n values, and of these nˆ are not estimated correctly, the precision is n− nˆ divided
by n). In the perfect case the precision is one, and zero in the worst case.
Error The error rate (if m values are estimated to belong to a category, but of these mˆ are not
correct, the error rate is mˆ divided by m). In the perfect case the error rate is zero, and one
in the worst case. In the case that m = 0 the error rate is defined to be zero.
Total miss rate The sum of not correctly and falsely classified values divided by the total number
of values belonging to that category (e.g., [(1− precision)n+(error rate)m] divided by n).
In the perfect case the total miss rate is zero, and limited by mˆ in the worst case.
As in subsection 4.1.1, we calculate the 95% confidence intervals of the mean of each classifi-
cation rate to see whether any method is significantly superior (inferior) to the naive estimators.
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4.2 The Tournament
A theory is a good theory if it satisfies two requirements: it
must accurately describe a large class of observations on the
basis of a model that contains only a few arbitrary elements, and
it must make definite predictions about the results of future
observations.
Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time, 1988
To test the reliability of the calculated estimators, we let them compete against each other
in a tournament of estimation quality. Each estimator has to proof itself in its precision and
classification quality.
4.2.1 The Competitors
There is no need for these hypotheses to be true, or even to be at
all like the truth; rather one thing is sufficient for them - that
they should yield calculations which agree with the
observations.
Andreas Osiander, Preface to Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus,
1543
We gathered all estimators (from subsections 3.6.3, 3.6.4, 3.6.5 and 3.6.6) and assigned them
into different groups:
naive The naive approaches which select either none or all variables.
SET0 The most naive estimator. In case of the loss-function it is the mean weighted (nor-
malized) t-value of all observations (i.e., a regression with the constant only), while it
is a random guess1 for the classification ratings.
SET1 The OLS regression with all 492 variables (some variables are dropped due to singu-
larity problems).
SET2 All remaining variables after removing those which are responsible for singularity prob-
lems and which have a p-value > 0.1; 77 variables remained. Although this could also be
named naive, we take this specification as the most simple model.
EBA Extreme Bounds Analysis with different inclusion criteria. All variables with a stability-
coefficient which does not lie within a 95% CI of the mean stability-coefficient are excluded
beforehand2.
1The category of a random (normalized) t-value estimated by the mean weighted (normalized) t-value plus a normal
distributed random variable (the standard deviation is that of the full data set without the 1%-quantiles).
2The stability-coefficient is calculated as the quotient of the mean and median (normalized) t-value. All variables
which lie outside an interval of twice its standard deviation around the mean stability-coefficient are excluded
because these results seem to be unreliable.
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SET3 Extreme Bounds Analysis with the CDF test (A); 254 variables are selected.
SET4 Extreme Bounds Analysis with the strong sign test (B); 156 variables are selected.
SET5 Extreme Bounds Analysis with the extreme CDF test (C); 119 variables are selected.
SET6 Extreme Bounds Analysis with the absurd test (D); 80 variables are selected.
stepwise Stepwise (backward and forward) regressions.
SET7 Forward stepwise regression (starting with no variables) based on the significance of
each variable; 43 are variables selected.
SET8 Backward stepwise regression (starting with all variables) based on the significance
of each variable; 80 are variables selected.
SET9 Backward stepwise regression (starting with no variables) based on the AIC improve-
ment; 269 variables are selected.
SET10 Forward stepwise regression (starting with all variables) based on the AIC improve-
ment; 233 variables are selected.
BMA Bayesian Model Selection and Averaging. Due to computational limitations only 50 vari-
ables are allowed to be included in any submodel at any time. Eventually, the best 15 models
are selected.
SET11 All variables are selected with a posterior probability ≥ 0.9 after a Bayesian Model
Averaging procedure; 49 variables are selected.
SET12 Full Bayesian Model Averaging in every run. 49 variables are selected (the constant
is the 50th).
4.2.2 The Contest
It is far better to foresee even without certainty than not to
foresee at all.
Jules H. Poincare´
In the following we present and compare the performance of the different estimators. The first
part, section 4.2.2, contains the measures to assess the quality of the estimators. They describe
how well the estimators predict and fit the actual data. The second part, section 4.2.2, shows the
percentages of correctly and incorrectly classified (normalized) t-values. These are used to judge
the performance of the estimators in reproducing certain properties of the (normalized) t-values.
Predicting and Fitting Performance
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 contain the resulting values of the loss-functions for the 50%-observation based
test sets, while tables 4.3 and 4.4 contain those which are based on the 10%-study based test
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sets. The rows contain the loss-functions, while the various competing methods are located in the
columns. To simplify the interpretation, the number of variables used in each method is given in
the second row. Bold cells contain the best value of all methods (in the case of the error statistics
this means more similarity to the normal distribution). Light (dark) cells indicate that the model
is superior (inferior), as described in subsection 4.1.1, to the best naive model (SET0 or SET1).
It is obvious that the SETS 7, 8 and 11 perform very well compared to all other methods.
They perform best in many criteria and especially the backward stepwise regression (based on
significance) has a high correlation, the best root mean squared error (for all observations as well
as for those with a false predicted sign), the best mean absolute error and log predictive score.
Furthermore, the variance of its residuals is the smallest and the encompassing test does also state
that it does contain relevant information. Considering the fact that the stepwise forward method
just uses 43 variables it performs very well. This is reflected by the best adjusted LPS (but not the
adjusted R2), the hit ratio and the relative RMSE. The same applies to the BMS-set, which has the
highest correlation and, although not the best, many fairly good values. It should be mentioned
that the means given for BMA inhibit a very large deviation - in some runs it performed very well,
in others extraordinarily bad.
In table 4.2 we test how well the estimators are in reproducing the data. The whole data set is
used to establish the estimator, and a randomly chosen 50% set of the data is then estimated. This
is repeated ten times. The same notation as in table 4.3 applies. This is done to study whether and
by how much any method performs significantly better or worse than the naive methods3, when
the estimators are based on the whole data set.
It is not surprising that SET1 has the best RMSE, correlation values and is the only method
chosen by the encompassing test - and that its residuals are “the best” - because the model is
optimized according to these criteria. Nevertheless, the stepwise estimators perform fairly well:
the relative RMSE is the best for SET7 while SET9 and SET10 are the only estimators which are
not significantly worse than the full OLS estimator and even outperform it in some criteria (Sign.
and fsRMSE). As could be expected, estimators which are based on many variables perform better
than those based on only a small set of variables in fitting the data.
Instead of using very large test sets (50% of the data) and to lessen the effect that many obser-
vations will not be independent (because they belong to the same study), we repeat the procedure
with a 90% vs. 10% partition on the study-level. Thus, the (normalized) t-values belonging to
a randomly chosen 90% set of all studies are assigned to the training set, while the rest remains
in the test set. Due to time constraints and the mediocre performance of BMA, we removed the
bayesian model averaging estimator from the sets and did not recalculate the set of variables for
the bayesian model selection approach for each run4.
3The OLS estimator with all variables and data shows the best performance in many criteria (eg. RMSE, correlation,
encompassing test) because it is constructed that way.
4We use the same set of variables derived from the whole data set and merely recalculated the coefficients for each
training set.
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Compared with table 4.1 the results in table 4.3 are quite similar. However, the good perfor-
mance of SET8, the backward stepwise regression, is not as dominating as before. Other stepwise
procedures (SET7 and SET9) get closer to SET8. Although the variables for the BMS approach
are not recalculated, SET11 performs much better.
Table 4.4 is the analogy to table 4.2. The estimators are based on the full data set and their
performance in fitting random 10% sets of the studies are compared.
There are not many differences between the results from the test sets based on random 10%
studies or 50% data. Of course, SET1 is the best while the StepAIC results come second.
Classification Performance
For reasons of parsimony, the classification ratings are given only for the 10%-test sets, which
can be interpreted as a simulation of the estimation of unknown studies. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report
the statistics of the precision of the estimates for predicting and fitting unknown studies. Again,
the columns contain the models5 while the rows display the categories. SET1 is not a constant
anymore (which does not make much sense when classifying observations) but random draws
from the statistical distribution6 of the (normalized) t-values. The last column (N) contains the
number of observations in the various categories. To simplify the interpretation, the number of
variables used in each method is given in the second row. Finally, the cells report the precision
ratings (the number of correctly classified observations divided by N). Again, bold cells contain
the best value of all methods. Light (dark) cells indicate that the model is superior (inferior) to the
best naive model (all or no variables used).
Overall, SET7 (which uses only 43 variables) performs best when classifying negative (normal-
ized) t-values, while the AIC-based stepwise estimators are somewhat better in predicting positive
values. The naive approach (SET1) perform worse in almost all categories (except the positive
(normalized) t-values which are significant at a 5% level). Random guessing is especially bad.
When all studies are used to construct the estimators, the picture changes somewhat. Although
the naive approach is still much better in fitting than in predicting, it performs not as well. SET1 is
only the best in one category while SET9 and SET10 are not significantly worse in any category.
SET9 seems to perform best in this case.
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 contain the classification error statistics of the models of predicting and
fitting other studies. The models are in the columns and the statistics are given in the rows (the
second row reports the number of variables used in each model). The rows are organized in groups
of three lines and contain the average values of all ten runs.
The first line reports the category and the error rate, which is calculated by the percentage of
falsely classified estimates in that category. This value is the number of estimates which actually
5Since the results by BMA are unreliable (very high variance in their quality) and would have taken several weeks to
compute, we have, again, omitted BMA from the study-based analysis and did not recalculate the sets for BMS.
6In fact, we did not draw from the sample but used the normal distribution with the corresponding moments.
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do not belong to that category (given first in the second line) divided by the number of obser-
vations estimated to be in that category (given in the second line in parentheses). The number
in parentheses in the first column is the actual number of observations in that category. The total
miss rate is given in the third line and is calculated by the sum of the not correctly (the observation
actually belongs to the category but not the estimate) and falsely classified (the estimate belongs
to the category but not the actual observation) values divided by the total number of actual values
belonging to that category (thus a 0 indicates a perfect classification while 2 is the worst case when
every observation is incorrectly classified7.
Looking at table 4.7 the stepwise regressions (SET7 and SET8) appear to perform best while
it is appropriate to point out that all estimators do much better than the naive approaches. Not
surprisingly, the number of positive outcomes is generally underestimated and the percentage
of wrong classifications is better for negative (normalized) t-values than for positive values. It is
interesting to note that the number of positive results is underestimated by the stepwise regressions
based on the significance levels while it is overestimated by the stepAIC algorithm. For SET7 and
SET8 the total miss rates are all below one. Although the EBA results are not as good, they
perform fairly well in predicting the sizes of the categories.
Again, the picture changes when all studies are used to construct the estimators (table 4.8).
SET1 performs better but is the best in just one category. SET7 and SET8 fall back behind SET9
and SET10. All in all, the total miss rates have been reduced by a large margin. Surprisingly, the
estimated number of observations in each category has, overall, become worse.
4.2.3 And the Winner. . .
There is no more common error than to assume that, because
prolonged and accurate mathematical calculations have been
made, the application of the result to some fact of nature is
absolutely certain.
Alfred N. Whitehead, Alfred North Whitehead: An Anthology,
1953
. . . depends on the aim of the researcher. Shall the estimator fit (ex post prediction) the existing
data as well as possible? Or should the estimator predict (ex ante) unknown data? Is a good fit
more or less important than a general classification?
One general conclusion seems to be that selecting fewer variables is better for predicting but
worse for fitting the data. Bayesian Model Averaging was restricted to 50 variables and stands
out by its high variability: in some runs its predictive/fitting performance is very good and in
some cases it is extraordinarily bad. This may come from utilizing too much detailed information
from some studies which are rather specialized and not suited to be used for other studies because
7This is the case when every value which is estimated to belong to that category actually does not, and every
observation which does not belong to that category is estimated to be part of it.
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Bayesian Model Selection, which is inherently similar to BMA, performs quite good in predicting
the data and only slightly worse in fitting them. In our scenario, BMA does not perform as well
as in Ferna´ndez et al. (2001b), who compare the naive estimator, one EBA version and BMA in
the case of a moderately sized set of variables in the context of country growth. Their conclusion,
that BMA is superior to EBA, cannot be unambiguously confirmed.
EBA performs mediocre in most cases except for predicting the sizes of various general classes.
However, we have to keep in mind that EBA only selects seemingly important and stable variables
but does not - because we restricted the number of variables to be included in every regression -
evaluate their conjoint influences as the other approaches do.
All in all, the stepwise approaches perform best, while those based on the significance levels
of each variable (which lead to fewer variables) are good in predicting unknown results. Those
based on the model improvement are more suited to fit the data. This applies both to the general
fit of the estimators as well as to their classification performance.
Since the out of sample prediction is commonly the preferred way to judge a forecasting
method, we come to the following conclusions. In the case of our data set, we prefer stepwise
regressions to select the variables for further inspection. In general, when dealing with data sets
containing numerous variables in an exploratory context, it seems advisable to employ methods
which resort to a small set of really important variables. Including too many variables seems to
dilute findings. It may not be a good idea to rely solely on “expert opinions” in selecting variables,
because several important influences could be missed since they do not belong to any underlying
theory.
4.3 Further Results from the Best Models
Mathematics is not a careful march down a well-cleared
highway, but a journey into a strange wilderness, where the
explorers often get lost. Rigour should be a signal to the
historian that the maps have been made, and the real explorers
have gone elsewhere.
Anglin (1992)
Since we have chosen the stepwise estimators to be the most useful, we may delve deeper into
their results than we have already done in subsection 3.6.5. Besides the results already given
there, several other implications can be derived from table 3.52. In both regressions the significant
coefficients of the number of the ending page are larger in absolute value than of the starting
page of a study (−0.006112 and −0.006064 versus 0.005689 and 0.005788; the differences of
the absolute values are also significant). This implies that studies which cover more pages report
results which are more negative than shorter studies; studies with a larger starting page also yield
more negative values. However, the page numbering is not always consistent between journals
because some issues of one volume are consecutively numbered while others are not.
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The number of measuring points (in time) also shows a significant positive statistical linkage to
the results. However, because the coefficients (0.0005378 and 0.0005834) are quite small and the
median number of measuring points is just three (since surveys, experiments and cross-sections
usually have only one measuring point in time), this variable seems to be catching just some
anomalies in the data. The time a study covers (measured in month; coefficient is −0.00074
in both regressions) is significantly related with smaller (normalized) t-values. Although this
implicates that analyzing a longer period in time is associated with more significant results in
favor of the deterrence hypothesis, we have to keep in mind that this variable is, to some extent, a
substitution for studies using time-series; and the latter variable is not included in any of the four
stepwise regressions.
It is somewhat surprising that the population sizes are included and very significant in every
regression although the number of observations (as the square root and diversified by its sign) is
also included as well. The inclusion of significance-tests is negatively related on the study-level
and positively on the estimate-level. Since the absolute coefficients are very similar this indicates
that estimates without a value of significance in a study which provides such tests in general are
more negative. On the other hand, this may be just be an artifact of our transformation scheme8.
Compared to books and conference papers, estimates published in journals yield results which
are less in compliance with the deterrence hypothesis. The opposite is observed for working and
discussion papers and other types of publication. Economists and psychologists are more likely
to produce results which are more in line with the deterrence hypothesis while the contrary is
observed for sociologists and criminologists (as can be seen by the discipline of the author or
the journal). However, some authors are included with deviating signs9. Among these, the most
prominent economists seem to be Levitt, Ehrlich, Cloninger and Witte. Although publishing in
an economic journal is accounted for, Levitt, Cloninger and Witte bear a positive sign which
could imply that “their” results are, after controlling for many other influences, less in favor of the
deterrence hypothesis. This is especially interesting for Steven Levitt because he is known for his
innovative ideas of finding evidence of deterrent effects. For criminologists and sociologists the
picture is less clear.
Amongst the studied countries two conclusions seem to be possible10. Studies with German,
Swedish, Australian and Dutch data are associated with more negative (normalized) t-values while
the opposite is observed for studies using data from the USA, UK, Canada and other countries.
Especially Canada stands out by being included in every regression with large and very significant
positive coefficients. In regard to studies using German data we have to remark that the coefficient
of using the PKS as a public data base is positively signed and is a very large - in contrast to the
coefficient of studying German data, which is negative and is somewhat lower in absolute value.
8Such a t-value has to be a transformed test statistic.
9We have to keep in mind that the reference category is, depending on the actual regression, quite different and
relates to several authors.
10All countries are listed in table 3.52; hence, the reference category depends on the actual regression.
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In regard to the theory of a U-shaped crime distribution (Howsen and Jarrell, 1987), it is in-
teresting to note that deterrence is more readily found to be effective for very small and large
locations. Thus, not only does the crime density increases in very densely and sparsely populated
areas but also does the significance of deterrent effects.
While the number of bivariate results is positively related to the (normalized) t-values, no sim-
ilar relationship is observed for the number of multivariate results. Although only a few obser-
vations exist, studying social fringe groups is accompanied by large positive coefficients. Several
technical variables in regard to representativeness, reliability and pretests are included as well, but
their proper interpretation seems to be difficult.
Studies which do not test predefined deterrence hypotheses are associated with more positive
results. Moreover, as can be seen in the other models, results are more negative when the studied
deterrence variable is the focus of the study. Whether or not this can be interpreted in the context
of publication bias remains unclear but plausible. It also seems to be that smaller (normalized)
t-values can be observed for subsets which consist of males, youths, adults or people from rural
areas; however, the number of such observations in our meta-data base is very small. As before,
(normalized) t-values in regard to the deterrent effect of the death penalty are much larger than
all others. They are especially large when the deterrent effect is measured by the existence of the
death penalty.
Among the deterrence measures several general issues can be observed: there are only very few
variables with negative coefficients (conviction rate, convicted per crime, arrest rate and incarcer-
ated per crime); all other variables are positively signed, even the other incarceration measures.
Especially, all measures in regard to the severity of punishment have a positive sign. The same
picture emerges for surveys: the probabilities of detection and punishment are negatively signed
while the algorithms have included only one measurement of the severity of punishment which
bears a positive sign (severity of punishment by others). It is noteworthy that the coefficients
for the probabilities are much larger (in absolute value) when detection or punishment relates to
friends or the family (in contrast to the police, justice or employment). This might be interpreted
as evidence that social capital may be even more important than human capital. Last but not least,
only the probability of detection (with a negative sign) is included in the case of experiments.
Among the endogenous variables which measure the number of offenses only a few are sig-
nificant and are included: violating prescriptive limits and self reported delinquency (lifelong).
Since the reference category consists of several other measures, interpretation is somewhat diffi-
cult. However, it is easier in the case of the general crime category: only for misdemeanors the
deterrent effects are more significant than for crimes. Among the studied crimes there are also
some interesting observations. We have already mentioned that dealing with hard drugs bears the
opposite sign than dealing with soft drugs. The same can be observed for assault and negligent
assault which might implicate that negligent offenses are less affected by deterrence measures.
Since each estimate is often based on multiple offenses, a more detailed interpretation is difficult
and the question why so many of these variables are positively signed remains unanswered.
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The situation is similar in the case of the implemented covariates. However, it is interesting that
the absolute coefficients of the profession, social class, drug usage, morality, random effects, GDP
and risk propensity are, compared to all others, quite large. Especially the latter has a coefficient
twice as large as the second largest. It might be a coincidence but most of the economic covari-
ates (GDP, labor force and consumption) are negatively signed while most social and personal
covariates have a positive sign.
The dummy which indicates that an estimate is not corrected for simultaneity is negatively
signed and highly significant. Compared to those estimates which do use methodological means
to correct for simultaneity (the reference category), relying only on additional variables - usually
lagged variables - is also associated with smaller (normalized) t-values. This could mean that
results relying on models which do not consider simultaneity problems overestimate deterrent
effects. This bias is reduced partially when feedback effects are taken care of with additional vari-
ables. However, this interpretation is put into perspective when we look at the highly significant
and negative coefficients of the dummy which indicates the usage of 2SLS because methodologi-
cal correction for simultaneity and 2SLS are highly correlated. GLS and ARIMA models are also
highly significant and bear a negative sign.
As is the case in all other models, the square roots of the number of observations each estimate
is based on (diversified by their sign) are both highly significant. This underlines that the statistical
relationship between the values of significance and the number of observations is not negligible
and should be considered in a meta analysis. This should be done in regard to publication bias as
well to explain more variance.
5 Conclusion
An education isn’t how much you have committed to memory,
or even how much you know. It’s being able to differentiate
between what you do know and what you don’t. It’s knowing
where to go to find out what you need to know; and it’s
knowing how to use the information you get.
William Feather
The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to
correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black
seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we would voyage far. The sciences, each
straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing
together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of
our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from revelation or flee from
the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age.
Howard P. Lovecraft, The Call of Cthulhu, 1926
The main result most certainly is that the outcome of an empirical study of the deterrent effect
of punishment is not independent of its design. It is not surprising that the kind of offense or the
studied population play an important role. However, it is not self-evident that personal character-
istics of the authors, the implemented techniques, estimation properties or the design of a study in
general also have an important impact on the results. But let us begin in a chronological order.
This study emerged from a project financed by the DFG and conducted by two teams from
different universities. After multiple stages of filtering, we identified - from a pool of more than
nine thousand studies found by a preceding search in numerous data bases - 840 empirical studies
which contain relevant results in regard to deterrence. A large set of information about each study
- including characteristics of the author and publisher, the design of the study and its techniques -
was entered into a shared data base by both teams. Due to time constraints each team could only
process 350 studies; a random set of 140 studies had to remain unattended. The results of each
study were - if not already given explicitly - recoded or transformed into normalized1 t-values.
Subsequently, we analyzed these (normalized) t-values on their own and their relationship with all
other recorded information in a meta regression analysis.
While interpreting the derived results, we have to keep in mind that the estimates of these
studies are somewhat distorted. Although the evidence of publication bias is not sufficient to
1The dependence on the degrees of freedom was removed and their sign made consistent.
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correct the data, the apparent sparse distribution in some regions of the (normalized) t-values
indicates that some bias is present. It should be less of a problem if the models were respecified
until their results look good because this is taken account of in our meta analysis. Nevertheless,
a publication bias may have other sources (intentional or unintentional). Therefore, the average
(normalized) t-value of −1.4 (median −1.37) should be interpreted carefully. It might be slightly
biased downwards (i.e., it is too small) but, on the other hand, it is averaged over all studies
and results. For example, as shown in section 3.5, studies conducted in the United Kingdom
or Germany yield results which are more in line with the deterrence theory than those studies
employing data from Canada (table 3.31). Another example is the type of offense (table 3.43):
while results for tax evasion, drunk driving and fraud - and property crime in general - are more
compatible with the deterrence hypothesis, those for homicide or assault are not. Results for the
probability of punishment are also more in favor of the deterrence hypothesis than those based on
the severity of punishment. It also seems important to note that studies focussing on deterrence
report results which are slightly but significantly more supportive of the deterrence hypothesis.
However, in every analysis those variables associated with the sample size are highly significant.
This also indicates, as explained in section 3.4, that some effect exists. All in all, summing over all
studies, the null-hypothesis of no deterrent effect should be discarded rather than accepted. This
view is also consistent with the overall opinion of the authors.
In a bivariate analysis we focus on comparisons of several selected variables we assume to be
important. Among other things, we find that when the authors or the journal belong to the field of
psychology or economics their results are significantly more in line with the deterrence hypothesis
than those from sociological or criminological authors or journals. As shown in table 3.36, the
results also vary largely between the most frequent authors. While there is no trend in the year
of publication, there is weak evidence that studies using newer data yield results which are less
in favor of the deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, studies using experiments do agree more with
the deterrence theory than those using time series, panel or cross sectional data. The same applies
when studies using no public data base are compared to those using the UCR.
When dealing with certain properties of the estimators there are also some distinctive features:
using the crime rate as the endogenous variable yields results which are less in favor of the deter-
rence hypothesis than most other definitions like the reported delinquency, accidents, etc. When
analyzing crime data the same is observed for exogenous variables: comparing police, inspection
variables or sentence lengths to arrest rates or convictions per crime, the latter are more in line
with the deterrence theory. In regard to surveys and experiments the same is observed for vari-
ables measuring the severity of punishment and the probability of detection. The studied offense
also seem to be important: while analyzing speeding, tax evasion, drunk driving, larceny, fraud
or environmental offenses, the reported estimates are supporting the deterrence hypothesis much
more than in the case of homicides, drug dealing, assault or the general crime rate. Furthermore,
there is evidence that the employed techniques play an important role. Using Pearson correlations,
path analysis or other multivariate (those not listed in table 3.48) methods yield results which are
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less supportive of the deterrence theory. Tobit analysis or GLS shows the contrary. For some tech-
niques (e.g., VAR methods) it is important whether or not simultaneity is considered; however the
effect is not consistent for all methods.
Although such bivariate comparisons have their merit one should not rely on them exclusively.
Some of the previously described effects vanish or are even reverted (e.g., the effect of some
authors like Piquero), when several variables are considered simultaneously in a multivariate set-
ting. We employ several methods to identify important variables and their influence: simple OLS,
EBA, stepwise regressions and bayesian estimators. To judge the quality of these methods their
performance in fitting and predicting the data, as well as their precision therein, is compared. We
conclude that the stepwise regression estimators are of superior quality in our case. However, there
are some issues all models agree upon: when studies provide tests of significance, deterrence is
their focus, are written by Ehrlich, deal with the possession of hard drugs, use a dummy as the
endogenous variable or do not correct for simultaneity, than their results are significantly more
in favor of the deterrence hypothesis. An opposite effect can be observed when Canadian people
are studied, the representativeness of the data is not checked, the death penalty is studied or when
poverty or welfare or urbanity or population (-growth) is used as a covariate.
When we resort to stepwise regression only we see that, additionally to those results just men-
tioned, the following properties imply more negative (normalized) t-values: being an economic
study, not being published in a journal, the author is Rasmussen or Hakim or Vire´n, large cities
or (small) villages are studied, the probability of detection and punishment (by an institution or
friends or family) is used in surveys, the probability of detection is used in experiments, the exoge-
nous variable refers to a whole year, misdemeanors or “other” offenses are studied, age or social
class or drug usage or spatial fixed effects or GDP or consumption is used as a covariate, bivariate
regression or point biserial correlation (however, the sign on Pearson correlation is indecisive) or
2SLS or GLS or MANOVA or an “other” multivariate method is employed.
By contrast, larger (normalized) t-values are observed when the author is from Sweden or
Switzerland or the Netherlands, the study is published in a journal, the author is Levitt, the study
is of criminological or sociological nature (however, there are differences within such journals),
the exogenous variable is the clearance rate or a sentence length or an incarceration rate or a police
variable, U.S. data is used, information about the data base is not missing, state-based data is used,
the exogenous variable is used in differences, crime is measured with recidivism, convicted to
prison sentences or accidents, the endo- and exogenous variable do not relate to the same offense,
possession of soft drugs or environmental offenses are studied, the offense has characteristics of
violent and property crime, marital status or morality or random effects or alcohol consumption
or risk propensity is implemented as a covariate, or binomial tests or COX regressions are used.
To sum up, there are several properties which significantly add to the determination of a study’s
results. This implies that the design of an empirical study and its authors determine - at least to
some extent - the published results. Furthermore, the large variety of results found in the literature
about the deterrent effect may partially be explained by the variety of implemented methods,
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study designs, employed sources and other properties. It would not be surprising when this also
applies to other interesting topics. However, although the size of empirical coverage in deterrence
research may not be unique, it is certainly an exception.
Even though this thesis has become very long there still remain aspects which deserve more at-
tention. The applied techniques have analytical deficiencies as they only cover linear relationships,
all eventually rely on OLS and their applicability is not perfect (as far as the usual assumptions
about the error terms are concerned). There are also several technical problems of which the com-
puting time and its scaling in the number of observations is most prominent. All EBA methods,
as well as the bayesian models, suffer from the restriction on a certain number of variables. Be-
side other regression methods like MMA or an optimization of the bayesian models (using other
priors or other model weights) the usage of non-linear methods could prove useful. Among such
methods, decision trees and RSDA have been previously tested with smaller test sets.
It is inherent to the data we use that different results may be derived therefrom. While some
results are derived from every method, some are not. Using the prediction quality and coverage is
just one way to judge the reliability of the estimators. We do not explicitly rule out that there may
be better ways to do so but we are confident that our tournament is a useable benchmark.
We are sure that further insights may be reached when the analysis is focussed on certain subsets
instead of using all data simultaneously. The subsets described in section 2.2 should be promising
candidates; especially the death penalty, drunk driving, tax evasion, environmental offenses and
Index I crimes. The established data base includes enough literature covering these subjects to
make such a specialized meta analyses viable. Furthermore, we have concentrated on the direction
of the influential variables and their significance but did not discuss the seize of their coefficients
and how these should be judged.
So, who benefits most from this thesis? What guidelines can be drawn for public policy? The
derived results should significantly improve the understanding of the existing studies which es-
timate the deterrent effect of the probability or severity of punishment. There have been many
ongoing discussions about the reliability of many results, the “correct” handling of the data and
their interpretation. A major contribution of this study is the provision of a guidance to properly
associate the discussion with the context. At least some discrepancies found in the literature can
be traced back to properties of the author, the design of the study and its estimators. Furthermore,
there is evidence that - considering all studies simultaneously - the existence of a deterrent effect is
much more likely than its absence. Although this may not stop the discussion about the existence
of a deterrent effect of punishment, this work is certainly a good and important argument.
Another aspect is the technical conception of this study which may be used as a guideline
for further meta regression analyses. This applies to the acquisition of the literature, the meta
regression methods, as well as their comparison and interpretation. The whole concept - or parts
of it - are applicable to many other fields in which a meta analysis is useful.
A Appendices
One of the most fortunate situations a scientist can encounter is
to enter a field in its infancy.
Bernhard Scho¨lkopf and Alexander J. Smola, Learning with
Kernels, 2001
Some statistics and tables are not really necessary to understand the full scope of the study.
Some parts, like A.1 and sections A.2, are just additional information and statistics about some
sections and further information which go beyond the central theme of this study.
On the other hand, section B.1 shows the basic statistics of all variables. Although these lists
are quite long, providing these seems essential for such a study. Finally, section B.2 gives a list
of all relevant and included studies accompanied by the opinion of their authors, their date of
publication and who entered the information into the data base.
A.1 Other Statistics
A.1.1 Statistics About the References
As in many other fields of science the number of publications has steadily increased over time, as
seen in figure A.1 (based on the 3598 references after the first stage of the search process; refer to
subsection 3.1.1). In fact, this is not true for all disciplines. Whereas sociological studies steadily
increased over time, economic publications decreased by a large amount in the eighties and re-
covered in the nineties, while “other” studies had a short temporary increase in the late eighties.
The drop in the field of economics could be explainable by a receding interest in explaining the
deterrence model after the long debate about Ehrlich’s studies which started in the mid seventies
and ebbed in the eighties. Then, it became popular to include deterrence measures as covariates
in other studies; e.g., to understand the crime-unemployment relationship (Entorf and Winker,
2002). It is also interesting to note that the non-economical and non-sociological literature started
to study deterrence after a lag of ten years (instead of the mid seventies, the main surge began in
the mid eighties).
It is not surprising that, the number of pages per study has increased over time, as can be
seen in figure A.2, and is significantly higher for sociological studies. Regressing the number
of pages on the year and dummies for economic and sociological studies (taking all other dis-
ciplines as the reference) for articles results in (t-vales in brackets): pages = 0.21(8.66)year+
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Figure A.1: Number of publications in the course of time (1950-2006)
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0.45(0.56)economic+ 4.4(6.27)sociologic− 401(−8.30) with N = 2505, adj. R2 = 0.05. The
picture remains largely the same if we look only at relevant studies in our data base: pages =
0.27(7.69)year+ 2.31(2.29)economic+ 5.09(5.46)sociologic− 520(−7.46) with N = 697 and
adj. R2 = 0.10.
In this context, it is also worth mentioning that there seems to be, when looking at the median
(normalized) t-value, an interesting relationship between the number of pages and the associated
approval of the deterrence theory. As the number of pages of a study increases, the median (nor-
malized) t-value increases as well (i.e., the deterrence theory is less supported). This is illustrated
by table A.1 (the categories are chosen in such a way that each contains approximately the same
amount of estimates). However, these differences are not significant and can be explained by the
finding that sociological studies are less supportive of the deterrence hypothesis and tend to consist
of more pages. When considering other factors this relationship is even reversed (see section 4.3).
A.1.2 Increasing Efficiency of the Literature Data Bases Over Time
In the nineties many (and now most) publishers are present in the internet and their publications
are administered electronically. The same applies for authors who publish their working papers
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Figure A.2: Number of pages per study in the course of time (1950-2006)
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Table A.1: Differences by the number of pages
Pages mean median % #e #s
1-9 −1.40 −1.73 48.03 1077 109
10-13 −1.33 −1.45 41.01 1160 119
19-27 −1.37 −1.35 40.53 1520 155
Overall mean −1.40 −1.37 41.66 6530 663
14-18 −1.41 −1.33 41.31 1394 139
28-439 −1.51 −1.11 38.81 1379 141
Mean and median correspond to the (normalized) t-values of the particular group. % is the percentage of estimates
which are consistent with the deterrence hypothesis and significant at a 5% level in a two sided test. #e is the
weighted number of all valid estimates. #s is the number of studies the estimates are based on. Italic entries are
not significant in the ANOVA at a 5% level, but are included, like the overall mean, to show otherwise interesting
or some selected groups. The underlined entry is the reference category.
on public sites. Since it benefits all, it is also common to store a study’s reference in various data
bases to make it available to a broader audience1. To a large extent this is not the case for many
1Though acquiring a new study is almost no problem anymore, it is still difficult to make a study known to the
relevant audience when it is not published in one of the most popular journals.
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old studies which aren’t published in a well known journal; especially working papers and articles
of minor journals. Although some data bases try to index such papers, their success is limited
because many papers are not available anymore. Whereas an electronic format (in most cases pdf)
stores the data in an easy accessible (text-)form, many old studies are, if at all, only available in a
(scanned) paper-form or on micro-film. These limitations of the available data bases were proved
to be strong in our research process, as can be seen by the ratio between the number of references
retrieved by the data bases and the references based on citations only 2, as depicted in figures A.3
and A.4.
Figure A.3: Source of all 3598 references in the course of time (1950-2006)
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After the first stage of the search process and attaining all available studies, 34.63% (31.89%
of all journal articles) of all references are taken from citations of acquired studies and another
3.22% (5.75%) from miscellaneous sources (refer to figure A.3 for the distribution over time).
This picture remains robust with respect to the relevance of these studies. In regard to all studies
which were attained and judged relevant (see figure A.4), 32.86 (32.82%) are based on citations
and 5.71% (2.25%) on other sources (numbers in parentheses are restricted to journal articles
only). The drop in the beginning of the 21th century of the references-by-studies is partly based
2Retrieval by data bases also included those studies which cite Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), as described in
section 3.1.
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Figure A.4: Source of all 840 relevant references in the course of time (1960-2006)
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on the fact that studies require some time to be referenced by other studies and the newest acquired
studies are from the first half of 2006.
A.2 Publication Bias
In the case of no effect the expected value of α0 (see subsection 3.4.1) is computed as
E[log(|t|)] = 2
∞∫
0
log(t)
Γ
(ν+1
2
)
√
piνΓ
( 1
ν
) (ν+ t2
ν
)− ν+12
dt
=
− log( 1ν )−Ψ(ν2 )− γ−2log2
2
=− log2+ γ
2
+
logν−Ψ(ν/2)− log2
2
=− log2+ γ
2
+O(1/ν)
≈−0.6351814
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The DiGamma-function Ψ is dΓ(x)dx
1
Γ(x) and the Euler-constant γ is approximately 0.5772157.
The term logν−Ψ(0.5ν)−log22 is O(1/ν) because
limsup
ν→∞
∣∣∣∣ν logν−Ψ(0.5ν)− log22
∣∣∣∣= 0.5.
Indeed, − log2+γ2 is the result derived from the standard normal distribution.
B Statistics of Variables and Studies
There is no safety in numbers, or in anything else.
James Thurber
The Codebook contains all variables in our data base, including the variables we have discarded
for various reasons (mainly due to the lack of observations). Afterwards, we show all studies in
our meta-data base along with some basic information (studied crime types, overall opinion of the
authors and the user who processed the study) and its reference (including the year of publication).
B.1 Codebook
The variables are sorted by their relationship to study- and estimate-properties and whether they
are metric or non-metric. Only non-empty entries of a variable are listed.
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics of the non-metric study-variables
Unweighted Weighted
Variable N Percent Cum. N Percent Cum.
Study: user
ah 122 17.43 17.43 1209.27 18.52 18.52
aw 197 28.14 45.57 1911.78 29.28 47.80
kr 22 3.14 48.71 175.17 2.68 50.48
mw 9 1.29 50.00 88.76 1.36 51.84
tr 350 50.00 100.00 3145.01 48.16 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: publication, type
conference paper 11 1.57 1.57 98.30 1.51 1.51
journal 604 86.29 87.86 5634.98 86.29 87.80
edited volume 28 4.00 91.86 260.70 3.99 91.79
working paper 34 4.86 96.71 321.90 4.93 96.72
miscellaneous 6 0.86 97.57 54.32 0.83 97.55
book 17 2.43 100.00 159.80 2.45 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: publication, thesis
PhD thesis 16 2.29 2.29 149.61 2.29 2.29
none 684 97.71 100.00 6380.39 97.71 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: publication, country
Argentina 3 0.43 0.43 30.55 0.47 0.47
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. . . last page of table B.1 continued
Unweighted Weighted
Variable N Percent Cum. N Percent Cum.
Australia 4 0.57 1.00 40.74 0.62 1.09
Belgium 2 0.29 1.29 20.37 0.31 1.40
Canada 23 3.29 4.57 234.24 3.59 4.99
Chile 1 0.14 4.71 10.18 0.16 5.15
China 1 0.14 4.86 0.00 0.00 5.15
Columbia 1 0.14 5.00 6.79 0.10 5.25
France 1 0.14 5.14 0.00 0.00 5.25
Germany 31 4.43 9.57 298.84 4.58 9.83
Ireland 2 0.29 9.86 20.37 0.31 10.14
Italy 1 0.14 10.00 10.18 0.16 10.30
Republic of Korea 1 0.14 10.14 10.18 0.16 10.45
Netherlands 18 2.57 12.71 166.34 2.55 13.00
Russia 1 0.14 12.86 5.09 0.08 13.08
Sweden 3 0.43 13.29 25.46 0.39 13.47
Switzerland 1 0.14 13.43 10.18 0.16 13.62
United Kingdom 56 8.00 21.43 539.47 8.26 21.88
USA 550 78.57 100.00 5101.00 78.12 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: publication, discipline
missing 12 1.71 1.71 104.50 1.60 1.60
law 35 5.00 6.71 346.27 5.30 6.90
criminology 142 20.29 27.00 1335.35 20.45 27.35
economy 250 35.71 62.71 2348.48 35.96 63.32
sociology 135 19.29 82.00 1267.33 19.41 82.72
psychology 20 2.86 84.86 183.32 2.81 85.53
miscellaneous 103 14.71 99.57 919.29 14.08 99.61
not applicable 3 0.43 100.00 25.46 0.39 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: author, country
missing 5 0.68 0.68 50.92 0.75 0.75
Argentina 3 0.41 1.09 30.55 0.45 1.20
Australia 16 2.19 3.28 132.40 1.94 3.14
Brasilia 4 0.55 3.83 37.34 0.55 3.69
Canada 34 4.65 8.48 336.08 4.93 8.62
Chile 1 0.14 8.62 6.79 0.10 8,72
China 4 0.55 9.17 40.74 0.60 9.32
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 0.14 9.30 10.18 0.15 9.47
Finland 6 0.82 10.12 49.65 0.73 10.20
France 1 0.14 10.26 10.18 0.15 10.35
Germany 22 3.01 13.27 207.58 3.05 13.39
India 2 0.27 13.54 20.37 0.30 13.69
Ireland 2 0.27 13.82 20.37 0.30 13.99
Israel 9 1.23 15.05 84.87 1.25 15.24
Italy 3 0.41 15.46 30.55 0.45 15.69
Japan 1 0.14 15.60 0.00 0.00 15.69
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Republic of Korea 3 0.41 16.01 30.55 0.45 16.14
Netherlands 8 1.09 17.10 81.47 1.20 17.33
New Zealand 2 0.27 17.37 20.37 0.30 17.63
Norway 2 0.27 17.65 19.69 0.29 17.82
Russia 1 0.14 17.78 5.09 0.07 17.99
Singapore 2 0.27 18.06 10.18 0.15 18.14
Spain 2 0.27 18.33 20.37 0.30 18.44
Sweden 6 0.82 19.15 61.11 0.90 19.34
Switzerland 8 1.09 20.25 66.20 0.97 20.31
Turkey 1 0.14 20.38 10.18 0.15 20.46
United Kingdom 30 4.10 24.49 275.35 4.04 24.50
USA 552 75.51 100.00 5142.61 75.50 100.00
Total 731 100.00 6811.77 100.00
Study: author, discipline
missing 54 7.28 7.28 429.44 6.19 6.19
law 26 3.50 10.78 233.14 3.36 9.55
criminology 75 10.11 20.89 738.41 10.64 20.19
economy 296 39.89 60.78 2807.36 40.45 60.63
sociology 178 23.99 84.77 1689.98 24.35 84.98
psychology 29 3.91 88.68 274.98 3.96 88.95
miscellaneous 84 11.32 100.00 767.25 11.05 100.00
Total 742 100.00 6940.56 100.00
Study: author, institution
missing 21 3.00 3.00 183.32 2.81 2.81
law 28 4.00 7.00 253.21 3.88 6.68
criminology 81 11.57 18.57 784.08 12.01 18.69
economy 287 41.00 59.57 2728.86 41.79 60.48
sociology 149 21.29 80.86 1390.23 21.29 81.77
psychology 24 3.43 84.29 218.96 3.35 85.13
miscellaneous 110 15.71 100.00 971.33 14.87 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: type
explorative 37 5.29 5.29 264.01 4.04 4.04
not explorative 663 94.71 100.00 6265.99 95.96 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: theory
traditional 349 49.86 49.86 3374.81 51.68 51.68
economical 269 38.43 88.29 2465.96 37.76 89.45
miscellaneous 82 11.71 100.00 689.24 10.55 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: time series
no 458 65.43 65.43 4294.65 65.77 65.77
yes 242 34.57 100.00 2235.35 34.23 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
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Study: cross section
no 534 76.29 76.29 5012.89 76.77 76.77
yes 166 23.71 100.00 1517.11 23.23 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: panel data
no 598 85.43 85.43 5530.25 84.69 84.69
yes 102 14.57 100.00 999.75 15.31 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: single survey
no 577 82.43 82.43 5368.70 82.22 82.22
yes 123 17.57 100.00 1161.30 17.78 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: repeated survey
no 674 96.29 96.29 6325.37 96.87 96.87
yes 26 3.71 100.00 204.63 3.13 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: panel survey
no 662 94.57 94.57 6162.95 94.38 94.38
yes 38 5.43 100.00 367.05 5.62 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: experiment (laboratory)
no 671 95.86 95.86 6244.84 95.63 95.63
yes 29 4.14 100.00 285.16 4.37 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: experiment (field, researcher initiative)
no 690 98.57 98.57 6428.16 98.44 98.44
yes 10 1.43 100.00 101.84 1.56 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: experiment (field, institutional initiative)
no 689 98.43 98.43 6428.16 98.44 98.44
yes 11 1.57 100.00 101.84 1.56 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: experiment (natural)
no 679 97.00 97.00 6333.10 96.98 96.98
yes 21 3.00 100.00 196.90 3.02 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: document analysis
no 694 99.14 99.14 6468.89 99.06 99.06
yes 6 0.86 100.00 61.11 0.94 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: multiple dimensions
no 700 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: miscellaneous
no 698 99.71 99.71 6509.63 99.69 99.69
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yes 2 0.29 100.00 20.37 0.31 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: experimental
missing 2 0.29 0.29 20.37 0.31 0.31
experimental 47 6.71 7.00 445.57 6.82 7.14
quasi experimental 65 9.29 16.29 572.87 8.77 15.91
not experimental 586 83.71 100.00 491.20 84.09 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: first population
missing 8 1.11 1.11 72.99 1.09 1.09
Argentina 4 0.56 1.67 40.74 0.61 1.69
Australia 13 1.81 3.48 112.03 1.67 3.36
Austria 1 0.14 3.62 10.18 0.15 3.51
Bangladesh 1 0.14 3.76 10.18 0.15 3.67
Brazil 1 0.14 3.90 10.18 0.15 3.82
Canada 28 3.90 7.80 280.07 4.17 7.99
China 3 0.42 8.22 30.55 0.46 8.44
Ecuador 1 0.14 8.36 10.18 0.15 8.60
Egypt 1 0.14 8.50 10.18 0.15 8.75
Finland 7 0.97 9.47 59.83 0.89 9.64
France 3 0.42 9.89 26.19 0.39 10.03
Germany 19 2.65 12.53 177.03 2.64 12.67
India 1 0.14 12.67 0.00 0.00 12.67
Ireland 2 0.28 12.95 20.37 0.30 12.97
Israel 4 0.56 13.51 33.95 0.51 13.48
Italy 4 0.56 14.07 40.74 0.61 14.08
Jamaica 1 0.14 14.21 10.18 0.15 14.23
Japan 4 0.56 14.76 30.55 0.46 14.69
Republic of Korea 2 0.28 15.04 20.37 0.30 14.99
Malaysia 2 0.28 15.32 20.37 0.30 15.30
Netherlands 8 1.11 16.43 81.47 1.21 16.51
New Zealand 4 0.56 16.99 40.74 0.61 17.12
Norway 3 0.42 17.41 24.78 0.37 17.49
Russia 2 0.28 17.69 15.28 0.23 17.71
South Africa 1 0.14 17.83 10.18 0.15 17.86
Spain 1 0.14 17.97 10.18 0.15 18.02
Sweden 9 1.25 19.22 91.66 1.37 19.38
Switzerland 8 1.11 20.33 66.20 0.99 20.37
Turkey 1 0.14 20.47 10.18 0.15 20.52
United Kingdom 33 4.60 25.07 327.26 4.87 25.39
USA 538 74.83 100.00 5008.50 74.61 100.00
Total 718 100.00
Study: second population
Albania 1 3.03 3.03 14.94 3.48 3.48
Finland 1 3.03 6.06 14.94 3.48 6.97
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Germany 2 6.06 12.12 29.89 6.97 13.93
Israel 1 3.03 15.15 14.94 3.48 17.42
Norway 2 6.06 21.21 29.89 6.97 24.38
Sweden 1 3.03 24.24 7.47 1.74 26.13
USA 25 75.76 100.00 16.92 73.87 100.00
Total 33 100.00 429.00 100.00
Study: sample base, first population
missing 3 0.43 0.43 30.55 0.47 0.47
complete country 262 37.43 37.86 2410.25 36.91 37.38
partial country 435 62.14 100.00 4089.20 62.62 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample base, second population
missing 667 95.29 95.29 6233.82 95.46 95.46
complete country 16 2.29 97.57 140.94 2.16 97.62
partial country 17 2.43 100.00 155.24 2.38 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, first population, nation
no 587 83.86 83.86 5509.41 84.37 84.37
yes 113 16.14 100.00 1020.59 15.63 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, first population, states
no 545 77.86 77.86 5099.55 78.09 78.09
yes 155 22.14 100.00 1430.45 21.91 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, first population, counties
no 525 75.00 75.00 4887.24 74.84 74.84
yes 175 25.00 100.00 1642.76 25.16 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, first population, individuals
no 570 81.43 81.43 5332.31 81.66 81.66
yes 130 18.57 100.00 1197.69 18.34 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, first population, groups
no 612 87.43 87.43 5663.11 86.72 86.72
yes 88 12.57 100.00 866.89 13.28 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, first population, actions
no 696 99.43 99.43 6489.26 99.38 99.38
yes 4 0.57 100.00 40.74 0.62 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, first population, miscellaneous
no 650 92.86 92.86 6046.35 92.59 92.59
yes 50 7.14 100.00 483.65 7.41 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, second population, nation
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no 697 99.57 99.57 6500.72 99.55 99.55
yes 3 0.43 100.00 29.28 0.45 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, second population, states
no 695 99.29 99.29 6481.99 99.26 99.26
yes 5 0.71 100.00 48.01 0.74 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, second population, counties
no 690 98.57 98.57 6450.90 98.79 98.79
yes 10 1.43 100.00 79.10 1.21 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, second population, individuals
no 688 98.29 98.29 6420.52 98.32 98.32
yes 12 1.71 100.00 109.48 1.68 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, second population, groups
no 697 99.57 99.57 6499.69 99.54 99.54
yes 3 0.43 100.00 30.31 0.46 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, second population, actions
no 700 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample unit, second population, miscellaneous
no 699 99.86 99.86 6519.82 99.84 99.84
yes 1 0.14 100.00 10.18 0.16 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample individuals, first population
missing 4 0.57 0.57 40.74 0.62 0.62
population 455 65.00 65.57 4165.76 63.79 64.42
students 78 11.14 76.71 762.06 11.67 76.09
pupils 23 3.29 80.00 200.49 3.07 79.16
prisoners 4 0.57 80.57 40.74 0.62 79.78
miscellaneous 136 19.43 100.00 1320.21 20.22 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: sample individuals, second population
missing 668 95.43 95.43 6244.00 95.62 95.62
population 19 2.71 98.14 166.57 2.55 98.17
students 3 0.43 98.57 30.55 0.47 98.64
pupils 1 0.14 98.71 9.94 0.15 98.79
miscellaneous 9 1.29 100.00 78.93 1.21 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: type of first sample
missing 413 59.00 59.00 3850.93 58.97 58.97
complete 74 10.57 69.57 641.15 9.82 68.79
random 118 16.86 86.43 1131.75 17.33 86.12
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quota 16 2.29 88.71 152.77 2.34 88.46
extreme 3 0.43 89.14 30.55 0.47 88.93
unsystematic 76 10.86 100.00 722.85 11.07 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: type of second sample
missing 685 97.86 97.86 6397.68 97.97 97.97
complete 2 0.29 98.14 17.65 0.27 98.24
random 10 1.43 99.57 90.91 1.39 99.64
extreme 1 0.14 99.71 10.18 0.16 99.79
unsystematic 2 0.29 100.00 13.58 0.21 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: data base
missing 63 9.00 9.00 629.50 9.64 9.64
PKS 8 1.14 10.14 74.93 1.15 10.79
UCR 163 23.29 33.43 1494.18 22.88 33.67
miscellaneous 280 40.00 73.43 2617.58 40.09 73.75
not public 186 26.57 100.00 1713.81 26.25 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: income, first population
missing 628 89.71 89.71 5815.92 89.06 89.06
above average 4 0.57 90.29 40.74 0.62 89.69
representative 7 1.00 91.29 68.74 1.05 90.74
below average 61 8.71 100.00 604.60 9.26 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: income, second population
missing 695 99.29 99.29 6481.87 99.26 99.26
representative 1 0.14 99.43 7.64 0.12 99.38
below average 4 0.57 100.00 40.49 0.62 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: education, first population
missing 630 90.00 90.00 5837.39 89.39 89.39
above average 63 9.00 99.00 624.96 9.57 98.96
representative 6 0.86 99.86 58.56 0.90 99.86
below average 1 0.14 100.00 9.09 0.14 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: education, second population
missing 697 99.57 99.57 6501.99 99.57 99.57
above average 2 0.29 99.86 20.37 0.31 99.88
representative 1 0.14 100.00 7.64 0.12 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: class, first population
missing 683 97.57 97.57 6361.91 97.43 97.43
upper above average 4 0.57 98.14 40.74 0.62 98.05
no class above average 7 1.00 99.14 68.74 1.05 99.10
lower above average 6 0.86 100.00 58.61 0.90 100.00
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Study: class, second population
missing 698 99.71 99.71 6512.18 99.73 99.73
no class above average 1 0.14 99.86 7.64 0.12 99.84
lower above average 1 0.14 100.00 10.18 0.16 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: disadvantaged group, first population
missing 686 98.00 98.00 6399.00 97.99 97.99
yes 10 1.43 99.43 90.26 1.38 99.38
no 4 0.57 100.00 40.74 0.62 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: disadvantaged group, second population
missing 700 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: percentage convicted, first population
missing 692 98.86 98.86 6449.62 98.77 98.77
1-25 percent 1 0.14 99.00 10.18 0.16 98.93
26-50 percent 1 0.14 99.14 9.09 0.14 99.06
51-75 percent 2 0.29 99.43 20.37 0.31 99.38
76-100 percent 4 0.57 100.00 40.74 0.62 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: percentage convicted, second population
missing 700 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: main location, first population
missing 655 93.57 93.57 6100.98 93.43 93.43
1000-5000 inhabitants 1 0.14 93.71 10.18 0.16 93.59
5000-20000 inhabitants 2 0.29 94.00 19.27 0.30 93.88
20000-100000 inhabitants 6 0.86 94.86 50.92 0.78 94.66
100000-500000 inhabitants 9 1.29 96.14 91.66 1.40 96.06
>500000 inhabitants 24 3.43 99.57 226.43 3.47 99.53
mixed 3 0.43 100.00 30.55 0.47 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: main location, second population
missing 698 99.71 99.71 6512.35 99.73 99.73
>500000 inhabitants 2 0.29 100.00 17.65 0.27 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: urbanity, first population
missing 644 92.00 92.00 5986.11 91.67 91.67
smaller cities above average 7 1.00 93.00 68.92 1.06 92.73
representative 7 1.00 94.00 68.74 1.05 93.78
large cities above average 42 6.00 100.00 406.23 6.22 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: urbanity, second population
missing 698 99.71 99.71 6512.35 99.73 99.73
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large cities above average 2 0.29 100.00 17.65 0.27 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: claims representativeness
missing 334 47.71 47.71 3139.46 48.08 48.08
yes 137 19.57 67.29 1266.48 19.39 67.47
no 229 32.71 100.00 2124.06 32.53 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: tests representativeness
missing 161 23.00 23.00 1566.28 23.99 23.99
yes 21 3.00 26.00 186.71 2.86 26.85
no 518 74.00 100.00 4777.01 73.15 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: data are representative
missing 681 97.29 97.29 6357.55 97.36 97.36
yes 3 0.43 97.71 28.76 0.44 97.80
no 16 2.29 100.00 143.70 2.20 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: performs pretest
yes 19 2.71 2.71 168.48 2.58 2.58
no 681 97.29 100.00 6361.52 97.42 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: pretest questions
missing 38 5.43 5.43 340.39 5.21 5.21
open 10 1.43 6.86 91.66 1.40 6.62
open and closed 15 2.14 9.00 134.09 2.05 8.67
closed 148 21.14 30.14 1404.47 21.51 30.18
not applicable 489 69.86 100.00 4559.39 69.82 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: error and plausibility checks
yes 220 31.43 31.43 2053.09 31.44 31.44
no 480 68.57 100.00 4476.91 68.56 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: check for reliability
yes 33 4.71 4.71 324.26 4.97 4.97
no 667 95.29 100.00 6205.74 95.03 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: reliability check results
missing 669 95.57 95.57 6215.93 95.19 95.19
for all variables 9 1.29 96.86 90.26 1.38 96.57
for some variables 22 3.14 100.00 223.81 3.43 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: values of reliability checks
missing 669 95.57 95.57 6226.11 95.35 95.35
yes 25 3.57 99.14 252.97 3.87 99.22
no 6 0.86 100.00 50.92 0.78 100.00
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Study: reliability method
missing 673 96.14 96.14 6256.67 95.81 95.81
Cronbach’s α 23 3.29 99.43 232.60 3.56 99.38
Guttman 1 0.14 99.57 10.18 0.16 99.53
Correlation 1 0.14 99.71 10.18 0.16 99.69
Miscellaneous 2 0.29 100.00 20.37 0.31 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: reliable variables
missing 668 95.43 95.43 6205.74 95.03 95.03
some 2 0.29 95.71 20.37 0.31 95.35
yes 25 3.57 99.29 254.37 3.90 99.24
unknown 5 0.71 100.00 49.52 0.76 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: check for validity
yes 17 2.43 2.43 136.53 2.09 2.09
no 683 97.57 100.00 6393.47 97.91 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: validity test
missing 686 98.00 98.00 6413.84 98.22 98.22
for all variables 2 0.29 98.29 15.28 0.23 98.46
for some variables 12 1.71 100.00 100.89 1.54 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: validity test method
missing 687 98.14 98.14 6424.02 98.38 98.38
by criteria 7 1.00 99.14 62.46 0.96 99.33
by construction 3 0.43 99.57 18.05 0.28 99.61
miscellaneous 3 0.43 100.00 25.46 0.39 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: valid variables
missing 683 97.57 97.57 6393.47 97.91 97.91
no 1 0.14 97.71 10.18 0.16 98.07
yes 13 1.86 99.57 105.98 1.62 99.69
unknown 3 0.43 100.00 20.37 0.31 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: conditions for significance check fulfilled
yes 348 49.71 49.71 3317.27 50.80 50.80
almost 274 39.14 88.86 2527.22 38.70 89.50
almost not 52 7.43 96.29 451.27 6.91 96.41
no 26 3.71 100.00 234.24 3.59 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: tests of significance
missing 3 0.43 0.43 30.55 0.47 0.47
yes 614 87.71 88.14 5915.06 90.58 91.05
no 83 11.86 100.00 584.39 8.95 100.00
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Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: values of relationships
missing 3 0.43 0.43 30.55 0.47 0.47
yes 619 88.43 88.86 5913.85 90.56 91.03
no 78 11.14 100.00 585.60 8.97 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: uses covariates
yes 553 79.00 79.00 5260.02 80.55 80.55
no 147 21.00 100.00 1269.98 19.45 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: problems reported by author
yes 238 34.00 34.00 2194.16 33.60 33.60
no 462 66.00 100.00 4335.84 66.40 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: problems reported by reader
no 189 27.00 27.00 1839.95 28.18 28.18
some 438 62.57 89.57 4151.97 63.58 91.76
severe 73 10.43 100.00 538.07 8.24 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: quality index
0 (good) 138 19.71 19.71 1347.68 20.64 20.64
1 2 0.29 20.00 20.37 0.31 20.95
2 49 7.00 27.00 471.90 7.23 28.18
3 281 40.14 67.14 2687.72 41.16 69.34
4 28 4.00 71.14 254.70 3.90 73.24
5 129 18,43 89.57 1209.55 18.52 91.76
6 43 6.14 95.71 300.44 4.60 96.36
7 2 0.29 96.00 10.18 0.16 96.52
8 (bad) 28 4.00 100.00 227.45 3.48 100.00
Total 700 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Study: author opinion, violent crime, probability
strongly agree 69 20.97 20.97 871.04 21.47 21.47
partially agree 101 30.70 51.67 1259.70 31.05 52.52
indecisive 41 12.46 64.13 462.15 11.39 63.91
partially disagree 67 20.36 84.50 834.94 20.58 84.49
fully disagree 51 15.50 100.00 629.17 15.51 100.00
Total 329 100.00 4057.00 100.00
Study: author opinion, violent crime, severity
strongly agree 32 20.38 20.38 489.37 21.93 21.93
partially agree 37 23.57 43.95 550.24 24.65 46.58
indecisive 29 18.47 62.42 366.75 16.43 63.01
partially disagree 30 19.11 81.53 398.02 17.83 80.84
fully disagree 29 18.47 100.00 427.61 19.16 100.00
Total 157 100.00 2232.00 100.00
Study: author opinion, property crime, probability
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strongly agree 106 31.74 31.74 1391.31 32.19 32.19
partially agree 109 32.63 64.37 1439.27 33.30 65.49
indecisive 37 11.08 75.45 462.43 10.70 76.19
partially disagree 48 14.37 89.82 585.60 13.55 89.75
fully disagree 34 10.18 100.00 443.19 10.25 100.00
Total 334 100.00 4322.00 100.00
Study: author opinion, property crime, severity
strongly agree 29 19.33 19.33 492.05 18.96 18.96
partially agree 31 20.67 40.00 571.18 22.01 40.97
indecisive 25 16.67 56.67 396.96 15.30 56.27
partially disagree 40 26.67 83.33 678.67 26.15 82.42
fully disagree 25 16.67 100.00 456.14 17.58 100.00
Total 150 100.00 2595.00 100.00
Study: author opinion, other crime, probability
strongly agree 43 16.04 16.04 375.61 15.09 15.09
partially agree 117 43.66 59.70 1136.10 45.65 60.74
indecisive 16 5.97 65.67 141.26 5.68 66.41
partially disagree 46 17.16 82.84 433.44 17.41 83.83
fully disagree 46 17.16 100.00 402.59 16.17 100.00
Total 268 100.00 2489.00 100.00
Study: author opinion, other crime, severity
strongly agree 23 14.29 14.29 266.95 14.60 14.60
partially agree 40 24.84 39.13 454.23 24.83 39.43
indecisive 18 11.18 50.31 211.10 11.54 50.97
partially disagree 32 19.88 70.19 369.92 20.23 71.20
fully disagree 48 29.81 100.00 526.80 28.80 100.00
Total 161 100.00 1829.00 100.00
Columns 2-4 are not weighted and refer to one estimate per study. Columns 5-7 are weighted and relate to all
valid estimates. For reasons of parsimony the authors and journals are not displayed in this list.
Table B.2: Descriptive statistics of the non-metric estimate-variables
Unweighted Weighted
Variable N Percent Cum. N Percent Cum.
Estimate: deterrence is focus-variable
yes 7133 91.19 91.19 5563.96 85.21 85.21
no 689 8.81 100.00 966.04 14.79 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: complete sample
missing 1 0.01 0.01
yes 6209 79.38 79.39 5558.02 85.12 85.12
no 1612 20.61 100.00 971.98 14.88 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
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Estimate: sub-sample, sex
missing 7637 97.63 97.63 6384.54 97.77 97.77
female 73 0.93 98.57 51.12 0.78 98.56
male 112 1.43 100.00 94.34 1.44 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: sub-sample, age
missing 7525 96.20 96.20 6416.82 98.27 98.27
younger 181 2.31 98.52 83.38 1.28 99.54
older 116 1.48 100.00 29.79 0.46 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: sub-sample, urbanity
missing 7759 99.19 99.19 6461.51 98.95 98.95
urban 54 0.69 99.88 53.86 0.82 99.78
rural 9 0.12 100.00 14.63 0.22 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: sub-sample, education
missing 7819 99.96 99.96 6509.63 99.69 99.69
low 2 0.03 99.99 15.28 0.23 99.92
high 1 0.01 100.00 5.09 0.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: sub-sample, norm acceptance
missing 7816 99.92 99.92 6525.93 99.94 99.94
low 3 0.04 99.96 2.04 0.03 99.97
high 3 0.04 100.00 2.04 0.03 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: sub-sample, expected probability of detection
missing 7709 98.56 98.56 6473.72 99.14 99.14
low 33 0.42 98.98 27.68 0.42 99.56
medium 21 0.27 99.25 6.46 0.10 99.66
high 59 0.75 100.00 22.13 0.34 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, index
missing 7484 95.68 95.68 6296.90 96.43 96.43
additive, unweighted 69 0.88 96.56 41.47 0.64 97.07
additive, weighted 8 0.10 96.66 14.00 0.21 97.28
mean 1 0.01 96.68 0.68 0.01 97.29
multiplicative 173 2.21 98.89 125.79 1.93 99.22
miscellaneous 87 1.11 100.00 51.15 0.78 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, index items processed
missing 7503 95.92 95.92 6323.47 96.84 96.84
raw 304 3.89 99.81 181.07 2.77 99.61
standardized 10 0.13 99.94 10.18 0.16 99.77
miscellaneous 5 0.06 100.00 15.28 0.23 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
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Estimate: study type
Death Penalty 842 10.76 10.76 534.20 8.18 8.18
Crime Data 4066 51.98 62.75 3569.17 54.66 62.84
Survey 2569 32.84 95.59 1595.07 24.43 87.27
Experiment 345 4.41 100.00 831.57 12.73 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, existence of death penalty
no 7747 99.04 99.04 6463.02 98.97 98.97
yes 75 0.96 100.00 66.98 1.03 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, conviction rate
no 7815 99.91 99.91 6510.99 99.71 99.71
yes 7 0.09 100.00 19.01 0.29 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, percentage of all convictions
no 7726 98.77 98.77 6484.80 99.31 99.31
yes 96 1.23 100.00 45.20 0.69 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, execution rate
no 7288 93.17 93.17 6215.23 95.18 95.18
yes 534 6.83 100.00 314.77 4.82 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, death penalty, other
no 7686 98.26 98.26 6433.28 98.52 98.52
yes 136 1.74 100.00 96.72 1.48 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, clearance rate
no 7432 95.01 95.01 6186.25 94.74 94.74
yes 390 4.99 100.00 343.75 5.26 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, arrest rate
no 6980 89.24 89.24 5911.20 90.52 90.52
yes 842 10.76 100.00 618.80 9.48 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, conviction rate
no 7512 96.04 96.04 6275.12 96.10 96.10
yes 310 3.96 100.00 254.88 3.90 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, percentage of conviction, adult criminal law
no 7822 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, discontinuation rate
no 7822 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
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Estimate: exogenous, crime data, indictment rate
no 7809 99.83 99.83 6523.82 99.91 99.91
yes 13 0.17 100.00 6.18 0.09 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, refraining from punishment (percentage of all con-
victions)
no 7822 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, parole rate
no 7799 99.71 99.71 6519.58 99.84 99.84
yes 23 0.29 100.00 10.42 0.16 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, prison sentences per conviction
no 7807 99.81 99.81 6517.90 99.81 99.81
yes 15 0.19 100.00 12.10 0.19 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, parole-rate (only if applicable)
no 7822 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, incarcerations (absolute or per capita)
no 7720 98.70 98.70 6472.88 99.13 99.13
yes 102 1.30 100.00 57.12 0.87 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, incarceration rate
no 7739 98.94 98.94 6488.14 99.36 99.36
yes 83 1.06 100.00 41.86 0.64 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, mean sentence length (sentenced)
no 7549 96.51 96.51 6396.57 97.96 97.96
yes 273 3.49 100.00 133.43 2.04 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, inspections
no 7744 99.00 99.00 6450.78 98.79 98.79
yes 78 1.00 100.00 79.22 1.21 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, mean sentence length (served)
no 7611 97.30 97.30 6417.77 98.28 98.28
yes 211 2.70 100.00 112.23 1.72 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, time between offense and clearance
no 7818 99.95 99.95 6527.45 99.96 99.96
yes 4 0.05 100.00 2.55 0.04 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, time between offense and conviction
no 7820 99.97 99.97 6530.00 100.00 100.00
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yes 2 0.03 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police expenditures
no 7577 96.87 96.87 6272.29 96.05 96.05
yes 245 3.13 100.00 257.71 3.95 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, police strength
no 7364 94.14 94.14 6016.77 92.14 92.14
yes 458 5.86 100.00 513.23 7.86 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, other
no 7240 92.56 92.56 5972.23 91.46 91.46
yes 582 7.44 100.00 557.77 8.54 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, probability dummy (regime shift)
no 7723 98.73 98.73 6301.50 96.50 96.50
yes 99 1.27 100.00 228.50 3.50 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, severity dummy (regime shift)
no 7654 97.85 97.85 6295.68 96.41 96.41
yes 168 2.15 100.00 234.32 3.59 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, probation rate
no 7787 99.55 99.55 6517.33 99.81 99.81
yes 35 0.45 100.00 12.67 0.19 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, incarceration per crime
no 7728 98.80 98.80 6471.10 99.10 99.10
yes 94 1.20 100.00 58.90 0.90 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, convicted per crime
no 7784 99.51 99.51 6489.16 99.37 99.37
yes 38 0.49 100.00 40.84 0.63 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, crime data, fine
no 7774 99.40 99.40 6487.42 99.35 99.35
yes 47 0.60 100.00 42.58 0.65 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, surveyed is . . .
missing 5403 69.07 69.07 5003.23 76.62 76.62
delinquent 2159 27.60 96.68 1335.16 20.45 97.07
fictitious delinquent 260 3.32 100.00 191.61 2.93 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, is experiment
missing 5324 68.06 68.06 4961.81 75.98 75.98
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yes 27 0.35 68.41 59.83 0.92 76.90
no 2471 31.59 100.00 1508.36 23.10 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by police
no 7047 90.09 90.09 6063.72 92.86 92.86
yes 775 9.91 100.00 466.28 7.14 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by justice
no 7338 93.81 93.81 6238.28 95.53 95.53
yes 484 6.19 100.00 291.72 4.47 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, type of punishment
no 7761 99.22 99.22 6512.80 99.74 99.74
yes 61 0.78 100.00 17.20 0.26 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by justice
no 7307 93.42 93.42 6318.64 96.76 96.76
yes 515 6.58 100.00 211.36 3.24 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of civil punishment
no 7818 99.95 99.95 6525.76 99.94 99.94
yes 4 0.05 100.00 4.24 0.06 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of civil punishment
no 7821 99.99 99.99 6529.15 99.99 99.99
yes 1 0.01 100.00 0.85 0.01 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by employment law
no 7798 99.69 99.69 6490.52 99.40 99.40
yes 24 0.31 100.00 39.48 0.60 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by employment law
no 7808 99.82 99.82 6501.14 99.56 99.56
yes 14 0.18 100.00 28.86 0.44 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of other kind of punishment
no 7775 99.40 99.40 6503.98 99.60 99.60
yes 47 0.60 100.00 26.02 0.40 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of other kind of punishment
no 7809 99.83 99.83 6511.16 99.71 99.71
yes 13 0.17 100.00 18.84 0.29 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by friends or family
no 7789 99.58 99.58 6518.95 99.83 99.83
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yes 33 0.42 100.00 11.05 0.17 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by friends or family
no 7583 96.94 96.94 6424.74 98.39 98.39
yes 239 3.06 100.00 105.26 1.61 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by friends or family
no 7683 98.22 98.22 6467.95 99.05 99.05
yes 139 1.78 100.00 62.05 0.95 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of detection by others
no 7779 99.45 99.45 6503.11 99.59 99.59
yes 43 0.55 100.00 26.89 0.41 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, probability of punishment by others
no 7751 99.09 99.09 6471.36 99.10 99.10
yes 71 0.91 100.00 58.64 0.90 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, severity of punishment by others
no 7803 99.76 99.76 6501.14 99.56 99.56
yes 19 0.24 100.00 28.86 0.44 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, time between offense and clearance
no 7795 99.65 99.65 6520.76 99.86 99.86
yes 27 0.35 100.00 9.24 0.14 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, time between offense and conviction
no 7812 99.87 99.87 6525.02 99.92 99.92
yes 10 0.13 100.00 4.98 0.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, previous experience with police or justice
no 7791 99.60 99.60 6473.99 99.14 99.14
yes 31 0.40 100.00 56.01 0.86 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, other
no 7653 97.84 97.84 6286.36 96.27 96.27
yes 169 2.16 100.00 243.64 3.73 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, survey, relates to . . .
missing 5322 68.04 68.04 4960.67 75.97 75.97
the present 2378 30.40 98.44 1391.96 21.32 97.28
the past 122 1.56 100.00 177.38 2.72 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, is experiment
missing 7477 95.59 95.59 5705.22 87.37 87.37
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yes 139 1.78 97.37 469.33 7.19 94.56
no 206 2.63 100.00 355.45 5.44 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, experimental variation of probability of detection
no 7783 99.50 99.50 6394.04 97.92 97.92
yes 39 0.50 100.00 135.96 2.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, actual variation of probability of detection
no 7697 98.40 98.40 6272.00 96.05 96.05
yes 125 1.60 100.00 258.00 3.95 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, actual variation of severity of punishment
no 7779 99.45 99.45 6393.02 97.90 97.90
yes 43 0.55 100.00 136.98 2.10 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, experimental variation of severity of punishment
no 7731 98.84 98.84 6390.29 97.86 97.86
yes 91 1.16 100.00 139.71 2.14 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, game losses (delinquent)
no 7821 99.99 99.99 6524.91 99.92 99.92
yes 1 0.01 100.00 5.09 0.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, game losses (fictitious delinquent)
no 7822 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, utility balance (delinquent)
no 7817 99.94 99.94 6509.63 99.69 99.69
yes 5 0.06 100.00 20.37 0.31 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, utility balance (fictitious delinquent)
no 7822 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, other
no 7776 99.41 99.41 6389.12 97.84 97.84
yes 46 0.59 100.00 140.88 2.16 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, experiment, relates to . . .
missing 7478 95.60 95.60 5593.19 85.65 85.65
present 328 4.19 99.80 906.25 13.88 99.53
past 16 0.20 100.00 30.55 0.47 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, relates to . . .
missing 1413 18.06 18.06 825.43 12.64 12.64
under one year 1972 22.21 43.28 2130.39 32.62 45.27
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one year 3570 45.64 88.92 2786.08 42.67 87.93
more than one year 867 11.08 100.00 788.10 12.07 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 5924.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, category
missing 34 0.43 0.43 75.36 1.15 1.15
binary 914 11.68 12.12 1232.60 18.88 20.03
nominal 41 0.52 12.64 16.13 0.25 20.28
ordinal 750 9.59 22.23 483.20 7.40 27.68
metric 5116 65.41 87.64 4129.71 63.24 90.92
interval 967 12.36 100.00 593.00 9.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, in logs
missing 455 5.82 5.82 306.76 4.70 4.70
yes 1571 20.08 25.90 1319.27 20.20 24.90
no 5796 74.10 100.00 4903.98 75.10 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, in differences
missing 7589 97.02 97.02 6310.53 96.64 96.64
yes 227 2.90 99.92 204.20 3.13 99.77
no 6 0.08 100.00 15.28 0.23 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: exogenous, other transformation
missing 433 5.54 5.54 288.89 4.42 4.42
yes 361 4.62 10.15 368.42 5.64 10.07
no 7028 89.85 100.00 5872.70 89.93 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, index
missing 7659 97.92 97.92 6424.22 98.38 98.38
additive, unweighted 49 0.63 98.54 49.75 0.76 99.14
additive, weighted 42 0.54 99.08 6.74 0.10 99.25
mean 58 0.74 99.82 30.30 0.46 99.71
multiplicative 9 0.12 99.94 13.58 0.21 99.92
miscellaneous 5 0.06 100.00 5.41 0.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, number of reported crimes (absolute numbers)
no 7230 92.43 92.43 5808.12 88.95 88.95
yes 592 7.57 100.00 721.88 11.05 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, number of registered suspects
no 7800 99.72 99.72 6492.61 99.43 99.43
yes 22 0.28 100.00 37.39 0.57 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, number of incarcerated
no 7816 99.92 99.92 6495.20 99.47 99.47
yes 6 0.08 100.00 34.80 0.53 100.00
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Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, crime rate
no 3745 47.88 47.88 3611.54 55.31 55.31
yes 4077 52.12 100.00 2918.46 44.69 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, number of suspects
no 7816 99.92 99.92 6524.18 99.91 99.91
yes 6 0.08 100.00 5.82 0.09 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, number of convicted
no 7807 99.81 99.81 6509.63 99.69 99.69
yes 15 0.19 100.00 20.37 0.31 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, number of convicted to prison sentence
no 7807 99.81 99.81 6516.42 99.79 99.79
yes 15 0.19 100.00 13.58 0.21 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, self reported delinquency
no 5921 75.70 75.70 5346.10 81.87 81.87
yes 1901 24.30 100.00 1183.90 18.13 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, probability of future delinquency (surveyed is delinquent)
no 7369 94.21 94.21 6263.63 95.92 95.92
yes 453 5.79 100.00 266.37 4.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, probability of future delinquency (fictitious delinquent)
no 7802 99.74 99.74 6509.27 99.68 99.68
yes 20 0.26 100.00 20.73 0.32 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, probability of delinquency of fictitious offense (surveyed is delin-
quent)
no 7761 99.22 99.22 6452.44 98.81 98.81
yes 61 0.78 100.00 77.56 1.19 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, probability of delinquency of fictitious offense (surveyed is ficti-
tious delinquent)
no 7808 99.82 99.82 6480.10 99.24 99.24
yes 14 0.18 100.00 49.90 0.76 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, other
no 7550 96.52 96.52 5862.18 89.77 89.77
yes 272 3.48 100.00 667.82 10.23 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, recidivism
no 7788 99.57 99.57 6485.87 99.32 99.32
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yes 34 0.43 100.00 44.13 0.68 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, accidents
no 7632 97.57 97.57 6255.59 95.80 95.80
yes 190 2.43 100.00 274.41 4.20 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, violating prescriptive limits
no 7681 98.20 98.20 6343.36 97.14 97.14
yes 141 1.80 100.00 186.64 2.86 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, relates to . . .
missing 2040 26.08 26.08 1312.88 20.11 20.11
under one year 1704 21.78 47.86 1908.00 29.22 49.32
one year 3209 41.03 88.89 2555.30 39.13 88.46
more than one year 869 11.11 100.00 753.82 11.54 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, self reported delinquency
missing 5982 76.48 76.48 5421.42 83.02 83.02
under one year 329 4.21 80.68 288.55 4.42 87.44
one year 1134 14.50 95.18 535.66 8.20 95.65
since age of 14 32 0.41 95.59 39.04 0.60 96.24
lifelong 345 4.41 100.00 245.33 3.76 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, future self reported delinquency
missing 7339 93.83 93.83 6255.52 95.80 95.80
under one year 73 0.93 94.76 79.78 1.22 97.02
one year 77 0.98 95.74 57.29 0.88 97.90
more than one year 43 0.55 96.29 7.91 0.12 98.02
unlimited 290 3.71 100.00 129.51 1.98 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous and exogenous relate to the same offense
missing 27 0.35 0.35 42.59 0.65 0.65
yes 7363 94.13 94.48 6075.90 93.05 93.70
no 432 5.52 100.00 411.52 6.30 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: crime category, crimes
no 445 5.69 5.69 556.10 8.52 8.52
yes 7377 94.31 100.00 5973.90 91.48 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: crime category, misdemeanors
no 7266 92.89 92.89 5910.26 90.51 90.51
yes 556 7.11 100.00 619.74 9.49 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: crime category, formal deviant behavior
no 7653 97.84 97.84 6369.00 97.53 97.53
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yes 169 2.16 100.00 161.00 2.47 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: crime category, informal deviant behavior
no 7684 98.24 98.24 6416.96 98.27 98.27
yes 138 1.76 100.00 113.04 1.73 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: crime category, violation of game-rules
no 7781 99.48 99.48 6372.14 97.58 97.58
yes 41 0.52 100.00 157.86 2.42 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: crime category, other
no 7762 99.23 99.23 6434.10 98.53 98.53
yes 60 0.77 100.00 95.90 1.47 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, homicide
no 6121 78.25 78.25 5114.99 78.33 78.33
yes 1701 21.75 100.00 1415.01 21.67 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, manslaughter
no 7752 99.11 99.11 6448.84 98.76 98.76
yes 70 0.89 100.00 81.16 1.24 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, assault
no 6957 88.94 88.94 5869.42 89.88 89.88
yes 865 11.06 100.00 660.58 10.12 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, negligent assault
no 7686 98.26 98.26 6410.74 98.17 98.17
yes 136 1.74 100.00 119.26 1.83 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, malicious mischief
no 7659 97.92 97.92 6437.36 98.58 98.58
yes 163 2.08 100.00 92.64 1.42 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, burglary
no 6970 89.11 89.11 5734.70 87.82 87.82
yes 852 10.89 100.00 795.30 12.18 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, robbery
no 6852 87.60 87.60 5740.93 87.92 87.92
yes 970 12.40 100.00 789.07 12.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, larceny (Index I, general)
no 6679 85.39 85.39 5709.09 87.43 87.43
yes 1143 14.61 100.00 820.91 12.57 100.00
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Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, larceny (inferior)
no 7521 96.15 96.15 6356.75 97.35 97.35
yes 301 3.85 100.00 173.25 2.65 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, larceny (severe)
no 7519 96.13 96.13 6322.85 96.83 96.83
yes 303 3.87 100.00 207.15 3.17 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, drug possession (soft)
no 7764 99.26 99.26 6485.11 99.31 99.31
yes 58 0.74 100.00 44.89 0.69 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, drug dealing (soft)
no 7758 99.18 99.18 6488.48 99.36 99.36
yes 64 0.82 100.00 41.52 0.64 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, drug possession (hard)
no 7804 99.77 99.77 6497.84 99.51 99.51
yes 18 0.23 100.00 32.16 0.49 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, drug dealing (hard)
no 7782 99.49 99.49 6500.81 99.55 99.55
yes 40 0.51 100.00 29.19 0.45 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, drug related crime (general)
no 7338 93.81 93.81 6241.83 95.59 95.59
yes 484 6.19 100.00 288.17 4.41 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, rape
no 7320 93.58 93.58 6078.18 93.08 93.08
yes 502 6.42 100.00 451.82 6.92 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, sexual assault
no 7751 99.09 99.09 6497.45 99.50 99.50
yes 71 0.91 100.00 32.55 0.50 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, other sexual related crimes
no 7766 99.28 99.28 6479.50 99.23 99.23
yes 56 0.72 100.00 50.50 0.77 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, speeding
no 7774 99.39 99.39 6457.53 98.89 98.89
yes 48 0.61 100.00 72.47 1.11 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
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Estimate: offense, driving without a licence
no 7786 99.54 99.54 6527.27 99.96 99.96
yes 36 0.46 100.00 2.73 0.04 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, drunk driving
no 7323 93.62 93.62 5742.83 87.95 87.95
yes 499 6.38 100.00 787.17 12.05 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, fare dodging
no 7731 98.84 98.84 6506.06 99.63 99.63
yes 91 1.16 100.00 23.94 0.37 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, blackmailing
no 7817 99.94 99.94 6513.87 99.75 99.75
yes 5 0.06 100.00 16.13 0.25 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, fraud
no 7525 96.20 96.20 6273.26 96.07 96.07
yes 297 3.80 100.00 256.74 3.93 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, tax evasion
no 7563 96.69 96.69 6056.33 92.75 92.75
yes 259 3.31 100.00 473.67 7.25 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, defalcation
no 7806 99.80 99.80 6522.62 99.89 99.89
yes 16 0.20 100.00 7.38 0.11 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, embezzlement
no 7800 99.72 99.72 6522.79 99.89 99.89
yes 22 0.28 100.00 7.21 0.11 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, smuggling
no 7812 99.87 99.87 6528.07 99.97 99.97
yes 10 0.13 100.00 1.93 0.03 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, other crimes
no 7312 93.48 93.48 6003.69 91.94 91.94
yes 510 6.52 100.00 526.31 8.06 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, crime rate (general)
no 7501 95.90 95.90 6127.96 93.84 93.84
yes 321 4.10 100.00 402.04 6.16 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, other misdemeanors
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no 7562 96.68 96.68 6323.89 96.84 96.84
yes 260 3.32 100.00 206.11 3.16 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, other
no 7528 96.24 96.24 6069.87 92.95 92.95
yes 294 3.76 100.00 460.13 7.05 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, vehicle theft
no 7174 91.72 91.72 5972.46 91.46 91.46
yes 648 8.28 100.00 557.54 8.54 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: offense, environmental crimes or violations of prescriptive limits
no 7699 98.43 98.43 6378.70 97.68 97.68
yes 123 1.57 100.00 151.30 2.32 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, income inequality
no 7076 90.46 90.46 6007.53 92.00 92.00
yes 746 9.54 100.00 522.47 8.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, time trend
no 7530 96.27 96.27 6178.56 94.62 94.62
yes 292 3.73 100.00 351.44 5.38 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: characteristics
missing 232 2.97 2.97 239.63 3.67 3.67
property offenses 2591 33.12 36.09 1959.87 30.01 33.68
violent offenses 1160 14.83 50.92 984.77 15.08 48.76
property and violent offenses 3839 49.08 100.00 3345.73 51.24 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, category
missing 27 0.35 0.35 60.09 0.92 0.92
binary 447 5.71 6.06 625.76 9.58 10.50
nominal 162 2.07 8.13 20.37 0.31 10.81
ordinal 276 3.53 11.66 299.77 4.59 15.41
metric 6597 84.34 96.00 5256.87 80.50 95.91
interval 313 4.00 100.00 267.15 4.09 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, in logs
missing 417 5.33 5.33 335.93 5.14 5.14
yes 2108 26.95 32.28 1750.43 26.81 31.95
no 5297 67.72 100.00 4443.64 68.05 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, in differences
missing 7588 97.01 97.01 6313.09 96.68 96.68
yes 234 2.99 100.00 216.91 3.32 100.00
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Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: endogenous, other transformation
missing 444 5.68 5.68 327.85 5.02 5.02
yes 524 6.70 12.38 509.04 7.80 12.82
no 6854 87.62 100.00 5693.12 87.18 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: relation between endogenous and exogenous
missing 42 0.54 0.54 70.29 1.08 1.08
same time 5702 72.90 73.43 4701.48 72.00 73.07
exogenous before endogenous 1967 25.15 98.58 1674.51 25.64 98.72
exogenous after endogenous 111 1.42 100.00 83.72 1.28 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, age
no 6389 81.68 81.68 5210.87 79.80 79.80
yes 1433 18.32 100.00 1319.13 20.20 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, sex
no 6828 87.29 87.29 5593.92 85.66 85.66
yes 994 12.71 100.00 936.08 14.34 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, marital status
no 7507 95.97 95.97 6162.82 94.38 94.38
yes 315 4.03 100.00 367.18 5.62 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, nationality
no 7361 94.11 94.11 6317.97 96.75 96.75
yes 461 5.89 100.00 212.03 3.25 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, education
no 7085 90.58 90.58 5960.68 91.28 91.28
yes 737 9.42 100.00 569.32 8.72 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, income
no 5545 70.89 70.89 4609.52 70.59 70.59
yes 2277 29.11 100.00 1920.48 29.41 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, profession
no 7805 99.78 99.78 6505.39 99.62 99.62
yes 17 0.22 100.00 24.61 0.38 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, unemployment
no 5378 68.75 68.75 4787.35 73.31 73.31
yes 2444 31.25 100.00 1742.65 26.69 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, social integration
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no 7655 97.86 97.86 6432.71 98.51 98.51
yes 167 2.14 100.00 97.29 1.49 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, religion
no 7636 97.62 97.62 6418.28 98.29 98.29
yes 186 2.38 100.00 111.72 1.71 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, social class
no 7735 98.89 98.89 6477.80 99.20 99.20
yes 87 1.11 100.00 52.20 0.80 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, drug usage
no 7743 98.99 98.99 6445.90 98.71 98.71
yes 79 1.01 100.00 84.10 1.29 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, previous convictions
no 7642 97.70 97.70 6424.22 98.38 98.38
yes 180 2.30 100.00 105.78 1.62 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, previous incarceration
no 7797 99.68 99.68 6472.29 99.12 99.12
yes 25 0.32 100.00 57.71 0.88 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, acceptance of norms
no 7411 94.75 94.75 6388.11 97.83 97.83
yes 411 5.25 100.00 141.89 2.17 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, morality
no 7601 97.17 97.17 6424.12 98.38 98.38
yes 221 2.83 100.00 105.88 1.62 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, personal characteristics
no 7662 97.95 97.95 6337.20 97.05 97.05
yes 160 2.05 100.00 192.80 2.95 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, importance of goal
no 7822 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, possibility of legal success
no 7814 99.90 99.90 6524.91 99.92 99.92
yes 8 0.10 100.00 5.09 0.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, utility from offenses
no 7746 99.03 99.03 6507.93 99.66 99.66
yes 76 0.97 100.00 22.07 0.34 100.00
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Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, utility from legal work
no 7822 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, costs of legal success
no 7822 100.00 100.00 6530.00 100.00 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, costs from illegal success
no 7814 99.90 99.90 6524.91 99.92 99.92
yes 8 0.10 100.00 5.09 0.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, fixed effects (spatial)
no 6840 87.45 87.45 5879.13 90.03 90.03
yes 982 12.55 100.00 650.87 9.97 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, fixed effects (time)
no 6726 85.99 85.99 5747.60 88.02 88.02
yes 1096 14.01 100.00 782.40 11.98 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, random effects
no 7780 99.46 99.46 6464.05 98.99 98.99
yes 42 0.54 100.00 65.95 1.01 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, other
no 3087 39.47 39.47 2339.57 35.83 35.83
yes 4735 60.53 100.00 4190.43 64.17 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, youths
no 6710 85.78 85.78 5609.93 85.91 85.91
yes 1112 14.22 100.00 920.07 14.09 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, race
no 5953 76.11 76.11 5062.33 77.52 77.52
yes 1869 23.89 100.00 1467.67 22.48 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, poverty or welfare
no 7320 93.58 93.58 6113.61 93.62 93.62
yes 502 6.42 100.00 416.39 6.38 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, urbanity
no 6970 89.11 89.11 5996.94 91.84 91.84
yes 852 10.89 100.00 533.06 8.16 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, GDP
no 7714 98.62 98.62 6441.31 98.64 98.64
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yes 108 1.38 100.00 88.69 1.36 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, population (-growth)
no 6755 86.36 86.36 5782.27 88.55 88.55
yes 1067 13.64 100.00 747.73 11.45 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, alcohol (consumption)
no 7724 98.75 98.75 6421.01 98.33 98.33
yes 98 1.25 100.00 108.99 1.67 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, labor force
no 7670 98.06 98.06 6365.06 97.47 97.47
yes 152 1.94 100.00 164.94 2.53 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, property value
no 7753 99.12 99.12 6407.45 98.12 98.12
yes 69 0.88 100.00 122.55 1.88 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, consumption
no 7720 98.70 98.70 6400.18 98.01 98.01
yes 102 1.30 100.00 129.82 1.99 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, risk propensity
no 7781 99.48 99.48 6476.18 99.18 99.18
yes 41 0.52 100.00 53.82 0.82 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: covariate, miles driven
no 7728 98.80 98.80 6444.68 98.69 98.69
yes 94 1.20 100.00 85.32 1.31 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: linear model
missing 328 4.19 4.19 282.36 4.32 4.32
yes 6720 85.91 90.10 5264.25 80.62 84.94
no 774 9.90 100.00 983.39 15.06 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: additive model
missing 355 4.54 4.54 301.95 4.62 4.62
yes 7388 94.45 98.99 6121.57 93.75 98.37
no 79 1.01 100.00 106.48 1.63 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: error corrections implemented
yes 1037 13.26 13.26 837.09 12.82 12.82
no 6785 86.74 100.00 5692.91 87.18 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
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Estimate: weighted model
yes 697 8.91 8.91 445.06 6.82 6.82
no 7125 91.09 100.00 6084.94 93.18 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: correction for simultaneity
missing 4359 55.73 55.73 3120.28 47.78 47.78
by methodology 638 8.16 63.88 594.60 9.11 56.89
with variables 645 8.25 72.13 593.49 9.09 65.98
by methodology and variables 173 2.21 74.34 74.33 1.14 67.12
none 2007 25.66 100.00 2147.30 32.88 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: bivariate method
missing 5352 68.42 68.42 4936.38 75.60 75.60
chi2 36 0.46 68.88 97.09 1.49 77.08
contingency coefficient 7 0.09 68.97 5.09 0.08 77.16
phi 48 0.61 69.59 15.01 0.23 77.39
binomial test 6 0.08 69.66 10.18 0.16 77.55
Wilcoxon test 2 0.03 69.69 10.18 0.16 77.70
other non-parametric test 5 0.07 69.75 5.82 0.09 77.79
Spearman’s ρ 149 1.90 71.66 29.71 0.45 78.25
Kendall’s τ 197 2.52 74.18 55.83 0.85 79.10
γ 214 2.74 76.91 148.00 2.27 81.37
t-test for independent samples 6 0.08 76.99 35.22 0.54 81.91
t-test for dependant samples 9 0.12 77.10 36.83 0.56 82.47
ANOVA 36 0.46 77.56 139.87 2.14 84.61
differences 104 1.33 78.89 258.23 3.95 88.57
point biserial correlation 85 1.09 79.98 24.75 0.38 88.95
Pearson correlation 1462 18.69 98.67 617.10 9.45 98.40
regression 70 0.89 99.57 41.87 0.64 99.04
other 34 0.43 100.00 62.83 0.96 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: multivariate method
missing 2473 31.62 31.62 1593.2 24.40 24.40
VAR 46 0.59 32.20 41.59 0.64 25.04
ANOVA, ANCOVA 7 0.09 32.29 25.46 0.39 25.43
Logit/Probit (standardized) 120 1.53 33.83 107.08 1.64 27.07
Logit/Probit (unstandardized) 286 3.66 37.48 393.65 6.03 33.10
partial correlation 167 2.14 39.62 41.72 0.64 33.74
Poisson-regression 61 0.78 40.40 68.74 1.05 34.79
OLS (standardized) 1225 15.66 56.06 811.71 12.43 47.22
OLS (unstandardized) 1787 22.85 78.91 1582.90 24.24 71.46
2SLS (standardized) 43 0.55 79.46 53.07 0.81 72.27
2SLS (unstandardized) 735 9.40 88.85 638.88 9.78 82.06
Pathanalysis (standardized) 53 0.68 89.53 87.17 1.33 83.39
Pathanalysis (unstandardized) 9 0.12 89.64 10.18 0.16 83.55
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GLS 70 0.89 90.54 109.26 1.67 85.22
COX 15 0.19 90.73 20.37 0.31 85.53
GMM 35 0.45 91.18 50.68 0.78 86.31
ARIMA 132 1.69 92.87 275.93 4.23 90.54
TOBIT 180 2.30 95.17 215.77 3.30 93.84
other ML 322 4.12 99.28 331.37 5.07 98.92
other 56 0.72 100.00 70.84 1.08 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: sign supports deterrence hypothesis
missing 181 2.31 2.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
yes 5459 69.79 72.10 4820.64 73.82 73.82
no 2182 27.90 100.00 1709.36 26.18 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: p-value in original study
no 932 11.92 11.92 357.25 5.47 5.47
yes 6890 88.08 100.00 6172.75 94.53 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: p-value
missing 765 9.78 9.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
99.9%, support 622 7.95 17.73 671.54 10.28 10.28
99%, support 760 9.72 27.45 835.06 12.79 23.07
95%, support 1111 14.20 41.65 1215.75 18.62 41.69
90%, support 268 3.43 45.08 278.63 4.27 45.96
not significant, support 2307 29.49 74.57 1819.66 27.87 73.82
not significant, no support 1464 18.72 93.29 1141.63 17.48 91.31
90%, no support 57 0.73 94.02 52.32 0.80 92.11
95%, no support 256 3.27 97.29 282.24 4.32 96.43
99%, no support 119 1.52 98.81 137.51 2.11 98.54
99.9%, no support 93 1.19 100.00 95.66 1.46 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: t-value in original study
no 5574 71.26 71.26 3868.42 59.24 59.24
yes 2248 28.74 100.00 2661.58 40.76 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: F-value in study
no 7653 97.84 97.84 6315.27 96.71 96.71
yes 169 2.16 100.00 214.73 3.29 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: χ2-value in study
no 7772 99.36 99.36 6386.57 97.80 97.80
yes 50 0.64 100.00 143.43 2.20 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: other-value in study
no 7758 99.18 99.18 6380.63 97.71 97.71
yes 64 0.82 100.00 149.37 2.29 100.00
232 B Statistics of Variables and Studies
. . . last page of table B.2 continued
Unweighted Weighted
Variable N Percent Cum. N Percent Cum.
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: violent crime
no 4947 63.24 63.24 4267.44 65.35 65.35
yes 2875 36.76 100.00 2262.56 34.65 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: property crime
no 3850 49.22 49.22 3308.39 50.66 50.66
yes 3972 50.78 100.00 3221.61 49.34 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: other crime
no 5774 73.82 73.82 4261.11 65.25 65.25
yes 2048 26.18 100.00 2268.89 34.75 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: dummy for first estimate
no 7122 91.05 91.05 4584.33 70.20 70.20
yes 700 8.95 100.00 1945.67 29.80 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: dummy for randomly chosen or unique estimate
no 4527 57.88 57.88 2114.23 32.38 32.38
yes 3295 42.12 100.00 4415.77 67.62 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: dummy for favored and not unique estimate
no 6142 78.52 78.52 5154.52 78.94 78.94
yes 1680 21.48 100.00 1375.48 21.06 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: negative and significant (by p-value)
missing 374 4.78 4.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
no 4930 63.03 63.03 3788.77 58.02 58.02
yes 2518 32.19 100.00 2741.23 41.98 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Estimate: negative and significant (by normalized t-value)
missing 765 9.78 9.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
no 4538 58.02 67.80 3809.92 58.34 58.34
yes 2519 32.20 100.00 2720.08 41.66 100.00
Total 7822 100.00 6530.00 100.00
Columns 2-4 are not weighted and refer to all estimates. Columns 5-7 are weighted and relate to all valid estimates.
Tables B.3 and B.4 present the metric variables (neglecting missing values).
Table B.3: Descriptive statistics of the metric study-variables
Min Mean Median Max sd Weights N
Study: publication, volume
1 37.95 31 455 33.08 604 604
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Min Mean Median Max sd Weights N
1 38.28 31 455 33.38 553.30 5126
Study: publication, number
1 4.91 3 437 27.49 584 584
1 5.11 3 437 28.69 534.84 5008
Study: publication, year
1952 1989.78 1990 2006 10.60 700 700
1952 1990.01 1990 2006 10.55 641.18 6530
Study: publication, page start
1 303.47 241 1869 294.06 699 699
1 302.03 237 1869 294.66 640.18 6526
Study: publication, page end
7 326.79 264 1879 289.25 700 700
7 325.53 257 1879 289.91 641.18 6530
Study: publication, number of pages
2 24.75 17 439 38.05 700 700
2 24.97 17 439 38.45 641.18 6530
Study: measuring points
1 36.33 3 4197 212.18 682 682
1 37.96 3 4197 221.12 624.30 6408
Study: year of first measure
1830 1971.35 1975 2002 19.93 593 593
1830 1971.74 1975 2002 19.88 540.92 5273
Study: year of last measure
1892 1983.48 1986 2004 14.08 428 428
1892 1983.70 1987 2004 14.20 391.98 3957
Study: time span in months
1 185.00 120 1728 195.70 442 442
1 184.85 120 1728 194.07 404.92 4347
Study: number of studied populations
1 1.07 1 7 0.39 700 700
1 1.06 1 7 0.36 641.18 6530
Study: size, first population
1 17677.39 229 2167700 169012.90 168 168
1 8429.98 212 2167700 101642.08 159.76 2449
Study: size, second population
44 649.14 262 3145 1106.10 7 7
44 715.12 262 3145 1104.80 5.91 178
Study: size, first sample
1 4344.02 245 199358 20280.04 178 178
1 4521.18 222 199358 21003.51 164.03 1398
Study: size, second sample
13 14685.78 1725 101636 33433.50 9 9
13 16114.44 1725 101636 33506.94 7.82 127
Study: size, first realized sample
1 1763.98 133 135931 9023.28 398 398
1 1736.17 130 135931 9216.19 370.27 3842
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Min Mean Median Max sd Weights N
Study: size, second realized sample
13 1679.61 293 16193 3755.34 18 18
13 1490.56 262 16193 3437.58 15.53 331
Study: rate of return, first sample
13 76.80 81 100 22.53 90 90
13 75.98 80 100 22.78 83.14 764
Study: rate of return, second sample
49 79.00 85 100 22.39 7 7
49 76.6 85 100 21.19 5.95 35
Study: minimum age, first population
10 16.44 17 24 2.81 61 61
10 16.41 17 24 2.85 57.60 624
Study: minimum age, second population
11 14.50 15 18 3.11 4 4
11 14.51 16 18 2.71 3.98 144
Study: maximum age, first population
16 35.21 24 99 22.58 39 39
16 35.16 24 99 22.60 36.82 367
Study: maximum age, second population
18 21.00 21 24 4.24 2 2
18 21.04 24 24 3.01 1.98 136
Study: mean age, first population
15 26.29 22 76 12.57 34 34
15 26.65 22 76 12.72 31.85 289
Study: mean age, second population
17 22.00 22 27 7.07 2 2
17 22.00 22 27 5.35 2.00 8
Study: female fraction, first sample
0 33.79 46 84 24.17 87 87
0 32.81 46 84 23.90 82.00 952
Study: female fraction, second sample
0 34.30 48.39 58 26.82 6 6
0 34.23 46.78 58 24.59 5.98 149
Study: number of estimates, bivariate
1 12.24 5 155 21.91 238 238
1 11.08 4 155 19.04 208.01 2889
Study: number of estimates, multivariate
1 21.72 8 764 52.02 570 570
1 21.70 8 764 53.27 530.79 5782
Each first row refers to all studies (maximum of 700) and is unweighted. The second row is weighted (each study
is weighted equally, the maximum cumulative weight is 641.18) and relates to all valid estimates (maximum of
6530).
Missing values are not considered.
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Table B.4: Descriptive statistics of the metric estimate-variables
Min Mean Median Max sd Weights N
Estimate: number of estimates
1.00 21.19 10.00 210.00 28.90 7822 7822
1.00 6.01 3.00 210.00 10.77 641.18 6530
Estimate: exogenous, number of index items
1.00 1.07 1.00 21.00 0.57 7818 7818
1.00 1.06 1.00 9.00 0.44 641.18 6530
Estimate: exogenous, first year of observation
1830.00 1968.42 1973.00 2002.00 21.78 6130 6130
1830.00 1972.14 1975.00 2002.00 19.26 517.54 5027
Estimate: exogenous, last year of observation
1892.00 1979.87 1983.00 2004.00 16.66 5454 5454
1892.00 1982.91 1986.00 2004.00 14.44 453.09 4495
Estimate: exogenous, number of categories
2.00 27.86 5.00 100.00 41.14 2680 2680
2.00 16.54 2.00 100.00 33.07 226.28 2442
Estimate: endogenous, number of index items
1.00 1.06 1.00 14.00 0.51 7822 7822
1.00 1.06 1.00 14.00 0.64 641.18 6530
Estimate: endogenous, first year of observation
1830.00 1968.74 1973.00 2002.00 21.39 5759 5759
1830.00 1972.21 1975.00 2002.00 19.11 503.30 4656
Estimate: endogenous, last year of observation
1892.00 1980.58 1985.00 2004.00 16.81 5025 5025
1892.00 1983.26 1986.00 2004.00 14.46 435.38 4086
Estimate: endogenous, number of categories
2.00 12.25 3.00 200.00 29.13 1170 1170
0.00 2.50 0.00 200.00 15.44 641.18 6530
Estimate: number of used covariates
1.00 7.55 7.00 92.00 6.05 5297 5297
1.00 7.14 6.00 92.00 6.20 481.76 4470
Estimate: sd of estimate
0.00 4.78 0.12 861.40 49.55 1177 1177
0.00 5.54 0.15 861.40 49.76 103.61 913
Estimate: effect value
−10122.00 2.95 −0.07 40001.04 527.71 7374 7374
−10122.00 24.91 −0.08 40001.04 1213.91 574.45 6288
Estimate: degrees of freedom of effect value
305.00 305.00 305.00 305.00 0.00 1 1
305.00 305.00 305.00 305.00 0.00 1.00 1
Estimate: t-value, not normalized
−582.00 −1.45 −0.97 21.54 7.99 7057 7057
−582.00 −1.51 −1.37 20.93 4.51 641.18 6530
Estimate: degrees of freedom of t-value
4.00 158.00 10.00 1102.00 327.38 59 59
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Min Mean Median Max sd Weights N
4.00 246.52 24.00 1102.00 389.83 10.27 57
Estimate: value of F-value
−19.55 22.34 2.14 1745.73 140.14 168 168
−19.55 67.16 4.35 1745.73 275.41 20.58 163
Estimate: degrees of freedom of F-value
1.00 13.09 1.00 132.00 39.44 11 11
1.00 13.81 1.00 132.00 40.58 5.17 11
Estimate: value of χ2-value
0.01 9838.85 9.90 240498.00 48074.47 49 49
0.01 17205.79 9.90 240498.00 62543.34 14.01 49
Estimate: degrees of freedom of χ2-value
1.00 5.41 7.00 11.00 2.79 27 27
1.00 4.04 2.00 11.00 3.60 8.17 27
Estimate: value of other-value
−1.38 3.79 0.22 83.00 14.22 64 64
−1.38 2.60 0.34 64.00 10.48 14.67 42
Estimate: degrees of freedom of other-value
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1 1
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1
Estimate: R2 of model
−0.06 0.62 0.71 1.00 0.30 3059 3059
−0.06 0.61 0.68 1.00 0.30 253.22 2642
Estimate: F-value of model
0.69 57.20 24.30 797.50 92.22 642 642
0.69 58.55 23.80 797.50 104.25 65.89 557
Estimate: goodness of fit value
0.01 27.08 1.73 625.45 91.10 48 48
0.01 20.26 1.00 625.45 72.83 6.00 41
Estimate: degrees of freedom of model
4.00 223.94 36.00 3439.00 531.20 383 383
4.00 268.27 36.00 3439.00 577.52 48.38 341
Estimate: other model value
−21284.50 −212.52 1.71 33532.00 2707.48 692 692
−21284.50 −221.79 1.76 33532.00 3584.15 76.41 614
Estimate: sample size
5.00 1518.60 232.00 206035.00 6531.11 5972 5972
5.00 2203.89 213.00 206035.00 11256.29 522.20 5050
Estimate: square root of sample size for positive values
3.00 21.10 13.13 223.62 28.70 1708 1708
3.00 25.31 15.07 223.62 32.55 132.23 1404
Estimate: square root of sample size for negative values
2.24 23.69 15.84 453.91 32.53 4264 4264
2.24 25.74 14.42 453.91 41.49 389.97 3646
Estimate: weights, weights all estimates equally
0.00 1.95 1.00 44.17 3.45 7822 7822
1.00 2.48 1.00 44.17 3.83 641.18 6530
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Min Mean Median Max sd Weights N
Estimate: weights, weights all studies equally
0.00 0.09 0.04 1.00 0.14 7822 7822
0.00 0.31 0.20 1.00 0.30 641.18 6530
Estimate: transformed p-values
0.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.39 7057 7057
0.00 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.41 641.18 6530
Estimate: normalized t-value
−64.81 −1.27 −0.96 20.37 3.13 7057 7057
−64.81 −1.40 −1.37 19.05 3.07 641.18 6530
Each first row refers to all observations of all studies and is unweighted (maximum of 7822; the weights are equal
to the number of observations). The second row is weighted (maximum cumulative weight is 641.18) and relates
to all valid estimates (maximum of 6530).
Missing values are not considered.
B.2 Included Studies
Table B.5 shows all 700 studies of our meta analysis. The first column contains the names of up
to two authors. The crime type (CT) states whether violent, property or other crimes are studied
(either yes or no). The overall opinion of the authors (O) ranges from -2, full support, to +2, no
support; see subsection 3.3.3. The fourth column contains the abbreviation of the user who read
the study and recorded its information; all but “tr” were part of the team in Heidelberg.
Table B.5: Studies included in the meta-data base
Authors CT O U Source
Schuessler, K. nny −1 aw Schuessler (1952)
Michaels, R. ynn +1 tr Michaels (1960)
Rettig, S.; Rawson, H. nyn −1 ah Rettig and Rawson (1963)
Sinha, J.; Wherry, R. ynn −1 ah Sinha and Wherry (1965)
Clarke, R. ynn −2 tr Clarke (1966)
Sharkansky, I. nyy +2 ah Sharkansky (1967)
Sinha, J. ynn −1 ah Sinha (1967)
Campbell, D.; Ross, L. ynn −1 aw Campbell and Ross (1968)
Cardarelli, A. nny +2 ah Cardarelli (1968)
Glass, G. ynn −2 tr Glass (1968)
Gray, L.; Martin, D. nny −1 aw Gray and Martin (1969)
Hill, J.; Kochendorfer, R. nyn −1 aw Hill and Kochendorfer (1969)
Horai, J.; Tedeschi, J. ynn −1 kr Horai and Tedeschi (1969)
Jensen, G. yyy −1 aw Jensen (1969)
Tittle, C. nyy −1 aw Tittle (1969)
Chiricos, T.; Waldo, G. nyy 0 kr Chiricos and Waldo (1970)
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Authors CT O U Source
Gahagan, J. et al. ynn +1 ah Gahagan et al. (1970)
Ross, L. et al. ynn −1 aw Ross et al. (1970)
Salem, R.; Bowers, W. yyn +2 tr Salem and Bowers (1970)
Bailey, W. nyy 0 aw Bailey (1971)
Bean, F.; Cushing, R. nny −1 aw Bean and Cushing (1971)
Logan, C. yyy +1 aw Logan (1973)
Morris, D.; Tweeten, L. nyy 0 tr Morris and Tweeten (1971)
Press, S. yyy −2 tr Press (1971)
Allison, J. yyy 0 tr Allison (1972)
Bowers, W.; Salem, R. ynn −1 ah Bowers and Salem (1972)
Cho, Y. nyy +2 ah Cho (1972)
Ehrlich, I. nyy −2 tr Ehrlich (1972)
Logan, C. nyy −1 aw Logan (1972)
Snyder, D.; Tilly, C. ynn +2 ah Snyder and Tilly (1972)
Teevan, J. yyy +2 ah Teevan (1972)
Waldo, G.; Chiricos, T. yyn +1 aw Waldo and Chiricos (1972)
Antunes, G.; Hunt, A. nyy 0 aw Antunes and Hunt (1973a)
Antunes, G.; Hunt, A. nyy +1 aw Antunes and Hunt (1973b)
Carr-Hill, R.; Stern, N. yyy −2 tr Carr-Hill and Stern (1973)
Ehrlich, I. nyy −2 tr Ehrlich (1973)
Erickson, M.; Gibbs, J. nny −1 aw Erickson and Gibbs (1973)
Greenwood, M.; Wadycki, W. nyy 0 tr Greenwood and Wadycki (1973)
Jayewardene, C. nny +1 ah Jayewardene (1973)
Jones, T. nyy +2 tr Jones (1973)
Robertson, L. et al. ynn +2 tr Robertson et al. (1973)
Tittle, C.; Rowe, A. ynn −1 ah Tittle and Rowe (1973)
Bailey, W. nny +1 aw Bailey (1974)
Bailey, W. et al. nyy −1 kr Bailey et al. (1974)
Buikhuisen, W. ynn −2 tr Buikhuisen (1974)
Chaiken, J. et al. nyn −2 tr Chaiken et al. (1974)
Glaser, D.; Zeigler, M. nny +2 aw Glaser and Zeigler (1974)
Heisler, G. nyn 0 aw Heisler (1974)
McPheters, L.; Stronge, W. yyy −2 tr McPheters and Stronge (1974)
Swimmer, E. nyy −2 tr Swimmer (1974a)
Swimmer, E. nyy +1 aw Swimmer (1974b)
Tittle, C.; Rowe, A. yyy −1 mw Tittle and Rowe (1974)
Wellford, C. yyy −1 aw Wellford (1974)
Bacon, P.; O’Donoghue, M. ynn −2 tr Bacon and O’Donohue (1975)
Bailey, W. nny −1 ah Bailey (1975)
Bowers, W.; Pierce, G. nny +2 ah Bowers and Pierce (1975)
Burkett, S.; Jensen, E. ynn +1 tr Burkett and Jensen (1975)
Cloninger, D. nyy −1 tr Cloninger (1975)
Danziger, S.; Wheeler, D. nyy −1 tr Danziger and Wheeler (1975)
Ehrlich, I. nny −2 tr Ehrlich (1975a)
Erickson, M.; Gibbs, J. nyy 0 aw Erickson and Gibbs (1975)
Greenwood, M.; Wadycki, W. nyy 0 tr Greenwood and Wadycki (1975)
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Kau, J.; Rubin, P. nyy −1 tr Kau and Rubin (1975)
Logan, C. nyy −1 aw Logan (1975)
Minor, W. yyn +1 aw Minor (1975)
Passell, P. nny −1 aw Passell (1975)
Phillips, L.; Votey, H. nyy −2 ah Phillips and Votey (1975)
Pogue, T. yyy 0 tr Pogue (1975)
Ross, L. ynn −1 ah Ross (1975)
Williams, A.; Robertson, L. ynn +2 aw Williams and Robertson (1975)
Avio, K.; Clark, C. nyn −1 tr Avio and Clark (1976)
Bailey, W. nny +2 aw Bailey (1976)
Bailey, W.; Lott, Ruth P. yyn +1 mw Bailey and Lott (1976)
Chambers, L. et al. ynn −1 tr Chambers et al. (1976)
Chapman, J. nyy −1 tr Chapman (1976)
Erickson, M.; Gibbs, J. nyy −1 ah Erickson and Gibbs (1976)
Erickson, P. ynn +2 aw Erickson (1976)
Forst, B. nyy +1 aw Forst (1976)
Grasmick, H.; Milligan, H. ynn −1 aw Grasmick and Milligan (1976)
Land, K.; Felson, M. nyy 0 aw Land and Felson (1976)
Mathieson, D.; Passell, P. nyy −1 aw Mathieson and Passell (1976)
Silberman, M. yyy 0 kr Silberman (1976)
Spicer, M.; Lundstedt, S. nyn +1 tr Spicer and Lundstedt (1976)
Teevan, J. nyn +1 aw Teevan (1976a)
Teevan, J. yyn +1 aw Teevan (1976b)
Teevan, J. yyn +1 aw Teevan (1976c)
Tittle, C. yyy −1 aw Tittle (1974)
Upper, J.; White, J. nyn +2 ah Upper and White (1976)
Yunker, J. nny −2 tr Yunker (1976)
Zador, P. ynn +2 tr Zador (1976)
Alcorn, D. nyy +1 aw Alcorn (1977)
Anderson, L. yyn 0 aw Anderson (1978)
Anderson, L. et al. ynn 0 aw Anderson et al. (1977)
Bailey, W. nny −1 aw Bailey (1977)
Blumstein, A.; Nagin, D. ynn +1 ah Blumstein and Nagin (1977)
Cloninger, D. nny −2 tr Cloninger (1977)
Ehrlich, I. nyy −2 tr Ehrlich (1977a)
Ehrlich, I. nny −2 tr Ehrlich (1977b)
Erickson, M. et al. nyy +1 tr Erickson et al. (1977)
Forst, B. nny +2 ah Forst (1977)
Fox, J. nny +2 tr Fox (1977)
Geerken, M.; Gove, W. nyy −1 aw Geerken and Gove (1977)
Grasmick, H.; Appleton, L. ynn −1 aw Grasmick and Appleton (1977)
Sesnowitz, M.; McKee, D. nny +2 tr Sesnowitz and McKee (1977)
Mehay, S. nyy −1 tr Mehay (1977)
Meier, R.; Johnson, W. ynn +1 aw Meier and Johnson (1977)
Nagel, W. yyy +2 ah Nagel (1977)
Passell, P.; Taylor, J. nny +1 tr Passell and Taylor (1977)
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Ross, L. ynn −1 aw Ross (1977)
Silverman, L.; Spruill, N. nyy −1 tr Silverman and Spruill (1977)
Thaler, R. nyn −1 tr Thaler (1977)
Victor, M. nyy +2 aw Victor (1977)
Witte, A.; Schmidt, P. yyy 0 tr Witte and Schmidt (1977)
Avio, K.; Clark, C. nyn −1 tr Avio and Clark (1978)
Bailey, W. nny +2 aw Bailey (1978a)
Bailey, W. nyy 0 ah Bailey (1978b)
Bailey, W. nny +1 aw Bailey (1978c)
Black, T.; Orsagh, T. nny −1 aw Black and Orsagh (1978)
Brown, D. nyy +1 ah Brown (1978)
Cohen, L. ynn +1 aw Cohen (1978)
Erickson, M.; Gibbs, J. yyy −1 aw Erickson and Gibbs (1978)
Friedland, N. et al. nyn −1 tr Friedland et al. (1978)
Hakim, S. et al. nyn −2 tr Hakim et al. (1978)
Holtmann, A.; Yap, L. nyn −2 tr Holtmann and Yap (1978)
Hurst, P. ynn −1 ah Hurst (1978)
Jensen, G. et al. yyn 0 aw Jensen et al. (1978)
Klemke, L. nyn −1 aw Klemke (1978)
Landes, W. ynn −2 tr Landes (1978)
Levy, P. et al. ynn −1 aw Levy et al. (1978)
Mason, R.; Calvin, L. nyn −1 aw Mason and Calvin (1978)
Mathur, V. nyy −2 tr Mathur (1978)
McPheters, L. yyy +2 ah McPheters (1978)
Norstro¨m, T. ynn −1 ah Norstro¨m (1978)
Pontell, H. nyy +1 ah Pontell (1978)
Vandaele, W. nyn −2 tr Vandaele (1978a)
Vandaele, W. nyy −2 tr Vandaele (1978b)
Votey, H. ynn −2 tr Votey (1978)
Wilson, J.; Boland, B. nyn −2 aw Wilson and Boland (1978)
Wolpin, K. nny −2 tr Wolpin (1978a)
Wolpin, K. yyy +1 tr Wolpin (1978b)
Akers, R. et al. ynn +2 aw Akers et al. (1979)
Archambeault, W. ynn −2 aw Archambeault (1979)
Avio, K. nny +2 tr Avio (1979)
Fabrikant, R. nyn −1 tr Fabrikant (1979)
Fujii, E.; Mak, J. nyy 0 tr Fujii and Mak (1979)
Greenberg, D. et al. nyy −2 tr Greenberg et al. (1979)
Hakim, S. et al. nyy −2 tr Hakim et al. (1979)
Kleck, G. nny −1 ah Kleck (1979)
Otterbein, K. nny −1 kr Otterbein (1979)
Parker, R.; Smith, M. nny −1 kr Parker and Smith (1979)
Peek, C. et al. ynn −1 aw Peek et al. (1979)
Pontell, H. nyy +2 aw Pontell (1979)
Sickles, R. et al. yyy −1 tr Sickles et al. (1979)
Storey, D. yyn −1 tr Storey (1979)
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Albrecht, H. yyn +1 aw Albrecht (1980)
Bailey, W. nny +1 aw Bailey (1980a)
Bailey, W. nny −1 aw Bailey (1980b)
Brier, S.; Fienberg, S. yyy +1 tr Brier and Fienberg (1980)
Bryjak, G. nyn +1 aw Bryjak (1980)
Burkett, S.; Carrithers, W. ynn −1 ah Burkett and Carrithers (1980)
Fujii, E.; Mak, J. nyy 0 tr Fujii and Mak (1980)
Goldberg, I.; Nold, F. nyn −2 tr Goldberg and Nold (1980)
Grasmick, H.; Bryjak, G. nyy −1 aw Grasmick and Bryjak (1980)
Hakim, S. nyn 0 tr Hakim (1980)
Hoenack, S.; Weiler, W. nny −1 tr Hoenack and Weiler (1980)
Huff, R.; Stahura, J. nyy +2 ah Huff and Stahura (1980)
Humphries, D.; Wallace, D. nyy +2 ah Humphries and Wallace (1980)
Kirchner, R. et al. nyn +1 kr Kirchner et al. (1980)
Loftin, C. nny +1 aw Loftin (1980)
Phillips, D. nny −1 ah Phillips (1980)
Witte, A. yyy −1 tr Witte (1980)
Wolpin, K. nyn −2 tr Wolpin (1980)
Cloninger, D. ynn −2 tr Cloninger (1981)
Corman, H. nyn −1 tr Corman (1981)
Ehrlich, I. nyy 0 tr Ehrlich (1981)
Furlong, W.; Mehay, S. nyy −2 tr Furlong and Mehay (1981)
Gabor, T. nyn +1 kr Gabor (1981)
Jacob, H.; Rich, M. yyy +2 ah Jacob and Rich (1981)
Miranne, A. nyn +1 aw Miranne (1981)
Pierce, G.; Bowers, W. nyy +1 ah Pierce and Bowers (1981)
Scott, W.; Grasmick, H. nyn −2 tr Scott and Grasmick (1981)
Williams, K.; Gibbs, J. yyy −1 ah Williams and Gibbs (1981)
Bailey, W. nny +2 ah Bailey (1982)
Biles, D. yyy +1 ah Biles (1982)
Bishop, D. ynn 0 aw Bishop (1983)
Chilton, R. yyy −1 aw Chilton (1982)
Grasmick, H.; Scott, W. nyn −1 aw Grasmick and Scott (1982)
Greenberg, D.; Kessler, R. nyy +1 ah Greenberg and Kessler (1982a)
Greenberg, D.; Kessler, R. nyy −1 tr Greenberg and Kessler (1982b)
Gross, M.; Hakim, S. yyn +2 tr Gross and Hakim (1982)
Hannan, T. nyn −1 ah Hannan (1982)
Jensen, G.; Stitt, B. yyn −1 aw Jensen and Stitt (1982)
Leamer, E. nny 0 tr Leamer (1982)
Loftin, C.; McDowall, D. nyy +2 tr Loftin and McDowall (1982)
Medoff, M.; Magaddino, J. nny +2 kr Medoff and Magaddino (1982)
Meier, R. ynn +1 ah Meier (1982)
Minor, W.; Harry, J. yyn +1 aw Minor and Harry (1982)
Myers, S. nyn −2 tr Myers (1982)
Parilla, P. nyn −1 aw Parilla (1982)
Paternoster, R. et al. yyn +1 aw Paternoster et al. (1982a)
242 B Statistics of Variables and Studies
. . . last page of table B.5 continued
Authors CT O U Source
Paternoster, R. et al. yyn −1 aw Paternoster et al. (1982b)
Rankin, J.; Wells, L. yyy −1 aw Rankin and Wells (1982)
Saltzman, L. et al. yyn −1 aw Saltzman et al. (1982)
Sesnowitz, M.; Hexter, J. nyn −2 tr Sesnowitz and Hexter (1982)
Spicer, M.; Thomas, E. nyn −2 tr Spicer and Thomas (1982)
Stack, S. nyn +1 aw Stack (1982)
Wa¨rneryd, K.; Walerud, B. nyn −1 ah Wa¨rneryd and Walerud (1982)
Bailey, W. nny +1 ah Bailey (1983)
Do¨lling, D. yyy −2 mw Do¨lling (1983)
Forst, B. nny +1 ah Forst (1983)
Ghali, M. et al. yyy −1 tr Ghali et al. (1983)
Grasmick, H. et al. nyy −1 aw Grasmick et al. (1983)
Greenberg, D. et al. nyy +2 ah Greenberg et al. (1983)
Hollinger, R.; Clark, J. nyn −1 aw Hollinger and Clark (1983)
Houston, J. nyn 0 tr Houston (1983)
Kohfeld, C. nyy −1 aw Kohfeld (1983)
Layson, S. nny −1 tr Layson (1983)
Leamer, E. nny 0 tr Leamer (1983)
Liu, Y.; Bee, R. nyn −1 tr Liu and Bee (1983)
Low, S.; McPheters, L. yyy 0 tr Low and McPheters (1983)
McFarland, S. nny +2 aw McFarland (1983)
Norstro¨m, T. ynn +2 ah Norstro¨m (1983)
Paternoster, R. et al. nyn +1 mw Paternoster et al. (1983a)
Paternoster, R. et al. yyn +1 aw Paternoster et al. (1983b)
Votey, H.; Shapiro, P. ynn −2 tr Votey and Shapiro (1983)
Willis, K. nyy −2 tr Willis (1983)
Zedlewski, E. yyn −1 aw Zedlewski (1983)
Bishop, D. yyy −1 aw Bishop (1984a)
Bishop, D. nyy −1 aw Bishop (1984b)
Clark, A. nyn −2 aw Clark (1984)
Decker, S.; Kohfeld, C. nny +2 aw Decker and Kohfeld (1984)
Epple, D.; Visscher, M. nyn −2 tr Epple and Visscher (1984)
Hilton, M. ynn −1 aw Hilton (1984)
Krylo, D. nyn +1 aw Krylo (1985)
McCormick, R.; Tollison, R. ynn −2 tr McCormick and Tollison (1984)
Meier, R. et al. ynn −1 kr Meier et al. (1984)
Pestello, F. yyy −1 aw Pestello (1984)
Stack, S. nyn +2 aw Stack (1984)
Swan, P. ynn −1 aw Swan (1984)
Sykes, G. ynn +2 aw Sykes (1984)
Votey, H. yyy −1 tr Votey (1984a)
Votey, H. ynn −2 tr Votey (1984b)
Withers, G. yyy −1 tr Withers (1984)
Zimring, F. nny −1 ah Zimring (1984)
Benjamini, Y.; Maital, S. nyn +1 tr Benjamini and Maital (1985)
Friedland, N. nyn −1 kr Friedland (1985)
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Isachsen, A. et al. yyn −1 tr Isachsen et al. (1985)
Jackson, Betty R.; Jones, S. nyn −1 ah Jackson and Jones (1985)
Killias, M. ynn −1 aw Killias (1985)
Layson, S. nny −2 tr Layson (1985)
Layton, A. ynn −2 tr Layton (1983)
McManus, W. nny 0 tr McManus (1985)
Montmarquette, C. et al. yyn −1 aw Montmarquette et al. (1985)
Sheley, J.; Bailey, K. ynn −1 aw Sheley and Bailey (1985)
Spicer, M.; Hero, R. nyn −1 tr Spicer and Hero (1985)
Williams, F. ynn +2 aw Williams (1985)
Wilson, R.; Jonah, B. ynn −1 tr Wilson and Jonah (1985)
Witte, A.; Woodbury, D. nyn +1 ah Witte and Woodbury (1985)
Berger, D.; Snortum, J. ynn +2 tr Berger and Snortum (1986)
Blau, P.; Golden, R. yyy −1 ah Blau and Golden (1986)
Bursik, R.; Baba, Y. ynn +1 ah Bursik and Baba (1986)
Gyimah-Brempong, K. nyy 0 tr Gyimah-Brempong (1986)
Miller, J.; Anderson, A. nyn −1 ah Miller and Anderson (1986)
Paternoster, R.; Iovanni, L. nyn +1 mw Paternoster and Iovanni (1986)
Pogue, T. nyn +1 tr Pogue (1986)
Stafford, M. et al. yny −2 tr Stafford et al. (1986)
Viscusi, W. nyn −2 tr Viscusi (1986)
Ward, D. at al. ynn −1 kr Ward et al. (1986)
Watson, R. ynn −1 aw Watson (1986)
Webley, P.; Halstead, S. nyn 0 ah Webley and Halstead (1986)
Becker, W. et al. nyn −1 ah Becker et al. (1987)
Berlitz, C. et al. yyy +1 aw Berlitz et al. (1987)
Cloninger, D. nny −2 tr Cloninger (1987)
Cohen, L.; Land, K. nyy −1 ah Cohen and Land (1987)
Cohen, M. nyn −2 tr Cohen (1987)
Corman, H. et al. nyn −2 tr Corman et al. (1987)
Demers, D.; Lundman, R. ynn −1 kr Demers and Lundman (1987)
Ehrlich, I.; Brower, G. nny −2 tr Ehrlich and Brower (1987)
Good, D.; Pirog-Good, M. ynn 0 tr Good and Pirog-Good (1987)
Howsen, R.; Jarrell, S. nyn −1 tr Howsen and Jarrell (1987)
Kalfus, G. et al. yyn −1 aw Kalfus et al. (1987)
Lott, J. yyy 0 tr Lott (1987)
McCarthy, P.; Oesterle, W. ynn −2 tr McCarthy and Oesterle (1987)
Miranne, A.; Gray, L. nyn +1 kr Miranne and Gray (1987)
Rabow, J. et al. ynn −1 tr Rabow et al. (1987)
Ross, L. ynn −2 tr Ross (1987a)
Ross, L. ynn −1 aw Ross (1987b)
Schumann, K. et al. yyy +1 aw Schumann et al. (1987)
Smith, D.; Paternoster, R. yyn +2 ah Smith and Paternoster (1987)
Stack, S. nny −1 aw Stack (1987)
Voas, R.; Hause, J. ynn −2 tr Voas and Hause (1987)
Wilkinson, J. ynn +2 tr Wilkinson (1987)
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Avio, K. nny +1 tr Avio (1988)
Beron, K. et al. nyn −1 tr Beron et al. (1988)
Burnell, J. nyn +1 tr Burnell (1988)
Cover, J.; Thistle, P. nny 0 tr Cover and Thistle (1988)
Devine, J. et al. nyy −1 ah Devine et al. (1988)
Dubin, J.; Wilde, L. nyn +1 ah Dubin and Wilde (1988)
Hessing, D. et al. nyn 0 tr Hessing et al. (1988)
Hite, P. nyn +2 ah Hite (1988)
Maghsoodloo, S. et al. ynn −1 tr Maghsoodloo et al. (1988)
Merriman, D. nny −1 kr Merriman (1988)
Paternoster, R. yyn −1 ah Paternoster (1988)
Shore, E.; Maguin, E. ynn −2 tr Shore and Maguin (1988)
Smith, D. ynn −1 aw Smith (1988)
Stevans, L. nyn −2 tr Stevans (1988)
Bailey, W.; Peterson, R. nny +1 ah Bailey and Peterson (1989)
Bo¨nitz, D. yyy +1 aw Bo¨nitz (1989)
Cameron, S. nny −1 tr Cameron (1989)
Chressanthis, G. nny −2 tr Chressanthis (1989)
Craig, S.; Heikkila, E. nyn −2 tr Craig and Heikkila (1989)
Friedman, J. et al. ynn −1 mw Friedman et al. (1989)
Gillis, A. nyy 0 ah Gillis (1989)
Goel, R.; Rich, D. ynn −2 tr Goel and Rich (1989)
Green, D. ynn +1 aw Green (1989a)
Green, D. ynn −2 aw Green (1989b)
Haque, M.; Cameron, M. ynn +2 aw Haque and Cameron (1989)
von Hofer, H.; Tham, H. nyn +2 aw von Hofer and Tham (1989)
Keane, C. et al. ynn +1 aw Keane et al. (1989)
Klepper, S.; Nagin, D. nyn 0 ah Klepper and Nagin (1989a)
Klepper, S.; Nagin, D. nyn 0 kr Klepper and Nagin (1989b)
Klepper, S.; Nagin, D. nyn +2 aw Klepper and Nagin (1989c)
McAleer, M.; Veall, M. nny +2 tr McAleer and Veall (1989)
Muller, A. ynn −1 aw Muller (1989)
Paternoster, R. yyn 0 aw Paternoster (1989a)
Paternoster, R. yyn +2 ah Paternoster (1989b)
Saffer, H.; Chaloupka, F. ynn −2 tr Saffer and Chaloupka (1989)
Snortum, J.; Berger, D. ynn −1 tr Snortum and Berger (1989)
Stalans, L. et al. nyn −1 aw Stalans et al. (1989)
Trumbull, W. yyy −2 tr Trumbull (1989)
Zador, P. et al. ynn −1 ah Zador et al. (1989)
Alm, J. et al. nyn 0 tr Alm et al. (1990a)
Alm, J. et al. nyn +2 tr Alm et al. (1990b)
Bailey, W. nny +1 aw Bailey (1990)
Bursik, R. et al. nyn +2 aw Bursik et al. (1990)
Caudill, B. et al. ynn +1 tr Caudill et al. (1990)
Chressanthis, G.; Grimes, P. nyy −2 tr Chressanthis and Grimes (1990)
Clark, D.; Cosgrove, J. nny +1 tr Clark and Cosgrove (1990)
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Cloninger, D. yyn −2 tr Cloninger (1990)
Corman, H.; Joyce, T. nyy 0 aw Corman and Joyce (1990)
Decker, S.; Kohfeld, C. nyn −1 tr Decker and Kohfeld (1990a)
Decker, S.; Kohfeld, C. nny +1 ah Decker and Kohfeld (1990b)
Field, S. yyy 0 tr Field (1990)
Gartner, R. nny −1 ah Gartner (1990)
Gibbs, J.; Firebaugh, G. yyy −1 aw Gibbs and Firebaugh (1990)
Grasmick, H.; Bursik, R. yyn −1 aw Grasmick and Bursik (1990)
Grogger, J. nny +2 tr Grogger (1990)
Jarrell, S.; Howsen, R. nyy −1 aw Jarrell and Howsen (1990)
Karstedt-Henke, S. nyy −1 aw Karstedt-Henke (1991)
Legge, J. ynn −1 aw Legge (1990)
Magat, W.; Viscusi, W. yyn −2 tr Magat and Viscusi (1990)
Mikesell, J.; Pirog-Good, M. nyn +1 tr Mikesell and Pirog-Good (1990)
Ross, L.; Voas, R. ynn −1 kr Ross and Voas (1990)
Ross, L. et al. ynn +2 tr Ross et al. (1990)
Schumann, K.; Kaulitzki, R. yyy +1 aw Schumann and Kaulitzki (1991)
Soper, J.; Thompson, L. ynn +2 tr Soper and Thompson (1990)
Stack, S. nny −1 ah Stack (1990)
Vire´n, M. nyn −2 tr Vire´n (1990)
Bailey, W. nyy +2 aw Bailey (1991)
Braithwaite, J.; Makkai, T. yyn +1 tr Braithwaite and Makkai (1991)
Cappell, C.; Sykes, G. nyy +1 ah Cappell and Sykes (1991)
Collins, J.; Plumlee, R. nyn +2 aw Collins and Plumlee (1991)
Evans, W. et al. ynn +1 tr Evans et al. (1991)
Furlong, W. nyn −2 tr Furlong (1991)
Laycock, G. nyn −2 tr Laycock (1991)
Mann, R. et al. ynn 0 tr Mann et al. (1991)
Nagin, D.; Paternoster, R. yyn −1 ah Nagin and Paternoster (1991)
Peterson, R.; Bailey, W. nny +1 ah Peterson and Bailey (1991)
Thurman, Q. nyn +2 tr Thurman (1991)
Alm, J. et al. nyn 0 tr Alm et al. (1992a)
Alm, J. et al. nyn −2 tr Alm et al. (1992b)
Benson, B. et al. nyn −2 tr Benson et al. (1992)
Bunn, D. et al. yyn +2 tr Bunn et al. (1992)
Chamlin, M. et al. nyn +1 ah Chamlin et al. (1992)
Cloninger, D. yyy −2 tr Cloninger (1992)
Erard, B. nyn +2 tr Erard (1992)
Hessing, D. et al. nyn +2 ah Hessing et al. (1992)
McDowall, D. et al. nyy 0 ah McDowall et al. (1992)
Meier, K. nyy +2 ah Meier (1992)
Pate, A.; Hamilton, E. nny +2 aw Pate and Hamilton (1992)
Sheffrin, S.; Triest, R. nyn −2 tr Sheffrin and Triest (1992)
Smith, K. nyn −2 tr Smith (1992)
Steenbergen, M. et al. nyn +2 tr Steenbergen et al. (1992)
van Tulder, F. yyy −1 ah van Tulder (1992)
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Ward, S. et al. nny −1 aw Ward et al. (1992)
Williams, K. nny −2 mw Williams (1992)
Burkett, S.; Ward, D. ynn −1 aw Burkett and Ward (1993)
Chaloupka, F. et al. ynn −1 tr Chaloupka et al. (1993)
Cheatwood, D. nny +2 aw Cheatwood (1993)
Ensor, T.; Godfrey, C. yyy 0 tr Ensor and Godfrey (1993)
Kenkel, D. ynn −2 tr Kenkel (1993)
Koskela, E.; Vire´n, M. nyn −2 tr Koskela and Vire´n (1993)
Neustrom, M.; Norton, W. ynn −2 tr Neustrom and Norton (1993)
Rasmussen, D. et al. nny −2 tr Rasmussen et al. (1993)
Rhee, L.; Zhang, J. ynn −1 aw Rhee and Zhang (1993)
Yu, J.; Liska, A. nyy −1 kr Yu and Liska (1993)
Bailey, W.; Peterson, R. nny +2 ah Bailey and Peterson (1994)
Cloninger, D. nyy −1 tr Cloninger (1994)
Cochran, J. et al. nny +2 ah Cochran et al. (1994)
Cornwell, C.; Trumbull, W. yyy 0 tr Cornwell and Trumbull (1994)
Denq, F. et al. yyy +1 aw Denq et al. (1994)
Eide, E. et al. yyy −2 tr Eide et al. (1994)
Homel, R. ynn −1 ah Homel (1994)
Jensen, E.; Metsger, L. nyy −1 kr Jensen and Metsger (1994)
Koskela, E.; Vire´n, M. nyn −2 tr Koskela and Vire´n (1994)
Legge, J.; Park, J. ynn +2 kr Legge and Park (1994)
Marvell, T.; Moody, C. yyy +2 tr Marvell and Moody (1994)
Mullahy, J.; Sindelar, J. ynn −2 tr Mullahy and Sindelar (1994)
Paternoster, R.; Nagin, D. yyy −1 aw Paternoster and Nagin (1994)
Niskanen, W. nyy +2 aw Niskanen (1994)
Petee, T. et al. yyn −1 kr Petee et al. (1994)
Pyle, D.; Deadman, D. nyn −2 tr Pyle and Deadman (1994)
Rogers, P.; Schoenig, S. ynn −1 tr Rogers and Schoenig (1994)
Sloan, F.; Githens, P. ynn −2 tr Sloan and Githens (1994)
Sloan, F. et al. yny −1 tr Sloan et al. (1994)
Sollars, D. et al. yyn +1 aw Sollars et al. (1994)
Tauchen, H. et al. yyy −2 tr Tauchen et al. (1994)
Vire´n, M. yyn −2 tr Vire´n (1994)
Wieczorek, W. et al. ynn +1 aw Wieczorek et al. (1994)
Anderson, E.; Talley, W. nyn +1 tr Anderson and Talley (1995)
Andreoni, J. yyy +2 tr Andreoni (1995)
Brumm, H.; Cloninger, D. nny −2 tr Brumm and Cloninger (1995a)
Brumm, H.; Cloninger, D. nyy −2 tr Brumm and Cloninger (1995b)
Elis, L.; Simpson, S. ynn +1 aw Elis and Simpson (1995)
Gertz, M.; Gould, L. yyy −1 ah Gertz and Gould (1995)
Hull, B.; Bold, F. yyy +2 mw Hull and Bold (1995)
Johnson, D.; Fell, J. ynn −2 tr Johnson and Fell (1995)
Masih, R. nyn +1 tr Masih (1995)
McDowall, D. et al. nny +2 ah McDowall et al. (1995)
Meera, A.; Jayakumar, M. yyy −1 tr Meera and Jayakumar (1995)
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Parker, R. nny +2 aw Parker (1995)
Ross, L.; Klette, H. ynn +2 tr Ross and Klette (1995)
Sherman, L.; Rogan, D. yyy −1 aw Sherman and Rogan (1995)
Sloan, F. et al. ynn +2 ah Sloan et al. (1995)
Wong, Y. yyy 0 tr Wong (1995)
Allen, R. nyn +1 tr Allen (1996)
Anderson, E.; Diaz, J. yyy −1 tr Anderson and Diaz (1996)
Brumm, H.; Cloninger, D. nny −1 ah Brumm and Cloninger (1996)
Deshapriya, E.; Iwase, N. ynn −1 tr Deshapriya and Iwase (1996)
Entorf, H. yyy +1 tr Entorf (1996)
Hingson, R. et al. ynn −1 aw Hingson et al. (1996)
Hsing, B. ynn −1 aw Hsing (1996)
Levitt, S. nyy −1 tr Levitt (1996)
Mann, R. et al. ynn +2 tr Mann et al. (1996)
Marvell, T.; Moody, C. nyy −1 aw Marvell and Moody (1996)
Mixon, F.; Mixon, D. nyn +1 tr Mixon and Mixon (1996)
Paternoster, R.; Simpson, S. nyn +1 ah Paternoster and Simpson (1996)
Pommerehne, W.; Weck-Hannemann, H. nyn +1 ah Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996)
Reilly, B.; Witt, R. nyn −1 tr Reilly and Witt (1996)
Ruhm, C. ynn +2 tr Ruhm (1996)
Berger, D.; Marelich, W. ynn −2 tr Berger and Marelich (1997)
Bodman, P.; Maultby, C. nyn −2 tr Bodman and Maultby (1997)
Bosco, L.; Mittone, L. nyn +2 tr Bosco and Mittone (1997)
Foglia, W. yyy −1 aw Foglia (1997)
Goodman, D. nyy −2 tr Goodman (1997)
Grau, M.; Groves, T. nyn 0 tr Grau and Groves (1997)
Johnson, J.; Lesniak-Karpiak, K. nyn −1 aw Johnson and Lesniak-Karpiak (1997)
Kaplan, H.; Damphousse, K. nyn +1 aw Kaplan and Damphousse (1997)
Koskela, E.; Vire´n, M. nyn −2 tr Koskela and Vire´n (1997)
Levitt, S. nyy −1 tr Levitt (1997b)
Lott, J.; Mustard, D. nyy −1 tr Lott and Mustard (1997)
Marselli, R.; Vannini, M. nyy −1 tr Marselli and Vannini (1997)
Marvell, T.; Moody, C. nyy −1 aw Marvell and Moody (1997)
McGeorge, J.; Aitken, C. ynn +2 tr McGeorge and Aitken (1997)
Merrifield, J. nyn −2 tr Merrifield (1997)
Mui, H.; Ali, M. ynn 0 tr Mui and Ali (1997)
Olson, D. nyy −1 aw Olson (1997)
Raftery, A. et al. yyy 0 tr Raftery et al. (1997)
Sirakaya, E.; Uysal, M. ynn +1 tr Sirakaya and Uysal (1997)
Thomson, E. nyn +2 aw Thomson (1997)
Voas, R. et al. ynn 0 tr Voas et al. (1997)
Zhang, J. nyn +1 tr Zhang (1997)
Ayres, I.; Levitt, S. nyy −2 tr Ayres and Levitt (1998)
Bailey, W. nny +1 ah Bailey (1998)
Balbo, M.; Posadas, J. yyy 0 tr Balbo and Posadas (1998)
Baron, S.; Kennedy, L. nyy 0 aw Baron and Kennedy (1998)
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Benson, B. et al. yyy −2 tr Benson et al. (1998)
Black, D.; Nagin, D. nyy +1 aw Black and Nagin (1998)
Borack, J. ynn −2 tr Borack (1998)
Bronars, S.; Lott, J. nyy −1 ah Bronars and Lott (1998)
Chambouleyron, A.; Willington, M. ynn −2 tr Chambouleyron and Willington (1998)
Dezhbakhsh, H.; Rubin, P. nyy +1 tr Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (1998)
DiPasquale, D.; Glaeser, E. ynn −1 tr DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998)
Entorf, H.; Spengler, H. yyy −2 tr Entorf and Spengler (2000)
Fajnzylber, P. et al. nyy −2 tr Fajnzylber et al. (1998)
Fishman, G. et al. nyn −2 aw Fishman et al. (1998)
Foss, R. et al. ynn +2 tr Foss et al. (1998)
Goel, R.; Nelson, M. ynn 0 tr Goel and Nelson (1998)
Hale, C. nyn −1 ah Hale (1998)
Kuperan, K.; Sutinen, J. ynn +1 ah Kuperan and Sutinen (1998)
Levitt, S. nyy −2 tr Levitt (1998a)
Levitt, S. nyy −1 tr Levitt (1998c)
Lott, J. nyy −2 tr Lott (1998)
Ludwig, J. nny +2 tr Ludwig (1998)
Piquero, A.; Paternoster, R. ynn +1 ah Piquero and Paternoster (1998)
Sigman, H. nyn −1 tr Sigman (1998)
Taxman, F.; Piquero, A. ynn +2 tr Taxman and Piquero (1998)
Vingilis, E. et al. ynn +1 tr Vingilis et al. (1988)
Witt, R. et al. nyn +1 tr Witt et al. (1998)
Becsi, Z. yyy −2 tr Becsi (1999)
Benson, B. et al. ynn −1 aw Benson et al. (1999)
Cherry, T. nyy 0 tr Cherry (1999)
Cochran, J. et al. yyn +1 ah Cochran et al. (1999)
Curti, H. nyy −1 tr Curti (1999)
Doyle, J. et al. nyy −1 tr Doyle et al. (1999)
Ehrlich, I.; Zhiqiang, L. nyy −2 tr Ehrlich and Zhiqiang (1999)
Farrelly, M. et al. ynn 0 tr Farrelly et al. (1999)
Gawande, K.; Wheeler, T. yyn −2 tr Gawande and Wheeler (1999)
Gius, M. nyy +2 tr Gius (1999)
Grosvenor, D. et al. ynn +1 tr Grosvenor et al. (1999)
Hale, C. nyn +1 tr Hale (1999)
Hatcher, A. et al. ynn −2 tr Hatcher et al. (1999)
Curti, H. yyn −2 tr Curti (1984)
Kessler, D.; Levitt, S. nyy −1 tr Kessler and Levitt (1998)
Lynch, M. yyy +2 aw Lynch (1999)
MacDonald, J. yny 0 tr MacDonald (1999)
Mehay, S.; Pacula, R. ynn 0 tr Mehay and Pacula (1999)
Mocan, H.; Rees, D. yyy −1 tr Mocan and Rees (2005)
Olson, M. nyn −1 aw Olson (1999)
Papps, K.; Winkelmann, R. yyy +2 tr Papps and Winkelmann (1999)
Parker, J.; Atkins, R. nyn +2 tr Parker and Atkins (1999)
Ralston, R. nyn 0 tr Ralston (1999)
B.2 Included Studies 249
. . . last page of table B.5 continued
Authors CT O U Source
Retting, R. et al. ynn −2 tr Retting et al. (1999)
Sorensen, J. et al. nny +2 aw Sorensen et al. (1999)
Spencer, D. yyy 0 aw Spencer (1999)
Thomson, E. nny +2 aw Thomson (1999)
Tibbetts, S. nyn +1 aw Tibbetts (1999)
van Tulder, F.; van der Torre, A. yyy −1 tr van Tulder and van der Torre (1999)
Vinod, H. ynn −2 tr Vinod (1999)
Witt, R. et al. yyn +1 aw Witt et al. (1999)
Benson, B. et al. ynn −1 tr Benson et al. (2000)
Cerro, A.; Meloni, O. yyy −2 tr Cerro and Meloni (2000)
Cochran, J.; Chamlin, M. nny +2 ah Cochran and Chamlin (2000)
Corman, H.; Mocan, H. nyy −2 tr Corman and Mocan (2000)
Deadman, D.; Pyle, D. nyn −2 tr Deadman and Pyle (2000)
Diez-Ticio, A. nyn −2 tr Diez-Ticio (2000)
Fajnzylber, P. et al. nyy 0 tr Fajnzylber et al. (2000)
Fehr, E.; Ga¨chter, S. ynn −2 tr Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000)
Charmichael, F.; Ward, R. yyy +1 tr Carmichael and Ward (2000)
Giacopassi, D.; Forde, D. nny +1 aw Giacopassi and Forde (2000)
Gneezy, U.; Rustichini, A. ynn +2 tr Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
Kelly, M. nyy 0 tr Kelly (2000)
Mast, B. et al. ynn 0 tr Mast et al. (2000)
Pudney, S. et al. nyn −2 tr Pudney et al. (2000a)
Pudney, S. et al. nyn −1 tr Pudney et al. (2000b)
Resignato, A. nyy −2 tr Resignato (2000)
Spelman, W. yyy −1 tr Spelman (2000)
Stolzenberg, L.; D’Alessio, S. yyy 0 mw Stolzenberg and D’Alessio (2000)
Stout, E. et al. ynn 0 tr Stout et al. (2000)
Weber, J.; Crew, R. nyn −1 tr Weber and Crew (2000)
Whetten-Goldstein, K. et al ynn +1 tr Whetten-Goldstein et al. (2000)
Witt, R.; Witte, A. yyy −1 tr Witt and Witte (2000)
Yu, J. ynn +1 tr Yu (2000)
Bar-Ilan, A.; Sacerdote, B. ynn −2 tr Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2001)
Benson, B. et al. nyy +1 tr Benson et al. (2001)
Benson, B.; Mast, B. nyy +1 aw Benson and Mast (2001)
Braga, A. et al. nny −1 aw Braga et al. (2001)
Cherry, T. yyy −2 tr Cherry (2001)
Cloninger, D.; Marchesini, R. nyy −2 tr Cloninger and Marchesini (2001)
Cummings, R. et al. nyn +1 aw Cummings et al. (2001)
DeSimone, J. nyy −2 tr DeSimone (2001)
Dezhbakhsh, H. et al. nny −2 tr Dezhbakhsh et al. (2001)
Ferna´ndez, C. et al. yyy 0 tr Ferna´ndez et al. (2001a)
Gunnison, E. nyy +2 aw Gunnison (2002)
Shachmurove, Y. et al. nyn −2 tr Shachmurove et al. (2001)
Kelling, G.; Sousa, W. nyy 0 tr Kelling and Sousa (2001)
Kenkel, D.; Koch, S. ynn +2 tr Kenkel and Koch (2001)
Levitt, S. nyy 0 tr Levitt (2001)
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Authors CT O U Source
Levitt, S.; Lochner, L. yyy −1 tr Levitt and Lochner (2001)
Levitt, S.; Porter, J. ynn 0 tr Levitt and Porter (2001)
Liang, F. et al. yyy 0 tr Liang et al. (2001)
Lochner, L. yyn −2 tr Lochner (2001)
Lott, J.; Whitley, J. nyy −2 ah Lott and Whitley (2001)
Luiz, J. yyy +2 ah Luiz (2001)
Marvell, T.; Moody, C. nyy +2 aw Marvell and Moody (2001)
McGarrell, E. et al. nyy +1 ah McGarrell et al. (2001)
Miron, J. nny +2 ah Miron (2001)
Nagin, D.; Pogarsky, G. ynn −1 aw Nagin and Pogarsky (2001)
Olson, D.; Maltz, M. nny −1 ah Olson and Maltz (2001)
Parsley, J. nyy −2 tr Parsley (2001)
Plassmann, F.; Tideman, N. nyy +1 ah Plassmann and Tideman (2001)
Winter-Ebmer, R.; Raphael, S. nyy −1 ah Winter-Ebmer and Raphael (2001)
Scribner, R.; Cohen, D. ynn −1 aw Scribner and Cohen (2001)
Slemrod, J. et al. nyn +2 aw Slemrod et al. (2001)
Sullivan, K. et al. ynn +2 tr Sullivan et al. (2001)
Vire´n, M. nyn −2 tr Vire´n (2001)
Yunker, J. nny +2 aw Yunker (2001)
Allen, W. ynn 0 tr Allen (2002)
Andrienko, Y. nyy −2 tr Andrienko (2002)
Cherry, T.; List, J. nyy 0 tr Cherry and List (2002)
Cook, P.; Ludwig, J. nyn 0 tr Cook and Ludwig (2002)
Corman, H.; Mocan, H. nyy −2 tr Corman and Mocan (2002)
DeFina, R.; Arvanites, T. nyy 0 aw DeFina and Arvanites (2002)
Entorf, H.; Spengler, H. nyn −2 tr Entorf and Spengler (2002)
Entorf, H.; Winker, P. yyy +1 tr Entorf and Winker (2002)
Fajnzylber, P. et al. nyy 0 tr Fajnzylber et al. (2002a)
Fajnzylber, P. et al. nyy −1 tr Fajnzylber et al. (2002b)
Frey, B.; Feld, L. nyn 0 tr Frey and Feld (2002)
Weinberg, B. et al. yyy 0 tr Weinberg et al. (2002)
Grasmick, H.; Kobayashi, E. ynn +1 ah Grasmick and Kobayashi (2002)
Hansen, K.; Machin, S. yyy +1 tr Hansen and Machin (2002)
Kaminski, R.; Marvell, T. nny +2 aw Kaminski and Marvell (2002)
Kovandzic, T.; Sloan, J. nyy 0 aw Kovandzic and Sloan (2002)
Leung, A. nyy +1 tr Leung (2002)
Levitt, S. ynn 0 tr Levitt (2002a)
Levitt, S. nyy −2 tr Levitt (2002b)
Mann, R. et al. ynn −1 tr Mann et al. (2002)
McCrary, J. nyy −1 tr McCrary (2002)
Pfeiffer, M.; Gelau, C. ynn −1 aw Pfeiffer and Gelau (2002)
Piquero, A.; Pogarsky, G. ynn −1 ah Piquero and Pogarsky (2002)
Pogarsky, G. ynn −1 aw Pogarsky (2002)
Shepherd, J. nyy −1 aw Shepherd (2002a)
Shepherd, J. nyy +1 ah Shepherd (2002b)
Stafford, S. ynn −1 tr Stafford (2002)
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Authors CT O U Source
West, A. nny +2 ah West (2002)
Williams, J.; Sickles, R. nyn −1 tr Williams and Sickles (2002)
Anderson, L.; Stafford, S. ynn −2 tr Anderson and Stafford (2003)
Brezina, T.; Piquero, A. ynn +1 ah Brezina and Piquero (2003)
Buonanno, P. yyy −1 tr Buonanno (2003)
Deadman, D. nyn −2 tr Deadman (2003)
DeSimone, J.; Farrelly, M. ynn −2 tr DeSimone and Farrelly (2003)
Dezhbakhsh, H.; Shepherd, J. nyy 0 tr Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2003)
Elffers, H. et al. nyn −1 aw Elffers et al. (2003)
Entorf, H. nyy 0 tr Entorf (2003)
Funk, P.; Kugler, P. nyn −2 tr Funk and Kugler (2003a)
Funk, P.; Kugler, P. nyn −1 tr Funk and Kugler (2003b)
Gainey, R.; Payne, B. ynn 0 aw Gainey and Payne (2003)
Heckelman, J.; Yates, A. ynn +2 tr Heckelman and Yates (2003)
Ihlanfeldt, K. nyy 0 tr Ihlanfeldt (2003)
Katz, L. et al. nyy 0 ah Katz et al. (2003)
Kovandzic, T.; Marvell nyy +2 ah Kovandzic and Marvell (2003)
Lochner, L. yyy −1 tr Lochner (2003)
Mann, R. et al. ynn −1 tr Mann et al. (2003)
Mauser, G.; Maki, D. nyn −1 tr Mauser and Maki (2003)
Mocan, H.; Gittings, K. nny +1 aw Mocan and Gittings (2003)
Mustard, D. nyy −1 tr Mustard (2003)
Nagin, D.; Pogarsky, G. nyn −1 aw Nagin and Pogarsky (2003)
Neumayer, E. nny +2 ah Neumayer (2003)
Park, C.; Hyun, J. nyn −2 tr Park and Hyun (2003)
Richardson, L.; Houston, D. ynn +2 tr Richardson (2003)
Ritsema, C. et al. nyn +1 tr Ritsema et al. (2003)
Sridharan, S. et al. nyy +1 tr Sridharan et al. (2003)
Tao, H. nyn −1 tr Tao (2004)
Tittle, C. et al. yyy +1 kr Tittle et al. (2003)
Baker, T. et al. ynn −1 ah Baker et al. (2004)
Bar-Ilan, A.; Sacerdote, B. ynn −1 aw Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004)
Carmichael, S.; Piquero, A. nny 0 aw Carmichael and Piquero (2004)
Denny, K. et al. nyn −2 tr Denny et al. (2004)
Dittrich, M.; Markwardt, G. yyy −2 tr Dittrich and Markwardt (2004)
Earnhart, D. nyn −1 aw Earnhart (2004a)
Earnhart, D. nyn −2 tr Earnhart (2004b)
Feld, L.; Frey, B. nyn −1 tr Feld and Frey (2004)
Fischer, J. yyy 0 tr Fischer (2004)
Fortin, B. et al. nyn −2 tr Fortin et al. (2004)
French, M. et al. ynn −1 aw French et al. (2004)
Grxhani, K.; Schram, A. nyn 0 tr Ge¨rxhani and Schram (2006)
Kovandzic, T. et al. nyy +2 aw Kovandzic et al. (2004)
Zhiqiang, L. nny −2 tr Zhiqiang (2004)
Lochner, L. nyn −2 tr Lochner (2004)
Machin, S.; Meghir, C. nyn −2 tr Machin and Meghir (2004)
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Mendes, S. nyn −2 aw Mendes (2004)
Nilsson, A. nyy 0 tr Nilsson (2004)
Nott, D.; Green, P. yyy 0 tr Nott and Green (2004)
Pogarsky, G. ynn 0 aw Pogarsky (2004)
Pogarsky, G.; Piquero, A. ynn +2 ah Pogarsky and Piquero (2004)
Shepherd, J. nny −2 tr Shepherd (2004)
Soares, R. nyy 0 tr Soares (2004)
Spengler, H. yyy −1 tr Spengler (2004)
Stolzenberg, L.; D’Alessio, S. nny +1 aw Stolzenberg and D’Alessio (2004)
Wenzel, M. nyn −1 aw Wenzel (2004)
Worrall, J.; Pratt, T. nyy 0 aw Worrall and Pratt (2004)
Wright, B. et al. nyy −1 ah Wright et al. (2004)
Zimmerman, P. nny −1 tr Zimmerman (2004)
Carmichael, S. et al. yyn −1 ah Carmichael et al. (2005)
Donohue, J.; Wolfers, J. nny 0 tr Donohue and Wolfers (2005)
Dugan, L. et al. ynn −1 aw Dugan et al. (2005)
Entorf, H.; Spengler, H. nyy +1 tr Entorf and Spengler (2005)
Gawande, K.; Bohara, A. nyn +2 aw Gawande and Bohara (2005)
Klick, J.; Tabarrok, A. nyy −1 ah Klick and Tabarrok (2005)
May, P. ynn +1 ah May (2005)
McCarthy, B.; Hagan, J. yyy +1 ah McCarthy and Hagan (2005)
Mocan, H.; Bali, T. nyy −2 tr Mocan and Bali (2005)
Moffett, M. et al. nyn −2 ah Moffett et al. (2005)
Papachristos, A. et al. nny +1 ah Papachristos et al. (2005)
Shepard, E.; Blackley, P. nyy −1 ah Shepard and Blackley (2005)
Shimshack, J.; Ward, M. nyn +1 aw Shimshack and Ward (2005)
Tay, R. ynn −1 aw Tay (2005a)
Tay, R. ynn −1 aw Tay (2005b)
Thornton, D. et al. ynn +2 aw Thornton et al. (2005)
Tittle, C.; Botchkovar, E. yyy +2 aw Tittle and Botchkovar (2005)
Wagenaar, A. et al. ynn −1 ah Wagenaar et al. (2005)
Welch, M. et al. nyn −1 ah Welch et al. (2005)
Wilson, D. ynn −1 ah Wilson (2005)
Wilson, J.; Sheffrin, S. nyn +1 aw Wilson and Sheffrin (2005)
Witt, R. ynn −2 tr Witt (2005)
Antia, K. et al. ynn −1 aw Antia et al. (2006)
Friedman, S. et al. ynn +2 ah Friedman et al. (2006)
Harcourt, B.; Ludwig, J. nyy +1 ah Harcourt and Ludwig (2006)
Kim, K. et al. ynn +2 aw Kim et al. (2006)
Matsueda, R. et al. nyy −1 ah Matsueda et al. (2006)
The Authors-column contains the first and second name of the authors. CT reports the studied type of crime
(violent- property- or other; y=yes, n=no). The third column (O) ranges from -2 (strong agreement) to +2 (strong
disagreement of the deterrence hypothesis); see subsection 3.3.3. The U-column refers to the user who entered
the study into the data base while the last column displays the reference and year of publication.
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